PROBLEM OF ISIS'S QUR'ANIC INTERPRETATIONS AND CLAIM OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SHARIA LAW

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the problem of ISIS's Qur'anic interpretations regarding the implementation of sharia law and the concept of jihad. It is essential to address this topic because the self-proclaimed Caliphate have claimed that their barbaric actions such as indiscriminate killing of civilians, plundering, and declaring other Muslims as apostates are based on Qur'anic verses. They also consider these actions as part of the jihad to uphold sharia law. This paper argues that there are two main problems in ISIS's Qur'anic interpretations, namely (1) cherry picking Qur'anic verses that support their causes. According to the principles of Qur'anic exegesis (*ushul al-tafsīr*), this method of interpretation is certainly not justified because it will lead to the partial understanding of the message of the Qur'an; (2) attempting to enforce the sharia law without proper understanding of the law. As a result, ISIS's implementation of sharia goes against the ultimate purposes of the sharia (*maqāsid al-sharī'ah*).

Keywords

ISIS;
Qur'anic
interpretations;
Implementation of
sharia law;
Maqāsid al-sharī'ah.

INTRODUCTION

On one occasion members of Khawarij confronted Ali, the great Companion of the Prophet, the Khawarij said, "Tell us, do you think it is 'just' to give men authority in matters of blood?" 'Ali replied, "We have not given men authority; we have made the Qur'an the authority. But this Qur'an is merely a scripture placed between two covers. It does not speak; it is merely men who speak through it" (Mattson, 2008: 264).

Based on their poor understanding of Qur'anic messages, the Khawarij accused Ali of being injustice for he allowed human being to make decision on matters relating to other human blood, however, the historical record proof otherwise; it was precisely the Khawarijs who became an extremist splinter that justified killing other Muslims who did not share

their opinions. Whereas Ali has been remembered as the caliph who followed the true message of the Qur'an by promoting deliberation (*syura*) in order to bring about peace and eventually murdered by a Khawarij assassin.

This paper will discuss one of the modern extremist organizations that often called neo-khawarij by scholars. The violent movement started in 2014 when a leader of an Iraqi militia, Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, declared himself as the first caliph of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Syiria (ISIL/ISIS) or the Islamic State (IS). Ever since, ISIS has been considered as the the most radical and extreme movement in the name of Islam. Under the pretext of enforcing shara law, they killed, looted and conquered their surrounding regions. They do not hesitate to label other Muslims who do not want to join their movement as apostate. Once other Muslims are apostate, according to ISIS, it is permissible to kill them and take their wealth (Assad, 2014: 126-128). The discussion will focus on the ISIS's interpretation of Qur'anic verses and how the mainstream Muslim scholars understand those verses.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Brief History of ISIS

ISIS's name reflects its formative history. The formation of this so-called Caliphate was the result of the influx of many foreign fighters to Iraq and Syiria who eventually united under the ideological framework of Jihadi Salafism. The ISIS movement began with the establishment of "*Jamaah Tauhid and Jihad*" in Iraq in 2004 led by Abu Mush'ab Zarqawy. Zarqawi pledged allegiance to the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, making his army an official representative of Al Qaeda in Iraq. When the United States invaded Iraq, Zarqawi's force was one of the most aggressive resistance fighters. This caused many Iraqi fighters to join Zarqawi's forces despite having different ideology. The desire to win the war caused them to join forces in opposing American occupation of the Iraqi people. Zarqawi's influence grew stronger among the Iraqi fighters and the number of his troops grew significantly (Gabil, 2006: 44 and Figueira, 2011: 57).

However, Az-Zarqawi was killed by US Military attack in mid-2006, and the *Daulah Islamiyah's* leadership turned to Abu Hamza al-Mohajir. Four years later, on April 19, 2010, US troops in Iraq managed to kill Abu Hamza al-Mohajir, his successor was Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi. On April 9, 2013, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi stated that *Jabhah Nushra* (Victory Front), one of the rebel factions in Syria was part of the military force of the Islamic State of Iraq. The declaration marked the beginning of *DAES* (*Daulah al-Islamiyyah fi Iraq wa al-Sham*), foreign media then popularize their English name, ISIS. ISIS made the city of Raqqa as their main stronghold and commanding base in Syria. Their main strategy of ISIS apart from committing various terror actions in Syria, is to spread sectarian propaganda. In their propaganda, ISIS portray their war in Syiria as a Sunni revolutionary struggle against the Bassar Assad's oppressive Shi'ite regime. The propaganda turned out to be quite successful in attracting foreign fighters (Assad, 2014: 67-68).

In January 2014, ISIS turned their attention to Iraq and lunch massive and well-organized attacks. They succeeded in conquering many cities such as: Falujjah, Anbar, Ramadi, Mosul, and Tikrit. With this success, ISIS finally declare their movement as caliphate with Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi as the first caliph. ISIS territory is divided into 16 regions, 7 of which in Iraq including Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Saladin, Ninawa and Babil and the other 9 situated within Syrian territory such as al-Barakah, al-Khaeir, Raqqa, an-Nadia, Halab, Idlib Latakia and Damascus (Assad, 2014: 71).

ISIS and Western Intelligent Agencies

It has been argued that several intelligent agencies of Western countries played important role in the creation of ISIS. Edward Snowden, a former employee of the United States National Security Agency (NSA), stated that there are three countries that were involved in the creation of this extremist group. According to him, the intelligent agencies of the British, the US, and Israel have been working together to create the ISIS caliphate. This procedure of creating a proxy power with extreme religious ideology had been done before by the US during the Cold War.

According to Snowden, the intelligence services from these countries formed a terrorist organization to attract all militant extremists from all around the world. This is what they call the "honeycomb" tactic. The tactic was to make a violent movement in the name of Islam using Islamic slogans that in reality serves the interests of the Zionists. Moreover, the existence of ISIS has been further destabilized the Middle East. In fact, al-Baghdadi had received full-year military training from Mossad, as well as getting courses in theology and rhetoric from the Zionist intelligence agency (Assad, 2014: 37).

ISIS in Indonesia

In the mid August 2014, Indonesian people was shocked by a bomb threat that targeted the Borobudur Temple in Magelang, Central Java. The threat came from a group calling themselves "The supporters of ISIS in Indonesia" who posted the threat on their Facebook fanpage, called "we are Islamic State". The group also called for the destruction of various temples in Indonesia (Mashuri, 2014: 92). Although it did not happen, terror threat from ISIS affiliated groups have been the main concern of Indonesian government and its people, because such threat shows that the influence of ISIS propaganda among Indonesian citizen is real. Some of those affiliates with ISIS are mere sympathizers and supporters, some of them pledge allegiance to ISIS and there are those who have truly become 'fighters' (Mashuri, 2014: 92).

In Malang a number of young men wearing t-shirts with ISIS symbols to express their sympathy and support to the so-called Islamic state. In July 2014, there was also a group of people who gathered in a Mosque declaring their allegiance to al-Baghdadi both in Arabic and Bahasa Indonesia. The group that called themselves *Anshor al-Khilafah* (The Supporters of the Caliphate) was led by a man named Muhammad Romly. Mr. Romly told the media that they support ISIS's caliphate because the caliphate would be able to rebuild a better Islamic civilization. A number of media outlets reported the existence of ISIS

loyalist groups in major cities including Ciputat (Tangerang and Banten), Jakarta, Solo and Bima (Mashuri, 2014: 94).

In addition, a group of young Indonesians appeared in the video released by ISIS. In the eight-minute-long video, the leader of the group, a man who called himself Abu Muhammad al-Indonesi, called on Indonesians to join ISIS. In the video entitled 'let's join', he enthusiastically asked Indonesian people to support ISIS's struggle and migrate to ISIS territory. "Let's try our best, both physically and materially to move to this Islamic state." "This is an obligation ordered by Allah."

Commenting on Abu Muhammad al-Indonesia's video, Greg Barton, a security expert and an Indonesianist from Monash University, stated that ISIS is currently targeting Indonesia as the home of the largest Muslim population in the world. "Isis is directly targeting Indonesian citizens in this video because they are potential supporters". The existence of ISIS supporters among Indonesian who migrate to ISIS territory is confirmed when the chief of Indonesian Police Force, General Sutarman announced that in mid-August 2014, approximately 54 Indonesian citizens had joined ISIS. Five of them were killed including a suicide bomber.

These facts demonstrated the effectivity of ISIS propaganda in influencing and recruiting Indonesian Muslim. Indonesian officials as well as leaders of religious organizations have reacted to the threat. The Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Djoko Suyanto said that ISIS does not represent any religion, but rather an ideology that diametrically opposes the Pancasila. Therefore, according to Mr. Suyanto, Indonesian government will never allow ISIS to spread their ideology in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the Minister of Religious Affair of the Republic of Indonesia, Lukman Hakim Saifuddin and leaders of faith-based non-government organizations along with the leaders of Indonesian Ulema (MUI) Council issued a public statement warning Indonesian Muslims, especially the young Muslims to be careful of any radical movements hijacking the name of Islam.

MUI chairmen, Din Syamsuddin stated that ISIS is a radical movement in the name of Islam in Iraq and Syria. Din Syamsuddin argued that a caliphate should represent the core value of Islam, namely Islam as the blessing to the universe (rahmatan lil alamin), meanwhile Abu Bakr al-Baghadadi's so-called caliphate have coerced and murdered many innocent people, they have destroyed sites that were considered sacred by Muslims. Syamsuddin also pointed out that ISIS is actively undermine existing Muslim states that were established as the result of Muslims' struggle against colonialism (Mashuri, 2014: 101-103).

The leaders Islamic organizations such as the Indonesia Mosque Council,GP Ansar, Nahdhatul Ulama, and Muhammadiyah explicitly rejected ISIS's caliphate. They emphasized that al-Baghdadi and his caliphate had nothing to do with Islam. The Imam of Istiqlal Mosque, K.H Ali Mustafa Ya'qub was especially concerned with younger generation of Indonesian Muslims for they are the easy prey of ISIS recruiters and propagandist (Mashuri, 2014: 101-103).

Ideological Interpretation of ISIS

Muhammad Haidar Assad described ISIS the representation of Kharijite ideology in this century, a Neo-Khawarij movement. Harun Nasution had pointed out that even though the Khawarij had been destroyed institutionally, their extremist approach to understand and implement Islamic teachings is still adopted and practiced by some groups. ISIS is certainly one of those groups. One of the stark similarities between the old Khawarij and ISIS is their *takfiri* ideology. Both groups consider other Muslims who do not share their views as apostate and kill them without hesitation (Assad, 2014: 119).

In addition, Haidar Assad also pointed out other similarities between the two; firstly, both claim that the aim of their violent actions is to bring about peace; secondly, condemning the conflicts and civil war within Muslim community but at the same time wage war against their fellow Muslims; thirdly both build an army to achive their goals hesitation (Assad, 2014: 114).

Ali Musri Semjan Putra, a researcher at Imam Shafi'i Islamic College Jember concludes that ISIS's extreme ideology is indicated by five doctrines of the movement. The first is claiming that their leader is a caliph and therefore obeying him is an obligation of every Muslim; the second, declaring other Muslims who do not obey their leader as apostates; the third, killing every person who does not want to pledge allegiance to their caliph; the fourth, insisting that every Muslim must cancel their allegiance to the leaders of their respective countries; and the fifth, advocating the partial, pragmatic and extreme concept of jihad. With these five doctrines, ISIS has been recognized as the ultra-violent jihadist organization. They are so violent that even al-Qaeda refuse to acknowledge them as a jihad movement due to their brutality (Putra, 2014).

ISIS's extremism is also reflected in their method to recruit new fighters. The Daily Beast reported that ISIS had kidnapped hundreds of children, most of whom were under 15 years old. These children are prepared to become suicide bombers. For that purpose, during their detention they were forced to learn variety of jihadi materials concerning warfare, they were also forced to watch videos of beheadings and suicide bombings. ISIS alo terrorize the population of their conquered regions in the name of enforcing Islamic law. The Associated Press reported that during the holy month of Ramadan in 2014, ISIS militia tied a 14-year-old teenager on a crossbar and left him for several hours in the heat of summer because the child did not fast that day.

ISIS force those who they consider as infidels and apostates to convert to their version of Islam. A prime example would be the Yazidi communi ty who flee the region because they were froced to concert to Islam and pledge allegience to al-Baghdadi. At least a hundred Yazidi women have been kidnapped and possbily enslaved by ISIS troops (CNN, 13-8-2014). Apart from that, their takfiri ideology have led them to hate Muslims who do not want to pledge allegiance to their caliph more than non-Muslims. They regard those Muslims as their own enemies and justify killing them indiscriminately, whether they are small children, women, or old people. ISIS have destroyed places of worship, looting, which are essentially prohibited in the rules of Islamic jihad.

On top of that, ISIS have used the Qur'anic verses and hadiths to justify and legitimize those heinous actions. In an interview with albalad.co, Muhammad Haidar Assad stated that ISIS has a strong ideological basis in Islamic tradition.

(albalad.co/wawancara/2015A1154/tafsiran-isis-atas-quran-dan-hadis-menyimpang/). Certainly interpreted according to their wishes. Some examples of how ISIS employ distorted interpretations to support their claims are; the first, they argue that their caliphate is the only valid system of government according to Islamic law, ISIS claims that all systems that do not take the name of Islamic law are thagut. Nobody legislative right, because the only musharri' (law giver) is Allah. Therefore, according to ISIS, all the commands and prohibitions in the Qur'an must be implemented without any compromise from any human. Consequently, they conclude that any systems such as democracy with the parliaments including the MPR and DPR are *thagut*, while those who submit to this system are followers of the *Thagut* (Hussein 2008: 43). The basis for this claims are the following verses:

> "And indeed We have sent prophets to every nations of the people to cry out: worship God alone and stay away from Thagut. (al-Nahl: 36).

> "... in fact Pharaoh and Haaman and his soldiers were guilty ... (al-Qasas: 8)," the Pharaoh and his soldier, then we threw them into the sea ... (al-Qasas : 40).

In line with their method in understanding these verses, ISIS understanding of the concept of jihad is imbued by their extreme ideology. For them jihad is nothing but war. One of the reasons Zarqawi as the founding fighter of ISIS left Al-Qaeda, because they considered that al-Qaeda was no longer as extreme as it was in implementing the concept of their global jihad. This understanding requires that they against the value of love and mercy and uphold violence and cruelty as their values instead. For them, Islam must be enforced by means of violence because it is the solution to all differences in disputes among the people. Anyone who disagree with them are considered to be infidels so their blood is lawful to be shed (Assad, 2014: 199).

On one occasion, Zarqawi quoted a Prophet's hadith regarding jihad; "A martyr is blessed with six things: he is forgiven thanks to his first blood drop, he sees his seat in heaven, he will be enveloped in the delicacy of faith, he is married to seventy angles, he will be guarded from the slander, and he will be guaranteed from great fear".

He also quoted a sentence attributed to Ibn Taymiyyah "there is no more sunnah *afdhal* (greater) than jihad. It (jihad) is greater than Hajj. It is also greater than fasting, greater than prayer ... " (Hussein, 2008: 71).

Ideology of Islamic State: Between Shari'a Enforcement and the Method to Understand Shari'a

It is undeniable, that as a Muslim it is certainly not possible to say no when asked question; should we uphold the law of God. It was also the initial thesis put forward by the radical jihadist movement, including ISIS. In several statements, ISIS members as well as

their leader, al-Baghdadi, emphasize that the main reason to join ISIS is to fulfilling God's command to uphold His sharia.

However, further investigation into ISIS's arguments shows that the terrorist group do not understand the sharia properly. ISIS's mistakes stem from errenous conception about God as the only *musharri'*. Therefore, there is no need to discuss inconsistencies of ISIS in implementing sharia, or how ISIS does cherry pick the verses of the Qur'an, hadith and the words of the ulama in order to justify their brutal actions. There is no need to explain that they are actually the manifestations of tahgut itself. These problems are quite clear. Instead, this section will focus on the concept of musharri, i.e the legislative authority, and how the actual procedure of implementing the Shari'a is denied by ISIS.

In his letters entitled al-Jil al-Tsani li al-Qaeda (The Second Generation of al-Qaeda) during his trial in Jordan, az-Zarqawi insisisted that he did not recognize any legislators other than Allah. Although the legislator was an alim who master the science of sharia, a Muslim ruler, members of parliament or clan elders. He said that all those who follow any legal system other than the Sharia of Allah are considered to be polytheists (Hussein, 2008: 71). This statement certainly becomes odd considering that ISIS has consistently accused other Muslim of being apostates based on their own understanding of sharia. Hence, letting men to judge other men. The author of this paper would argue that there is a fatal error in the ISIS's methodology, namely their poor understanding of fiqh as the important tool to understand and implement the sharia. Without a good understanding of fiqh, the Shari'a cannot be applied properly.

Fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, is a device as well as a prerequisite for someone to apply God's law. Fiqh keeps someone from being overly subjective in their understanding of Shari'a, even though eliminating subjectivity is nearly impossible. Fiqh serves as a guidance so that the process of ijtihad does not deviate from the basic rules or basic objectives of the Shari'a. Fiqh helps the mujtahid (practiotioners of ijtihad) to differentiate the ijtihad that is a result of a comprehensive and good reasoning and product of ijtihad that is arbitrary and only serves the mujthaid's interest. Therefore, the position of fiqh is very essential because it safeguards the process as well as the product of ijtihad, and only trhought ijtihad the vitality of sharia law can be preserve. Al-Shahrastani said:

> Broadly speaking, we are all aware and know for sure that the reality and dynamics that occur in worship and transactions cannot be limited and calculated. We also know very well that every incident that occurs does not have a specific argument that discusses it, and it is also very impossible to happen. Therefore, the *naṣ* (Qur'anic/sunnaic provisions) are finite while the reality is unlimited, then the finite is impossible to regulate the infinite. Thus, we automatically know that ijtihad and qiyās are the only means of proving the permanence of the Shari'a, when facing new cases, ijtihad must be carried out (Al-Shahrastani, Vol. 1: 197).

One of the scholars who is often quoted by ISIS, Ibn Taymiyyah actually states that: ijtihad is to mobilize all abilities in studying the shar'i arguments in order to conclude shari'a laws. The word "studying the arguments of the shari'i" in Ibn Taymiyyah's statement implies that ijtihad is not purely subjective. The subjectivity in ijtihad is not pure but theological subjectivity, because in an ijtihad activity a mujtahid is not speaking in a pure

personal view, but he is trying to explain and find out the law of God manifested in the shar'i propositions. Therefore, he is bound by Shariah arguments, norms and procedures. if he has adhered to the arguments and follows the norms and procedures stipulated by the Shari'a, then the results of his ijtihad can be categorized as "Islamic law (*ahkam shari'ah*) " if not, then it cannot be called Islamic law. Therefore, in contrast to ISIS's ideology that God is the only legislator, trhought ijtihad, God has granted men the legislative right (Ibnu Taimiyyah, Vol. 9: 264).

However, not everyone fulfills the requirements to do ijtihad. Therefore, al-Shatibi classifies ijtihad into two categoreis, he said;

> "There are two kinds of ijtihad, firstly the legitimate one, i.e ijtihad which comes from experts who masters the science of sharia and have sufficient knowledge regarding the objects of ijtihad. Secondly, the illigetimate ijtihad i.e an ijtihad that is carried out by those who do not posses sufficient knowledge of sharia and the matters that become objects of the ijtihad. Such ijtihad (does not represent sharia) but rather represents one's personal views, personal tastes, blindness, and lust (Al-Ghazali, Vol. 2: 350).

Among the *rukun* of ijtihad are mujtahid or people who are qualified to do ijtihad. Broadly speaking, the conditions for becoming a mujtahid can be grouped into two, general conditions and special conditions. There are three general conditions (non-skills); Muslim, sane, and have reached the age of puberty. While special requirements (related to skills) are divided into two; main requirements and complementary requirements. The main requirement consisting of mastering Islamic traditional sciences regarding the the Qur'an, Sunnah, Arabic, and concensus of the scholars of previous generations. While the complementary requirements include intellect, integrity and credibility are as follows; knowing of the original rulings of a problem, knowing the *maqāsid al-sharī'ah* (the goals outlined in the Shari'a), mastering the universal rules of Shari'a, being aware of the existence of *ikhtilaf* (scholarly disagreement), have insight into the traditions and costums of the society in which he practice ijtihad, knowing *manthiq* (logic), having integrity and honor, using the techniques of ijtihad correctly, being considerate in analyzing and decision making, always feeling in need of the help of Allah and His guidance, self-confidence, acknowledged by ummah, always practicing what he preach (Al-Umari, 1985: 59).

The nuanced understanding of the concept of ijtihad as a mean of legislation sanctioned by God, reveals the erronous nature of az-Zarqawi's statement. In contrast to his ideology, people who meet the requirements of ijtihad has been granted the ability to find God's law, or at least the approximation of it. Furthermore, when these requirements cannot be found in one person, then the option is to form a group of scholars, each of them has the specification of expertise to meet the requirement. As for both az-Zarqawi and al-Baghdadi, the author doubts that they have fulfilled the prerequisites because from the reading sources that the author has acces to, they only studied Islam and understand the concept of jihad in the community which sees jihad as just war and violence. Moreover,

the fact that ISIS troops have consistently abused and misunderstood the sharia is the evidence of the unfulfillment of the requirements ijtihad.

There is also a need to discuss the correct method to implement sharia in spesific contexts, known as *tanzil al-hukmi*. Indeed God's predetermined law does not change and must not change. Therefore, it is a paradigmatic mistake if one considers that the law changes. However, it is essential to realize that law always follows its legal cause or *illa*, namely the specific set of circumstances that trigger a certain law into action. So what actually changes is the legal causes, not the law itself. In relation to this concept, as-Shatibi states;

> We already know the rule that "every intoxicant is *haram*", but this rule only functions when applied to an object that is clearly an intoxicant or not, so the final conclusion is that the object may be consumed or not… therefore, eventought the Shari'a have stipulated regulations in the matter of consuming wine, Muslims must firstly examine whether object of the *ijtihad* can be classified as wine or not. Finally, inevitably he must conduct a careful research to determine whether the object is *kamr* (intoxicants) or not. This procedure is called *taḥqīq al-manāṭ*. If after conducting the procedure, he find out that there are strong indicators that the object is indeed a wine, then he can decide that the object is an intoxicant so he must not consume it becaue according to the rule, "Every intoxicant, is *haram*" (Al-Shatibi, Vol. 3: 32).

Thus, one may conclude that apart from theoritical endeavour to determine the ruling for certain object, there must be also an effort to determine the aplicability of the ruling. Moreover, al-Shatibi's statement also indicates that the sharia itself is static, while the cause (*illat/manath*) is dynamic. Changes that occur in *tanzil al-ahkam* (legal enforcement) are due to changes in *manath*. *Manath* is a manifestation of several important factors that must be considered to decide wether or not a certain ruling is applicable or not. According to several scholars say, among the main components of *manath* are time, place, and the condition of the object of ijtihad (Al-Uqail, 1426: 73).

Among the characteristics of the *illa* in Islamic law is that in some cases it is easily identified while in other cases not so easy. Noneteles, an object that is identified not as a legal object cannot be judged with a legal product, whereas an object that clearly meets the criteria of a legal object must be treat as a legal object. For example, people who have clearly committed apostasy, fulfilled conditions of apostasy, and have no excuse justified by the Shari'a, deserve to be legally convicted as an apostate. And vice versa if there is a Muslim who commit an action that might be identified as a sign of apostasy but he has not met the all the criteria of apostasy or has excuses justified by Sharia, then it is strongly forbidden to impose the ruling of apostasy on him.

Again, reflecting on the above explanations will shows that what have been done by ISIS is not an enactment of Sharia law, instead, they have abused the sharia, especially in the matter of apostasy. Due to their shallow understanding of the sharia, they have declared many Muslims as apostates. The substance of apostasy (kufr) exists and will never change, but accusing and claiming a Muslim of being apostate is a matter of ijtihad which requires deep understanding and careful consideration. Therefore the *takfiri* movement carried out

by ISIS is a massive mistake even more so that the mistake have been used to justify murders lootings, whereas the Qur'an has clearly stated;

يا أيها الذين آمنوا إذا ضربتم في سبيل الله فتبينوا ولا تقولوا لمن ألقى إليكم السلام لست مؤمنا تبتغون عرض الحياة الدنيا فعند الله مغانم كثيرة كذلك كنتم من قبل فمن الله عليكم فتبينوا إن الله كان بما تعملون خبيرا

According to Ibn Abbas this verse was revealed in response to an incident when a man from Banu Sulaim who was herding his goats passed in front of a group of Companions. The man greeted them with *salam*, but the Companions assumed that he said the *salam* just to be safe. Finally they killed him, then brought his wealth to the Prophet (Al-Bukhari, No. 4591).

CONCLUSION

Calling ISIS a neo-Khawarij movement is not an exagaration, because in terms of their extreme ideology and brutality, what have been done by ISIS since its inception it is very similar to what was done by the Khawarij. Morevoer, both group are dangerous especially because they convinced, that they are defending and upholding the religion of God.

ISIS call to establish a caliphate and their invitation to pledge allegience to their caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghadadi is also a dangerous trap. At least there are two horrible consequences of it. Firstly, their claim that they are practicing Islamic law while doing barbaric actions has reinforced the misconception about Islam as an inherently violent religion. Secondly, terror attack that have been committed by ISIS fighters in many places, especially in western country have helped to spread Islamophobia all over the world.

Among the fatal mistakes made by the ISIS group were misinterpreting many aspects of Islamic teachings and misunderstanding how to implement Islamic law. This then gave birth to a radical ideology that could at least be summarized in five points. The first: claiming that their leader is a caliph which means that it is the obligation of all Muslims to obey him; the second: accusing every Muslim who does not want to pledge allegiance to their caliph as apostate; the third: murdering every person who does not want to pledge allegiance to their caliph; the fourth; urging every Muslim to cancel their allegiance to the leaders of their respective countries; and the Fifth, adhering to a partial, pragmatic and extremist understanding of jihad.

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