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The Rise of Radicalism and Terrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia

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Abstract: *This article examines the dynamics of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia and how government from both countries responded to the rise of radicalism and terrorism. It discusses the development of terrorism in Southeast Asia from the period of Darul Islam in 1950s to Jama'ah Islamiyah in 2000s. In addition, it argues that Indonesia and Malaysia have become barometer of terrorism networks in Southeast Asia. Radicalism and terrorism networks also have transformed the character of Islam in Southeast Asia, and this certainly challenges the future of mainstream Muslims in the region who are recognized as maintaining moderate and peaceful Islam. This is based on interviews to terrorist and former terrorist detainees and government officials in Indonesia and Malaysia. It also comes from analysis of books and documents from radical-jihadist organizations and government. It recommends state and civil society policy to unite in preventing and countering radicalism and terrorism in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia.*

Keywords: Radicalism, Terrorism, Indonesia, Malaysia, Southeast Asia

Introduction

A series of acts of terror occurring in approximately the last decade has made Indonesia and Malaysia as among countries that gets the “red light” from the international world. In the Asian region, Indonesia and Malaysia have become two of the most important areas in the study of terrorism and religious radicalism.

Referring to the *Global Terrorism Database* (2007), of a total of 421 acts of terrorism in Indonesia recorded from 1970 to 2007, over 90% of acts of terrorism occurred during the years shortly before Suharto stepped down until entering the democratic era. In addition, the type of terrorism that is “fatal attack” also experienced a serious increase in that period. It includes the use of new methods of performing terror, namely the suicide bombing (suicide attacks), which previously almost never happened. Since the terror incident of Bali bomb I that killed 202 people until 2013, at least 12 suicide bombings have taken place. The radical Islamic group known as Jemaah Islamiah (JI) —and its

network— is regarded as the party most responsible for most of the waves of terror in post-reform Indonesia. Responding to these acts of terror, until mid-2014 the government has detained more than 900 terrorists and approximately 90 terrorist suspects were killed.¹

The involvement of radical Islamic groups in the acts of terror is by no means a new phenomenon in the history of politics in the country. Behind the many acts of terror that have lasted almost a decade and half after the reformation, we can explore a long series of political and religious upheavals having taken place since the formative period of the formation of this republic until afterwards, which can be seen as the root of Islamic radicalism today. Not all have connection with previous similar movements, but as far as involving certain parts of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) led by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, this connection seems quite clear. A small minority, which is generally a locally radical movement or having an individual network, may be a new movement which is not many linked with the previous movements (Ali, 2014). The influence and networking with groups of globally radical Islam, like the Afghan Mujahideen, al Qaeda, or ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) which many people recently discussed, are the aspects that distinguish with religious radicalism in the previous period that are domestic, besides the issues that caused it and also the actors.

Darul Islam (DI) Movement

When seeing history, it can be noted: the bombing in Cikini on November 30, 1957, and then violence by Darul Islam movement (DI) led by Kartosuwirjo (1950s to early 1960s). Then, during the New Order period, there was also a series of violence and bombings connected to Komando Jihad (Jihad Command) movement, the hijacking of Woyla aircraft by a group of fundamentalist congregation of Imron bin Muhammad Zein in 1981, the bombing of Borobudur temple by a Shiite group led by Hussein al Habsy in 1985, etc. The sporadic and massive terror acts with religious backgrounds re-emerged in line with the democratic transition to this date.

Many studies try to understand the root of terrorism and radicalism in various perspectives, either the economic, cultural, political, psychological, and religious perspective (Schmidt, 2011; Horgan, 2012). Experts agree that the root of terrorism is complex. There are several aspects of religious terrorism in Indonesia that distinguish it with similar phenomena

¹ Referring to BNPT data, since 2000 until 2014, as many as 729 terrorists have been penalized from the court, 19 are still on trial, 22 are still in the process of investigation, 330 are still in jail, 561 were freed from prison, and 96 were killed (shot dead and suicide bombing) (Menkopolkam, 2014).

in Western countries as well as other Muslim countries such as Malaysia, that are the elements of history. The root of terrorism in Indonesia today that involves many radical Islamic groups will be well recognized by seeing its relevance to radical Islamic movements that have existed before. The author sees that Islamic radicalism today is a “derivation” of Islamic radicalism preceded by Kartosoewirjo with his Darul Islam since the 1950s and the Komando Jihad or Komji movement that emerged in the late 1970s (Mubarak, 2008). This relationship is evident not only in terms of commonality of ideology, but also in family relationship factor. Some of the names of terrorists, either captured alive or shot dead, have a track record related to the previous similar movements.

Looking back, there are several phases that illustrate the rise of terror acts and religious radicalism in post-independence Indonesia until today. The first phase, as mentioned earlier, is marked by the appearance of DI/ TII of Kartosoewirjo movement followed by Kahar Muzakkar and Daud Beureuh. The second phase is the emergence of Komando Jihad movement of the 1970s to the 1980s and some of the main actors are former members of DI / TII in Kartosoewirjo era. The names of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’ashir, later widely known as the *amir* (leader) of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), emerged in that phase. The third phase are various acts of terror and violence that took place during and after the reformation, the late 1990s to the present. The fourth phase is marked by the development of new radical Islamic groups, especially from younger groups, which have no or little linkage with previous generation figures. Their radicalization is more influenced by global events than local conditions, and the emergence of ISIS-network support in Indonesia today is one example.

Abu Bakar Ba’ashir has become the most widely-mentioned figure – perhaps having the most important role—in the development of the radical Islamic movement after Kartosuwiryo era. His role in the extreme Islamic movement has been widely mentioned since the late 1970s, alongside Abdullah Sungkar—in a series of cases of Komando Jihad. The movement which was later called by Pangkopkamtib Soedomo as Komando Jihad itself involved many NII exponents during Kartosuwiryo era, among others: Aceng Kurnia—former Commander of Kartosuwiryo’s aide, Haji Ismail Pranoto (HISPRAN), Danu Muhammad Hassan, Dodo Muhammad Darda, Ateng Djaelani, Warman, etc. This movement launched terrors in several areas in Java and Sumatra. Referring to Solahudin (2011), Ba’ashir and Sungkar—formerly active in the Da’wah (propagation) Council—

joined the NII in the late 1970s through Haji Ismail Pranoto. At almost the same time several young groups also joined the NII, among others: Irfan Awwas—currently the Chairman of the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI)—and his brother, Fihiruddin, who is today better known as Abu Jibril. Abu Jibril in the early 2000s was jailed by the Malaysian government for allegedly involved in the terror group of the *Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia* (KMM/ Malaysian Mujahideen Movement). Currently he is still active in MMI. The importance of kinship or brotherhood factors in bridging one's involvement in radical organization occurs in the case of Abu Jibril. His son named Mohammed Jibril in the late 2000s was sentenced to prison for his involvement in funding the terrorist movement in Indonesia.

The central role of Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar in the development of radical Islamic movement networking took place through the mobilization of the mujahideen—most of them consist of youths—for jihad to Afghanistan in the late 1980s. They departed from Malaysia where Ba'asyir and Sungkar have developed their da'wah (propagation) after escaping a court verdict. From this network of mujahideen, the root of Islamic radical groups began to emerge and increasingly grow. Until his return from Afghanistan, they—who then become widely known as part of Jemaah Islamiyah—were involved in a series of bloody terrorist acts in Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto. From various reports issued by the International Crisis Group (CGI) of Indonesia, important data related to the background of these new mujahideen are found. Some of them in fact have—either direct or indirect—historical relationship with relatives or other members of the family who have been involved in the struggle to establish an Islamic State, either through the DI movement in Kartosuwiryo era, Komando Jihad, or other movements whose ideology and motifs are almost same. For example, Farihin, one of the perpetrators of the bombing action at the Philippine Embassy on August 1, 2000, apparently still has a kinship relationship with the perpetrators of terror of bomb throwing in Cikini in 1957 (Farihin, 2011).

Reasons of Performing Jihad

To find out what motives underlie radical Islamic groups to commit acts of violence, considered as part of jihad, in this country over the last decade, it can be seen at least through two aspects. First, the reasons stated by the perpetrators themselves. Second, explanation by using academic approaches through several social theories. Ali Imron—the Bali Legian Bali bomber of October 12, 2002—stated the reasons why he committed

jihad through bombing.

First, feelings of dissatisfaction against the existing government. The absence of *imamah*—leadership in the NII concept—has led to various damages and immorality, either the emergence of deviate schools, promiscuity, or the people's submission to the leadership of others (America and the West-author).

Second, Sharia (Islamic law) is not enforced as a whole. Through this bombing action, he hopes to trigger a revolution that leads to the formation of *imamah* and the enforcement of Sharia as a whole.

Third, a hope of the opening of *jihad fi sabilillah* (jihad in Allah's way). The only effective way to resist the injustice is to open the field of jihad, that is the battle between truth and falsehood. By carrying out bombings that killed foreigners in Bali, he hopes to open a war field between the Muslims and the unbelievers.

Fourth, implementing the obligation of jihad. Jihad is a holy war in Allah's way, which according to him, by involving one's self in the action of the bombing means to have carried out jihad in Allah's way.

Fifth, a revenge to the infidels. The Bali bombing and bombing of churches on Christmas Eve are acts of revenge against the barbarism of Israeli and American Zionist against Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan, Somalia, Kashmir, Chechnya and so on. In addition, they are a revenge for Christians related to the Ambon and Poso cases (Imron, 2007).

The motive for revenge against America, Israel and its allies considered to be colonial and barbaric to the Islamic world is also clearly visible as stated by other Bali bombers (Ghufron, 2009; Amrozi, 2009, Samudra, 2004; Samudra, 2009). It distinguishes with the justifications that underlie acts of terror by Islamic groups in the previous era which contained more national issues rather than global or international issues.

Academic explanations are abundant in its attempts to explain aspects of terrorism. The political economy approach emphasizes marginalization of economy and deprivation as a major factor (*Ted Robert Gurr, 2006*). The individual's psychological factor of the perpetrators of terror have also been studied, among others, by Jerold M. Post (2007) and John P. Horgan (2011), historical approach by Walter Laqueur (1999, 2001), and social movement approach by Charles Tilly (2001) and Della Porta (2002). The growing number of these approaches shows that the problem of terrorism is complex. One of the most interesting theories of social movement in explaining why Islamic groups have chosen violence in achieving their political purposes, among others, emerged in the

research of Mohammed Hafez's (2007) on the terrorist movement of the Islamist group GIA (Group Islamique Army) in Algeria. In summary, the approach framed in *violence and contention* has postulated: (1) state's repression has led to an environment of politics of schism and brutality; (2) the rebels (oppressed parties) form exclusive organizations to protect themselves from repressive action; (3) the rebels develop anti-system frames to motivate collective action to overthrow the government (Hafez, 2007). The fact is that the emergence of Islamist terror from Islamic groups, especially from the early to middle 1990s, took place in the middle of the repressive state after the cancellation of the victory of Islamic Party FIS in Algeria elections.

With this approach, it seems somewhat difficult to explain the occurrence of terror and other radical actions by Islamic groups in Indonesia which even emerged in the era of democratic transition, and when the New Order's repressive regime was over. Unlike what happened in Algeria, the terror on the pretext of jihad in Indonesia actually goes hand in hand with the transition of democracy that opens space for many parties to participate. Some radical Islamist groups have taken advantage of the opportunity to join the system.

The Bases of Radical Ideology: Jihad dan Takfir

In addition to the historical root, the genealogy of thought/ ideology that has inspired the development of religious radicalism is also important to explore. The political democratization in Indonesia that has been going on for about one and half decade has proved to be a golden opportunity for the advent of radical religious thought. Mass media that are increasingly widespread and certainly more free, as well as the development of information technology which is characterized by the proliferation of internet or online media is a very good and efficient tool used as the dissemination of ideas and religious news by radical Islamic groups which are more organized. It is easy to find various invitations and *fatwas* (unbinding legal opinion) of jihad under the pretext of defending Islam there. To become a radical Muslim becomes easier, and does not need to bother to attend an Islamic study held by jihadist groups or have to read a pile of books about jihad practice. Online media and the like provide everything needed by a young Muslim who seeks the true Islam, wants to be a radical muslim and ready to pick up jihad invitation.

When looking at the genealogical side of radical Islamic ideology, the development of radical Islamic ideas in this country, in which some of its political expression is done through acts of terror, it is difficult to be separated from the classical *ulama* Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, and Sayyid Quthb—a radical Muslim thinker of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

(Ikhwanul Muslimin) who was finally hanged. Ibn Taymiyya and Sayyid Quthb, though living in far different era over a few centuries, have similarities in seeing the possibility that those who claim to be Islam, for some reasons, are allowed to be regarded as unbelievers who must be fought. Quthb's thought—through *Ma'alim fi at Thorieq*—many inspired religious radicalism among youth in the 1980s. In particular, his view on modern *jahiliyah* (ignorance) and the definition of *kufir* (disbelief) became widespread.

This Quthb's idea inspired Egyptian militant groups such as Al-Jihad to kidnap and kill government officials in Egypt under the pretext of jihad against unbelievers. Then, this idea was reinforced by Shaykh Abdullah Azzam—with his concept of jihad, which later succeeded in influencing Indonesian Muslim activists to go for jihad to Afghanistan. Then, Osama bin Laden became the most important figure in influencing the direction and development of the contemporary neo-fundamentalism movement (Roy, 2005). The justification of jihad and of religious postulates that much out of radical activists today is in fact nothing more than a “copy and paste” phrase often stated by Bin Laden before. The strong influence of the above figures can also be read clearly in various books, magazines, tabloids, or other media produced by radical Islamic groups in this country.

Although the radical Islamic groups that are developing today have many variants either in terms of organization, model of the movement, as well as the background of its establishment, according to Roy (2005) they hold the doctrine which is almost the same, among others: *First*, establish an Islamic authority, whether it is an Islamic State or Islamic Caliphate. The reason is that only through such means, political power, Sharia and all policies that are truly Islamic can be applied. *Second*, cut ties with contemporary society. In their minds, today's society, seen as “unholy”, has diverted from the teachings of Islam. They call it “modern *jahiliyah* (ignorance)”. The concept of *takfir* (calling others disbelievers), including for Muslims who disagree with their Islamist agenda, among other things evolved from this doctrine. *Third*, create a theocracy. In their view, the system of life (social, economic, and political, or whatever) that does not come from Islam is *kufir* (disbelief). They oppose democracy (people's power) and authoritarian rule under the pretext that the model of power does not come from Islam. In Islam, it is only Allah who is powerful. The Islamist groups use slogans, “sharia is the solution” and “the Qur'an is the constitution” (Roy, 2005, pp. 37–34).

The concept of *takfir*, which is controversial, originally came from classical *ulama* Ibnu Taymiyya, later revived by Quthb and modern Islamists of his followers, to judge the government that is Muslim but not Islamic. For them,

the definition of *kafir* (infidels) and all its implications not only apply to those who are not Muslims or atheists but also apply to a government which claims to be Muslim but does not make Islamic Sharia as the basis of policy. By dividing the only two choices for today's society: the Way of the Allah (*hizb Allah*) or Way of Satan (*hizb al-syaithan*), Quthb insists that anyone who does not rely only on Allah's law (Sharia), then they are part *hizb al-syaithan*.

Thoughts and ideologies of radical Islamic movements in the history of Indonesia's journey, ranging from the Darul Islam (DI) movement to Jemaah Islamiah (JI), hold firmly to all three doctrines above. The text of the proclamation of DI, for example, clearly mentioned the obligation of the people to form an Islamic power because only that power model is "blessed" by Allah. The DI also introduced the concept of *hijrah* (movement/migration), which contains a call to the citizens of the Republic of Indonesia—a country considered as *kufur*—to move to the Islamic State formed by Kartosoewirjo. Assassinations and attacks carried out by the DI in Muslim areas that did not support their political purposes are also based on the belief that although they are Muslim but can be judged as *kufur* for not supporting the jihad for the establishment of the Islamic State. The killing of Muslims who are non-NII supporters is therefore also justified as part of a *sabil* war. The idea of jihad itself was written by Kartosuwirjo in 1930, followed then by delivering the concept of hijra, from "Makkah-Indonesia" to "Medina-Indonesia", in 1940 (Formichi, 2014). Then later, along with the increasingly harsh confrontation between DI Movement and the Indonesian government in the 1950s, the concept is interpreted and applied in its most radical form.

This concept of jihad and hijra can also be found in the rhetoric of later radical Islamic movements, for example within the movement of Komando Jihad in the New Order era and Jemaah Islamiah (JI) after reformation. Until today, the meaning of jihad and hijrah are also increasingly widespread. If in the previous time, jihad only referred to the national struggle against the Dutch colonial, and then in the 1950s targeted the government that "supported" the communists, but in recent years the meaning of jihad has become more international, encompassing resistance for anyone (government) considered to have supported the oppression of the Islamic world by the United States and Israel.

In line with Quthb's concept of the *jahiliyah* (ignorant) society, both Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah also give a religious assessment to the government of the Republic of Indonesia, as a *jahiliyah* (ignorant) government due to its unwillingness to run Sharia with *kaffah* (comprehensively) (Pinaridi, 1964; Barton, 2004). For them, if the government of ignorance is not willing to "*hijrah* (move)" voluntarily, then it must be fought. In "Dakwah and Jihad" (2003), Abu

Bakar Ba'ashir explicitly explains some important points concerning with religious doctrine that is the implementation of Sharia and the law for those (government) who does not run it, among others: Firstly, *Dienul Islam* (Islamic religion) must be practiced purely, not mixed with man-made teachings and laws; Secondly, *Dienul Islam* must be practiced in sovereign way / with government / with power, not in individual way or in groups.

On the basis of the obligation to run Sharia with *kaffah* (comprehensively), Ba'asyir then stated idolatrous (*musyrik*) for those who are included in the categories: First, a person or group who makes laws or legal without referring to the Quran and the Hadith; Secondly, anyone who justifies and obeys laws or man-made laws that do not refer to Allah's law. Referring to Shaykh Abdullah Azzam's opinion, *kafir* (infidel) also applies to: the president, scholars or intellectuals, the Parliament, as well as the society, who have established and implemented laws which are not based on the Sharia from Allah. For Ba'ashir, "whoever signed the implementation of the law—which does not come from Allah—then he has become an infidel (*kafir*), out of Islam and the group of the Muslims". Although Indonesia has adopted several elements of Sharia in national law, even has given legality to the Province of Aceh—now Nangroe Aceh Darussalam—to implement Sharia, for Ba'asyir the Indonesian government is still an infidel (*kafir*) government because Sharia is not fully implemented (Adhitama, 2011).

He asserted, "although the government implements part of Islamic law, even making Islam the state's religion, if he (the government) deliberately implements Allah's law comprehensively (*kaffah*), and refuses to make the Quran and Sunnah as the only source of law, then such government includes a group of *thagut*" (Ba'asyir, 2003). In a treatise made at the Nusakambangan Prison, Ba'asyir said that the government officials (and the government) who manage not based on *kaffah* Islam then its *tauhid* (monotheism) is declared void and become infidels (Ba'asyir, 2013, p. 15). The infidel (*kafir*) and unjust (*dholim*) punishment was also imposed on the Indonesian government for cooperating with enemies of Islam, such as the United States and Australia, to fight the mujahideen (Ba'asyir, 2013, pp. 15–21).

The idea of jihad and *takfir* as above can also be clearly seen in Imam Samudra's belief, so it inspired him to perform Bali bombing on October 12, 2002. According to Imam Samudra, jihad which means a war against unbelievers must be done anytime and anywhere until Allah's law is implemented perfectly. This jihad also applies to fight the group called *bughot* or those are Muslims, but rejected the Islamic State (Samudra, 2004). A radical understanding of jihad until the enforcement of Allah's law on earth can also be found in the various testimonials of suicide bombers. In the eyes of these perpetrators whoever rejects the enforcement of *kaffah* Islamic law is considered as part of the *kuffar*

salibis-zionis (Crusader-Zionist infidels) who must be fought.

It is quite possible that the extreme ideas of Ibn Taymiyya, Quthb, Kartosuwirjo, and Ba'ashir are no longer become the most important reference for the new radical group of "ISIS generation" which is younger. The more global internet and other online media, which are certainly cheaper and highly accessible, make the latest jihadist *fatwas* far more influential. It is no surprise that figures like Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri (two figures of al Qaeda), Abu Mahammad al Maqdisi, and ISIS figure Abu Bakar al Baghdadi are not only more popular for new radical generation, but also the most widely adhered as to its *fatwas*.

After the establishment of ISIS and the growing support of radical Islamic groups in Indonesia which provided support, the understanding on the concept of *takfir* among jihadists in Indonesia also increasingly underwent radicalization. One of the most important figures of ISIS supporters in this country, Aman Abdurrahman, wrote and distributed many of his writings containing a more assertive *takfir* concept. A number of Aman's books that discuss *takfir* and its support to the ISIS caliphate are widespread in a number of ISIS online media which are pro ISIS in Indonesia.²

ISIS Network in Indonesia and Malaysia

ISIS phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia becomes one of the important developments marking the strengthening global factors in giving influence to the dynamics of Islamic movements in Southeast Asia. This global (Islamic world)–national relation has been seen since the Iranian revolution of 1979, then the Afghan war in 1980s till 1990s, the war in Chechnya, and the latest conflict and war in Iraq, Syria and several regions in the Middle East. A number of Indonesians were listed of being involved in the war in Syria. BNPT (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme/ National Agency for Combating Terrorism*) recorded approximately 30 people, some say 50s. Among them directly departed from Indonesia and others are students in Sudan, Yemen and Egypt. At least two people were reported dead, one named Reza Fardi alias Abu Muhammad al Indunisy (alumni of Pondok Al Islam Ngruki) and the other named Wildan Mukhollad alias Abu Bakar al-Muhajir, after a suicide bombing (*istismata*) in Iraq as a martyr of ISIS, a new radical movement which is a fraction of al Qaeda (Tempo, 12 August 2014).

ISIS (*Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/ Sham*) was established on January 3, 2014 and declared a caliphate on June 29, 2014. The ideology of ISIS is char-

² One of ustadz Aman Abdurrahman's works that gained widespread acceptance among jihadists in this country is *Seri Materi Tauhid* (Abdurrahman, 2015). The printed version of the book was freely and openly discussed in a number of places.

acterized as Salafy, jihady Wahhaby, the caliphate, as well as strong stance of anti-Shiite. Currently the ISIS-formed caliph is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Not to be outdone by ISIS, the al Qaeda faction of Jabath Nusroh some time later announced the power of the “Islamic Emirate” in the territories they controlled. Similarly, the Boko Haram movement in Somalia in August 2014 also declared Islamic Caliphate with their leader as their caliph.

In Indonesia, some radical Islamist groups are quite enthusiastic about providing support to ISIS and the caliphate they form. In February, a number of hundreds of Islamic groups calling themselves as the Islamic Sharia Activist Forum (*Forum Aktvris Syariat Islam/ FAKSI*) declared their allegiance to the ISIS *amir* (leader) (Rachel, 2014). One of allegiance read by Abu Sholih at- Tamorowi stated,

“By God, we and all the Muslims are indeed happy with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syiria (ISIS) which Insha Allah will be the forerunner of the Islamic Caliphate Ala Minhajin Nibunnwab”.

After ISIS declared the caliphate of Islamiyah on June 29, 2014, then a week later hundreds of people with the FAKSI flag dated July 6, 2014 declared their allegiance to the ISIS caliphate. Most participants come from several regions in West Java, Banten, Lampung and Riau. In the allegiance led by Abu Zakariyya they declared:

“I do allegiance to the amirul mukminin (leader of believers) Abu Bakar al Baghdadi al Quraysi to hear and obey the difficult and easy conditions. On a silent and lazy conditions. And even though our rights are abandoned. As well as I will not rob the power of its owner unless I see a real disbelief, in which I have a real proposition in it from Allah. Allah is the Greatest.”

In a short time a number of Islamic organizations in Solo, Jakarta, Bekasi, and Bima also expressed their allegiance in demonstrative way. In Bekasi, the declaration was made by an association calling itself the Congress of Muslims (*Kongres Umat Islam*). Actually when viewed from the aspect of ideology, the existence of massive support is not a surprising thing. Therefore, a number of Islamic organizations or Indonesian Islamic groups that provide support and allegiance to the ISIS have a not-so-different ideological root, namely the establishment of Islamic Caliphate. Some of the activists playing an important role in the support acts came from the Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Salafi Jihadi Aman Abdurrahman, and several other small groups. Some factions in other JAT declared refusing to give support to the ISIS caliphate that caused a split within the splinter organization of the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI).

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir from Nusakambangan Prison also reportedly gave his allegiance to ISIS-formed Islamic Caliphate. Later the leader of the Islamic Reformist Movement (*Garis/ Gerakan Reformis Islam*) Cianjur, declared himself as the President of Indonesian ISIS.

However, not all radical Islamic movements provide support. Hizbut-Tahrir (HT) for example, although fighting for the establishment of Islamic caliphate, they refuse to recognize the declaration of Islamic caliphate of al Baghdadi (Kiblat, 2014). In Indonesia, HTI campaigns that ISIS is an organization made by the United States and Israel to destroy the Islamic movement. Some JAT activists also declared rejection by disintegrating themselves and forming a new organization called Jamaah Anshorus Syariah (JAS) led by Syawal Yasin, the son-in-law of the late Abdullah Sungkar. The refusal to recognize the ISIS caliphate was also raised by the leadership of the Indonesian Mujahideenn Council (MMI) (Wiwoho, 2014).

It is clear that although initially demonstrations to support the ISIS were quite massive, it does not adequately describe the strong support of the majority of militant groups in this country. A very intense media exposure has caused as if the giant ISIS is awakening in this country, whereas in reality those who are supportive are nothing more than a small branch of the radical Islamic movement. Although the number of them is small, it does not mean that it does not carry a serious threat. Various groups are concerned about the effects of radicalization and terrorism which may be much more powerful than before, when some of the *Mujabideen al-Indunisy* who are ISIS supporters return to their country. It is feared to repeat the return of "bombing" acts like what had been done by the former Afghan mujahideen once they gathered again in Indonesia.

From the above description, it can be concluded about the dynamics of Islamic radical groups in Indonesia today. The existence of support to ISIS shows the potential that radicalization in the Islamic movement in this country is still ongoing. Those who want the Islamic Caliphate still exist include those who are willing to fulfill the call of jihad abroad. It is not too surprising that a number of Muslims in some areas in this country went to Iraq and Syria joining as a *combatant* of ISIS and other Islamic groups because of the call of jihad.

Radical ideology continues to grow along with the development of information technology and online media whose working ways are more effective and far-reaching. Not a few young people who are called for jihad by means of television, internet and other social media. With an easier way

do they gain access as well as a network to be able to join the transnational radical group. Such this condition seems to be a new phenomenon which is not found before. Instant Jihad is a sufficiently precise term to describe groups of young, mostly middle class and well educated, who suddenly becomes radicalized by the development of increasingly sophisticated information technology. Later it can be seen that they no longer require any group or organization as a clear place to join, and as a means of mobilization of jihad. Some families and individuals who currently have joined or are joining jihadist groups in the Middle East, reportedly set off alone. They meet and know one another then, after being in Syria, Iraq, or the surrounding area.

With such pattern, of course it is more difficult to identify or map out people who have the jihadi potential of new generation which is more fluid. The unconventional way should be done by the government as an effort to detect, prevent and control religious radicalization whose patterns are more varied. The effectiveness of repressive actions (*hard actions*) having been carried out by the Indonesian police, in this case the Detachment, often seems to be questionable. If not anticipated correctly, then this country is just waiting for a time bomb. Not only do new jihadists who return to this country after fighting alongside ISIS and other radical groups become a danger but also hundreds or even thousands of other young children in this country are still vulnerable to grow as new jihadists.

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