

EXAMINING THE PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE AMID THE SOUTHERN THAILAND CONFLICT¹

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ABSTRAK

Berbicara secara umum, masjid-masjid dan pondok-pondok pesantren di Thailand Selatan dipandang sebagai tempat melahirkan militan Muslim Thailand. Secara khusus, di wilayah Pattani kebanyakan masjid diasumsikan sebagai tempat merekrut militan Muslim guna melawan Pemerintah Thailand. Dalam hal ini, insiden Masjid Kru-Ze 2004 telah menumbuhkan Muslim militan untuk melawan pemerintah Thailand. Dalam hal ini, saya percaya bahwa Masjid Central Pattani di Thailand Selatan memiliki elemen-elemen non-kekerasan yang bisa diaktivasi sebagai tempat untuk mencegah kekerasan yang tidak adil. Oleh karena itu, artikel ini akan menilai kualitas nyata dari Masjid Raya Pattani di Thailand Selatan dengan dasar profil deskriptif dari masjid tersebut. Dengan demikian, pembaca akan mendapatkan gambaran yang lebih utuh tentang permasalahan tersebut. Selanjutnya, dengan menganalisa praktik-praktik keagamaan di masjid tersebut, penulis berkesimpulan bahwa Masjid Raya Pattani nampak sebagai campuran yang setara antara Muslim moderat dengan jemaah yang lebih konservatif daripada radikal dan ekstrem.

Kata kunci: Masjid, praktik pendidikan Islam, Salafy-Wahaby

ABSTRACT

Generally speaking, mosques and pondok (Islamic boarding schools) in Southern Thailand are regarded as place for fostering Muslim militants. In Pattani, many mosques are taken for granted as places to recruit Muslim militants against the Thai Government. For instance, Kru-Ze Mosque incident in 2004 had raised various militant, Islamist activities against the central government. In this regard, I believe that Pattani Central Mosque has non-violence elements that could be activated as a sanctuary to hinder the unjust violence. Therefore, this article will examine the real quality of Pattani Central Mosque in southern Thailand on the basis of its profile. Consequently, readers would grasp a general picture about those matters. Thus, by analyzing the religious practices within the mosque, I conclude that Pattani Central Mosque seems to be composed of a fairly equal mixture of moderate and more conservative Muslims instead of those with radical and extreme tendencies.

Keywords: Mosque, Islamic teaching practices, Salafy-Wahaby

INTRODUCTION

This article aims to depict the general picture of Pattani Central Mosque in terms of its profile, Islamic teaching practices, and its management. In other words, this study is important to carefully look at another function of the place for worship in which case is not only for religious activities but could also be activated as a sanctuary from the unjust violence. Compared

with the Indonesian context, this paper gives a general portray about the dynamics of religious practices and the mosque management with the latent conflict between the Southern Thai Muslims against the Thailand central government. This article describes the profile of Pattani Central Mosque and discussanalyze the research findings viz., this mosque represents both the moderate and conservative believers rather than the radical ones.

¹ This article is modified of my thesis research "Examining Pattani Central Mosque: Islamic Teaching Practices and Views of Good Governance, Human Rights and Anticipation for Radicalism" for Master of Human Rights and Democratisation of Sydney University, Australia, and Mahidol University, Thailand..

A BRIEF PROFILE OF *MASJID JAMI'* PATTANI (PATTANI CENTRAL MOSQUE)

Entering the Pattani land from Hat Yai airport, people can easily read the name of *Masjid Jami'* Pattani in the advertisement on the street. Another popular mosque is the *Kru-ze* Mosque. Both mosques are well-known, not only to the Thai people but also to foreign people such as Malaysians and Indonesians. In addition, a number of tourism websites have put both mosques as the tourist destinations.

In 1964 *Masjid Jami'* is built and located in Yarang, the Pattani Municipality. According to an informant, there was a rumor behind the establishment of the mosque. It is said that the King of Thailand wanted to do a good deed for the Pattani people by building a mosque as a compensation because there was a mass murder at that time, and as a consequence, there were discontent of Muslim people.

If this is the case, those who know the story are reluctant to pray in the mosque because the idea of developing the mosque is not fully sincere. In addition, before the King ordered to establish the mosque, he and his companions spent a month in India to study the architectures of existing buildings there to choose the most suitable style for the mosque in Pattani.

According to my informant, it was merely a small *masjid* that is used only for praying at first. Then, it is enlarged until its current form gradually, and it took nine years to complete its construction. The mosque thus is not dedicated only to prayer but also to other activities. To date, its surrounding are business places such as a travel agent, a furniture store, banks, etc. There is also a second hand market nearby the mosque. Its strategic location makes the mosque is easily reached by a car, a motorbike and on foot.

Basically, the mosque's architecture adopted *Taj Mahal* in India. There is a big dome in the center which is surrounded by four small minarets. A big pond is located in front of the mosque, and there is a large hall and two sided corridors inside

the mosque. Small trees and various beautiful flowers make the mosque appear beautifully and bring peaceful tranquility either for the congregations or tourists especially in summer. Hence, there is no exaggeration to claim that this is one of the most beautiful and largest mosques in Thailand.

There are three entrances in the mosque. The main entrance is in the middle, and it leads directly to the pond. The second entrance leads to the parking area and the last one is located behind the mosque. This entrance is rarely used by tourists, and only a small number of Muslims come and go through this way.

This mosque is the most important center for Islamic religious activities in the Southern Thailand. In addition, the mosque has many activities, ranged from five prayers in a day and *tadika* (a kindergarten) to organizing various rallies against the Thai government.

ISLAMIC TEACHING PRACTICES

Generally speaking, Islamic teaching practices in this mosque follow the tradition of *Shafi'i* school of *Sunni* tradition. It is obviously reflected in the practice of the five day prayers (*rawatib*), such as reciting *zikir* after praying, reading *qunut* in the *shubuh* praying, the two consecutive calls to prayers (*azan*), the practice of raising a stick during Friday prayers, reading *Yasin* verses collectively, reading *Barazanji* in the celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH, etc. These *Shafi'i* traditions are found in the mosque. A similar Islamic practices could be found in many other mosques in Pattani as well as many mosques in Indonesia due to the fact that the majority of Muslims are *Shafi'i* followers.

Fortunately, there are no hints of Islamist neo-fundamentalism in the mosque. Furthermore, the mosque does not unify some fragmentations within the diverse Islamic group in Pattani region, but it finally represents itself as the fortress of *khana kao*. In this regard, *khana kao* means Muslim's conservative groups, that represent old generations.

THE RELUCTANCE OF OTHER ISLAMIC GROUP TOWARD THE EXISTENCE OF THE MOSQUE

There are no clues provided in the mosque, through its Islamic teaching practices, promulgates ideas on struggling for the Islamist main goal such as the idea of forming an Islamic state or, at least, teaching about the application of Shari'a on the state level. In addition, there is no striking evidence of *Salafy-Wahaby* followers, as part of *dakwah* movement in Pattani, who practice religious activities, here. Although there are few constituents of *Jemaah Tabligh* who pray five times a day in this mosque, their presence here is no more than some individuals who practice its tenets rather than an organized movement.

This argument is supported by the informant perceptions and my own observations. I did not observe any of them attending this mosque. My informant told me that followers of *Salafy-Wahaby* prefer to pray in their own mosque, not in this mosque. To some extent, they do pray in the mosque of the Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus.

The reluctance of these groups could be considered as the religious tension among the mosque stakeholders (*khana kao*), *Jemaah Tabligh*, and *Salafy-Wahaby* followers (*khana mai*). Here, this study uses a sociological, theoretical framework that is Weber's and Troeltsch's conception of tension (cited in Bagby 2009). Basically, the concept is related to the Catholic tradition, that is, a tension between a 'sect' and a 'church'. The concept explains a type of religious dominant group that maintain and sometime accommodate the social cultural norms of the society. But, at the same time there is another religious group challenges the existing norms.

The congregation of the mosque could be put as the religious dominant group (*khana kao*) in Pattani region. Meanwhile, the *Salafy-Wahaby* and the *Tabligh* could be considered as the *khana mai* (the new school) some of which challenging the religious practices of the mosque that are presumably against the pristine Islam.

Consequently, their rejection to attend prays in the mosque implies the development of some new mosques, and eventually have made a polarization among various Muslim communities in Pattani. The phenomenon is portrayed (McCargo, 2008) as tensions and competitions between the 'new school' (*khana mai*) and the 'old school' (*khana kao*) in taking place in some mosques in Pattani region.

Furthermore, Stark and Bainbridge (cited in Bagby 2009) discuss that 'Church-set typology as a continuum, and the operational variable is the degree of tension between the religious group and the dominant culture—i.e. tension caused by acceptance or rejection on the part of both entities'. In the case of Pattani mosques, tensions occurred due to the rejection of some Islamic teaching practices from different Islamic groups.

Beside both groups, there are a few Muslims that not related to the both groups do not pray in the mosque as well due to two main reasons: firstly, they believe that non-Muslims should not enter the mosque whatever the reasons are; secondly, they have seen the mosque is dominated by symbols of the Thai monarchy because it is built and funded by the King.

PREACHERS AS AFFIRMATION OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY

From a theoretical perspective, Gaffney (1994, 194-250) categorized three types of preachers according to its sermons in Egypt mosques: firstly, preachers as the affirmation of traditional authority; secondly, preachers as the advocate of religiously inspired modernity; and thirdly, preachers of apologist for the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism.

To put it simply, the first character emphasizes preaching that mostly talks about religious matters. As Gaffney (1994, 194) mentioned that:

"The central theme of the sermon, including the main Qur'an verse which it is built, is quite familiar; in fact the verse is among the commonplace of citations in all of contemporary Muslim religious rhetoric...In short the sermon in the first category reflects the classical standard."

The second character, according to Gaffney (1994, 208), reflects ‘a considerable measure of innovation and adaptation. Hence, the preaching, combined with other ritual expression, offers elements that tend to be less predicable, seemingly experimental, and sometimes idiosyncratic’. The kind of preaching that is aimed ‘to carry Islam from the pulpit to the streets’ allow a greater flexibility and a more dialectical interaction with the everyday occurrence of the world outside the mosque. The third character asserts the ‘preacher who legitimates his function by assuming the culturally constituted duty of “struggle” or jihad’ (Gaffney, 1994, 238).

I argue that the majority of Pattani Central mosques preachers could be categorized as the affirmations of traditional authority. The reason lies in the content of their *khutbahs* many of which discussing the religious matters. In practice, preachers here recite common verses from Qur’an that can be easily found in many mosques in the Muslim world. Their *khutbahs* do not venture beyond these verses.

In practice, no preachers have talked outside this perimeter. I saw that they are reluctant to go beyond the religious matters because the mosque does not allow preachers to talk about *ikhhtilaf* (deviation/differences) and armed *jihad*, etc. To sum up, no preachers in this mosque could be put into either the second or the third types of Gaffney’s classification.

As a central mosque in conflict situation, the emergence of preachers who campaign for peace, good governance and values such as pluralism and multiculturalism is required to maintain the mindset of congregation to internalize, to adopt and to act in accordance with those values. However, it is unlikely we could find preachers stemming from the threat of militant groups. At the same time, if they talk about *jihad* or criticize the Thai government or monarchy, they would face the cruelty of State officials. Interestingly, my informant told me that generally *uztad* share similar concerns with militants, for example, in

terms of grievances. The difference lies in the militants who follow the violence path while most *uztads* are silent in responding to situations. In short, many *uztad* who preach in the mosque strive to avoid sensitive issues. To conclude, most preachers in the mosque could be categorized as the second type of Gaffney’s category.

THE ABSENCE OF LITERATURE THAT SUPPORT VIOLENT JIHAD

The other important clue that this mosque is not infiltrated by radicalism is the absence of literature that support the violent *jihad*. This study presume that many mosques in Pattani do not provide literatures with which justifying the violent *jihad*. Once, I performed my *Jum’at* prayers at a mosque in Bangkok in 2012. Soon after, the mosque officials distributed a leaflet about Muslim massacres or genocide in Syria while at the same time calling Muslims to help their Muslim brothers and sisters in Syria through donations of money, and via a *jihad* against the Assad administration.

There was no clue as to whom the authors of this leaflet are, or whether it was the work of an individual or a group. In the light of this particular event, leaflets and bulletins that support *jihad* may have developed in such a way in many mosques in Thailand. In this regard, further research about this is needed. It is important to note that in the case of *Kru-ze* Mosque there was a booklet that justifying the violent *jihad* which is found on the body of victim. Its title is *Berjihad di Patani*, as described in the previous chapter.

The phenomenon of literature that supporting the violent *jihad* could be found in both American and Indonesia mosques. Kedar and Yerushalmi (2009) claim there are a number of American mosques providing literature that endorsing the violent *jihad*. Indeed, some invited preachers promulgate and encourage the violent *jihad* in their preaching.

In Indonesia, many mosques and office's mosques (mosques be attached to offices) provide

literatures containing contents some of which calling for the violent *jihad* in the forms of leaflets and bulletins. Such literatures could easily be found there especially in relation to calamities in some countries such as Palestine, Bosnia and Afghanistan many of which Muslims are the victims. Apart from these literature, it does not include bulletins from Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), to wit *Al-Islam*, by which it could easily be found in every mosque every Friday pray. In this light, Fealy (2004, 105-106) argues that HTI is one of the radical Islamist groups.

To date, the *Al-Islam* of HTI bulletin has been seen as an alternative critique against injustices of the Indonesian governmental system. In general, the idea of global Islamic caliphate for majority of Muslims in Indonesia seems peculiar due to who should be the legitimate caliph. In addition, some moderate Islam groups, such as NU and *Muhammadiyah*, are worried with the penetration of Caliphate ideas toward the ummah.

Furthermore, it seems that more students in Indonesia or abroad, some of which in Australia, become sympathizers of HTI. I know it whenever I was studying in Sydney, Australia, for my MHRD in 2011. For instance, in the mailing list of the Indonesian students in the University of Sydney, I often received various propaganda concerning HTI's ideology, including its electronic bulletin, *Al-Islam*. In addition, I also met some HTI sympathizers during an Indonesian student conference in the Indonesian Consulate in Sydney.

Questioning Mosque Management: Some Observations

Generally speaking, the mosque management in Pattani has functioned well in running religious activities. The Imam gives opportunities to all Muslims to conduct religious activities regardless their own affiliations to one of which four Islamic schools (*mazhab*). Furthermore, the management team has applied the idea of *shura* in determining policies that are related to mosque matters. Additionally, they practice transparency in using funds related to mosque expenses as well.

Mosque management in the Pattani central mosque, to some extent, shares some similarities with the mosque management team in Indonesia. The management in Indonesia is called Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid (DKM/the mosque prosperity council). Its operation is based on a policy that is enacted by the Indonesian government (Al-Makassary, 2011, 288).

In DKM, there are three divisions which serve as indicators to examine the effectiveness of a mosque. Firstly, the division of organization (*idaroh*). Secondly, the division of welfare (*imaroh*). Thirdly, the division of maintenance and development (*ria'yah*). Moreover, *idaroh* does some planning, organizing, administering, financing and supervising all activities within the Indonesian mosques. Meanwhile, *imaroh* serves the education activities, be the center of *dakwah* (proselytization), improving the welfare of ummah, youths, library, etc. The services of *ri'ayah* includes architectures and the design of a mosque, maintaining facilities, park and the environment.

Regardless the operation management of this mosque, I have some suggestions that are important to be considered in managing mosques everywhere.

The Involvement in Civic Engagements

It seems that civic engagements, such as empowering the community, cleaning up the environment, and peace initiatives, are not sufficiently noticed by this mosque. It functions no more than a place for praying and other religious activities. Therefore, the mosque management should enlarge their functions beyond serving as a place of prayer and devotion.

In comparison, according to McLoughlin (2005, 1408), some mosques in Britain have functioned as places of prayer, devotion, and serving as 'advice centers for the unemployed, Members of Parliament's surgeries, homework clubs, youth centers, elderly day-care centers, and spaces to prepare food for communal gatherings such as weddings' since the 1980s.

In a similar way, Bagby (2009, 481) claims that the political and community involvement is manifest in American mosques. Furthermore, he adds that The Mosque Life Survey (MLS) found that 20 percent of participants took part in 'community service, social justice or advocacy activities of their mosque'.

Another example is a mosque in Sierra Leone. Drewer (2010, 57) argues that a primary key of conflict resolution or peacekeeping is to maintain houses of God, namely via churches and mosques through the Inter-religious Council of Sierra Leone. At this point, I regard that mosques could play a pivotal role in the civic engagements in their congregations.

The Influence of Salafy- and Wahaby-based Donor

As showed above, The Pattani Central Mosque could be categorized as a *khana kao* home base by carefully examining its Islamic teaching practices. I presume that many mosques in Pattani belong to the *khana kao*. However, the recent trend shows that several new mosques are built by the generosity of *Salafy and Wahaby*-based funds from Saudi Arabia.

McCargo (2008) discusses the tensions between 'new school' (*khana mai*) and 'old school' (*khana kao*) that taking place in some Pattani mosques due to a different approach in Islam. Basically, the 'new school' are alumni from abroad universities and follow progressive interpretation about Islamic teaching that differ from the old school that represent conservative group.

The extent to which some mosques in Pattani have been infiltrated by *Salafy and Wahaby*-based funds require further investigations because a probable mission behind of the funds is the promotion of *Wahabism*.

It is not surprising that Saudi Arabia is striving to promulgate *Wahabism* in the Muslim world. Wahid (2009) reveals that the *Wahaby* movements in Indonesia strives to promulgate their ideas through Islamic institutions and organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI),

and the education and government institutions and mosques.

Recently, the Islamic radical movement has implanted its ideology in mosques that are commonly under the auspices of the two biggest Islamic organisations viz., Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. In this light, the former general chairman of NU, Hasyim Muzadi, has warned all Muslim communities to be fully vigilant in regard to the emergence of what has been called the transnational ideology. To him, such an ideology is at odds with the Indonesian mainstream Islam which has been renowned for its tolerant and moderate character. Hence, this ideology must be rejected (Muzadi, 2009).

Moreover, the Central Committee of NU thinks it is necessary to protect NU's mosques from the infiltration of radical movement. In October 2007, at Pondok Pesantren Zainul Hasan Genggong (an Islamic boarding school), Probolinggo, Jawa Timur, the NU central committee held a *Bahtsul Masa'il* (a discussion on contemporary issues) which issued an edict on the certification of NU's mosques in order to keep them away from the influence of and the probable takeover done by this movement. Similarly, the Central Chair of Muhammadiyah issued the decree No.149/December 2006 that aims to protect Muhammadiyah's properties, such as mosques, schools, orphanages, hospitals, and universities from the influence and takeover by such radical group whose world-view is very much different from Muhammadiyah.

America faces a similar situation of which *Wahabism* is promoted through financial assistance. As Keller (cited in Haddad, 1994, 144) explains how a mosque could be easily influenced by the donors' ideology. For instance, a mosque in Los Angeles had received funds from a company or some individuals from Saudi Arabia. This could either directly or indirectly influence a mosque status and its congregation.

In southern Thailand, *Salafy-Wahaby* or *khana mai* has been largely commanded by a *Salafist-Wahabist* scholar named Dr. Ismail Lutfi

Chapakia. He has institutions such as the Yala Islamic College and the College of Islamic Studies at Prince of Songkla University.

Although previous research (Liow, 2006, 47-48; Yusuf, 2007, 18) considers Dr. Lutfi and his followers as the moderate *Wahaby*, and do not have relationships with other militant groups, I guess other radical *Salafy-Wahaby* movements strive to nurture influence, and promulgate ideas secretly through their financial assistance to mosques and *pondok* (Islamic boarding schools). Yet, Liow recognizes that the orthodox *Wahaby* is still a small and periphery group in southern Thailand.

The Weak Control toward Religious Study Groups

To date, the Pattani Central mosque has a good management in running their own religious study groups. Preachers of these study groups are *uztads* who have moderate views, such as *Uztad* Ismail Sepanjang. Theoretically speaking, mosques with a weak management could be easily infiltrated by the radical Islamic ideas. I think the weak control of religious study groups pave the way to radical preachers in promoting the radical Islamist concepts. This situation, in fact, allows the infiltration of radical ideas which occurs in mosques.

The history of Dani Dwi Permana, who became a suicide bomber at the *JW Marriot* Hotel, provides a valuable lesson. Dani was a religious study group member recruited by *Uztad* Saefuddin Jaelani at the *As-Surur* mosque in the *Telaga Kahuripan* housing in Bogor, Jawa Barat, Indonesia. Furthermore, a mosque study group could potentially transform into an ‘incubator of *Jihadism*’ to some extent (Ward, 2008, 216).

In the light of above, I argue that to some extent *Kru-ze* Mosque tragedy on 28 April 2004 is caused by the weak control over the religious study group in Pattani.

The Yawi Language as Social Resistance

During my fieldwork, one of my first encounters concerning Malay Pattani is, on the one hand, the Pattani language. On the other

hand, Pattani food, especially *nasi kerapu* suits my taste. Concerning the language, Pattani people could speak with others by using Bahasa Indonesia though we cannot fully grasp every single word. Yet, they still understand the substance of conversation. In contrast to such thing, I was surprised by the fact that preacher, delivered his sermon in the standard Malay so that I understood the sermons perfectly.

I asked myself then why do the preachers address their sermons in the ‘standard Malay’ while in the daily life, including my interviews, the Mosque congregation speaks with a dialect of Pattani language. Could the congregation then comprehend the sermons delivered in the standard Malay?

Several explanations pop up in my mind. Firstly, the preachers are educated people many of which have pursued their studies abroad such as in various *pondoks* and universities in Indonesia and Malaysia. In other words, they might want to show their own educational level. That explains some suspicions toward all Indonesians or Malaysians especially those from traditional *pondok* and certain Islamic universities in Java Island, Indonesia. Secondly, I think the sermons could not be fully understood by the Thai intelligence operatives especially during the crises in the region. Thirdly, that is tradition since the outset, and they just keep the tradition. Fourthly, they wish to preserve Bahasa Melayu in the midst of the domination of Thai language.

Recently, I know that majority of Pattani people, especially the old generation, speak Yawi language in a daily life. According to Gilquin (2002, 53), Yawi is ‘linked to religion, and is traditionally written with characters used in Arabic’. This is the difference from other languages (Bahasa Malaysia, Bahasa Indonesia and the Languages of Mindanao) that use the Roman alphabet.

However, the Arabic character of Yawi writing is sharply declining because the Thai alphabet is massively taught in the school. This phenomenon raised some concerns amongst

certain well educated groups in Pattani. Firstly, a foundation such as the Bungaraya Foundation tries to maintain the existence of *Yawi* language through publishing some books for students. In this sense, the foundation manager told me that the main idea to publish books in *Yawi* language is to preserve the language in the midst of the Thai language supremacy. Secondly, *Yawi* language is more than a mean to communicate among the freedom fighters that I have met in a prison in southern Thailand. To them, *Yawi* language is the national identity of Pattani. If Pattani loses its *Yawi* language, Pattani will lose its identity as well. Similarly, Nilsen (2011, 148) claims that 'in the Patani region, the local Malay dialect indicates Muslim identity'.

Based on my observation and interview, I think that the Pattani young generation and children accustom to speak the Thai language than the Malay language. One interesting fact that I saw during my fieldwork was the temporary *tadika* that using the Thai language as the language of instruction.

Furthermore, I argue that the rise of Thai language is caused by the job and career requirements either in Pattani region or in Thailand. Therefore, the decline of Malay language is inevitably triggered by the lost of economic interest on it. Thereby, mastering the Malay language means strengthening their identity as one Pattani nation, and establishing the local Muslim language.

THE CONTESTING VIEWS TOWARD MASJID JAMI' PATTANI

As a central mosque, *Masjid Jami'* Pattani, is the center of Islamic activities in Pattani. However, the perceptions of Pattani people toward this mosque are quite different primarily since 2004. There are two main views occurred during my interviews:

Firstly, most Muslims in Pattani regard this mosque as the symbol of Muslim existence in the area. Moreover, this mosque plays a pivotal role

in teaching Islamic community through many activities. Secondly, *Masjid Jami'* is considered as a symbolic power of the Thai Kingdom in Pattani. They view this mosque as the King's mosque because it is built and funded by the King. It is clearly shown by the Thai flag on the top of the mosque, and the presence of representative of Thai Monarchy in some occasions such as giving prizes for the winners of Qur'an reciting competitions. In addition, some people in Pattani hold the view that non-Muslims (including the King) should not enter a mosque. Practically speaking, the mosque manager allows non-Muslims to enter this mosque, which is regarded as a bad thing by these people. Finally, they have seen that *Masjid Kru-ze* turned out to be a brutal, slaughtering spot against 106 Muslims on 28 April 2004. Consequently, the mosque be the symbol of the struggle for freedom in Pattani.

CONCLUSION

Pattani Central Mosque is one entry point to look at the dynamic of Islam and conflict in southern Thailand through the sociological lens and the narrative description of the real inherent quality of the mosque (its Islamic teaching practices) Many things are available there to endorse a view that the mosque plays more roles than a mere worshiping place. Thus, it zigzags across time ranged from the site for some peaceful rallies in 1975 and 2007 by Malay Muslim Pattani against the Thai Government; the place for resisting the triumph of Thai language by exercising the standard Malay language in the Friday sermons; until it is regarded as the representation of predominant symbol of the Thai Kingdom.

To conclude, a groundless suspicion that the mosque is the place to recruit and teach Thailand Muslim militants; is not proven on this mosque. In addition, the mosque could not represent itself as a common house for all Islamic groups due to the tensions amongst certain Islamic groups that resist the existence of the mosque itself, and they prefer to run their own Islamic teaching and

developing their views on good governance and human rights within their own mosques.

Furthermore, a different depiction and qualities of a mosque could probably occur in the Pattani sub-urban areas and villages, especially mosques with which enjoy financial assistance from certain donors such as the *Salafy-Wahaby*. In particular, the radical Islamic ideas, teachings, and the practice to recruit young Muslims are not proven. Once again I want to emphasize that the real quality of the mosque is unique and distinct. Hence, it could not be generalized in studying other mosques in the Pattani villages.

All in all, the Pattani Central Mosque appears to be composed of a fair, equal mixture of moderate and conservative Islamic point of views instead of the radical and extreme ones.

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