

## Blue Ocean Strategy in Managing Maritime Security

Sapto J. Poerwowidagdo\*

\*Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia

---

| Article Info  | Abstract   |
|---|--|
| <p><b>Keywords:</b><br/>Archipelagic state,<br/>Maritime domain awareness,<br/>Blue ocean strategy,<br/>Revolution in navy affairs.</p> | <p><i>The impact of the extension of the sea area of Indonesia, the biggest archipelagic state, is the bigger task of the Indonesian Navy and the other institutions and stake holder of the maritime security. The overlapping of the responsibility and authority in the maritime security tasks, pushes the Indonesian Navy in optimizing its main task. In the scope of the Maritime Domain Awareness, the Blue Ocean Strategy might be considered in managing an integrated maritime security by using Revolution in Navy Affairs in the Indonesian sea-power building.</i></p> |
| <p><b>Corresponding Author:</b><br/>spoerwowidagdo@idu.ac.id</p>  | <p>Pengembangan luas wilayah laut Indonesia sebagai negara kepulauan besar, berdampak terhadap besarnya tuntutan tugas yang harus diemban oleh TNI-AL dan aparat yang menangani keamanan laut. Tumpah tindih wewenang dan tugas mendorong penggunaan kekuatan angkatan laut ke arah pengoptimalan tugas utamanya. Dalam lingkup maritime domain kesadaran, Strategi Laut Biru perlu dipertimbangkan untuk penanganan keamanan laut secara terpadu, dengan memanfaatkan Revolusi Angkatan Laut dalam pembangunan kekuatan laut Indonesia.</p>   |

---

**Jurnal Pertahanan**  
Volume 1 Nomor 1  
Januari-April 2015  
ISSN 2087-9415  
hh. 13-26  
©2015 JP. All rights reserved.

### Introduction

Indonesia gained over the territorial waters of Indonesia and the acquisition of sovereign rights over the EEZ and Continental Shelf as well as the acquisition of authority over the

Additional Zone was selected for his efforts to fight for the interests of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is now recognized all over the world. With the development of the new Law of the Sea, Indonesia

acquire sea area of about 3 million km<sup>2</sup>. Means that area of Indonesian natural power that used to only approximately 2 million km<sup>2</sup> (1945) in 1957 growing to 5 million km<sup>2</sup> and growing again since 1982 approximately 8 million km<sup>2</sup>, of which 6 million km<sup>2</sup> of which is in the ocean.

Securing such a vast ocean areas need Indonesian Navy force and officers related to the enforcement of the rule of law and the sovereignty of the territory is quite large, in line with the objectives of national defense. The problem of maritime security is not just a national issue, but also an international issue that over time more prominent and affected relations with the nation Indonesia or other parties, mainly the waters of Indonesia. Based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, Indonesia has sovereignty waters, but also must allow the passage of naval vessels and/or other countries civilian.

Furthermore, in accordance with the UNCLOS, 1982, law enforcement authorities at sea by the Government boat ship is still weak due to spread in some instances.

Maritime security arrangement Indonesia needs to be reorganized to make it more efficient by establishing the Indonesian Sea and Coast Guard, as a single agency with multi task which has the capability of law enforcement at sea are qualified, as well as strengthen the capacity and the position of the Navy which has the function of diplomacy, polisional and military.

The important is securing economic activities in the marine jurisdiction and sovereignty of Indonesia's extensive system requires a professional, effective and efficient. To achieve the required maritime strategy which includes a variety of fields.

Some sea security issues are quite prominent, and the attention of the world community are: (a) the high threat of violence, such as hijacking, piracy, sabotage, and terror vital objects; (b) the threat of navigation, such as shortages and theft of navigational aids; (c) the threat of resources, such as the destruction and pollution of the sea and its ecosystem; and (d) the threat of the sovereignty

and laws, such as illegal fishing, illegal immigrants, making illegal treasure, exploration and exploitation of natural resources illegally, as well as smuggling of goods, people and weapons.

For the handling of maritime security problem is not only the duty and authority of the Indonesian Navy, but held together by a coordinated manner Bakorkamla (Maritime Security Coordinating Board).

Carvalho et al (2011) says that the Maritime Domain Awareness is the concern/awareness of the maritime sphere, is an effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime sphere that can impact the security, safety, economy, and environment. Maritime Domain Awareness requires an integrated approach between government, naval forces, law enforcement agencies and other agencies at all levels.

In creating the persistence of Maritime Domain Awareness requires sensor technology portfolio to the target search, detection, tracking and identification. No single sensor technology can achieve this in an

affordable manner. Maritime Domain Awareness involves the ability to integrate information from various sources in a complex and evolving scenario to generate dynamic images, comprehensive, and accurate of naval operations environment.

The emphasis on a clean operation and a shift to asymmetrical warfare have added an additional level of complexity and technical challenges for the integration of automated information and predictive assessment of the situation (Frazer, et al, 2010).

#### ***Minimum Essential Forces Goals***

The Government of Indonesia through the Ministry of Defense has devised a program allocating approximately 150 billion rupiahs for Indonesia's military modernization is through the achievement of Minimum Essential Force.

Indonesia's military enhanced capabilities through the Minimum Essential Force is expected to bring it become more professional and reliable in performing basic tasks and additional tasks assigned to him in accordance with Law 34/2004 on

military Indonesia. In addition, one of the main objectives Minimum Essential Force is to achieve total independence in the defense industry in 2024 (Piesse, 2015).

The achievement of the MEF will focus on the development and modernization of military force that prioritizes the development and modernization of the power of the Air Force and the Navy, and the stabilization of the power of the army. Minimum Essential Forces (MEF), aims to develop the Indonesian navy capable of patrolling the breadth of the islands of Indonesia in 2024. The Indonesian Military is currently hampered by outdated weapons systems that make it difficult to effectively protect the country's territorial waters (Guidance 2008).

Plans defense capabilities aimed at achieving the Minimum Essential Forces that “the level of force that can ensure the achievement of the strategic defense interests directly, with priority given to increase the procurement of defense force minimum and or replacement of weapon systems / equipment that is

outdated (Presidential Regulations No. 7/2008) , In operational terms, there are no immediate plans to introduce a significant increase in the number of military personnel (Indonesia's Ministry of Defence, 2008), but priority will be given to improve the quality of combat readiness, mobility, and maintenance and repair of general ability navy, corps sea, and the air force (Wulan, 2009).

In the interest of maintaining the safety, security, and defense at sea, the Navy Indonesia as the backbone of the defense and security at sea still do not have sufficient capacity to undertake mastery of the sea under national jurisdiction. Of the needs of approximately 300 combatant ships, the Navy had about 130 ships to the composition and capabilities were deemed inadequate.

Development of Indonesian Navy should become more outward looking, which is based on the needs of the national sea control to the boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zone, not only to support the defense on the ground. It should also consider

the defense strategy that is both deterrent and denial. If the enemy can be resisted and prevented in the ocean, we do not need to fight on land.

### **Research Methods**

This research explained using a qualitative method which to give description about the implementation of blue ocean strategies in the maritime security. This study illustrates the application perspective blue ocean strategy as the basic framework of maritime security in Indonesia. With the orientation discussion on four levels in the value of innovation

### **Result and Discussion**

#### ***Revolution in Navy Affairs***

Revolutionary of Military Affairs (RMA) is an evolving concept with the development of technology and information that encourages a country to increase its capabilities in winning the battle or face future threats. RMA refers to the introduction and implementation of new thinking about strategy and tactics, organization and military doctrine, force structure and weapons entire acquisition (Gongora and von

Riekhoff, 2000; Gray, 2004; US Secretary of Defense, 2003).

Hundley (Moon and Lee, 2008) shows, RMA paradigm involves a major change in the conduct of military operations, which result from the combination of several innovations in technologies, devices, systems, operational concept and military doctrine and force structure. In a narrow sense, based on major innovations in sensor (reconnaissance and surveillance), command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, sniper, and the network, assuming the network-centric warfare as the core of a future war.

Based on that idea, the RMA can be regarded as a comprehensive transformation to improve a country's ability to win the battle facing the threat of ever-changing and multidimensional due to the progress of science and technology, particularly computer-based technologies, communications and information.

RMA also refers to the effectiveness of performance in the context of the capability for the battle-winning capabilities. MEF compliance

in relation to the development of doctrine and organization to achieve the level of capability that can address all forms of threats that can jeopardize the projected state sovereignty, territorial integrity and safety of the nation. This is in line with the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which is an improvement of military capabilities in carrying out combat operations.

According Blaker (Hoffman, 2006) RMA as a supporter of the superiority and dominance alleged information for American arms. They called for a sharp increase in spending on the “system of systems” that will increase the capacity of the United States to use information technology and precision weapons. Those with the most fully developed plan explicitly used cutting ground forces, cutting at least two Divisions of the Army and the Marine Division as an offset for more computers, satellite, sensor networks, and precision munitions.

Several factors have facilitated the emergence of RMA in the United States and in other places. The first is a change in the overall security

environment after the Cold War and globalization. Various types of military forces needed to respond effectively in the emerging international order in which the threat of such global terrorist.

RMA can be viewed as the organization's response to changes in the security environment (Edwards, 2000). The second factor is technological change and its impact on the military field. Performance US military in the Gulf War of 1991, air strikes in Kosovo and most recently in the invasion of Iraq has shown, the evolution of weapons technology, particularly the revolution in information technology, has brought major changes in the military organization and doctrine (Moon and Lee, 2008).

Finally, in so much as new technologies and social arrangements and new organizations have formed RMA nature, new strategic thinking on the use of force, the conception of the war and win wars methods have been equally important. Precision demonstrations, as opposed to mass destruction, and the mandate of a

minimum of casualties, including soldiers have been justified to adopt RMA (Moon and Lee, 2008).

In the American context, the transition from military operations to build a centralized network to achieve effective expected to bring positive benefits, such as increased speed of command, self-synchronization, advanced targeting, tactical greater stability and the achievement of victory in the new security environment.

Ross (Moon and Lee, 2008) assessing the acquisition in the military usually occurs through one of four sources: the research and development of domestic, co-production or production through transfer of technology, licensed production and acquisitions abroad directly.

Given that the RMA involving most cutting-edge technology, most countries rely on overseas acquisitions directly, rather than on research and development of domestic or co-production. Indonesian Navy in using the RMA requires a major change in doctrine and organization, as well as

progress in the defense industrial base.

New strategies and doctrines that come from the RMA requires a platform of new weapons and defense industrial base as appropriate. If the weapon and sensor platforms that will form the basis of a centralized network war is smaller, lighter, faster, and more complex, the platform manufacturers must build more complex than building ships and planes.

### ***Blue Ocean Strategy***

Given the breadth of the territorial sea of the archipelago and the tasks to be performed by the Indonesian Navy in upholding the country's sovereignty at sea, maintaining the integrity of the homeland, and maintain the safety of the nation and the state of the sea, then externally, with various countries in the Asia Pacific region, particularly in Asia southeast, as well as internally with all components and institutions which have the authority in the sea and beaches in the whole of Indonesia, must compete to demonstrate the capacity of its ability in carrying out a duty.

Anticipating the competition

there should be a strategy to support the Indonesian Navy with operational units built up strength and awakened on target Minimum Essential Forces. The theory of strategy is a multidisciplinary field with competing ideas based on the most basic assumptions can be compared, including disagreements about what should be the strategy theory seeks to explain. This is confirmed by Schendel (Maykish, 2011) that the considerable effort over the past decade in the field to identify paradigms and seek new approaches (Maykish, 2011).

First, the theory of strategy has an emphasis on educating practitioners on how the theory of the strategy involves several changes from concept to reality in the military strategy of the war plan for organizational transformation strategy. Secondly, in this definition the emphasis on the battlefield for comparison in war strategy.

Drew and Snow (2006) introduced the process of national security, acknowledged there are five levels of classic strategy. 1) The

purpose of National Security (National Security Strategy, foreign policy, etc.); 2) Grand strategy (or a national policy for all the instruments of power); 3) Military Strategy; 4) Operational Strategy; and 5) Battlefield Strategy.

Low-level strategy is internally consistent with the rest of the strategy process as a plan of action which organized the effort to achieve a goal. Furthermore, the strategy was made by different people or groups at different levels of authority, with often very different perspective of what can or should be done. Evolution of five levels also support their view of the general strategy only expanded by a new scale of organization (Drew and Snow, 2006).

For military theory, most definitions center on level 3 or between levels 2 and according to Gray (2010) Strategies is a bridge that relates military power for political purposes; this is not a military power per se or political purposes. With the strategic use is made of force and the threat of violence for policy purposes. Clausewitz (Gray, 2010) that the theory of the military in the war is the




use of engagements for the object of war.

However, Clausewitz did not write during the time scale of a tripartite war (strategy, operations and tactics). It Winton, Clausewitz (Gray, 2010) expand the view to display the tripartite war bipartite still do to this day.

Furthermore, Gray (2010) interpret it in that military strategy alignment function to the highest levels of government in which the object set. While Dolman (2005) states that the strategy is a plan to maintain excellence consistently. The strategy is not about winning, but a moment in time for strategists, strategies that focus on long beyond setting conditions during the battle and campaign events.

Blue Ocean Strategy is an alternative strategy that supports the Indonesian Navy in the formation, development, and use of powers associated with the implementation of the main tasks or the basic tasks in hand. In Kim and Mouborgne (2005), military strategy was criticized as inherently simple and limited to the concept and field competitors.

This thinking is labeled “Red ocean” that means locked receive, factors that become the main obstacle battlefield is limited and the need to defeat the enemy to succeed. On the other hand, the creative strategy of “blue ocean” create competition relevant. The concept is the innovation value of the process of removing, reducing, adding, and created from what is on the standard profiles that apply in general, as seen in Figure 1.



**Figure 1. Value Innovation (Kim dan Mauborgne, 2005)**

In figure 1, the four main frameworks in the Blue Ocean Strategy, namely Eliminate, Reduce, Increase, and Create. In step Eliminate, discover what factors may be deleted, which is considered 'must' in the activities of the organization in general.

In step Reduce, explore the factors that which can be improved over the standard of organization in general. In step Increase, explore what factors may be reduced below the standard of organization in general. In step Create, explore what factors may be created which has never been raised or carried out in the organization in general. Blue Ocean Strategy Implementation in the Maritime Security Troubleshooting Territory, by implementing four major frameworks, as follows:

**First step, Eliminate.**

Indonesia requires the Navy to identify factors that have long been the scene of rivalry that is often taken for granted although it did not give the value or reduce value to the organization. By looking at the time, the situation of the red ocean focus on

the main tasks or the basic tasks Navy Indonesia, namely state sovereignty and law enforcement in marine waters, EEZ and continental shelf. To get away from the 'red ocean', the new strategy will focus on fulfilling the primary function of sovereignty and law enforcement in the region within the range of tasks Indonesian Navy and abolish the functions can be done by other agencies involved in coordination Bakorkamla (Maritime Security Coordinating Board).

**Second Step, Reduce.** An evaluation step of the operations that had been prepared by the Indonesian Navy to be able to carry out all the tasks handed over to the Indonesian Navy. In support to the task force Bakorkamla (Maritime Security Coordinating Board), reducing delivery task forces that can be prepared by other agencies, without prejudice to the existence of Indonesian Navy in coordination Bakorkamla (Maritime Security Coordinating Board). Reduce any excessive spending, with the efficiency of delivery of the elements of the sea and the air is right and appropriate tasks to be assigned.

Without reducing the effectiveness of the carrying ability of the elements of the Indonesian Navy under the control of the operation (BKO) to Bakorkamla (Maritime Security Coordinating Board), efficient allocation of budgetary support. Without prejudice vigilance against possible escalation of conflict in the sea border with neighboring countries, reducing shipping combat forces deployed at the borders with other countries, but rather pointed to the diplomatic efforts in the next step.

**Third Step, Increase.** Indonesian Navy efforts to improve operational capabilities according main tasks or the basic tasks in hand. Improve guidance and development of Indonesian Navy force refers to the target MEF (Minimum Essential Forces) as a sea power that is reliable and respected. In addition, optimizing diplomacy with friendly countries, either directly has a maritime border with Indonesia, and which have an influence on the environmental situation in the border conflict around the area.

**Fourth step, Creating.** An

attempt by the Navy to demonstrate the ability to use sea power as demanded in the essential task or core functions, namely enforcement of the sovereignty and laws in the area of sea to the EEZ and the continental shelf, at least not lead to strength according MEF, it needs the capability to reach that should not be physically accessible by elements of the ship or plane, but with the ability C4ISR (Command, Control, Computer, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), with the proliferation ability of Cyber War- Revolution in Navy Affair.

### **Conclusions**

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that in the process of development of the defense forces, with the goal of MEF in 2024 or earlier, handling maritime security issues in the region NKRI such a vast, requires finesse (expected) capable of handling it. One alternative is to apply the Blue Ocean Strategy.

From the perspective of the Navy, as part of a major component of the defense, around the implementation of the tasks that must

be carried in handling maritime security, maritime security with such a broad area, the implementation of the Blue Ocean Strategy is a necessity. Four frameworks, eliminate-reduce-increase-creating, namely: First, eliminate things that do not directly or less relevant to the task (principal) to be carried. Second, Reduce the intensity of the tasks and things that can be done by other agencies concerned and more relevant to the goals to be achieved.

Third, increasing external communication with other countries, diplomacy in terms of area maritime border, and internal communication with relevant agencies with maritime security, in coordination countermeasures marine security issues, either through Bakorkamla, as well as bilateral and multilateral basis with the agencies concerned and Fourth, creating a sea power capable C4ISR (Command, Control, Computer, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), and Cyber warfare.

### **Recommendation**

Although this research has

resulted in a conclusion that supports efforts to establish maritime security through the implementation of blue ocean strategy, but the researchers realized that not only the four stages of the value of innovation to create a maritime security. There are still many other variables that can be used as study materials to achieve maritime security in Indonesia such as the establishment of a new city strategy reinforced the coastal region with a fleet of maritime patrol were armed sophisticated and integrated communication system with the army and navy. Future studies need to be done so that the conclusions empirical studies reflect actual research object.

### **Reference**

- Carvalho, R. N., Haberlin, R., Costa, P. C. G., Laskey, K. B., & Chang, K. C. (2011). Modeling a probabilistic ontology for maritime domain awareness. In *Information Fusion (FUSION), Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on* (pp. 1-8). IEEE.
- Dolman, Everett C. (2005). *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age, Cass Series-- Strategy and History*. London: New York.
- Drew, Dennis M. and Donald M.

- Snow. (2006). *Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy: An Introduction to Modern National Security Processes and Problems*. Alaska: Air University Press.
- Edwards, S. A. (2000). *Swarming on the Battlefield: Past, Present, and Future*. Canada: RAND Research.
- Frazer, G. J., Meehan, D. H., Abramovich, Y. I., & Johnson, B. A. (2010). Mode-selective OTHR: A new cost-effective sensor for maritime domain awareness. *IEEE Radar Conference*.
- Gongora, T. and Harald von Riekhoff (eds). (2000). *Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs?: Defense and Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century*. Westport. Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Gray, C. S. (2004). *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and The Evidence of History*. London: Frank Cass.
- Gray, Colin S. (2010). *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Guidance, A. S. (2008). Golden window of opportunity: a new maritime strategy and force structure for the Australian Navy. *Security Challenges*,4(2), 81-104.
- Hoffman, F. G. (2006). Complex irregular warfare: the next revolution in military affairs. *Orbis*, 50(3), 395-411.
- <http://www.invonesia.com/mengenal-batas-batas-wilayah-indonesia.html>.
- Indonesia's Ministry of Defence. (2008). *Indonesia's Defence White Paper*. Jakarta: Indonesia's Ministry of Defence.
- Kim, Chan dan Renée Mauborgne. (2005). *The Blue Ocean Strategy*. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press.
- Marsetio. (2013). Developing Regional Naval Cooperation: The Indonesian Navy's Perspective. *IMDEX 2013-2014*.
- Maykish, P. J. (2011). *Strength in Ways: Finding Creativity in Routine Strategy Development*. Montgomery: Air University Maxwell AFB Al School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.
- Moon, C. I., & Lee, J. Y. (2008). The revolution in military affairs and the defence industry in South Korea. *Security Challenges*, 4(4), 117-34.
- Piesse, M. (2015). The Indonesian maritime doctrine: Realising the potential of the ocean. *Headmark*, (154), 10.
- Presidential Declare No. 7/2008 on General Policy Guidelines on State Defence Policy.
- Subekti dan Poerwodigdo. (2013). Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Security Affairs in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Seminar di National Defense University. 19 September 2013.

US Secretary of Defense. (2003). *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*. Washington, D.C: US Department of Defense.

Wulan, Alexandra R. (2009). *Satu Dekade Reformasi Militer Indonesia*. Jakarta: Pacivis and FES.