

Sociopolitical Analysis of The Escalation of The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) Movement During The Reign Of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) In DKI Jakarta 2014-2017

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ABSTRACT

This study analyze how social conditions during the reign of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) affected the escalation of the Islamic community organization Front Pembela Islam (FPI) movement and built the reality of socio-political conflicts that occurred in DKI Jakarta from 2014 to 2017. The method used in this research is a qualitative research method using a case study approach. The case study approach was used to analyze how the process of forming the escalation of the Islamic community organization movement of Front Pembela Islam (FPI) against socio-political conditions during Ahok's reign in DKI Jakarta from 2014 to 2017. Using theories related to the concept of Political Opportunity, New Social Movements, and Identity Theory becomes an analytical knife to explain questions that have been formulated academically and, of course, produce an answer from the results of the analysis. From the results of the research, the Islamic Mass Organization of Front Pembela Islam (FPI) was one of the Organizations that experienced an escalation of the movement based on various conflicts that occurred both before, during his time in office, and also after Ahok served as governor of DKI Jakarta. FPI is present as a hard-pressure group for Ahok's refusal to become Governor. FPI became one of the organizations considered very active and aggressive in carrying out a series of protests against Ahok's rejection.

Keywords: FPI, Social Movement, Ahok, Socio-Political.

Background

Various cultural patterns in Indonesia are well known in various corners of the world. Multiculturalism is the right word for Indonesia because it has various tribes, cultures, languages, races, and religions. Almost every region of Indonesia has more than one difference between the five fields mentioned earlier. Humans have nature as social creatures by living side by side and also needing each other between humans and humans.

According to Keith Jacobs, the word social is that there is something that has been built and runs on a site against the community. Every difference that exists in society has a high level of complexity. Differences are the main factors of social and political disputes in the order of society. Therefore, boundaries or regulations are considered important to achieve common welfare goals.

Known as a multicultural state, political parties are ideal places for the affair in the political scene to provide a place or place to select or unite the thoughts of various bodies into one mind and one unity of purpose. With the widespread idea that the people are factors that need to be considered and included in the political process, political parties have been born spontaneously and developed into a link between the people and the government (Bambang Sunggono, 1992).

Social stratification also forms a diversity that is so submissive in Indonesian society. A loyalty that must be mandated to citizens does not rule out the possibility that each citizen has double loyalty according to its portion. According to Surbakti, although every citizen must maintain the country's unity, they also have an attachment to their group identity. They agreed to live together as a nation based on the political framework and legal procedures that apply to community members. Citizens use this opportunity to dedicate themselves to the nation and its group.

So, they build their ideology and strength. The ideology and power can be seen in various community organizations or organizations born in this country. The power built is not only financial but also gives an ideological influence on the order of the Republic of Indonesia or in the sense of participating in voicing its aspirations in parliament until now. Community organizations or organizations can be divided into several social aspects such as religious-based community organizations, social and cultural-based community organizations, and national or political-based community organizations.

Organizations move more dynamically and flexibly than political parties that only show their noses in political years. As the name implies, community organizations stand for the hand of all aspirations, goals, and containers of the nearest ideals for the community to participate in helping and accommodating other communities without government interference. Faith-based community organizations look more dominant than other community-based organizations. Currently, there are more than thousands of Islamic faith-based organizations in Indonesia. Each Islamic organization has its characteristics both from

its ideology, its movements, and the most basic is from the color patterns used in its uniform during every protest.

Now Islamic faith-based community organizations have grown rapidly. The quantity of Islamic organizations in Indonesia is too much. This is directly proportional to social control skills. According to Bruce J. Cohen, social control is a means or method used to behave in harmony with the people's will in large or special groups. The ability of social control or social control belongs to the government. Still, as the ability of human thinking tools develops, these abilities will be possessed by either individuals or groups who meet the requirements of the power to enter the social control circle.

Front Pembela Islam, or what we often call FPI, is one of the many Islamic organizations that have become the center of attention in the past few years. In the political years 2014 to 2017. The struggle of faith-based organizations has long been seen to color often the balance of social and political life in Indonesia, one of which is Front Pembela Islam (FPI). FPI, led by Al-Habib Rizieq Shihab, is always seen taking part in Indonesia's dark black record of social and political life. Through the robustness of principles and think-provoking that is poured into each of its movements, FPI should be taken into account. With the burning sentences of the FPI admonitions ignited a huge fire of spirit in his thousands of followers. FPI contributions can control the social and political balance in Indonesia.

Quoted from Al Zastrouw Ngatawi (2006), if you look at the escalation or improvement of the FPI movement in social, political, and religious aspects, it will look more prominent in its social and political aspects. Indeed, when viewed from the factors behind the birth of FPI, it seems clear that the birth of FPI cannot be separated from the reform event as a momentum of socio-political change in Indonesia.

Front Pembela Islam's (FPI) work as a social movement consistent in promoting Islamic identity politics further creates an absolute classification of identity in one particular group. On the one hand, it can be an adhesive, but, on the other hand, it can be a source of conflict. As a group that highlights Islamic identity, FPI itself, since its establishment, is indeed involved in religious activities and is also active in efforts to help the government to reduce social problems such as sweeping actions on places of prostitution, gambling, and drug transactions that are contrary to the values in Islam. FPI also has a large role in social activities, such as helping the handling victims of natural disasters.

It is clear that the emergence of religious identity groups, in this case, namely Islam, as presented by one of them, namely FPI, is triggered by not only the religious factor itself but the existence of different backgrounds, including as a reaction to marginalization and response to national and global political hegemony.

Joko Widodo's rise to the presidency was accompanied by the promotion of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) as Governor of DKI Jakarta. We know that ethnicity, race, culture, and religion are inherent components of socio-politics. So, if one of these components

experiences friction, there will be an opportunity for a change in the order of socio-political life in it.

Some of the escalations or escalations of movements carried out by Front Pembela Islam (FPI) during Ahok's reign include:

- November 10, 2014; Front Pembela Islam (FPI) organized a movement to reject Ahok's declaration to be a governor in DKI Jakarta.
- October 14, 2016; Front Pembela Islam (FPI) organized a protest called Aksi Bela Islam I by demanding that an investigation into the blasphemy case carried out by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) be carried out immediately.
- November 4, 2016; Front Pembela Islam organized Aksi Bela Al-Qur'an, or peaceful Protest/ still in the atmosphere of Aksi Bela Islam II to follow up that Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) is considered to have insulted the religion of Islam.
- December 2, 2016; Front Pembela Islam (FPI) held peaceful protests/ Aksi Bela Islam III.

Based on several movement actions carried out by FPI from year to year above, what is a factor in the movement's formation? What about the socio-political situation at the time? Or just because Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) became the leader? Then, how did socio-political life go during Ahok's leadership in DKI?

This reality greatly impacts the life of a multicultural Indonesian society and upholds democracy based on three important elements, namely social, political, and religious elements. Thus the author wants to conduct a study entitled "Socio-Political Analysis of the Escalation of Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Movement during the Reign of Basuki Tjahaja Prunama (Ahok) in DKI Jakarta 2014-2017".

Literature Review

Concept of Political Opportunity (Political Opportunity)

The term Political Opportunity Approach is commonly known by the term Political Opportunity Structure or The Political Process Theory. Douglas McAdam first formulated the theory of political processes about Social Movements in 1982 in a book entitled "Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970" (Locher, 2002:264).

Eisinger (in Wahlstrom & Peterson, 2006: 364) introduced the concept of the Structure of Political Opportunity (the Political Opportunity Structure/POS), and today the concept of the Structure of Political Opportunity (the Political Opportunity Structure) is often used by McAdam (1982) and Tarrow (1994). POS is an expression that aims to analyze the political situation that influences the emergence, structure, scope, and success of a social movement. The scientists used the concept of POS, which can be applied in general in analyzing

movements in local characteristic contexts. A structure is specific; each location is different and varies over time.

McAdam (Locher, 2002: 265) argues that three determinant factors can drive the success of a social movement there are (1) organizational strength; (2) cognitive liberation; dan (3) political opportunities. First, Organizational strength, namely the level (level of conditions) of organizations in society that feel aggrieved. The more organized a group of people is, the more likely it will succeed in a social movement. Like in Resource Mobilization Theory, McAdam also noted the importance of organizational presence in forming social movements through his Political Process Theory. Regardless of its type, the existence of an organization will build a structure of solidarity incentives, communication networks, and recognized leaders. Furthermore, McAdam argues that the existence of a social group will allow the emergence of social and interpersonal motivations to take part in group activities with other members. Members of a group who do not want to join a movement and others will feel guilty and be punished socially. Meanwhile, they will benefit socially and feel closer to other members if they join.

According to Porta and Diani (2006: 140), the study of social movement organizations (SMO) is fairly popular in analyzing social movements. Although experts give a fairly varied understanding of the organization of social movements, it can generally be said that the organization of social movements is an identity organization of a complex or formal nature to achieve the goals implemented in a social movement or counter social movement. In contrast, the other definition states that the organization of social movements is an association of people who make moral and ideal demands about how society's marginalized personal or group life is organized.

Second, Cognitive liberation is the perception of the chances of success in society. The more they believe they can succeed, the greater they will try to get involved in social movements. Cognitive Liberation is a simple concept. Before people participate in a movement, potential members must develop the idea that a situation is viewed as unfair and that this condition can be changed through a collective protest. In other words, they must develop a feeling of relative deprivation, be sure that this deprivation is wrong, decide that their goal is right, and be sure that the solution to their problem is structural. McAdam never used the word relative deprivation, but his ideas have something in common. Before a movement can begin, there must first be a group whose members desire and are confident that they will gain something from a collective protest.

Third, Political opportunities. There are two political opportunities concepts: (a) Political opportunities, namely the alignment between groups and the larger political environment. The more a group can unite in the political arena, the more likely it is to be able to make changes in a political system. Political Opportunity is a very important aspect compared to the other two factors. The movement's organizations must acquire and use political power to achieve significant results. The existence of changes in a system will allow for the emergence

of a social movement, and (b) for The Social System to survive, the social movement must be able to adapt to social and political changes in society.

McAdam mentions that there are four dimensions of political opportunity that have a direct relationship with the social system in which the movement exists (Locher, 2002: 267; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 2004:27); there are: (1) The relative open or closedness of an institutional political system, (2) the stable or unstable of various relations between ruling groups, (3) the presence or absence of communion between forces (elites) in society, and (4) the capacity and the tendency of the State to take reflexive actions. Each factor directly determines how much political opportunity a social movement has. A movement must exist in situations and places where these factors support it to be successful.

In explaining the political opportunities or opportunities for the birth of a movement, Sydney Tarrow (in McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 2004: 41-44) argues that, in general, two approaches can be used to determine the political opportunities that trigger the emergence of social movements, there are (1) Proximate opportunity structure; and (2) State centered opportunity structure. First is the proximate opportunity structure. This approach emphasizes the signs received from policies in the community or from changes that occur in community resources and resources. In particular, this approach is further divided into two types, namely: (1) Policy specific opportunities, which are of the view that political opportunities or opportunities for the birth of a social movement can arise because of a government policy that is not under the aspirations of the community, or not implemented by the government properly.

Such government policies can provide opportunities for the presence of a social movement. Political opportunities can also arise as a result of the government's declining legitimacy, or even because the legitimacy of the State is not recognized by society, and (2) Group-specific opportunities; this approach looks at the structure of opportunities focused on the changes that occur or are experienced by certain groups, either their purpose or existence in society. These changes can also trigger the emergence of collective protest. The causes of these changes can be caused by various factors, such as politics, economy, ideology, culture, war, etc.

Second State centered opportunity structure; this approach focuses on the state and all aspects therein that are the source of opportunities that can be used to bring about the collective protest. In particular, there are two types of State-centered opportunity structures: (1) Cross-sectional statism. In this approach, the state is considered an arena of competition between various social classes. The status and occurrence of political conflicts, and (2) Dynamic statism, which focuses on how the country changes and how the country changes produce or reduce political opportunities.

This approach highlights the influence of changes in a country and its influence on the actors of social movements. According to Tarrow (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 2004: 40-45),

the entire political system underwent changes that would change the environment of social actors strong enough to influence the initial steps, forms, and outcomes of collective protest.

1. The Concept of a New Social Movement (New Social Movement)

In the study of social movements, there are several explanations about theoretical studies and approaches that we can explore in understanding or analyzing how a social movement occurs. According to Singh (2010), several social movement studies are developing, namely classical social movements, neo-classical, and new social movements.

In the classical tradition, social movements were influenced by Western social psychologists and historians before the 1950s, which included most of the studies on the collective behavior of society in the form of crowds, riots, and rebels. In the neo-classical tradition, social movements began to develop after the 1950s and were divided into two old models of social movements, namely functional old social movements, and Marxist dialectics. And for new social movements, or so-called contemporary social movements developed around the 1960s and 1970s. Among Europeans and Americans, this new social movement includes humanist, cultural, and non-materialistic aspects, which essentially refer to universal goals and are directed towards protecting and maintaining human living conditions in a better direction. (Oman, 2016:9).

Referring to the theoretical understanding of the New Social Movement (NSM) explicitly according to their perspective, the NSM covers the logic of political, ideological, and cultural-based protests at the root of collective protests, as well as other sources of identity, ethnicity, gender, and sex that are interpreted into collective protest. Thus the New Social Movement (NSM) has a terminology of collective protest from the old social movement's concept of proletarian revolution and relates to the theory of classical Marxism. Although, on the one hand, the NSM rejects or criticizes the concept of classical Marxism theory in the Old Social Movement, the NSM is simply trying to update, revise, and change the assumptions of the Classical Marxist. (Buechler, 1995:442) (in Oman, 2016:118).

a. Mobilization Structure

Mobilization structure theory is a popular alternative mechanism for explaining social movements in society. The mobilization structure explains that a political system run on institutional elements such as the state, government, and institutions at the local level will give rise to a prospect of building collective protests and categories in a movement.

According to McCarthy in Situmorang (2007: 7), the structure of mobilization is carried away by social movement groups in forming collective protest with a movement tactic and a form of social movement organization. Likewise, in its implementation, this mobilization structure can be done in informal and formal collective protest. Wolifer in Situmorang (2007: 8) explains the development of the concept of informal structure based on the factors of the existence of a community. Gamson and Schmeidler explained some of the supporting factors in the informal

mobilization structure, based on subculture differences and protested infrastructure on a problem.

Edwards and McCarthy (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004:125-128) (in Oman, 2016:168) mentioned that in the concept of resource mobilization, there are several models, including:

First, mobilization of moral resources that include legitimacy, sympathy support, solidarity support, and support of people or public figures. The second mobilization of cultural resources is a conceptual set of cultural products and specialized knowledge. The concept of cultural products includes the production of movements or important issues such as music, literature, magazines, films, and videos. Third, mobilization of social and organizational resources includes intentional and commensurate social organizations. An intentional organization is an organization formed specifically for further social movements. Commensurate organizations are organs formed not based on the purpose of movement, but movement actors can access resources through this organ. Fourth, mobilization of human resources includes such resources as labor, security, skills, and expertise. Fifth, mobilization of material resources is a concept of resources such as monetary, property rights, office space, equipment, and supplies.

b. Framing

The framing mechanism is an advanced mechanism of mobilization structure in social movements. Because in its implementation, the mobilization structure has a problem that becomes a weakness in interpreting a phenomenon of the emergence of social movements. According to Rucht in Situmorang (2007: 9), the structure of mobilization is often too complex to interpret a movement phenomenon. It better explains how a social movement's level and scope of analysis.

Therefore, the framing process is very important in understanding the mechanisms of social movements more openly so that others will understand how achievement is made by social movement actors in performing a collective protest. Snow and Benford in Situmorang (2007: 10) emphasize two important things in framing a movement, including defining problems and their sources based on causation and also, at the same time, identifying the right strategies to fight for them.

In framing mechanisms, motion actors have the core task of how they can articulate a movement carried out at public discretion. According to Zald, some important things in the formformingng are the topic of cultural contradictions and historical flows. According to him, cultural tensions and contradictions such as injustice and grievances became one thing that was very important in the formation and framing process of the movement. Then the second is the framing process as a strategic activity where cultural contradictions become a context and opportunity for movement actors. In addition, the definition of ideology, symbols, and events becomes a study material for actors in choosing framing strategies that will be carried out in social movements.

To achieve a target group of a movement, movement actors need a tool to frame an issue raised in the movement. One of the tools in framing a movement is the media. According to Zald in Situmorang (2007: 12) mentioned that the implementation of framing occurs in interactions carried out through various print and electronic media such as books, pamphlets, magazines, etc. Actors from social movements also use community or public spaces such as stalls, cafes, markets, etc., to convey or interact with every problem that is the focus of discussion. Community groups want to be directly involved in the social movement. But in the process, the media is a tool in framing efforts; efforts to influence the government, elections directly, and public agendas can also be an alternative in framing social movements.

c. Repertoire

According to Tilly in Situmorang (2007:14-15), the repertoire is "a creation of culture through learning." Tilly further explained that the repertoire is a set of tools that a group of people can use to achieve their desires, such as destroying public facilities, attacking certain places, demonstrations in the streets, issuing petitions, formal meetings, etc.

In this concept, Tilly developed three categories in explaining how the mechanism of this concept is carried out in analyzing a movement. First, how the impact of a developed system. Second, reactive in defending threatened rights, and Third, proactively demanding rights that have not been enjoyed. (Situmorang, 2007:16)

2. Identity Theory

According to Singh (2001), the Identity Oriented Theory (the Identity Oriented Theory) about contemporary social movements describes basic assumptions as criticism from the perspective of resource mobilization theory. The rationality basis of the resource mobilization theory is considered inadequate in explaining some expressions of new social movements, such as; Feminist movement, Environment movement, peace movement, disarmament movement, and local freedom movement.

The identity-oriented theory is dominant in European countries as an opponent of the explanation (explanatory) rationality of contemporary social movements generally formulated and practiced by scholars in America. Compared to the resource mobilization theory, which focuses and is significantly tied to rationalism and materialism, identity theory generally has non-materialistic and expressive properties.

Identity theory addresses questions of solidarity and integration. According to this theoretical thinking, either the Durkheimian concept of anomalies and distractions or the Smelserian view of tension, general beliefs, etc., are considered less relevant to describe collective behavior. Social deviation as an idea of anomia or social disorder cannot be used as a measure in looking at various dimensions related to social movements.

Hunt and Benford, in Snow, Soule, & Kriesi (2004), mentioned in the social science literature on movement the concept of collective identity is widely used. Collective identity is viewed both as a factor required by the creation of collective protest and as a result of the collective protest movement. Researchers have used collective identity in various theories and at all levels of analysis. Collective identity has been central to the study of analysis of the emergence of movements, the trajectory of movements, and the impact of movements. The study of identity also goes into the dimensions of analysis of the construction of dissatisfaction and framing processes, motivation of participation, choice of activist tactics, results, and emotions. Collective identity seems to have been a central concept in almost every theoretical perspective and empirical question associated with contemporary studies of social movements.

According to Blumer, as mentioned in (Snow, Soule & Kriesi, 2004), the movement should ignite the spirit of the corps among members through the construction of in-group outgroup relationships, providing opportunities for formal interactions, formal rituals, and ceremonies of the organization. Hasol cites Blumer's thought of anticipating formulations of collective identity through attention to the movement's need to build ideology and ignite feelings of passion and energy.

The opinions of psychology, social psychology, and macro sociology on collective identity generally explain that groups of individuals have common interests, values, feelings, and goals. Collective identity emphasizes commitment to the individual, solidarity on collectivity, and a broader view of macro social structures and dynamics beyond the collectivity movement, including those that help shape and interest in political contexts and cultural symbols, goals, etc.

Johnston and Klandermans (1995) define collective identity as the interplay and sharing created by multiple individuals or groups on a more complex level and focus their orientation on the protests, opportunities, and constraints by which action occurs. There are three elements in collective identity: first, collective identity is a process involving cognitive denial of purpose, means, and field of action; Second, collective identity is a process that refers to a network of active relationships between actors who interact, communicate, influence each other, negotiate, and make decisions. Organizational forms and models of leadership, communication channels, and communication technologies are part of the network of relations. The third is a certain level of emotional investment, which allows the individual to feel like part of a whole.

Polleta and Jasper (2001) define collective identity as an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotionally linked to society, category, or institution. Collective identity exhibits perceptions of the status of a common relationship that may be imaginary rather than direct experience and distinguished from personal identity, even though collective identity is part of personal identity.

Method

The method used in this research is the qualitative research method. The qualitative research method is used to research a problem that is not yet clear what and how the problem is. With qualitative research methods, researchers will explore a subject in the research and find clarity on how the problems contained in the research. (Sugiyono:2016). With this method, the researcher will describe how a symptom or reality in the field is then processed into a theory and data from a study to produce an answer to the formulation of a predetermined problem.

The approach used in this research is the case study approach. The case study approach describes the research results to find a thorough picture of a situation. The use of case studies in this study is because the phenomenon studied is a case that requires a deep descriptive study, namely to find out the picture of the socio-political situation process during the reign of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) in forming an increase /escalation Pembela Islam (FPI) movement in DKI Jakarta 2014-2017. This study conducts observations, interviews, and documentation to get complete data, where this data will be tested for validity through source triangulation.

Result and Discussion

Polemic of Ahok's Appointment as Governor of DKI Jakarta

The election of governors in Indonesia is a political contestation that reflects part of a democratic process. The 2012 DKI gubernatorial election is a political contest that is quite fierce and has many colors. In the dki gubernatorial election there were 6 pairs of candidates who contested the position of governor and deputy governor, including the no. 1 Fauzi Bowo-Nachrowi Ramli, no. 2 Hendarji Soepandji-Ahmad Riza Patria, no. 3 Joko Widodo-Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, no. 4 Hidayat Nur Wahid-Didik, no. 5 Faisal Batubara-Biem Triani, and the last no. 6, namely the Alex Nordin-Nono Sampono couple.

Of the six candidates, the tight competition occurred in the no. 1 pair with no. 3, the pair of incumbent candidates Fauzi Bowo-Nachrowi, and no. 3, Joko Widodo-Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. Although it is quite noticeable that the difference in support of the Fauzi-Nachrowi candidate coalition has a lot of support, the Jokowi-Basuki pair was able to offset even winning in the votes in round 1 to round 2, which became the final decision that the dki governor election was won by the No. 3 pair, namely Joko Widodo and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok).

The election of Jokowi's partner with Basuki Tjahaja Purnama is enough to bring a very significant wind of change, especially in the development and infrastructure in Jakarta. But the polemics in the political contestation of the 2012 gubernatorial election were also very pronounced. The polemic that occurred brought an atmosphere to the difference in identity because Joko Widodo collaborated with Basuki, who has a Chinese background and adheres

to Protestant Christian beliefs. The atmosphere between the majority and minorities in Indonesia has a very sensitive tendency.

This tendency was already seen when Joko Widodo and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) managed to win the 2012 DKI gubernatorial election at that time. Although there has not been a fully visible phenomenon, the friction felt between the Muslim community and Ahok has been felt. Islamic figures up to community organizations, especially based on Islamic religion, have been paying attention since Ahok ran to be Jokowi's deputy governor. But when Ahok became the deputy governor of faith-based community organizations, especially Islam and other religious figures, he has not fully made significant movements. Still, a sense of concern arose in the minds of the Muslim community.

Arriving when Joko Widodo said that he would participate in political contestation in the Presidential Election of the Republic of Indonesia, namely the Presidential Election in 2014, Ahok was officially appointed as acting governor of DKI Jakarta from October 16, 2014, to November 19, 2014. The appointment of Ahok as governor of DKI Jakarta is a constitutional path contained in Presidential Decree No. 30/P/2014 concerning the Dismissal of the Deputy Governor of DKI Jakarta and the Ratification of the Appointment of the Governor of DKI Jakarta for the Remainder of the 2012-2017 Term, signed by President Joko Widodo. The inauguration process is also contained in article 163 Government Regulation in Lieu of Law of Local Leaders Election, which states that the president inaugurates the governor in the country's capital.

Related to the appointment of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok, who replaced Joko Widodo as Governor of DKI Jakarta, it experienced various criticisms and rejections by several factions in the DKI Jakarta DPRD. They are members of the Koalisi Merah Putih. It was a combination of political parties supporting Prabowo Subianto. In response to this, the chairman of the DKI Jakarta, Regional House of Representatives (DPRD), Prasetyo Edi Marsudi, ensured that the inauguration process of Ahok as Governor of DKI was under the constitution.

In addition to receiving some obstacles of rejection from several factions in the DKI Jakarta DPRD, it did not escape the Islamic Mass Organiasasi FPI also conveyed criticism to reject the appointment of Ahok as Governor of DKI Jakarta to replace Joko Widodo, who then formed a mass to protest in front of the city hall of the DKI Jakarta DPRD on Wednesday, September 24, 2014.

The protest was driven directly by FPI to reject Ahok's appointment as Governor of DKI Jakarta. Although the constitutional mechanism of Ahok's appointment did not violate the rules in various ways, FPI still carried out protests followed by approximately 200 to 300 masses. Although the phenomenon is not the starting point of his conflict with Ahok but becomes a process of escalation/increase of movement carried out by Front Pembela Islam.

The doctrine of Front Pembela Islam Teachings

As an Islamic mass organization with two focuses, they are recited and protest; in carrying out doctrinal actions, they intend to plant a vaccine struggle to FPI activists to live and practice the human FPI struggle well. In his book, Habib Rizieq Dialog, FPI Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Mungkar mentioned several doctrines instilled by FPI, including:

- Expressing intentions, in this case, aims to form FPI activists as true fighters, firm and resigned by the intentions built in the face of various trials and challenges and fight in the path of Allah SWT.
- Starting from yourself, in this case, FPI always prioritizes self-built intentions that arise from the heart, not just following along. The intention that arises from the heart has a power that is not easily shaken.
- The truth must be established. It becomes a belief for the FPI that mistakes will not disappear from our lives in the world unless we rise against them, the wrong must disappear when the right comes, and the right will only come when we voice and uphold it.
- Every human being must die. This doctrine is the most important role among the three doctrines above because this doctrine will be the belief to do anything in the face and fight. This doctrine formed an FPI activist fighter who was not afraid of anything. Thus, many FPI movements do not care about causation and violate the rules.
- Mujahid above his enemies, FPI succeeded in creating a fearless jihadi army in the face of danger with this doctrine. "If the criminals dare to bear the risk of their death, then the fighters Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Mungkar must be more courageous to face all the risks of his struggle." "If criminals dare to die for the immoral, why are we afraid to die to obey, and if criminals bravely die to go to hell, why are we afraid of death to go to heaven, then if the criminals dare to die for the devil, why are we afraid of dying for Allah the Almighty God."

Thus, we can understand how the teachings and the cultivation of beliefs in FPI organizations can influence how the results occur in the field. Movements that are born and activities are often called radical because it is very hand in hand with violence. This doctrine is a first thought placed in the brain and the hearts of FPI members who can further foster high loyalty to whatever is desired by the FPI leadership but still based on the law and Islamic rules.

Socio-Political Policies and Conditions During the Reign of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama

Like a new leader who is required to fix the city he leads, Ahok often makes policies considered detrimental to Muslims. Here are some policies of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok that are considered detrimental to Muslims, including:

1. Roving Takbir Ban Policy

The Roving Takbir Ban Policy made by Ahok caused wild assumptions among the Muslim community. Since long ago, Roving Takbir has been a tradition of Muslims as a symbol of victory or celebration has been carried out fasting 30 days in Ramadan and welcoming the day of all Muslims, namely Eid al-Fitr. In this case, it forms an opportunity for an identity conflict to occur.

By embracing the Protestant Christian identity, Ahok loudly made a policy of banning roving Takbir, which is considered to hurt the principle of tolerance of religious people in Indonesia. Quoted from Merdeka.com, Ahok said the DKI Provincial Government prohibited roving Takbir in Jakarta and asked police and Municipal Police (satpol PP) to comb out residents who carried out residents a convoy of roving takbir. The ban was conveyed by Deputy Governor of DKI Djarot Syaiful Hidayat while presiding over a regional leadership coordination forum (Forkopinda) at the City Hall. (Wednesday 29 June 2016)

In response to this, Organisasi Massa Islam Front Pembela Islam or FPI said that they would hold a huge convoy to carry out a roving takbir. Although the FPI ignored his policy, Ahok responded by coordinating with the police directly with Police Chief Tito Karnavian to tighten and conduct operations in areas of Jakarta, which is suspected to be holding a roving Takbir convoy carried out by the FPI.

This phenomenon illustrates how the government cannot control activities in society in which the elements and assumptions that create an identity conflict. Although not until there were clashes, the phenomenon already represents how the socio-political situation during the reign of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) affected the escalation or increase of the FPI movement.

2. Policy on Liquor Circulation

Regarding the Liquor Circulation policy, the prohibition of the circulation of alcohol is regulated in the Regulation of the Minister of Trade (Permendag) No. 06/M-DAG/PER/1/2015 concerning Control and Supervision of Minol Procurement, Circulation, and Sale. Convenience stores and retailers throughout Indonesia are prohibited from selling alcoholic beverages. Group A is t has an alcohol content below 5%. Ahok said he had returned it to the previous Regional Regulation.

Thus Ahok approved the sale of liquor sold in supermarkets or minimarkets that spread but liquor with levels below 5%. Regarding the policy, of course, alcoholic beverages are legally haram for Muslims. In response to this, Front Pembela Islam responded that the abandonment or free sale of alcohol would damage the generation of the Indonesian nation. This policy has formed a social conflict between the government and the people of DKI Jakarta, especially driven by FPI.

FPI's response regarding the policy of the circulation of alcohol is considered not to reflect tolerance in every religious community. How the majority of how people living in Indonesia are Muslim people. There is a ban on consuming liquor in the Al-Quran because the law is haram. Here is a passage in surah Al-Maidah verse 90 in the Al-Qur'an related to liquor:

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِنَّمَا الْجُمُورُ وَالْمَيْسِرُ وَالْأَنْصَابُ وَالْأَزْلَامُ رَجْسٌ مِّنْ عَمَلِ الشَّيْطَانِ فَاجْتَنِبُوا هُ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَفْلِحُونَ

"O believers! Intoxicants, gambling, idols, and drawing lots for decisions¹ are all evil of Satan's handiwork. So shun them so you may be successful". (Al-Maidah 5:90)

Regarding the presentation of the passage of letters in the Al-Qur'an, namely surah Al-Maidah verse 90, which affirms that consuming liquor and doing the deeds that have been mentioned in the meaning of the above verse is an evil deed, or haram act. With this, the Islamic Mass Organisation of Front Pembela Islam or FPI categorically rejects the policy that Ahok has made regarding liquor circulation.

In connection with the phenomenon described above, it is suspected to be able to create social conflicts, especially in DKI Jakarta. Ahok's policy on the circulation of alcohol hurts the principle of religious tolerance that, indeed, Ahok himself, in his religion, Protestant Christianity, there is no prohibition on the consumption of alcoholic beverages. Still, in the teachings of Muslims, it is prohibited because the law is haram.

In addition, the polemics that existed during Basuki's reign also dragged several names of government institutions and civil servants. The firmness and critical attitude carried out by Ahok became a factor in forming some of these conflicts. Ahok's conflict with the Regional House of Representatives of DKI Jakarta (DPRD DKI Jakarta) government agency began from allegations to council members that Ahok said that council members included a "stealth fund" in the 2015 DKI regional revenue and expenditure budget (RAPBD) draft, Ahok said the amount almost reached Rp. 12.1 trillion. The feud made the Regional House of Representatives of DKI Jakarta submit a questionnaire rights application and investigate violations committed by Ahok in budgeting to Ahok's ethics. At the same time, leading is also a concern of the Regional House of Representatives.

Furthermore, Ahok again feuded over the budget with the ministry in the country. The feud occurred because Ahok disapproves of the Ministry of Home Affairs' decision on the 2015 regional revenue and expenditure budget approved in the governor's regulation of only Rp. 69.28 trillion, while the DKI Provincial Government has proposed the amount of the Regional Budget reach Rp. 72.9 trillion. In addition to the budget, Ahok again accused the Ministry of Home Affairs of trying to deliberately inhibit the ratification of the 2015 DKI Jakarta's Regional Budget amendment.

As Ahok took office, Ahok often paid attention to how his subordinates' employees' performance in overcoming and assisting Ahok in handling and managing DKI Jakarta. Governance Institute of Home Affairs (IPDN) became the next government institution involved in the conflict with Ahok. Ahok's conflict with IPDN began when Ahok had proposed to President Joko Widodo to dissolve the official school belonging to the interior ministry. According to Ahok, to produce good and

potential civil servants, the government did not need to galvanize the military style in IPDN. Then, followed up by Dewan Pengurus Nasional Ikatan Keluarga Alumni Pendidikan Tinggi Kepamongprajaan (DPNIKAPTK) by visiting Ahok to DKI City Hall.

The socio-political conflict and identity itself were to illustrate how socio-political conditions during Ahok's reign against his policies created an escalation or increase in movement carried out by FPI through the creation of conflict between the government and dki Jakarta residents especially Muslims, led by FPI. In addition, Ahok's feud with government institutions highlights how many conflicts formed during his reign.

Blasphemy Cases Become Peak Factor in FPI Movement Escalation

In addition to policies that are considered detrimental to Muslims and his feuds with government institutions, Ahok's resistance is formulated into the thoughts of other groups that Ahok's way and style of leadership have crossed the boundaries of an arrogant, abusive tarian leader. Evidence and some speculation captured by the FPI against Ahok then led to a trigger for social and political conflict.

Then, the biggest trigger for the conflict began during Ahok's visit to the Thousand Islands on the socialization of his campaign. Ahok interpreted a piece of verse in the Islamic holy book, namely Surah Al-Maidah verse 51, with the comment "Do not believe in false guidance of Surah Al-Maidah verse 51". We need to explain that the contents of the passage of Surah Al-Maidah verse 51 are as follows:

تَأْتِيهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَتَّخِذُوا الْيَهُودَ وَالنَّصَارَىٰ أَوْلِيَاءَ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ وَمَنْ يَتَوَلَّهُمْ مِنكُمْ فَإِنَّهُ مِنْهُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَهْدِي الْقَوْمَ الظَّالِمِينَ

"O believers! Take neither Jews nor Christians as guardians they are guardians of each other.1 whoever does so will be counted as one of them. Surely Allah does not guide the wrongdoing people". (Al-Maidah 5:51)

By interpreting the passage of verses and letters from the Islamic holy book, Ahok is alleged to have cursed the Religion of Islam. Referring to the issue of identity, Ahok was judged not in his capacity to say so relatedly to the letter al-Maidah verse 51 and reflected that Ahok did not appreciate the sanctity of the Muslim holy book.

After he visited a thousand islands of Jakarta on September 27, 2016, the lawsuits and protests of Muslims who were motorized by several Islamic mass organizations, one of which was FPI, brought a considerable tendency to every religious community living in Indonesia. The phenomenon of conflict contains elements of ethnicity, race, and religion (SARA) which subsequently became supporters of the escalation of the movement carried out by the FPI

during the Ahok blasphemy case. The escalation of the FPI movement began with the protest at the DKI Jakarta city hall on October 14, 2016, but was not fully responded to. After being judged not responded to, FPI took action again on November 4, 2016, which we know as the 411 movements in Jakarta attended by millions of Muslims.

The 411 movement is considered to provide progress by raising the status of alleged blasphemy cases from investigation to investigation. As a suspect, the investigation also came to fruition by establishing Jakarta's non-active governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok). The FPI's escort of blasphemy cases continued until the movement on December 2, 2016, occurred with a larger number of people present than the mass movement on November 4.

The 212 movement intends to knock on the door of the sky to be given enlightenment and justice related to the blasphemy case committed by Ahok. Through various sanctions and conducting more than 20 court proceedings, Ahok was finally sentenced to 2 years in prison by the Jakarta district court. Thus, the phenomenon of conflict formed over blasphemy cases by Ahok greatly affects the formation of an escalation or increase in movement carried out by FPI.

From various backgrounds of social and political conflicts during the reign of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok, some policies made by Ahok considered to hurt or harm Muslims in Indonesia have geared the formation of an escalation or increase in movement by (FPI) during Ahok's reign.

Correlation of the Escalation of the FPI Movement to Socio-Political Conditions During the Reign of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama

The presentation of the above discussion related to the increase or escalation in FPI's several large elements triggered me. These elements become complementary in line with the formation of an escalation experienced by FPI. Elements of identity, politics, and society become a component and the background of the conflict during Ahok's reign in DKI Jakarta. Following what happened on the ground, the correlation between the escalation of the movement by the FPI line with what happened in the socio-political conditions of the Ahok era was divided into three conditions. Namely, pre-Ahok became governor, Ahok became governor, and then after, Ahok served as governor. They were starting with the election of Ahok as deputy governor of DKI Jakarta. Although at the time of serving as deputy of conflict, a protest had not been seen. Still, on the other hand, FPI has been very concerned and planned various internal discussions and the maturity of protests carried out in the community.

Some of these protests have indeed been carried out by FPI since long ago, such as sweeping gambling activities, intoxication, alcohol, and so on; the implied meaning of these activities is actually how the government fails to deal with these problems in people's lives, especially DKI Jakarta. FPI is known among the public and has experienced a rapid increase in followers through this activity. Then, when Joko Widodo made the transition of office by

participating in the 2014 election, Ahok had full responsibility for leading DKI Jakarta. The phenomenon of Ahok's ascension as governor of DKI Jakarta made several Islamic organizations and community elements rejected because they intersected with identity issues.

The escalation of FPI when Ahok became governor was very visible from the various movements carried out with a purpose, specifically the rejection of Ahok's rise to the governor. On September 24, 2014, FPI, with several Islamic mass organizations and community elements, took action at the DKI Jakarta City Hall statement rejecting Ahok as governor. Of course, the transition of political positions became the background of the social and political conflict so that the protest occurred.

Then the escalation of the FPI movement developed when Ahok officially served as governor of DKI Jakarta and was inaugurated directly by President Joko Widodo at the State Palace on November 19, 2014. Several policies made by Ahok such as the ban on roving Takbir and also related to the circulation of alcohol is a component of some protests led by FPI. Both policies are considered detrimental to Muslims and violate the principle of tolerance for every religious person living in Indonesia, especially the Muslim community in DKI Jakarta. The policy of banning traveling Takbir by Ahok was responded to by acts of defiance where the FPI conducted a large convoy of Roving Takbir in Jakarta. Then, the policy related to the circulation of alcohol was firmly rejected by the FPI by conducting a demonstration in front of the Ministry of Home Affairs Building.

Meanwhile, after Ahok served as governor, Ahok made a mistake where during his campaign socialization visit to the thousand islands of Jakarta by interpreting the passage of verses on the Letter of Al-Maidah in the holy book of Muslims, which is currently known as a blasphemy case that made Ahok snared two years in prison. The escalation of the movement experienced by FPI was very rapid. FPI held two protests attended by millions of Muslims, namely the November 4, 2016 movement known as the 411 movement and then the protest on December 2, 2016, known as the 212 movement. These two major protests greatly influenced how the social and political conditions then triggered the escalation of the movement, especially by the FPI. Then, looking at the phenomena and issues raised in this study, researchers concluded that the correlation between socio-political conditions during Ahok's reign and the escalation experienced by FPI was based on identity and social-political conflict.

Based on the discussion and the research results above researchers, the Islamic Mass Organization Front Pembela Islam or FPI became one of the Islamic mass organizations that escalated or increased movement during the reign of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok. The movement carried out by FPI is based on a difference in identity, especially religious identity. Ahok was a state official with a minority identity that adhered to Protestant Christianity and ethnic Chinese, which is a factor in forming social and political conflicts.

There are two that are the basis of differences in issues that occur. The issue in the Dki Jakarta Governor Election is nothing but a political aspiration, where at that time, the

community has not been affected by the existence of identity. Then the second, namely during Ahok's time as governor of DKI Jakarta by making various policies that are considered detrimental to the majority of Muslims and after Ahok served as Governor of DKI Jakarta, namely the case of blasphemy where at the moment Ahok experienced a mistake that became a turning point of the conflict at that time.

All movements carried out by FPI aim to reject Ahok as governor of DKI Jakarta and maintain the Marwah teachings of Islam. It has been mentioned above that it is forbidden to choose non-Muslim or pagan in Islamic teachings leaders. The escalation of the movement experienced by the FPI also played a role in the democratization process in Jakarta. The moment of democracy in Jakarta clearly illustrated that the Indonesian state has a variety of identities. This identity needs to be considered both in a political context and not.

Based on the theoretical foundation used by the author in the research, the concept of Political Opportunity becomes the analytical tool to see how factors affect relationships and an analysis of results rather than a social movement. Political Opportunity presents several ways of analysis by providing related approaches. If we pull it back, the definition of Political Opportunity is a knife of analysis to see how the cause and outcome of a social movement can develop and succeed or not. This is an analysis knife to see the cause and look for factors that influence the opportunity to form a social movement. In this case, the socio-political movement carried out by FPI is based on several opportunities to create a movement that develops to achieve an escalation.

The causes or factors that influence the escalation of movements by the FPI arise due to changes or certain levels of conditions, especially during the Ahok administration. Ahok's policies are also one of the causes of the movement carried out by FPI. This is in line with the napa that has been mentioned in the approaches to the concept of Political Opportunity, namely the approaches of Cognitive Organisation and Cognitive Liberation.

The author concludes a social construction that became a complete material in the formation of social and political conflicts at that time, namely, first, Front Pembela Islam became one of the Islamic mass organizations that highly supervised and paid attention to both social and political in Indonesia, in this case, FPI did not directly participate in the practical political process but often helped the course of democracy in Indonesia. Precisely at the 2012 DKI Jakarta political contestation related to the nomination of Joko Widodo's partner with Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok at this time, FPI began the step to escort the DKI Jakarta Election because Ahok, who was a candidate for deputy governor at that time had a non-Muslim identity or a Protestant Christian belief. The author concludes a social construction that became a complete material for forming social and political conflicts. Namely, Front Pembela Islam became one of the Islamic mass organizations that highly supervised and paid attention to both social and politics in Indonesia. In this case, FPI did not directly participate in the practical political process but often helped the course of democracy in Indonesia. Precisely at the 2012 DKI Jakarta political contestation related to the nomination of Joko

Widodo's partner with Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok at this time, FPI began the step to escort the DKI Jakarta Election because Ahok, who was a candidate for deputy governor at that time had a non-Muslim identity or a Protestant Christianity belief.

Then second, in the political contestation of the 2014 Presidential Election, where Joko Widodo took a sabbatical to participate in the political contestation of the 2014 Presidential Election, officially Ahok was appointed as Acting Governor on October 16, 2014, until 19 December 2014. Therefore, at the time of Ahok's appointment as Acting Governor experienced a political and social dynamic that was very sensitive among the Muslim-majority community, which FPI then drove in carrying out several movements/protests at that time.

Then the third started after Ahok's position as Governor ended with participating again in the political contestation of the Dki Jakarta Governor Election precisely when Ahok made a political socialization campaign visit to the Thousand Islands. In his campaign, Ahok interpreted a passage in the Muslim holy book, namely surah Al-Maidah verse 51, in which case Ahok is suspected of having committed blasphemy in Islam. This moment succeeded in triggering socio-political conflicts and various major movements/protests that had previously been presented in the discussion of the above research that led to Ahok's imprisonment for two years on the blasphemy case.

Thus, socio-political construction and various views of related sources succeeded in building socio-political conflicts and various major movements/protests cases. The theory used in research, namely the theory of social movements, identity, and social criticism, is closely related to the issues or problems in the field at that time. The theory of social movements here is clearly illustrated in every movement carried out by FPI, especially the protest of rejecting Ahok, the Roving Takbir protest, the protest action related to Ahok's policy on the circulation of alcohol, 411 protests, and also 212 protests.

Meanwhile, related to the theory of social criticism, according to Hasan Shadily, Social criticism is a form of communication in a society that serves as control throughout a social system or community process (Hantisa Oksinata, 2010: 33). With this, it can be concluded that social criticism is a form of resistance, opposition, or disagreement with a certain person or group on the reality of society's social life. So, in line with the existence of a protest inside a protest, there is also criticism such as statements, lawsuits or demands, and social and political aspiration. Then in the process of research, the role of identity is considered very important as the basis for various social and political conflicts during the Ahok administration. The conflict was based only on a difference in identity, namely Ahok as a minority, specifically as a Protestant with FPI as the majority of Muslims.

So, the results of the research that researchers obtained produced reality, and there is also a clear correlation where the issue raised in this study is how sociopolitical during the reign of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok complements the factors that influence the formation of an escalation or increase in movement experienced by the Mass Organization of Islamic Defenders Front.

Conclusion

Based on the results of the research and also the discussions that have been delivered, researchers conclude and answer the formulation of problems that researchers raise, the Islamic mass organization Front Pembela Islam or FPI has experienced an escalation or increase in movement during the reign of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok in DKI Jakarta. The formation of the Islamic mass organization FPI was motivated by the many hurts of Muslims since the New Order of the Suharto era. In the new order government, the president did not tolerate extremist acts. FPI was also formed to uphold Islamic law in a secular country. The weak enforcement of law and government at the beginning of the reform era in 1998 was exploited by a group of "mafias" consisting of NGOs. They sought to damage the country through systematic means by spreading various kinds of hypocrisy. That is what encourages scholars Habib and kyai so enthusiastic about establishing an organization called Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Mungkar.

The movement of FPI was lifted from various slopes of policies issued by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok as the Governor of DKI Jakarta at that time, which was considered detrimental to Muslims. Starting with the movement's goal to reject Ahok as governor has described the community's disapproval, especially the Islamic mass organization Front Pembela Islam or FPI. The emphasis carried out by FPI conducts continuous demonstrations, lobbying to establish direct communication with relevant government officials, propaganda through social media, and collecting support to the community with advocacy and then fully supported by the community, especially Muslims, managed to collect a period of approximately 3 million Indonesian citizens who finally reached the bright spot of being sentenced to two years in prison for the blasphemy case against Muslims.

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