

## The Nationalism of Educators: A Case Study of the National Insights of MAN Teachers in Cirebon Regency

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### **Abstract**

*In this piece, the nationality of the Madrasah Aliyah Negeri (MAN) instructors in the Cirebon district is attempted to be captured. It is believed that some people's understanding of the national outlook has been compromised by the rapid flow of information and the waning of nationalism as an ideology. Teachers have emerged as crucial circles for inquiry from many national viewpoints as educated circles as well as agents of information and values to pupils. This study employed qualitative approaches as its methodology. The findings indicated that MAN teachers in the Cirebon district had a very high level of nationality insight. In contrast, a teacher revealed in an interview that he was unfamiliar with the idea of the caliphate, which had been used to criticize the democratic system.*

**Keywords:** Cirebon, State Aliyah Madrasah, Teacher Nationalism, National Insight

## INTRODUCTION

Surprising facts are presented in the context of the national and state perspectives of some Indonesian citizens after the fall of the New Order regime and contemporaneous with the opening of the democratic faucet. For instance, the results of a study conducted by a major national newspaper, Kompas, and published on June 1, 2008, as cited by As'ad Said Ali, regarding public knowledge of Pancasila as the fundamental ideology of the state, are unexpected. 48.4% of respondents between the ages of 17 and 29 were unable to correctly and fully mention the Pancasila commandments. Even more surprisingly, 60.6% of respondents aged 46 and older were found to have mispronounced the five Pancasila commandments. In the meantime, 42.7% of respondents aged 30-45 mispronounced the Pancasila precepts (As'ad Said Ali, 2009, 1). Three years later, the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) found that only 67–78% of the populace was aware of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* as the cornerstones of national and state life. The survey, which included 12,056 participants from 181 regencies and cities throughout 33 provinces in Indonesia, found that Indonesians have little understanding of their own country; in fact, as many as 10% of the participants were reportedly unable to recite the Pancasila precepts in their entirety. 2011 statistics Most recently, a video of the chairman of the DPRD of an East Javan city who had not memorized Pancasila went viral in September 2022.

With more individuals being aware of radical religion, some of which eventually developed into acts of terrorism, there has been a drop in nationalism (Hendropiyono, 2009, 13). It also affects intelligent people with education, including students and instructors. In other words, the ideological orientation that is selected rather than inadequate education, socioeconomic status, or lack of access to knowledge is what contributes to the creation of radical thinking. Whatever the initiating circumstances, it is important to keep an eye out for the phenomena of the exposed educated, particularly instructors who act as role models and mentors for students, especially if it is brought on by a lack of knowledge and identification of one's own national identity.

Schools are ideal breeding grounds for radicalism because they are locations where the younger generation, which makes up the bulk of the population, congregates, studies, and hangs out with peers with whom they have a strong sense of solidarity. On the other hand, teachers play a crucial role in a country's civilisation as the driving force behind the continual transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next. Additionally, according to data from the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) on radicalization among students, lecturers, and students, it is clear that a teacher's knowledge and perspective have a significant impact on pupils (Society, 2018). Therefore, it is crucial to understand the amount of national insight among teachers.

This study used qualitative research as its methodology. This study was carried out at MAN 1, MAN 2, MAN 3, MAN 4, and MAN 5 in the Cirebon Regency. With a total of 330 teachers throughout the five MAN Cirebon districts, teachers were the study's target group. More specifically, there were 77 teachers in MAN 1, 103 teachers in MAN 2, 58 teachers in MAN 3, 50 teachers in MAN 4, and 42 teachers in MAN 5. The sample size for this study was 22%, or 73 respondents/teachers. The number of teachers in each school was as follows: MAN 1: 17 instructors, MAN 2: 23, MAN 3: 12, MAN 4: 11, and MAN 5: 10. While there were two teachers questioned for each MAN, a total of 10 MAN teachers were interviewed.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **National Insights**

National insight is a crucial component of a nation-state that every citizen must be aware of, understand, and believe in order to preserve the nation-identity states and integrity, which has evolved into a shared understanding. The words "Insight" and "Nationalism," which make up the phrase "National Insight," have two syllables each. Etymologically, insight means: (1) the outcome of insight, review, or view; it also has the secondary meanings of conception and point of view (National, 2008). Simply put, insight can be thought of as opinions or objectives (Badudu, and Zain, 2001). Nationality, on the other hand, is derived from the word nation, which denotes a group of people who are self-governing and who share the same origins, customs, language, and history (National, 2008)

Regarding terminology, nationalism is understood as a perspective of a nation whose embodiment or manifestation is determined by the dynamic dialogue of that nation with its environment throughout its history as objective and geographical conditions as well as with its culture as subjective conditions, and idealism which is the aspiration of a sovereign and dignified nation (Wahidin, 2015). Or to put it another way, nationalism is the culmination of a protracted process where a nation was born from historical, geographical, and cultural awareness that has settled for a long time and has become a common identity.

The term nationalism was created when people became more aware of themselves as a social group bound together by the idea of a nation-state. According to Hertz, a notion is a state ideology and a national behavior pattern. This philosophy grew out of the concept of the nation and later served as a strong basis for a nation to exist. As an ideology, nationalism can serve three purposes: it can unite all classes of citizens to the nation, unify the national mindset, and increase or strengthen the nationals' influence over governmental decisions. To keep the state and nation alive, nationalism is a means of securing societal solidarity. Nationalism is a unifying force that is necessary for all nations and nations (Hertz, 1966).

Indonesia, a nation with a variety of cultures, religions, ethnicities, languages, races, and other traits, has a different outlook on nationalism than other nations with more uniform social conditions, which highlights the country's distinctive features. In order for the existence of this ideology to serve as the fundamental framework for the creation of a nation-state, it is undoubtedly necessary for a set of ideologies capable of bridging the aforementioned divisions in society to exist. If this is the case, then nationalism is a pillar for preserving the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), since it determines the integrity of the state by existing in the minds and deeds of all citizens.

### **National Insights and Islam**

Each person could access any information and speak with whomever he chose thanks to the quick wave of globalization that was able to cross the physical limits of nation-states and the quick improvements in information technology. This prerequisite permits any foreign ideology with a range of cultural and political interests to penetrate the target nation. The significance of contemporary nationalism is that Pancasila, an ideology that has been successful in bringing together various societal strata under the umbrella of the Republic of Indonesia, is increasingly being contested by groups that, in the past, have frequently clashed over other issues, particularly religious discourse. Due to the fact that

the majority of Indonesians identify as Muslims, it is only logical that certain of the ideas in Islam frequently clash with the widely accepted idea of sovereignty. The idea of Indonesia as a republic with an Islamic form of government, Pancasila as the dominant state philosophy, and a caliphate are three topics that come up frequently.

An issue that is frequently raised on the political stage and is placed in opposition to the issue of secularization is the notion that Islam is a universal religion that can solve all ummah concerns. *Al-Islam huwa al-hal*, or Islam as a solution, is a method used by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), one of the parties founded on Islamic voters, to increase party support and draw in others of same mind and spirit (Muhtadi, 2012). The fact that PKS exceeded the electoral threshold demonstrates that there are many Muslims in Indonesia who share the same ideologies as this party.

*Al-Islam huwa al-din wa ad-dawlah*, the ideology that states that Islam is both a religion and a source of power at the same time, is integral to the discourse and dynamics of Muslim thought addressing the relationship between the state and religion (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1998). Generally speaking, the connection between the state and religion in the Muslim community has a number of tendencies, according to Munawir Syadzali as cited by Haedar Nashir; **First**, there is the traditional or intergalactic school of thought, which maintains that Islam is a perfect and comprehensive religion that governs all facets of human life, including the life of the state, rather than merely a religion in the Western sense, which focuses only on the relationship between humans and God (Nashir, 2013). Based on this understanding, an Islam-based state with unified governmental and religious powers is the ideal state model. **Second**, secular or reformist-secular organizations that assert that Islam is a religion in the Western sense and has nothing to do with public policy, that the Prophet Muhammad was merely a common messenger like the earlier apostles whose only goal was to persuade people to return to a noble life and uphold high moral character, and that the prophet never intended to found or rule a nation (Nashir, 2013; Al-Raziq, 1996, 2001). Other intellectuals have harshly criticized this point of view, like Arkoun, who said that Raziq had failed to develop the idea of an eclectic democratic state whose values could be drawn from the Islamic faith (Zaprul Khan, 2014). **Thirdly**, reformist or modernist organizations that disagree with the first two viewpoints. According to this viewpoint, Islam lacks a formal constitutional structure but does have a set of moral principles that guide governmental behavior. Muhammad Husein Haikal is the persona that this organization deems to be representative.

In Indonesia, the relationship between Islam and the state has undergone some unique fluctuations. Since the founding of our republic, discussions on the place and function of religion in the political landscape and in people's daily lives have always taken place. According to history, during the first 20 years after the Republic of Indonesia was founded, there was an ideological discussion about whether to construct an Islamic state or a state that was neutral toward religion. The argument over secularism in the Western setting, which tends to characterize the relationship between the two from a fairly adversarial standpoint, differs from the discussion of the relationship between state and religion in post-colonial Indonesia. In Indonesia, secularism is strongly tied to diversity—Islam—in the appropriate context within the state and society, rather than implying a division between religion and the state. Therefore, the ideological discussion in the early years following independence was focused on the issue of the "scale of adaptation" of the new republic to Islam (Ichwan, 2004) (Zuhri, 2021: 400).

The most important challenge in the first phase of creating the Indonesian state was reaching consensus on the state's foundation. The form of a republic was chosen by nearly all of the BPUPKI (Investigating Agency for Preparatory Efforts for Independence) members. The position of Islam, the country of Indonesia's majority religion, in the newly implemented planned state structure then became a source of concern. The Republic of Indonesia, as stated in article 29 of the UUD of 1945, is a state in which Islam and Islamic life have a very honourable and protected place. However, after extensive debate, the nation's founding fathers were able to come to an agreement that the Republic of Indonesia is not a theocratic state that relies on a religious model for its structure of government (Maarif, 2002). This action showed that at the time, Muslim leaders held the view that there was no fundamental conflict between Islam as a religion and the idea of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as a common consensus inside the state. In actuality, there are no verses in the Qur'an that discuss the structure and shape of the Islamic state (Rasyad, 2022).

One of Indonesia's founding fathers, Soekarno, fundamentally did not advocate for a radical break between the two since, in his political view, religion still had a place in the state. In fact, Soekarno exhorted Muslims to play a significant part in democratically expressing their political hopes and goals through the People's Representative Council or other official institutions. Islamic political aspirations would still be accommodated in Sukarno's vision of an independent Indonesian state, and Soekarno himself urged Muslims to hold as many seats in representative bodies as they could, just as he urged Christians to do (Soekarno, 1964: 150) (Faisal, 2018: 25). This viewpoint exemplifies the formation of the Indonesian nation's viewpoint. The state itself, though, is averse to letting religion take center stage in politics. This is in line with Latif's assertion that secularization in Indonesia is constantly "pushed" from above. In other words, secularization in Indonesia is viewed as beginning at the center of authority and moving outward toward its boundaries. From the outskirts to the heart of power, Indonesia's rise in religion may be observed. An important aspect of Indonesian politics continues to be the dialectic between secularization and religious revival. Latif therefore asserts that, at the very least in the near future There won't be a complete secularization or religious rebirth in this instance. due to the fact that each has its unique weapon and survival arena (Latif, 2013: 13).

Establishing Pancasila as the foundation of the state is not as simple as turning the palm of your hand, despite the fact that it is derived from the archipelago's original treasures and has a strong plurality spirit. The conception of Pancasila as the foundation of the Indonesian state has a long history that can be divided into three stages: nursery, formulation, and approval. At least in the 1920s, the pioneering concepts to seek inter-ideological synthesis and movement, together with the process of "discovering" Indonesia as a shared national code, marked the beginning of the nursery phase (civic nationalism). With Soekarno's speech on June 1 serving as the crown, the formulation phase got under way at the first trial of the Independence Preparatory Investigation Agency (BPUPK), which took place from May 29 to June 1, 1945. The proposal was subsequently considered at the *Cho Sangi In* meeting on June 22, which resulted in the creation of the "Committee of Nine" and the new Pancasila formulation in the Jakarta Charter version. The Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) meeting on August 18, 1945 marked the beginning of the "approval" phase and gave birth to the state's final, legally enforceable constitution (Latif, 2015) (Maliki, 2018).

Some Islamic circles opposed the process of ratifying Pancasila as the foundation of the state because they preferred religion (Islam) to serve as the foundation of state ideology. This is a result of their beliefs of how the state and religion interact (Piscatori, 1994). According to the Islamic organisation, "state" and "faith" cannot be separated. The national organization, however, contends that the state ought to be "neutral" regarding religion (Latif, 2011). Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), a group with cross-border (transnational) networks and its main office in London, England, has constantly called for the establishment of a caliphate in Indonesia (Peter Mandaville, 2007). The Republic of Indonesian government ultimately declared this group to be prohibited in 2017.

Masdar Hilmy, cited by Yanwar Pribadi, claimed that despite the fact that HTI operations were prohibited across Indonesia, the government would not be able to eradicate the khilafah doctrine, which became the organization's guiding principle. This is so because organized opportunities are what allow any ideology to exist. The ideology of the caliphate is likely to resurface in another form as long as societal issues like poverty, injustice, social inequality, and political pressure continue, he added (Pribadi, 2021).

## **National Insight among Teachers**

### **1. Teachers and National Insight**

A key player in the educational process in a school setting, especially Madrasah Aliyah Negeri (MAN) schools, is the teacher. The viewpoint of educators in the MAN environment is always founded on the Islamic views they hold because MAN is a ministry of religion institution. The viewpoints of the students they educate will depend on the teacher's knowledge of and opinions about the collection of national insights. Understanding teachers' perspectives on the national narrative of insights is crucial because they are the central figures and participants in the process of knowledge transfer in the classroom, and the beliefs and understandings they hold will have an effect on the beliefs and understandings of the students who attend the school. For the preservation of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, educators' nationalism as a manifestation of nationalism or state awareness is crucial.

However, teachers, who are intellectuals with greater insight than other communities, are frequently entangled in stories and religious understandings that place the state in opposition to religious principles rather than as their execution in a political context. Minor complaints about teachers being infiltrated by radical ideologies and movements are not rare. In fact, according to the findings of a poll by the Institute for Islamic Studies and Peace (LaKIP), 21% of instructors of Islamic Religious Education believe that Pancasila has no relevance to Islam (Suprastowo et al., 2018). On the other hand, the fact that students are the primary demographic for radical organizations' recruiting presents a challenge to the teacher's role as the person responsible for the students' nutritional knowledge (Muhammad Najib Azca, 2013: 15).

A group that has been outlawed by the government, Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia, persistently opposes the state ideology Pancasila and all the tenets that uphold the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in the context of the relationship between Islam and the state (HTI). Generally speaking, HTI activists should focus on two groups while introducing the khilafah concept: *First*, the urban populace, particularly the large mosques. They can hold lectures featuring speakers from HTI circles more easily because they control this mosque, making it simpler to introduce the topic of the caliphate to the crowd. *Next*, the campus. Members of HTI enjoy seeing student populations regenerate, therefore

in 2005 they established an underground group called the Student Movement (Gema) Liberation with the express purpose of promoting this cause (Nuruzzaman & Arif, 2019). HTI attempted to join the educational system through this student network by enlisting supporters from the Islamic Spiritual organization (Rohis).

Despite the fact that HTI was later designated as a prohibited organization by the government by Law No. 2 of 2017 about Community Organizations (Ormas) because of its opposition to Pancasila, the movement would continue to exist and employ alternative, covert tactics. The Islamic khilafah, which is asserted to be an authentic concept in Islam because it was practiced by the Prophet, is offered by an organization that is oriented towards Hizbut Tahrir (HT) and offers a concept of a state that is different from the concept of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), according to Nuruzzaman and Arif (2019). Despite the fact that these groups are socioeconomically comparable, Muslims who are unfamiliar with religious concepts are.

## 2. *National Insight of MAN Teachers in Cirebon Regency*

The results of measuring the knowledge of nationalism among MAN instructors in the Cirebon district using SPSS 23 are as follows:

<b>Descriptive Statistics</b>				
	<b>N</b>	<b>Mini mum</b>	<b>Maxi mum</b>	<b>Mean</b>
Data	73	92,00	139,00	117,8 904
Valid N (listwise)	73			

As noted in the chart above, 73 MAN teachers responded to the survey in its whole. The greatest value was 139, while the lowest score was 92. In terms of tolerance understanding, MAN students' average score was 117.8904.

Interviews with ten teachers from five MAN Cirebon districts revealed that their patriotic sentiment was extremely strong. Although Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which the state has now formally outlawed with its use of caliphate lingo, has frequently clashed with official state ideology, some teachers have demonstrated that they lack appropriate comprehension of Islamic beliefs or ideology.

Religion is now an institution in modern society as a result of the transformation of social and political life, and as such, it needs to be discussed in public. According to Turner, the liberal secularization concept that separates religion and the state is becoming increasingly illegitimate, yet religion plays a significant influence in the public sphere. In multicultural cultures, religion occasionally has a place in the public realm as a declaration of nationalism and ethnic minority identity (Turner, 2010). According to Munawir Syadzali, there is no fundamental requirement that Muslims create an Islamic state; rather, the relationship between religion (Islam) and the state is like a straight line. In other words, there is no set notion of the state or of politics in Islam. However, Munawir believes that a set of ethical guidelines can be drawn from both the Qur'an and the Sunnah and applied to state administration and governance structures (Bahtiar Effendy, 1995).

A set of ideals found in religion that are thought to provide a solution to society problems are inextricably linked to the function of religion in public life. It is urgently necessary for religion to play a role in bolstering the nation's ethics (morals), particularly in light of the rampant behaviour, violence, radicalism, infidelity, selfishness, and other morally reprehensible behaviours that exist in both everyday society and the political, legal, and administrative spheres of this country. The prevalence of teenage delinquency, drug looting, battles between groups, promiscuity, pornography, and similar behaviours is also rising today. In contrast to the democratic transition process that was successfully completed between 1998 and 2004, strengthening these morals is now crucial to strengthening political ethics in the process of consolidating democracy, which has been ongoing since 2004 but has not been going smoothly (Aspinal & Mietzner, 2010: 17) (Chrouch, 2010: 35). Islam has so played a crucial role in Indonesian political strategy. Although it may not always be in the forefront, the Islamic narrative itself is always there, just waiting for the right moment to emerge. A new tendency of exploiting Islamic narratives as a political tool has been revived as a result of the political events surrounding the 2014 presidential election (Widian et al., 2022).

According to Munawir Syadzali, there are fundamentally three paradigms for the interaction between religion and the state in the context of Islamic political theory. The first is the integralist paradigm, in which religion and state are integrated (integral). In this instance, it is impossible to separate Islam from the state. The state's territory is included in the field of religion (*din wa dawlah*). Since sovereignty truly comes from and is controlled by God, the state's government is structured on that foundation. The idea of a religious state, whereby constitutional processes are guided by religious principles, was then born as a result of this paradigm, giving rise to the idea of *Islam din wa dawlah*. Religious law is the foundation of positive law. The symbiotic paradigm is the next. This point of view holds that religion and the state have a mutually beneficial and interdependent connection. In this situation, the state is necessary for religion's development because of the state, but religion is also necessary for the state's development since it provides moral and ethical guidance. The secularist paradigm is the third. The integralistic and symbiotic relationships between religion and the state are both rejected by this viewpoint. The secularistic worldview suggests separating the state from religion instead. The secularistic paradigm opposes, at the very least, Islamic determination of a particular kind of state in the context of Islam (Munawir Sadzjali, 2011).

If we take a look at Syadzali's typology, the MAN instructors in Cirebon Regency's high level of nationalism also clearly demonstrates that the symbiotic paradigm is a widely held belief among MAN teachers. This fact, that there is a high level of nationalism among educators at Cirebon Regency MAN, is undoubtedly a good precedence for us. The majority of the instructors that participated in the study and served as resources were santri, an Indonesian socioeconomic class noted for its high levels of tolerance, which contributes to the high degree of nationalism (Auliya et al., 2019). **Second**, one of the key reasons why there is such a high level of awareness and comprehension of nationalism in MAN is that there is a public Madrasah Aliyah school, an institution that falls under the Ministry of Religion and has frequently advocated for religious moderation. Third, the existence of schools that are partially housed in Islamic boarding schools has an impact on the teachers' comprehension of various topics, including nationalism.



The following information and analysis will be provided for each school:

**a. Respondents MAN 1 Cirebon**

There were 17 teachers among the respondents that were from MAN 1 Cirebon Regency. The maximum score on nationalism for teachers at this school is 138, according to statistical findings using the SPSS 23 program. The minimum score is 97.00. Therefore, 116.5294 is the average score for nationalism among MAN 1 Cirebon teachers. The following statistical table provides an overview of the survey's findings:

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
MAN1	17	97,00	138,00	116,5294
Valid N (listwise)	17			

One of the initiatives to uphold the spirit of nationalism and nationalism in the educational environment, according to Ubaidillah, a teacher at MAN 1 Cirebon, is the flag ceremony that takes place every Monday morning. Another aim is to educate pupils about the risks associated with extremism. Interview with Ubaidillah, 16 September 2019. Three Citizenship Education (PKN) instructors at the MAN school, the only one in this urban region, have ASN status: Abdul Rojak, Mintarsih, and Zamzami. There is no need to strive to replace Pancasila with Islamic Shari'a or a caliphate, according to Ubaidillah, as Pancasila is acceptable and symbolizes Islamic Shari'a (Ubaidillah, Interview). When Natsir crossed off seven words from the first precept, he defended Pancasila, which is consistent with Ubaidillah's perspective (Latif, 2011).

In agreement with Ubaidillah, Muhajirin maintained that Pancasila was founded on Islamic religious shari'a principles (Muhajirin, Interview, 16 September 2019). He therefore enthusiastically pledged to preserve Pancasila and nationalism in the future. While the khilafah is a belief that is seen to have the potential to undermine Pancasila's ideology and cause the breakup of the country. He claims that MAN 1 Cirebon does not support the caliphate because of this.

**b. Respondents MAN 2 Cirebon**

Given that MAN 2 Cirebon Regency is situated near an Islamic boarding school in the village of Babakan Ciwaringin, which has no fewer than 50 Islamic boarding schools in one village, and that the majority of its students are Santri who reside in boarding schools near schools from various regions, the school is unique. In this school, 23 teachers participated in the survey, and the findings revealed that a significant level of nationalism was present among them. The minimum and highest scores are 92.00 and 139, respectively. The MAN 2 Cirebon teachers' average score on nationalism is 117.0000. The results are statistically represented in the following table:

Descriptive Statistics				
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
MAN2	23	92,00	139,00	117,0000
Valid N (listwise)	23			

At MAN 2, two chosen teachers participated in interviews. The first resource person interviewed on behalf of MAN 2 Cirebon was Sugih Subagja. He admitted that in order to foster the evolution of nationalism, at the very least, a flag ceremony must be held on a regular basis. This is because the teacher council is constantly reminded at that time to recognize the services of heroes (Sugih, Interview, 14 September 2019). In other words, for Sugih, valuing the contributions of heroes is a nationalistic act.

According to Sugih (Sugih, Interview), democracy grants all citizens equal rights, particularly when it comes to making decisions, allowing each citizen's aspirations to be expressed either directly or through a representative council. There is a resemblance between Islamic law and the idea that everyone is equal in Allah SWT's eyes. However, there is one aspect of democracy that he disagrees with: comparing the opinions of those who have information to others whose standing is murky. He did, however, assert that Indonesia was incorrect to put the caliphate system into effect.

Both Sugih's support and criticism of democracy are reasonable and frequently made by those who oppose it, who contend that one of democracy's faults is its failure to consider voter quality or to treat all voters equally. In addition, in a democracy, the majority of votes, not the actual truth, determines the winner (Oedoyo, 2016).

According to Husni Hamdiyah, another educator who served as a resource at MAN 2 Cirebon (Husni Hamidah, Interview, September 14, 2019), Islam already promotes democracy because it teaches nationalism, peace, and unity. He also asserted that he backed Pancasila because he believed the national philosophy would bring *Bhinnekaan* together. The founders of the Indonesian country as well as Ulama, or Islamic authorities, were also involved in the formation of Pancasila. In order to adopt Pancasila as the foundation of the state and incorporate all the laws into Islamic teachings, where are they with all the intelligent considerations? He claimed that neither the professors, staff, nor the kids showed any signs of supporting the caliphate at the school where he worked. He declared that the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila are still respected.

### c. Respondents MAN 3 Cirebon

At MAN 3 Cirebon, 12 teachers participated in the survey. Due to its setting in a boarding school, notably the Buntet Islamic Boarding School, MAN 3 is a school that is often comparable to MAN 2. With regard to nationalism, teachers at MAN 3 received a minimum score of 99.00 and a maximum score of 136, according to the SPSS 23 program results with the examined questionnaire. The teachers at MAN 3 Cirebon scored on average 113.8333 for nationalism. This statistic demonstrates the high level of nationalism among teachers at MAN 3 Cirebon Regency, as seen in the statistical description table below:

#### Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean
MAN3	12	99,00	136,00	113,8333
Valid N (listwise)	12			

Interviews with Zainal Arifin, the deputy head of curriculum, took place at MAN 3 Cirebon Regency. In his school, Zainal Arifin (Zainal Arifin, Interview, 20 September 2019) claimed that no research had been done explicitly on nationalism. He nonetheless promises that his school has no instructors who hold khilafah ideas. If you consider the significant number of national insights in this madrasa, you can believe this claim. The preschool instructors at this school employ reading materials that Zainal, the deputy head of curriculum, carefully chooses. In actuality, both teachers and students are constantly socialized regarding the four pillars. The four pillars' presence, according to Zainal (Zainal Arifin, interview), is crucial to protecting the Indonesian people against ideologies that are in opposition to Pancasila. Zainal disagreed and claimed that the sharia NKRI discourse only applies to itself and does not need to be integrated into Indonesian law.

**d. Respondents MAN 4 Cirebon**

At MAN 4 Cirebon Regency, there were 11 teachers who responded. According to the test findings utilizing the SPSS 23 program and a 28-question survey, the minimum score is 100.00 and the maximum value is 130. The average score for nationalism among MAN 4 Cirebon teachers is 119.4545. This statistic demonstrates the high level of nationalism among teachers at MAN 4 Cirebon Regency. The following table presents these numbers' descriptive statistics:

<b>Descriptive Statistics</b>				
	<b>N</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Mean</b>
MAN 4	11	100,00	130,00	119,4545
Valid N (listwise)	11			

Two teachers from the MAN 4 Cirebon district were interviewed. The first informant, Mubdiah, stated (Mubdiah, Interview, 23 September 2019) that given that Indonesia is made up of diverse ethnic religions and customs, we as the Indonesian nation must be able to bring all of society together. To him, Pancasila represents the triumph of the country's battle, whose continued existence will not weaken faith. This woman who teaches citizenship education acknowledges that she is unaware of what a khilafah is, but she asserts that Pancasila should not be replaced since it serves as a national unifier.

In agreement with Mubdiah, Nurkholish, who is also the deputy head of student affairs, stated that Indonesia is a big, multifaceted country that needs 4 pillars to be able to unite it. Being aware of this, he acknowledges that he frequently educates students about the history of the Indonesian people in order to strengthen the 4 pillars. (23 September 2019 interview with Nurkholish).

**e. Respondents MAN 5 Cirebon**

Ten teachers at MAN 5 Cirebon Regency participated in this survey as respondents. According to the test findings using the SPSS 23 program and a 28-question survey, the minimum value is 121.00 and the maximum value is 128. The average score for nationalism among MAN 5 Cirebon teachers is 125.4000. This statistic demonstrates the high level of nationalism among teachers at MAN 5 Cirebon Regency; in fact, when compared to the other four MANs, this MAN's

figure is the highest. The following table presents these numbers' descriptive statistics:

<b>Descriptive Statistics</b>				
	<b>N</b>	<b>Minim</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Mean</b>
MAN5	10	121,00	128,00	125,4000
Valid N (listwise)	10			

Two teachers were the resources questioned at the MAN 5 Cirebon Regency. Iskandar, a teacher and curriculum representative at MAN 5 Cirebon, claimed that there was a coaching program from the head of MAN 5 related to Nusantara insight, including the requirement to attend the flag ceremony every Monday and the involvement of teachers in the National Holiday Commemoration ceremony. There is only one PKN teacher in this school who has ASN status.

Iskandar was able to speak about the four pillars and saw their existence as the binding force of the country. Additionally, he thinks that Pancasila complies with Islamic law. A khilafah, according to the instructor who also teaches at a private university in Cirebon, is unnecessary because our nation has embraced a presidential khilafah, which means that it already has a president. So, as state decisions, we endorse the president's choices. I disagree if the caliphate intends to convert the United States into an Islamic state. Muslims who have a state are those who concur. Make our nation a Pancasila state.

Another teacher at MAN 5 questioned, Nurrohman, concurred with Iskandar's assertion that the curriculum at his school had strengthened nationalism. Among other things, he stated:

- 1) Advice from madrasa leaders, administrators, and other Ministry of Religion personnel
- 2) Mandatory attendance at Monday's flag ceremony
- 3) Involving teachers in PHBN initiatives

Nurrohman believes that democracy should be in accordance with Islamic law. When Ali's greatest buddy passed away, the caliphate that some people were echoing actually vanished and was replaced by an autocracy/kingdom. As a result, he is opposed to Pancasila's replacement because it is in line with Islamic law. If Indonesia adopts Islamic law, the regions where non-Muslims predominate will break away from Indonesia.

## **CONCLUSION**

According to the research, the Cirebon Regency State Madrasah Aliyah (MAN) teachers' nationalism is quite high, with a score of 117.8904, according to calculations made with SPSS 23.0 for Windows and interviews. According to the questionnaire, Cirebon district MAN teachers have a high value of national insight, which is compatible with the findings of the interviews, which demonstrate that these teachers have a very high level of national insight. The fact that academics at MAN are still conscious of an exciting nationalism in the midst of the quick flow of knowledge, globalism, and the propensity for nationalism to decrease in some circles, is obviously good news for everyone. The data also

demonstrates that there are no issues with nationalism or radical views and understanding in the context of the State Aliyah Madrasa teachers in the Cirebon Regency. To get a more complete image of the national vision of teachers in Cirebon, it is important to study how teachers in schools with a non-religious foundation, such as religion teachers in public schools, view their country.

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