

# THE RELATIONS OF ISLAM AND POLITICS

## (A Study of the Response of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Against the Islamic State of Indonesia)

**Masruhan Kholil & Sujito**

*Doctoral Students at UKSW, Salatiga.*

### **Abstract**

*Problems arising from the relationship between Islam (dîn) and politics (siyâsab) became the polemics among Muslim political thinkers that have not been completely solved up until now. Hence, it is difficult to identify which country such as Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Algeria, and Indonesia, that deserves to be a representation of an Islamic state. The consequence of different understandings about the relationship between Islam and politics – in the case in Indonesia- is the emergence of Indonesian Islamic State (NII). This movement attracted a number of responses from Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. Using a socio-historical-politics approach in discussing these responses as they do not agree about the establishment of the NII, will lead to an understanding of coercion and oppression of understanding group that is different from other groups.*

### **A. Introduction**

Problems arising from the relationship between Islam (*dîn*) and politics (*siyâsab*) deserve continuous discussion, which although has long been debated among Muslim politics thinkers, it remains completely unsolved yet and becomes a dilemma. The experience of Muslim communities in various parts of the world, especially after

World War II, gives an impression that there is an awkward relationship between Islam and politics.<sup>1</sup> As it is known, since the end of Western colonialism in the mid 20th century, "Islamic countries" such as Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Algeria, and Indonesia have difficulties in developing synthesis that is possible between Islam and politics. In these countries, the relationship between Islam and politics is characterized by sharp tensions, if it is not hostility.<sup>2</sup>

Various "experiments" have been done to synchronyze Islam with the concept and the political of Muslim societies, and the experiments that are very diverse in many ways. The penetration rate of "Islam" in to the country and politics also varied.<sup>3</sup> On one hand, Islam as a comprehensive religion, but on the other hand, there are variations in applying the doctrine of political Islam in the countries of the so-called "Islamic state". In relation to the prominent position of Islam in these areas, as the religion practiced by the majority of the population, this dilemmatic relationship is a phenomenon that raises a question mark, as if there is a gap, if not the differences, between the teachings of Islam about politics and the real experienced by the Muslim community. As a result, the long debate arose to answer the question about which country can be termed as a country that really is the prototype of the so-called "Islamic state". Does Saudi Arabia, Iran or even Pakistan can be termed as a representation of the "Islamic state"? During its development, it draws attention to a number of Islamic political observers to ask the question: Does Islam teach

- 
1. Azyumardi Azra, *Pergolakan Politik Islam: Dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme Hingga Post-Modernisme*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996), p. 1. See too, M. Din Syamsuddin, *Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru*, (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001), p. 2.
  2. Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), p. 2.
  3. Azyumardi Azra, *Pergolakan Politik Islam*, p. 1.

about politics? About sovereignty, constitution, and basis of a state? Is Muhammad apostolic really has a close relationship with political issues, state and government? In short, whether Islam is compatible or not with modern political system, where the idea of the nation-state is one of the constituents?<sup>4</sup>

These questions lead to answers given by Muslim intellectuals raises a number of movements. For the case in Indonesia, it is among the movements against the Indonesian government that they consider "infidels" and want the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia (NII). The reaction and response from the Indonesian Muslim intellectuals against the NII movement also varied. On the basis of this reasoning, the main problem studied in this paper is how Indonesian Muslim intellectual response about the NII movement?

## **B. Review of Literature**

There are a number of books that contain ideas about the relationship between Islam and politics. Among these is *Islam dan Tata Negara: Ajaran Sejarah dan Pemikiran*, Munawir Sjadzali's works. The book, that is written in 1988-1989 and prepared to teach students S3 IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, examines the relationship between Islam and politics, with the primary goal of finding answers about the presence or absence of a political system in Islam. Studies begin with:

- 
4. Some of the important works that can be referenced on the issue are: John L. Esposito (ed.), *Islam and Politics*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984); James P. Piscatori (eds.), *Islam in the Political Process*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, (Berkeley dan Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963); Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, (London dan New York: Routledge, 1991); Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*, London: Croom Helm, 1981); Edward Mortimer, *Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1982); and Fred Halliday dan Hamzah Alavi (eds.), *State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988).

(1) reopening the contents of the Koran, (2) exploring the constitutional history of the Islamic world, especially the time of the Prophet and the four Khulafa' al-Rashidun, (3) examining the ideas of Islamic scholars in political science from classical times, medieval to modern times, and (4) observing the comparison between pattern of governance in countries that claim to be an Islamic state.

Another book is titled, *Fiqh Siyasab: Ajaran Sejarah dan Pemikiran*, by J. Suyuti Pulungan. The book was first published in 1994 and prepared as textbooks Siyasah Fiqh subject. The book examines the diversity of civilization and intellectual treasures of Islam, especially about political thought ever practiced and thought of in history. The next book is *Min Fiqh al-Daula fi al-Islam*, work of Yusuf al-Qardlawy, which was published in 1997. It includes the concept of *daulah*, position, characteristics and condition according to Islam, while some of the arguments are cited merely to support the author's thinking. Another book is *Nidhâm al-Hukm fi al-Islam*, work of Taqi al-Din al-Nabhi'ani, published in 1997. The book discusses about the Islamic system of government that has the obligation to carry out the implementation of Islamic law for the people and the people's mandate bearers. Moreover another book is *al-Abkam al-Sulthâniyah wa al-Wilayah al-imam al-Diniyah*, work of Mawardi, which provides an overview of the rights and obligations that must be implemented by state officials to always do justice in implementing the policy.

The book that specifically discusses about NII is very limited. Among these is *Negara Islam Indonesia* by Kartosuwiryo. The book has contents about the basics of the establishment of NII and fighting strategies in achieving the goal. Another book is *Komandemen Wilayah (KW) 9* by al-Chaidar. The book discusses about the alleged "involvement" al-Zaytun Inderamayu Boarding School under the guidance of Sheikh Panji Gumilang in the establishment of NII.

Based on several books above, none of which is substantially equal to the contents of this paper, although the problem is identical to the object that is studied, which is about the relationship between Islam and politics, especially about NII. This is because this paper is focused on extracting information about the response of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals about NII.

### **C. Research Methods**

This paper is a qualitative study. Data, ideally gained from in-depth interviews with a number of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. However, because their thoughts are published on some print media, so this sufficient data is taken from library materials. The approach used is more emphasis on the historical-social-politics approach. Therefore, the studied problem is social and political issues that are occurred in the past. By using this approach, the authors tried to find various explanations about past symptoms related to social and political issues.<sup>5</sup> In this case, they look for information about responses of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals on the NII. All data collected will be classified according to themes and issues that were examined then is proposed using objective-descriptive-critical-analytical, is a problem-solving procedure that is investigated by describing the state of the object of study based on the facts as they appear, but remains critical-analytic.<sup>6</sup>

### **D. Islam and Politics**

Question asking which country among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Pakistan, Malaysia, Algeria, and Indonesia, which deserve to be called as "Islamic State," is basically caused by at

- 
5. Winarno Surachmat, *Dasar dan Teknik Reseach: Pengantar Metodologi Ilmiah*, (Bandung: Tarsito, 1975), p. 123.
  6. Hadari Nawawi, *Motode Penelitian Sosial*, (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1987), p. 62.

least unequivocal explanation of the Qur'an and Sunnah. This gives rise to diverse understanding and interpretation of: (1) Islamic teachings related to politics, and (2) the relationship of Islam with politics associated with the position of apostle.<sup>7</sup> These two footings are then led to concepts and ideas that are introduced by the Islamic political thinkers as political Islam.

About the first footing, i.e. the teachings of Islam with regard to politics, their concept can be differentiated into three kinds of thoughts: (1) there are teachings about the political system in Islam, because Islam is a complete religion, the teachings cover all aspects of life. The presence of Islam, therefore, always give the "correct moral guide for human action;"<sup>8</sup> (2) there is no teaching in Islam that is related to politics, because it contains only the doctrine of monotheism and morality and human development in various aspects of life. The life of society, state and nation is left entirely to the human mind to set it, (3) in the teachings of Islam, there is no political system, but it contains the basic teachings and country life.<sup>9</sup>

About the second foothold, which is about the relationship between Islam and politics associated with the position of the

---

7. Aside from these two things, according to Munawir Sjadzali, also due to the following three factors: *first*, the Islamic world and the fragility setbacks caused by internal causes; *secondly*, the challenge to the European countries and the political integrity of the Islamic world that led to the domination or colonization of Europe; and the *third*, the advantages of European countries in the fields of science, technology and organization. Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara: Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemikiran*, (Jakarta: UI-Press, 1993), p. 204.

8. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, (New York: Holt, 1966), p. 241.

9. Of the three schools of thought, as mentioned above, the *first* is represented by Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Rashid Ridla, and Abul A'la al-Mawdudi; the *second* represented by Ali Abdur Raziq and Taha Husain; was the *third* represented by Muhammad Hussein Haikal. See, J. Sujuthi Pulungan, *Fiqh Siyasa: Ajaran Sejarah dan Pemikiran*, (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 1994), p. xi-xii. See too, Munawir Sjadzali, *Islam dan Tata Negara*, p. 1-2.

Prophet, their concept can also be distinguished into three kinds of thoughts: (1) the country is a religious institution, as well as political institutions. Therefore, the head of state is the religious authority and political power, (2) the state is a political institution that is completely separate from religion. Therefore, the head of state only have political power or earthly rulers, (3) the state is a religious institution, but it has a political function. Therefore, the head of state has the power politics of religion dimension.<sup>10</sup> Another aspect of this problem is the fact that there is a difference between Muslim political thinkers who perceive whether the method of succession and the history of the caliphate after the Prophet Muhammad established a religion or worldly affairs (secular). Political thinkers Pre-modern Muslim, such as al-Mawardi, argues that the Caliphate as one religion.<sup>11</sup> While Ibn Khaldun only saw it as a secular political institutions. According to Ibn Khaldun, the leadership of the caliph after the Khulafa 'al-Rashidun essentially un-Islamic, because the leadership is transformed into a kingdom (*al-mulk*) is not based on Shari'ah, but based on group solidarity (*'asabiyya*).<sup>12</sup> Then, this type of thinking gives influence on Ali Abd al-Raziq, who claimed that the caliphate is not the only one form of Islamic government. Furthermore, Ali Abd al-Raziq argued that Islam does not specify a particular form of government. All of it was left to the Muslims themselves to establish a form of government that are relevant and appropriate to the era.<sup>13</sup>

An assortment of problem-solving relationship between Islam and politics have also been put forward by Muslim political thinkers

- 
10. J. Sujuthi Pulungan, *Fiqh Siyasaah: Ajaran Sejarah dan Pemikiran*, h. xi-xii. The characters of the three types of thinking, see foot note number 9.
  11. Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi, *al-Ahkâm al-Suthâniyyah*, (Kairo: Dâr al-Fikr, 1983), p. 5.
  12. Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun*, (Kairo: Dâr al-Fikr, 1958), p. 516-7.
  13. Ali Abd al-Raziq, *al-Islam wa Ushûl al-Hukm*, (Kairo: Tp., 1925).

in various countries, and differences in the way they think happened to political ideas because of the differences in historical and cultural background influenced by different political environments. This factor, of course, affects the ways in which the Muslim political thinkers in addressing the problems above, including some Muslims thought who want to establish an Islamic state.

## E. NII: History, System Administration, and its principles

### a. History of NII

NII was proclaimed on August 7, 1949/12 of Shawwal 1368<sup>14</sup> on Cisampah village, district, Ciawiligar, Tasikmalaya region, West Java, by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo in the name of the Muslim nation of Indonesia, as well as leader of NII.<sup>15</sup> Qanun Azasy of NII being compiled on August 27, 1948, one year earlier, by the Imamate Council consisting of:

<i>The priest, Supreme Commander, Chargé</i>	: S.M. Kartosoewirjo
<i>Deputy Imam, Commander Division</i>	: Kamran
<i>Interior Minister</i>	: Sanusi Partawidjaja
<i>Minister of Information</i>	: Toha Arsjad
<i>Minister of Finance</i>	: Udin Kartasasmita
<i>Minister of Defense</i>	: Raden Oni
<i>Minister of Justice</i>	: Ghazali Thusi

- 
14. That date coincides with the departure of Moh. Hatta to The Hague, Netherlands, to attend the Round Table Conference (KMB). KMB own ends disappointing, because the West Irian, according to the results of the negotiations, are not included in the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia.
  15. In August 1949, Kartosoewirjo published Notice No. NII. 7 which contains the affirmation of the founding of Darul Islam / Islamic State of Indonesia. In the latter part of the edict stated that on August 7, 1949 which coincides with the 12th of Shawwal 1368, officially established the NII. Text NII Proclamation signed by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewirjo.



NII establishment cannot be separated from the role K.H. Jusuf Taudjiri, a charismatic cleric from Garut, West Java, who made a large contribution in defending the homeland from occupation, but later opposed the government of Indonesia. Before fighting against the invaders, he was active in Sarekat Islam (SI). Not long after a Cimareme coup led by H. Hasan in 1918, virtually all of SI in Garut activists were arrested and imprisoned, including Damiri (the name as a child of KH Yusuf Taudjiri), because SI was accused of supporting the uprising. Some were disposed outside of Java, but only Damiri jailed for two months. He returned to Cipari and continue his activities in SI which later became PSII (Party of the Sarekat Islam Indonesia). In 1923, Damiri has opportunity to perform the pilgrimage, and after returning from the Hajj, his name changed to Jusuf Taudjiri.

In 1936, there is schism in PSII between Salim faction versus Abikusno Tjokrosujoso faction. At first, Kartosoewirjo and Jusuf support Abikusno faction with its political emigration (*hijrah*). In fact, Kartosoewirjo was well received due to his brochure about the political *hijrah*. However, in 1939, Kartosoewirjo got criticism from most of the leaders of PSII, after he said that he did not agree with the leader's policy at that time saying that PSII is not consistent with the political *hijrah*. His action was considered contradictory to the policy of PSII. PSII Executive Board then requested that Kartosoewirjo withdraw the brochure which was considered no longer relevant. However, he rejected the demands, so that led to the sacking him along with several other officers and members of PSII, such as Yusuf Taudjiri and Kamran, because it is against the decision of the organization. The official reason that is put

forward by the Executive Board on the dismissal Kartosoewirjo PSII was a misuse of party fund or a corruption.

With Jusuf, Kartosoewirjo then set PSII Truth Defenders Committee (KPK-PSII) to realign political *hijrah* of PSII. However, when the Commission-PSII hold congress in 1940 in Garut, the relationship between Jusuf and Kartosoewirjo broke, because of the difference principle. Jusuf then retreated from KPK-PSII and focused on the field of religion. He later founded a mosque and Islamic Darussalam in Wanaradja, while commuted to Cipari to teach students.

When some areas in West Java were empty, Kartosoewirjo invited Jusuf to proclaim NII. The request was rejected by Jusuf. As a result of the rejection, Cipari boarding school becomes one of Kartosuwirjo men target to be raid. As a result, most of PSII activity of West Java documents damaged and lost. No wonder if Cipari boarding schools that was used as the basis of Jusuf struggles were often being targets of attack by the DI / TII.

During the Japanese occupation government formed BPUPKI (Investigation Agency Efforts Preparation of Indonesian Independence) in May 1945, neither Kartosoewirjo nor Jusuf Taudjiri was elected to represent Islamic groups. Representatives of Islam, such as the Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and KH Ahmad Sanusi conveyed the idea about the founding of independent Indonesia, which imposed Islamic law. The proposal provoked a reaction from the secular nationalists group. The conflict was finally settled by Jakarta Charter.

It is not clear whether because it was as the result of the sessions that produced only BPUPKI Jakarta Charter or because Kartosoewirjo had already pessimistic about the result of BPUPKI work that was continued PPKI. To be sure, on

August 14, 1945, shortly after the Japanese bombed by the Allies, Kartosoewirjo asked Jusuf to immediately proclaim the establishment of the NII, but Jusuf refused. This refusal relates to the design of *Azazi Qanun* (Constitution) made at that time and distributed to the clerics and scholars that exist in West Java. The kiai and ulama, especially under the influence of KH. Ahmad Sanusi, consider that draft *Azazi Qanun* was not in accordance with Islamic teachings, such as issues of power priests who have almost unlimited rights.

The plan to proclaim NII in 1945 was canceled, although some aspirations to establish NII was still rolling. During the War of Independence, Kartosoewirjo continued political maneuvering. NII shadow government with all government agencies continued to do, especially after Linggarjati Agreement opposed by representatives of Masjumi in KNIP (Central Indonesian National Committee). Until 1947, Kartosoewirjo involved with Masjumi in KNIP. After Linggarjati Agreement, he returned to Malangbong because he disappointed with the results of the agreement. He then wrote a pamphlet entitled “Amir Sarifuddin *la'natullah*.” He considered Amir had betrayed the nation of Indonesia. Nonetheless, Kartosoewirjo officially remained in contact with the Government of Indonesia in Yogyakarta. At the same time, the preparation of the establishment of the NII continues to run.

Then, in early 1948, once again Kartosoewirjo asked Jusuf Taudjiri to declare NII, but Jusuf refused. In subsequent developments, due to the Renville Agreement, the entire military strength in the region of van Mook line were controlled by the Dutch and moved to Yogyakarta. West Java community who did not understand this policy was abandoned by the Indonesian government, so most of the Hezbollah forces

refused to move to Yogyakarta. Sabilillah forces also did not want to leave West Java. In fact, they did not want to disarm and be taken to Yogyakarta. Meanwhile, some communities in West Java, felt more betrayed by the government of Indonesia, because there were some promising military commanders to abandon all its weapons in West Java, if they migrate later. For example, Husinsjah and Utarja who agreed with the leader Sabilillah, R. Oni to hand over their weapons to them if moved. Apparently, when Oni will take place in the promised weapon, that weapon that do not exist because it has been brought to Yogyakarta.

The disappointment was pushed Oni closer to -and was exceptionally beneficial to the movement of- Kartosoewirjo. On January 30, 1948, Oni went to Peuteuyunggal village to negotiate with Kartosoewirjo on the impact of the Renville Agreement. In the meeting it was decided that the Sabilillah troops would remain in West Java. An important outcome of the talks was a plan to hold a conference on February 5, 1948 on the Pengwedusan village, near Cisayong, Garut. All local Islamic leaders Priangan planned to attend.

On the specified date, nearly 160 representatives of Islamic organizations gathered in Pangwedusan. Kartosoewirjo came as a representative of the Executive Board of Masjumi West Java. Important events in the conference is a change Masjumi and all branches of his organization into Center of Majelis Islam (MI/Islamic Assembly) led by Kartosoewirjo. This is an interim Islamic government in West Java which must be adhered to by Muslims in the area. Other decisions is the establishment of Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII/Indonesia Islamic Army) which is a combination of Hezbollah and Sabilillah and forces of several other Islamic organizations. Since the conference, the

conference held a few times that it reinforces the establishment of the NII, so it can be proclaimed on August 7, 1949.

#### **b. NII Government System**

NII Government led by Kartosoewirjo assisted by six members of the central leadership which is divided into three parts, namely:

- 1) Religion Section, headed by KH. Abdul Halim and KH. Ghazali Tusi.
- 2) Political Section, led by Sanusi Partawidjaja and Toha Arsyad.
- 3) The military, led by Kamran and R. Oni.

These seven persons were instructed to become leaders in West Java until all over Indonesia later. They were also instructed to:

- 1) Create a brochure about a political solution , namely the need for an Islamic State.
- 2) Urge the Indonesian government to cancel all negotiations with the Dutch. If it is not possible, it is better to Indonesian government to be disbanded and formed a new government on the basis of Islam.
- 3) Prepare for the establish an Islamic State , if the State Pasundan Dutch- born or the Indonesian government disbanded.
- 4) Any area that has been controlled by Islam must be arranged by Imam permission and guidance.
- 5) It should be made a Quick Business Register which explain to the people that deal with the Dutch would not bring independence for Indonesia.
- 6) All employees of the Republic and the Muslims who work for the Netherlands , as well as all the village heads who are

or are not under the control of the Netherlands , should as soon as possible have spirit of Islam.

- 7) Intensified information about monotheism , good deeds , and the spirit of sacrifice to the people should be citizens of the Islamic State.
- 8) An understanding of jihad and good deeds should be deepened and improved.

Military and government structures prepared by Kartosoewirjo and R. Oni is intended as an Islamic government that would replace the government of Indonesia, if RI losing the war against the Dutch. In Cipeundeuy meeting, DI/TII West Java also decided that the Division Commander of TII makes contact with the Regiment in the various regions, including Banyumas, Central Java. Later in Cijoho conference held in 1-5 May 1949 was decided to change the name of the Islamic Council Assembly Center became Imamate Assembly under the leadership of Kartosoewirjo. The Assembly is composed of several ministries:

- 1) The Assembly of Illumination, led by Toha Arsjad.
- 2) The Assembly of Finance, led by Sanusi Partawidjaja.
- 3) The Assembly of Justice, led by KH. Ghazali Thusi.
- 4) The Assembly of Defense, led by S.M. Kartosoewirjo.
- 5) The Assembly of Private Affair, led by Sanusi Partawidjaja.

The members of Imamate Assembly are Kamran as Commander of TII Division, Sharif Hidajat and R. Oni as Regiment Commander Sunan Rahmat. In addition to the Imamate Assembly, is also formed the Fatwa Assembly led by Kartosoewirjo. Assembly is in charge of forming the composition of government instead of the government of

Indonesia if it defeats against the Dutch. To run the economy of the state government, the Finance Assembly formed from the downtown to the village that requires the people to give 2.5% of their income as tax revenue (donation) to the civilian and military agencies. The tax is then distributed by the Board of Finance for the benefit of every commandment there.

The organizational structure of state NII intrinsically simple, yet quite practical. Even in simplicity seems that there is original thinking of Kartosoewirjo in regulating public administration, state and army. In regulating the growing power, Kartosoewirjo gives all the potential under his control. The administrative division of NII before the proclamation is:

- 1) Division and Region (Province) is a military government led by the division commander and governor as Commandant of Defence of Political Affairs.
- 2) Regiment and residency (residency) is a military government headed by the regiment commander and as a resident Regional Commander and the Defence of Political Affairs.
- 3) Battalion and District is a military government led by Battalion Commander. Defense Commander District I and II led by Regent I and II.
- 4) District led by deputy head of the subdistrict or district and subdistrict Defense Commander I and II.

Since there is no parliament, then all regulations issued by NII Top commandment, namely in the form of Imamate Council edict signed by a priest. The top commandment edict number I, for example, within certain limits to provide an overview the dynamics of Kartosoewirjo thinking in his quest to drive and control the emerging NII in the transition period. Power

separation of politics and military as practiced by Indonesia government gives lesson to Kartosoewirjo to issue their edicts. As a result, government leaders and state can be united and there is no dualism of leadership. If in an area controlled by the NII is no agreement between the military and civilian leadership in the face of a problem, higher authorities will adopt policies to resolve problems and reconcile disputes between the two leaders in the area. If the business of higher management is not successful, it was held a mutation of one of the leaders of the region to the two leaders in a region is really a duumvirate.

**c. Principles of NII**

NII principles that are initiated by Kartosoewirjo are as follows. *First*, the concept and practice of Hijrah. To establish NII, need to take change the "Islamic State Capital Region", which is an area that apply "rule and Islamic laws". This area is called Region I, while areas outside the Region I is divided into Regions II, which is only half occupied by Muslims, or is controlled by non-Muslims (the Netherlands). Region I is the area of Islamic laws have been enacted in the Muslim community, both in the fields of law, economics, social, and cultural. In Region I too, along with the priest standing state officials run the government and the country has mastered maintaining the area and seeks to expand the area and trying to connect Region I with the Region II, so Region II become Region I. In this case, people on Region II are need to be moved to Region I.

In the book *Daftar Usaha Hijrah* of PSII, Kartosoewirjo divides Indonesian community structure into three parts: (1) community as the Dutch East Indies colonial power, (2), the Indonesian people who do not have laws or rights and have no



self-governance, and (3) Islamic society under the auspices of the Darul Islam. Kartosoewirjo also distinguish between the people of Indonesia and the Islamic community. Indonesian society show their step and track record towards Indonesia Raya country so devoted to their home country. In contrast, Muslims who live in an Islamic society or Darul Islam does not want to devote to Indonesia or anyone, but only to Allah. Thus, the intent and purpose of the Darul Islam is not Indonesia Raya, but totally to Darul Islam where every Muslim performs the laws of Allah.

*Second*, Jihad. In congregational life, the most vulnerable problem and often invites disaster is split. That is why Kartosoewirjo anticipate the possibility of hostility and division among the Darul Islam fighters. He emphasized the importance of cleaning and sincere intention of struggling to carry out nothing other than the mandate of Allah. For that reason, we need unity and brotherhood based on faith and compassion. For the sake of jihad, the soul who dared to act channel behavior and actions based on the laws of jihad. Basic coaching principles of chivalry are:

- a) Faithful to Allah's love in meaning and form. It means, capable and able to carry out every His command and away from His prohibition.
- b) Faithful to the Prophet in meaning and form. It means, able to realize his teachings and sunah with confidence that no more major example and role model of his teaching and sunah.
- c) Love and loyal to *ulil amri* of Islam or The priest of NII, the commander in chief, which include: 1) sense of loyalty to NII government and not to foreign governments; 2) sense of loyalty to NII and not to an other country; 3)

sense of loyalty to NII law (Qanun Human) and not to the laws of any country. All that sense is included in the term of Islamic State of Indonesia.

*Third*, the Defense Against the Oppressed. The most basic teachings of Islam are defending the oppressed. In this case, feeding the hungry and giving people a sense of security, especially to those who threatened the core of the struggle.<sup>16</sup>

*Fourth*, Tawhid. Kartosoewirjo has a high dream and has a strong fighting spirit to uphold the NII. His thought and struggle become a struggle filler Indonesian history. His so strong aspiration to establish an Islamic state seen in a variety of thoughts that always attribute a variety of steps to get ridla Allah. Kartosoewirjo describes four concepts of monotheism as follows: a) *lā mathlūba illallah*, nothing is sought and cultivated except the grace of Allah, nothing is sought and carried on but the leader who brings Allah's message, nothing is sought and carried on but Allah's blessing; b) *lā maqshūda illallah*, no goals but leader's *idzhar* who brings Allah's message, no purpose but his religion/Allah's kingdom; c) *lā ma'būda illallah*, none to be worshiped except Allah, there is no leader who is adhered but him who brings the mandate of Allah, nothing is upheld except religion/Allah's kingdom; d) *lā maujūda illallah*, nothing is absolute except Allah, nothing is being admitted but the leader who bring Allah's mandate, nothing is being admitted except religion/Allah's kingdom.

## **F. Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Response to the NII**

There are many responses raised by Indonesian Muslim intellectuals to NII. However, if looked for a common thread, the

---

16. See, QS. al-Quraisy, 106: 4.

response can be classified into three groups. First, NII is the enemy within the Republic of Indonesia. The reason that they make is that in the attempt to present Islam as *rahmatan lil Alamin*, the Prophet Muhammad always give priority to raise awareness of the spiritual approach which encourages individual and social transformation. It is based on the fact that the inner tension between spirit and lust impact on outward activity. In fact, the inner tensions often lead to external conflicts, both among individuals and social. In this context, the words of the Prophet Muhammad to his Companions,<sup>17</sup> “*Raja'na min jihād al - ashghar ila jihād al-akbar* ” (We return from the smaller jihad to the greater jihad ), upon returning from Badr war, it becomes very important for us to gaze at thoughtfully. Hearing the statement, his friends were very surprised. They 're wondering, what kind of war (*qitāl*) is more awesome. Prophet explained, “The war against the passions.” The friend of silence, realize how heavy and hard against the enemy within. Besides difficult to identify, fighting enemies within ourselves requires firmness and hardness of emotional because it is an integral part of each person.

Lust is a force that always holds the potential destructive and makes life always restless agitated, and never quiet. The scholars often compare the lust with wild animals. Anyone who has tamed his desires, will be calm and able to use his passion to do his activity and or achieve lofty goals. Conversely, anyone who is still controlled by his desires, will always be restless and ridden by his desires, endangering himself and others. From this perspective, there are two categories of people: (1) those who have been able to tame his own desires, so that it can provide benefits to anyone. They are individuals who are calm and peaceful (*al-nasfs al-muthmainnah*) and the

---

17. Ibn Hanbal, *Masnad Ahmad*, (Kairo: Mauqi' Qazarat al-Auqaf al-Mishriyyah, tt); al-Syukani, *Fath al-Qadir*, (Kairo: Mauqi' al-Tafasir, tt), p. 142; Fakhruddin al-Razi, *Mafatih al-Ghaib*, (Kairo: Mauqi' al-Tafsir, tt), p. 474.

representation spiritual presence, the truly Allah's *kehalifat*, (2) those whom are still debauched, so it has always been a source of unrest and trouble for anyone. They are restless person and became the source of social anxiety and trouble makers (*al-nafs al-lawwâmah*) and became the representation of lust presence, the actual idolaters. Both of these groups are present in various levels of reality and social interaction with varying intensity. On local, national, to international level; in education and religion field until business and politics field in private life to the group life, and so on.

In fact, the conflict between the peaceful quiet souls with restless souls coloring history all over the world, such as the conflict between the Prophet Muhammad and pagan idolaters in Hijaz. But one thing that is unique in the Indonesian archipelago, although this kind of conflict occurred repeatedly since the time of the ancestors of Indonesia, spiritual teachings and noble values of peaceful souls remain dominant in our homeland. The principle of "Unity in Diversity" Mpu Tantular for example, has inspired the rulers of the archipelago of the Hindu-Buddhist era until today, and Sunan Kalijogo-known to the accommodating local traditions-educate the native rulers about a peaceful, tolerant, and spiritually of Islam. Through his students as Sultan Adiwijoyo, Juru Martani, and Senopati ing Alogo, Sunan Kalijogo managed to save and preserve the noble values that we can enjoy the benefits until today.

Also in Indonesia modern era, we see the presence of the peaceful souls (*al-nafs al-muthmainnah*) –such as- in the process of the birth and growth of our national consciousness, especially in the dialogue between Islam and Indonesian nationalism. Indeed, not really known about this one fragment of the conceptual history of our nationality.<sup>18</sup> Since 1919, an intensive three cousins started talking

---

18. Benih kesadaran kebangsaan Indonesia bisa dianggap bermula pada 20 Mei 1908 dengan berdirinya Boedi Oetomo.

about the relationship between Islam as a set of religious teachings with nationalism. They are H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, KH. Hasjim Ash'ari, and KH. Wahab Chasbullah. Later, Tjokroaminoto brother in law, Sukarno who was only 18 years old, were actively involved in weekly meetings that are going on for years. National consciousness is what is inherited by the next generation, such as Abdul Wahid Hasjim (son of KH. Hasjim Ash'ari), KH. A. Kahar Muzakkir from Yogyakarta (Muhammadiyah figures), and H. Ahmad Djoyo Sugito (figure of Ahmadiyya).

In the Congress on Banjarmasin on 1935, NU decided not to support the establishment of an Islamic state but rather encourage Muslims to practice their religion for the sake of the establishment of Islamic society and at the same time allow the establishment of the Nation State. Ten years later, the Muslim all over archipelago figures who involved in the process of independence accept the concept of Pancasila State that is submitted by Sukarno, and most of the leaders of Islamic organizations receives Soekarno's idea. Based on the nationality concept that is thick with religious values and culture of this nation, on August 17, 1945-in the name of Indonesia-Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed Indonesian independence, a Nation State that recognizes and protects the diversity of cultures, traditions, and religious who have become an integral part of Indonesian life.

The idea of Nation State is the result of a bitter historical experience of the Indonesian archipelago itself. On the one hand, the long history of the archipelago who have given birth and experienced great civilizations of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam during the period of the kingdom of Srivijaya, Sailendra, I Mataram, Kediri, Singosari, Majapahit, Demak, Aceh, Makassar, Goa, Mataram II, and others have strengthened awareness of the significance of preserving the richness and diversity of cultures and traditions of the nation.

While on the other hand, continuous dialogue between Islam as a set of religious teachings that nationalism is deeply rooted in the experience of Indonesia, has affirmed the consciousness that the Nation State that recognizes and protects the diverse beliefs, cultures, and traditions of the Indonesian nation is the right choice to build one nation life. Mpu Tantular's proverb, Sunan Kalijogo teachings and movements, as well as other such example, with the right reveals the spiritual consciousness that became the foundation of modern Indonesia and protect it from splits since the proclamation of independence in 1945.

The founding fathers realized that no one in the Pancasila principles contrary to the teachings of religion. In contrast, the principles of the Pancasila precisely reflect the key messages of all religions , which in Islam is known as *maqâshid al-Shari'ah*, namely the public good (*al-mashlahat al-'âmmah*, the common good). By this realization they reject the establishment or formalization of religion and emphasizing its substance. They positioned the state as an institution that recognizes diversity, protect all interests, and protect all beliefs, cultures , and traditions of the Indonesian nation. In this way, they bring Pancasila through religion as an expression of God's love for all His creatures (*rahmatan li al-'âlamîn*) in the true sense. In the context of the Pancasila ideal, everyone can help each other to realize and improve the welfare, and everyone is free to worship for a prosperous future without ignoring the first one.

Indeed there is a fluctuating relationship between religion (cq. Islam) with nationalism (cq. Pancasila). There is a group that wants to establish an Islamic state through the constitution (eg in the Constituent Assembly), and the other through force of arms (as in the case of DI / TII). However, there is always a majority of the Indonesian people (Muslims and non-Muslims) who agree with the idea of Pancasila and fight for the founding of the nation. All of this

becomes a very valuable lesson for building awareness of the importance of the Nation State. The attitude of religious mass organizations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, for example, as well as national-leaning political parties stating that the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is the final form and our national consensus building is not the attitude of political opportunism, but rather a true awareness of the based on historical reality, culture, and traditions of our own nation as well as the substance of religion which we believe to be the truth.

Nationalist attitude is also kind of a responsibility to ensure the future of the nation in order to keep it running in accordance with the culture and traditions of the archipelago, and also in accordance with the substantive values of religion that has become an integral part of Indonesian life. The attitude of the nationalist-religious figures who fight to preserve buildings Homeland nationality based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution can be referred to as the presence of peaceful souls (*al-nafs al-muthmainnah*), person who continue to try to benefit as much as possible to anyone without questioning the differences that exist. By this this way, they struggle to realize compassion (*rahmat*) for all beings.

We must realize that if Islam is converted into political ideology, he will become narrower as framed by the limits of ideological and political platform. Any different understanding or if it is contrary to their understanding, will easily be accused contrary to Islam, because the basic nature of ideology is to take charge and move homogenous. In this frame, considering some one as an infidel and apostate actions are often and is easy to be accused to another person or party. These changes clearly reduce, amputate, and castrate sublime message of Islam from, a religion that is full of love and tolerance into a set of narrow ideological boundaries and rigid.

In fact, so far Islam on Indonesia is well known , the soft, tolerant and peaceful. Even the international magazine 'Newsweek' once called Islam Indonesia as "Islam with a smiling face." "We've often been accused as infidels and apostates, but we remained calm. Hardline groups measure the truth of religious understanding ideologically and politically, while we base our understanding and practice of religious on an open spiritual and grace."<sup>19</sup> Therefore, the main reason of against the hardline movement is to restore the glory of Islam they have stained once, at the same time, saving Pancasila and the Homeland. If a majority of moderates against hardliners firmly, we will restore the religious atmosphere in Indonesia to be moderate and the hardline groups today will fail again as all the ancestors of their ideology in our country, which represent the presence of *al-nafs al-lamwâmah* . A victory on against them will restore the greatness of Islam as *rahmatan li al-'âlamîn*, and this is one of the keys to building world peace.

This thing we deliver to raise awareness of all components, especially the elite and the mass media, about the dangers of hard-line ideology and understanding brought to the fatherland. Furthermore, it is as an incentive to preserve the essence of Pancasila which reflects the truly Shari'ah and Islam as *rahmatan li al-'âlamîn*. In the framework of things, is necessary to do strategic steps to preserve the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Homeland, and uphold the noble traditions of heritage, culture and spirituality of Indonesia like: a) Encouraging and inspiring the public and the elite to be open, humble, and continue to learn in order to understand the essence of spirituality and religion, and be peaceful souls; b ) Stopping and cutting -by peaceful means and responsible- chain and the spread of hard-line ideology through

---

19. See, Hasyim's explanation, "People," in: "Umat," dalam: *Lautan Wahyu: Islam sebagai Rahmatan lil'Alamin*, episode 3, Supervisor Program: A. Mustofa Bisri, ©LibForAll Foundation 2009).



education (within the meaning of the word widely) that is enlightening, as well as teaching and practicing the noble message of Islam which is able to raise awareness as a humble servant of God , tolerant and peaceful.

Cooperative, remind each other about the truth (*wa tawâshau bi al-baqq*) and to always be patient (*wa tawâshau bil-shabr*) to be on importance key in this regard. We must remain polite, patient, tolerant, and open minded in efforts to preserve the noble vision and founding fathers. Noble purpose should not be tainted by dirty businesses, hatred, and violence. Lofty goal has to be achieved by the true, firm, thoughtful and responsible ways, which are far from arrogance, coercion, etc.

We deserve to remember the advice of Sheikh Ibn 'Ata Allah al-Sakan in his *Hikam*, "Do not make friend with anyone whose behavior does not arouse passion approaching God and his words do not show you to Him" (*lâ tash-bab man la yunhidluka ila Allah hâlubu wa lâ yabdika ila Allah maqâlubu*). People who feel most understood Islam, hateful to God's creatures who are not in line with them, and feel as the most correct and therefore entitled to claim his caliphate to organize everyone, certainly deeds and words will not bring us to God. Their ideal of the Islamic State is only an illusion. Islamic countries that are not included in the construction of government, but in opened to God and to his fellow creatures.

*Second*, groping elephant in the dark. The idea and effort to change Indonesia into the State of the Nation State Religion, Nation of Islam, when is read from the perspective of politics and education, can be a warning for Indonesia about the existence of hidden dangers. It is not only harmful to the people of Indonesia, but also for Islam itself. For Indonesia, the change becomes state religion would be the initial reduction of cultural wealth, and freedom of religion not only to non - Muslims, but also for Muslims, and even distortion of Islam

itself. For non-Muslims, these changes could make them undergo psychological and social alienation in a country that adheres to the official beliefs differ from the beliefs that they profess. For Muslims, this change will mean narrowing, restriction, and loss of the opportunity to interpret the religious messages in accordance with the social and cultural context of the Indonesian nation, and each reading is different from the official state interpretation would be subversive and should be banned.

For Islam, the formalization will turn it from a religion into an ideology that its boundaries will be determined by political interests. Islam is initially opened and is expansive, like a living organ communicative and interactive with the circumstances of its adherents, will be wrapped in the packaging ideological and turned into a monument that honored regardless of the true and noble purpose of religion itself. Eventually, religion becomes the ultimate goal, is no longer the way as it was originally revealed. The willing of Allah as *ghayab* which is even further.

Attempt to make Islam as an ideology and realize the Islamic State may be caused by the presence of excessive zeal, but are not supported by adequate knowledge. Excessive zeal can encourage someone to absolutizing knowledge achieved, even partial. As a result, other different knowledge is seen as wrong theory and should be rejected. It is interesting to compare this with a partial understanding with the saga "Groping Elephant in the Dark" five people who disagree only about the elephants, because each of them feel it in the dark, in a limited range of knowledge, and in the absence of light (*bid'ayah*). For anyone who understands fully about the elephant, it is ridiculous to hear the five men continue to be at odds, insists on imposing its definition based on their touching on elephant. Unfortunately, because they are not confident with the knowledge gained, was among those who tried to make his understanding of the

elephant as the official schools, while his friend's understanding is different, because it becomes a threat to the official view, is seen as subversive and must be silenced.

It is not stop just right there. Due to excessive spirit and practice of the Prophet felt, "Convey from me even though one verse" back to -the saga of elephant- the nonsense that insist and force others to admit that the elephant as a tree, or swing, or a wall, or whip, or fan. Or, in the reality of social interaction religious, ideological and Islamic reduced to only a set of conclusions of law, which represents only a few aspects of Islam itself. Convey the spirit of the Prophet is too large, it often makes people understand the word he was just being "Give me just one verse ". And even worse if the person concerned considers that one verse is the only truth that must be delivered everywhere and ignoring other verses.

If each one continues learning, listen to each other, of course their understanding will be better and complete. Anyone who has been closed his inner-partly because of feeling smartest and most correct not be able to see a different of other understanding, all those things remain arrogance (*takabbur*) and the rejection of others. When arrogance begins, while listening to other people's ends, when the study was stopped, the ignorance begins, a very dangerous situation for those concerned and the entire human race.

Stupidity is hidden dangers that is exist in every person, can be overcome by continue to learn and continue to listen to others. Because of ignorance too, there are those who try to please the Prophet with only imitate the outside appearance but ignores moral aspect; anyone wants to please God by building a state religion, but the religion itself change from the beginning as a way, then a final destination. They think that Prophet Muhammad would be happy if the people wearing clothes as he used fourteen centuries ago, they thought that God will be pleased (*ridla*) if made Islam as the official

state ideology and His servants build a State religion, the Islamic State. In this case they forget that the Prophet Muhammad himself asserted that he was sent to perfect noble character, lofty morals (*innamâ bu'itstu li utammima makârima al-akhlâq*), they also forget that the only principles and objectives of the coming of the Messenger of God is mercy for all beings ( *wa mâ arsalnâka illâ rahmatan lil 'âlamîn*). In fact, by arguing to uphold this grace also , there are other people who are trying to force entry into what they consider as a grace, an act that is contrary to the grace from any point of view.

In the educational context and in the context of the noble values of Islam 's main message, the real latent dangers or hidden dangers of forming an Islamic state is the lack of knowledge and assuming perfect knowledge. If everyone continues to learn and willing to listen to others, then they will get better and comprehensively understand about Islam. They will not reduce Islam into an ideology or system state. They will know that Islam is not sufficiently packed in ideology, inadequate wrapped in constitutional barriers. Therefore, the important idea that should be encouraged is struggle to always encourage everyone to continue to learn, struggle to against ignorance, struggle to encourage everyone to continue to be open up to anyone, the struggle to liberate everyone to get out of the ideological boxes and dogmatic boxes that had been shackled to trap them and have them understand the sublime teachings of religion only to the extent that can be accommodated by a message box that they build up.

Once again, ignorance can be overcome by seeing, watching, listening, and to keep learning. It is hard and become a problem when people no longer need to learn and seek the truth because it was already has perfect knowledge and consider as the most correct. Anyone would probably agree that ignorance is something that is very

dangerous, but not everyone is aware of stupidity, the latent dangers within himself.

*Third*, the future of Indonesia. Actually, in terms of the number, no one should worry about the future of Islam in Indonesia. The population census on 2000 noted that the number of Muslims in the country stood at 88.22 %, a very high percentage. However, disasters can happen when religious adherents lost the logical power, then judge all people who disagree with their school of thought that is menolitic. In the history of Islam, the group that feels most authentic faith is not hard to trace. If just feels right without punishing the other hand, perhaps it is not too dangerous. Dangers will arise when there are people in the name of God, then punish and destroy even different faiths. "In my reading, in many cases, the Qur'an is much more tolerant than the attitude of a few Muslims are intolerant of difference."<sup>20</sup> This kind of phenomenon can be found in many countries, both in developed countries, as well as in underdeveloped countries, not only in the Islamic world. What is commonly categorized as fundamentalist groups are in this category. In the U.S. for example, we know that Christian fundamentalist groups in the era of President George W. Bush became the main supporter of the regime's neo-imperialist. In the Islamic world, sporadically since the last few years this fundamentalism is perceived symptoms. The most extreme among them easily fall into the trap of terrorism.

There are several theories that discuss emerging fundamentalism in the Islamic world. The most widely cited is the failure of Muslims to face the modernity that have been really put Islam into a corner. The weakness to face the "hot" flow, the fundamentalist groups seeking religious arguments to "entertain themselves" in an imagined world that has not been contaminated. If merely "entertaining" probably will not pose much of a problem. But

---

20. Interviews with respondent in Jakarta on 30 September 2012.

once they develop political strength to resist modernity through a variety of ways, the clash with Muslim groups that do not agree with the ways they can not be avoided. It does not mean that Muslims are opposed to the way they have indulged in modernity. This class of opponents is not less critical face to face the modern flow, but the way in which escorted by logical power and clear judgment, even if not always successful.

Another theory says that the growing of Islamic fundamentalism wave in many countries mainly driven by a sense of solidarity to the fate of his brothers in Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The feeling of solidarity is actually owned by all Muslims around the world. But the difference is the attitude that is intended by the majority group as far as possible to avoid violence and keep waving the banner of peace, despite the suffering of the people in the region maps that conflict often was unbearable. If the condition is associated with Indonesia that is relatively safe, the emergence of the fundamentalism power, from the soft pole to the most extreme (terrorism) pole is, in fact, beyond reasoning. We take for example, the practice of suicide bombing while killing another human being (the case of Bali, Marriot, etc.), can not be understood at all. Indonesia is not the Palestinians, not Kashmir, not Afghanistan, and not Iraq, but why the barbaric practices have been done here?

The third theory, specifically for Indonesia, the rise of fundamentalism in the archipelago caused by the failure of the state to realize the ideals of independence in the form of social justice and the creation of equitable prosperity for all people. Corruption that is still rolling is the real evidence of failure. Everyone acknowledges this bitter reality. However, since fundamentalist group's knowledge is very poor about the sociological map of Indonesia that is not simple, then they take a short cut to justice: implementing Islamic law through power. With the implementation of *syar'ab*, imagined God

would bless Indonesia. Surprisingly, all of these fundamentalist groups is undemocratic to channel their political ideals. This fact by itself reveals one thing: for them, clash between theory and practice is not an issue. In other words, that can be read here is dishonesty in politics. In democracy theory is forbidden, the practice is used, in order to achieve the goal. "Finally, I came with fundamentalist groups concerns about conditions in Indonesia are far from justice, but, the way they use will not get closer the country to the noble ideals of freedom, instead will kill these ideals in the middle of the road. Problems of Indonesia, the largest Muslim nation on earth, may not be solved by the simple minds who prefer a short cut, sometimes in the form of violence. I realized that the democracy that is being executed today in Indonesia is not healthy at all, and if not quickly addressed, could become a source of harm for a while. But for the long term, there is no other option, except through a democratic system that is healthy and strong, moderate and inclusive Islam will continue to guide Indonesia to achieve the goal of independence. "<sup>21</sup>

## **G. Conclusion**

From the explanation above, it can be concluded that the Indonesian Muslim intellectuals do not agree to the motion of some Muslims who desire the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia. Therefore, Islam for them is the way to God, not a goal to be achieved.

---

21 *Ibid.*

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- al-Mawardi, Abu al-Hasan, *al-Abkâm al-Suthâniyyah*, (Kairo: Dâr al-Fikr, 1983).
- al-Razi, Fakhruddin, *Mafatih al-Ghaib* (Cairo: Mauqi' al-Tafsir, tt), vol. 7
- al-Raziq, Ali Abd, *al-Islam wa Ushûl al-Hukm*, (Kairo: Tp., 1925).
- al-Syukani, *Fath al-Qadir*, (Cairo: Mauqi' al-Tafasir, tt). Vol. 5.
- Ayoob, Mohammed (ed.), *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*, London: Croom Helm, 1981).
- Ayubi, Nazih, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, (London dan New York: Routledge, 1991).
- Azra, Azyumardi, *Pergolakan Politik Islam: Dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme Hingga Post-Modernisme*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996).
- Binder, Leonard, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, (Berkeley dan Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963).
- Effendy, Bahtiar, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998).
- Esposito, John L. (ed.), *Islam and Politics*, (Syracuse: Syarcuse University Press, 1984).
- Halliday, Fred dan Hamzah Alavi (eds.), *State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988).
- Ibn Hanbal, Abu Abdillah Ahmad ibn Muhammad, *Masnad Ahmad*, (Cairo: Mauqi' Qazarat al- Auqaf al-Mishriyyah, tt)].
- Ibn Khaldun, Abd al-Rahman, *Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun*, (Kairo: Dâr al-Fikr, 1958).
- Jalaluddn Rakhmat, Said Aqil Siraj, dan Masdar F. Mas'udi, "Kaum Beriman," dalam: *Lautan Wahyu: Islam sebagai Rahmatan lil-'Alamin*, episode 4, Supervisor Program: KH. A. Mustofa Bisri, ©LibForAll Foundation 2009).
- Mortimer, Edward, *Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1982).



- Muzadi, Hasyim, “Umat” dalam *Lautan Wahyu: Islam sebagai Rahmatan lil’Alamin*, episode 3, Supervisor Program: KH. A. Mustofa Bisri, ©LibForAll Foundation 2009).
- Nawawi, Hadari, *Motode Penelitian Sosial*, (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1987).
- Piscatori, James P. (eds.), *Islam in the Political Process*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
- Pulungan, J. Sujuthi, *Fiqh Siyasah: Ajaran Sejarah dan Pemikiran*, (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 1994).
- Sjadzali, Munawir, *Islam dan Tata Negara: Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemikiran*, (Jakarta: UI-Press, 1993).
- Surachmat, Winarno, *Dasar dan Teknik Reseach: Pengantar Metodologi Ilmiah*, (Bandung: Tarsito, 1975).
- Syamsuddin, M. Din, *Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru*, (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001).