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## The Discussion of Ulama and Ideology in The Indonesian Ideological Decade

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### ABSTRACT

The ideological decade in Indonesia was marked by the entry of various transnational ideologies. Thus, these various ideologies will be responded to with various responses that are different from each other, including the responses of the ulama as representatives of Indonesian Muslims (still the Dutch East Indies at that time). This article aims to describe various forms of response to several ideologies that developed during the ideological decade and their discourses. This article was written with a qualitative descriptive approach using the literature study method as the data collection method. From the results of the analysis, it can be concluded that the ulama as well as Muslims are fragmented in various responses and the roles shown in their various attitudes, when responding to the entry of various ideas/ideologies at this time. In the life of the community, the estuary of the responses that appear leads to the pros and cons of these ideas/ideologies.

**KEYWORDS:** Ulama, Ideas, Ideology, Response

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### INTRODUCTION

Ulama are a source of reference for the people in obtaining answers to various problems in people's lives (especially religious aspects). In the past, the role of the ulama was so dominant that each region gave its own name to the figure of a cleric, such as baleo, buya, ustadz, convert, master guru, kyai, ajengan, master, sheikh and so on.<sup>1</sup> The strong influence of the ulama in the past was due to their independent attitude, especially towards power. This independent attitude is based on their knowledge of

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<sup>1</sup> Etymologically the term ulama is the plural form of the Arabic noun (fail) 'alim, which comes from the verb 'alima which means "to know or "to know about. While 'alim is someone who has the attribute "ilm as a force that is firmly rooted in science and literature. In the Indonesian context, ulama also have different names in each region such as Kyai (Javanese), Ajengan (Sunda), Tengku (Aceh), Sheikh (North Sumatra/Tapanuli) and Tuan Guru (Nusa Tenggara and Kalimantan) (Isma'il, 1997: 60-63). The terminology understanding will depend on the perspective that will be drawn to define ulama. "adaptation" of meaning -if you don't want to call it a shift in meaning-, where in Indonesia the term ulama is still understood as a person who has knowledge in the field of sharia, especially fiqh (Burhanudin, 2002: xxviii-xxx).

Islam, their steadfast *ubudiyah* and their appreciation of Islamic teachings manifested in Sufistic life. In the past, it was easy for scholars to become leaders of the people and nation. They have scientific authority by following the image of the Apostle and his friends, namely spiritual enrichment and temporal power. So that they appear to be scholars who are the longing of the community marked by all their words and attitudes as role models.<sup>2</sup>

However, now this situation is starting to worry because of the weakening of the authority of the *ulama* and it is possible that they are trapped in various political (practical) interests. *Ulama* organizations are still developing and scattered throughout the archipelago, but these organizations no longer have a solid authority which causes people to start losing their role models. Indeed, the *ulama* were faced with two difficult choices, namely "making peace" with power, after going through a non-cooperative politics during the Dutch and Japanese colonial times or remaining non-cooperative by forming a separate community and doing '*uzlah*' from the midst of society. The first group of *ulama* is faced with the *ummah's* assumption that they have been "bought" by power, while the second group has always been anti-power. It must be admitted that the phenomenon of power politics in relation to Indonesia has had its ups and downs. During Soekarno's reign, *ulama* who thought "radically" seemed to be left out with the peak of the disbandment of *Masjumi* and the only "moderate" Islamic parties could approach. During the Soeharto era, at first he tended to mystical and secularistic schools, but at the end of his reign he began to tend towards Islam in accordance with the motto of green *royo-royo*. *Habibie's* rise, the existence of scholars is getting closer, especially scholars who have intellectual potential, namely with the birth of intellectuals and intellectuals (Latif, 2011: 64). The period of Abdurrahman Wahid was known for its religious views which tended to be free from the attachments to figures and emphasized more on an inclusive religious approach. Megawati does not show the style of her approach in placing the *ulama's* position, but tries to embrace the *ulama* by forming a religious wing in the political party he leads.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono began to develop a clerical approach that puts more emphasis on intellectual discourse even though it is not very clear for everyone to read. However, his obsession to build Islamic civilization became his themes in developing scholarly insight. However, because the cadre of *ulema* is mostly started from the basis of the life of an agrarian society, the *ulema* in Indonesia are not too accustomed to talking about the relationship between Islam and modernity. As a result, the position of the *ulama* in the context of nationality is still mostly on the development boundary line, so that the dialogue process between the *ulama* group and intellectuals does not run smoothly. The impact is that the preparation of development programs only provides a little "pity" for the development of religious morals with the target being to minimize the role of radical religious groups. Strictly speaking, religion as the basis for ethical, moral and spiritual development has not been concretely described (Lubis, 2014: 2-3).

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<sup>2</sup> In fact, the position of the *ulama*, not only has the authority of leadership and spirituality, but has a much more complicated complexity. The complexity of the role of *ulama* in important sectors of Islamic society (Indonesia) is accompanied by the legitimacy of the basis of the Islamic religion, so that people's appreciation and importance in Muslim society is very high. Moreover, the attachment of the term '*ulamaship*' to a person, not through a long process in society itself, where the elements of a person's clerics in the form of integrity, scientific quality and credibility of moral piety and social responsibility, are proven. Their clericism will not be manifested in real terms if it is not accompanied by the appearance of personal qualities that deserve to be possessed. In society (Islam), *ulama* ultimately have a role as informal leaders/community leaders in their community (Suri, 2004: 1-2).

This discourse has made the ulama as agents of transfer of Islam who have marginalized Islam as an idea for the state. In addition, other ideas, such as communism/socialism, which had "touched" some scholars in the past, have also been absolutely banned at this time. The idea of nationalism (in the sense of Indonesian-ness) remains, which is given more space to develop in the social dynamics of Indonesian society today. This is interesting, if you look at the role of ulama and their response to this idea, before the formation of a de facto Indonesian identity on August 17, 1945, especially during the radical period of the movement which was later known as the Age of Movement. At this time,<sup>3</sup> the diversity and development of national ideas felt more "sportsmanlike" in competing to grow and develop, and for each of them to look for supporters. For this reason, this article tries to describe and analyze how the actual position and response of the ulama during the movement period was in responding to various national ideas that emerged at that time.

## **METHODS**

The writing of this article uses an analytical descriptive method based on extracting data through the literature study/literature study method from several (written) literature sources. Writing is carried out through a process of extracting data from various reference sources discussing various articles/writings related to various literatures on themes related to articles, especially those relating to decades of ideology. These various sources are published in public media, so they can be accessed through various places (libraries) and the internet openly (Prayogi, 2021). This paper can be an elaboration of various related articles and writings. Likewise, this article is more of a synthesis of existing writings, to be seen later in relation to what can be done in the current context (Prayogi, 2022).

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **Ulama In 1920-1930**

Ulama themselves literally mean "people who have knowledge". From the literal meaning, it can be concluded that the ulama are: 1) Muslims who master the science of Islam; 2) Muslims who fully understand Islamic Shari'a (kaaffah) as summarized in the Al-Quran and "as-Sunnah"; 3) Be a role model for Muslims in understanding and practicing it.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Dutch colonialists began to carry out a political ethic or politics of reciprocation which actually only created a layer of society that could help them in their government in Indonesia. The politics of reciprocity provides education and jobs for the Indonesian people, especially Muslims. Apart from that, it also prepared for a layer of bureaucracy that the Dutch people could no longer hold. The people who received education were not even the whole community, but only the Priyayi (aristocrats), therefore the leaders of the movement were from the aristocratic group.

The strategy of resistance against the invaders at this time was more of a formal organization than with weapons. The Sarekat Dagang Islam organization was established which was the first national movement organization in Indonesia in 1905, which had members from the common people to the priyayi and covered a wide area. After that, various movement organizations were founded which were fronted by the

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<sup>3</sup> This period has been termed the "ideological decade" in Indonesia's modern history. It was also at this time that various types of ideologies, which would later influence religious growth and the ideological basis of the struggle, began to be debated among the national movement (Abdullah, 1987: 15).

ulama. In this context, the ulama realized that their struggle would not be successful if they continued with traditional methods. In the years 1920-1930 the ulema moved in the form of various organizations. Therefore, it is necessary to make changes, even though they originate from the colonial influence itself, namely struggling through organizations, both in the social field of education or in the field of political movement. So it is clear that the ulama respond to various ideological dynamics through the organizational vehicle in which they are located or in other words the movement organization (Islam) is actually the embodiment of the ulama themselves. In fact, this realization was later realized by the polarization of Islamic movements/organizations at two poles, namely traditionalists and modernists.

### **Dynamics Of Islam 1920-1930**

Indonesia at the beginning of the 20th century was marked by the emergence of many movement organizations founded by indigenous people. Although the emergence was for the same goal of advancing the lives of the indigenous people, each organization has a different identity and path of struggle. Some of them took a compromise (cooperative) path with the Dutch East Indies government and most of the others chose a radical (non-cooperative) path. Their identities are not all the same, broadly they are fragmented into three groups: Islamic, Nationalist/Secular, and Communist.

At that time, Muslims (Muslim communities) were also fragmented into various organizations with different styles. However, the forum for Muslim organizations can be represented by the existence of Islamic organizations, which indeed claim to carry Islam as the main idea and Islam as well as its identity, although within certain limits. The existence of Islamic organizations at that time, such as Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, Nahdhatul Ulama, and several other Islamic organizations. At this time, Muslims were also faced with the entry of other ideas. The development of the teachings of communism in the Dutch East Indies made Muslims experience the contact of ideas politically. Although then, the teachings of communism were (considered) very contrary to the teachings of Islam which were widely embraced by the community, but it turned out that this idea was able to influence several groups of Islamic society in the Dutch East Indies to later serve as a political stance for their struggle.<sup>4</sup> In addition to communism, the Muslims of the Dutch East Indies also accepted a secular national conception. The nationalism of this nation requires the unity of Indonesia as a nation without barriers, including religion. The idea of nationalism then developed by giving rise to various dynamics which in the end also helped shape the response and position of Muslims in the political arena at that time (Noer, 1983: 160-161).

In addition, Muslims also experience dynamics in the form of internal "disputes" between Muslims. The reason is the different views on religious practice between the reformers and the traditional. Among the causes of the emergence of this dispute is the difference in *furu'iyah* in matters of schools of jurisprudence. Even though Indonesian Muslims recognize any school of thought, especially in terms of *fiqh*, the majority of Indonesian Muslims practice the Syafi'i School, the school that is the most easily recognizable identity of the traditional groups. Meanwhile, the reformers came with a new school of thought. In general, this group practices a lot of the Hanbali School of Jurisprudence, although the popular doctrines in this group are "no schooling" and "returning to the Qur'an and As-Sunnah". It is this debate about the necessity and non-compulsion of schools of thought that is quite often a topic of discussion among

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<sup>4</sup> The contact of the idea of communism with the Muslims of the Dutch East Indies occurred when some of the communist leaders began to join the Sarekat Islam (Shiraishi, 2005: 308-311).

reformers and traditional figures. In this case of fiqh, among the reformers, the term heresy was popularized to indicate teachings (fiqh and others) which were considered to deviate from the principles of the Qur'an and Sunnah (Bachtiar, 2011: 21-22). Fierce debates and discourses on this issue arose among Muslim leaders. The different views on the issue of fiqh have resulted in the emergence of blocs within the body of Muslims which at certain moments turn into political identities. In other words, this problem has polarized Muslims into traditional and reformist groups (Bachtiar, 2011: 30-31). With the emergence of Islamic polarization, we can see the position of the ulama based on this structure, which can also read the responses between these groups of scholars in responding to the political ideas that developed at that time.

### **Response and Role of Ulama to the Idea of Communism**

The contact of the idea of communism with Muslims on a massive scale may be traced from his contact with the large Islamic organization at that time, namely the Sarekat Islam. At that time, the idea of socialism emerged as an "introduction" to the idea of communism which was originally brought by Henk Sneevliet, a Dutch socialist who first came to the Dutch East Indies in February 1913. He was the intellectual actor behind the radicalism of the Sarekat Islam Semarang under Semaoen. Henk also spearheaded the formation of the Red Guard, which consisted of Navy sailors in Surabaya as the pillars of the revolution he was pioneering. It was because of his political activities that he was brought to the high court in Semarang. He was charged with sedition against the colonial government. The Henk Sneevliet trial was the first ever trial of a white man for his political conduct. His trial caused a big reaction among the activists of the Sarekat Islam Semarang. Some of them even felt sympathy for Henk who sacrificed himself for the sake of the nation that was colonized by his people. His trial also made a deep impression on Darsono, who later played an important role in the Islam-Communism movement that led to the formation of the Indonesian Communist Party. Further interaction between communism and the Sarekat Islam then received a good response from the chairman of the Sarekat Islam at the time, Tjokroaminoto. Henk's idea was welcome because at the same time Sarekat Islam showed its moderate attitude. Tjokroaminoto is an eclectic Muslim. He is more seen as a syncretist who longs for unity among members of the Sarekat Islam. Islam for Tjokro is a unifying instrument (Soewarsono, 2000: 23-38).

Having a "safe" position, communist figures with vehicles in the form of the Semarang branch of the Sarekat Islam led to conflicts and criticisms aimed at Tjokro's leadership. This criticism is getting more and more massive. Darsono, one of the leaders of the Sarekat Islam Semarang, accused Tjokro of corrupting the organization's funds. He expressed this at the second congress of the Sarekat Islam in Batavia. Frankly, Tjokro denies these accusations. Darsono even more vigorously launched his criticism, although Tjokro repeatedly denied it. The adoption of Henk Sneevliet's idea of Socialism was also inseparable from the political situation and the attitude of Sarekat Islam under Tjokro's control in dealing with the colonial government. Semaoen and his friends at the Sarekat Islam Semarang took a revolutionary path against the colonial government which they considered a representation of capitalism/imperialism. After all, the colonial government had an interest in protecting its business and keeping profits flowing to the mother country. The divisions within the Sarekat Islam escalated when the Afdeling B incident occurred in 1919. The incident of Haji Hasan's resistance in Leles, Garut, which opposed paying the rice tax and led to a bloody riot opened Pandora's box for the involvement of communist cells within the Sarekat Islam. Haji Hasan is a religious leader in Leles and a member of the Sarekat Islam. He fought back and killed himself and his

family members. The incident spread everywhere. This resulted in the arrest of leaders of the Sarekat Islam including Tjokraminoto. This incident was immediately responded by Haji Agus Salim, in which he did what Tjokro could never do, namely purging the Sarekat Islam from elements of Communism (Triyana, 2013: 7-8).

Not only the Sarekat Islam, communism was also responded to with an appropriate acceptance in various regions with several prominent ulama as the front line. The ulama played the role of interpreters and implementers of communist ideas that were united with their Islamic beliefs. In Surakarta as one of the movement base cities in Java, Haji Misbach's name was recorded. Haji Misbach, who is known for his devout worship, responded by accepting Communism as a liberation idea/ideology without having to worry about losing his faith. Haji Misbach is adept at quoting verses from the Koran and the hadith of the Prophet and incorporating them into his critical and pithy articles. Haji Misbach's social view rests on the values of Islamic teachings that are in favor of the oppressed. This was the response that found the meeting point between Islam and communism, which was propagated by Haji Misbach at that time.<sup>5</sup>

In Banten, Communism was accepted among the ulama at first because they were disillusioned with the leadership of Tjokroaminoto's Sarekat Islam. Moreover, the Sarekat Islam Banten was led by Hasan Djajadiningrat, who was known as a moderate and secular leader of the Sarekat Islam. Hasan is a real picture of the local Sarekat Islam leader who was not frontal in facing the colonial government. Another Sarekat Islam figure who also responded well and even played an important role in the development of Communism in Banten was Kyai Haji Achmad Chatib. He is the son-in-law of Kyai Haji Asnawi Caringin who is well-known and respected. Like Misbach, Chatib was a devout person who accepted the ideas of Communism. Another important figure in Banten is Ahmad Basaif, a Bantenese of Arab descent who is fluent in Arabic and devoted to worship. He, along with Puradisastra and Tubagus Alipan, were pioneers in the movement that combined Islam and Communism in Banten, so that a new term emerged in the form of Islam-Communist which was known to the public and began to be responded to well by Muslims (Triyana, 2013: 9-10).

The seeds of Communism which were initially responded to by some scholars as a weapon of class struggle continued to crystallize over time. He continued to process, institutionalize and after going through several stages ended in the formation of the Indonesian Communist Party, May 23, 1920. This party became a generator for the course of the revolution in the Dutch East Indies. After the successive exiles of its main characters: Henk Sneevliet, Tan Malaka, Semaoen and Darsono, a group of young communists plotted a revolt against the colonial authorities. The decision against that was known as the Prambanan decision, November 1925. A year later a rebellion broke out. Two areas with a fairly large escalation of events are Banten and Silungkang. And both areas are known as devout Muslims. Since 1926 thousands of leftists were exiled to Boven Digul, a prison deliberately built by the colonial government to detain the communists involved in the 1926 incident. a completely new and different national political stage from what they faced during the national movement (McVey, 2009).

### **Response and Role of Ulama to Pan-Islamic Ideas**

At the beginning of the 20th century, Muslims in Indonesia viewed the Ottoman Empire as the embodiment of the "Uniting State of Islam"/Khilafah. They have been

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<sup>5</sup> Haji Misbach acted as an interpreter of the idea of Communism and became a propagandist and non-formal leader in his status as an executor of communist ideas (Suryanegara, 1995).

interested in following the development of the Ottoman Empire since the country was involved in World War I until then the caliphate system in Turkey was overthrown and the idea for the establishment of a new caliphate emerged. At that time, Muslims in Indonesia were not only interested in this issue, they even felt obliged to discuss and resolve it (Noer, 1996: 242). The Ottoman Turks became the losers in World War I with a weak, poor, and almost bankrupt economy. In such conditions Turkey was invaded by Greece, so that the suffering of the country that the Western world had feared in the past was complete. In this weak and chaotic government situation, Mustafa Kemal Pasha emerged on the Turkish political stage and changed the government structure in Turkey from a caliphate system to a Republic of Turkey state (Zurcher, 2003: 215-216).

The incident immediately became news that spread and shocked the Islamic world. This condition was inseparable from the understanding of Pan-Islamism which at that time influenced many Muslims in various parts of the world, including Indonesia. There is a close relationship between Pan-Islamism and the position of caliph. This understanding has the aim of uniting the entire Islamic world under one political and religious power headed by a caliph. Therefore, when this position was abolished, there were many Muslims who responded and fought for it to be upright again (Suminto, 1996: 80-83). The collapse of the Ottoman Turks was not only a problem for the Turks but had become a problem for other Muslims because so far the Khilafah institution had stood with Muslims for more than a thousand years. Because of the importance of the existence of the caliphate institution, the news of this abolition has brought a response from the Islamic world who are trying to re-establish the caliphate. The idea of finding a replacement for the caliphate continues and continues to be discussed. Then in several places a meeting was held to resolve this issue.

News of this abolition reached Indonesia and received a response from scholars and leaders of the Islamic movement during the Al-Islam Congress 19-21 May 1924 in Garut. In the opening speech of the congress, Agus Salim put this issue in the context of the struggle between the Islamic world and the colonial government. According to him, relations between Muslim countries are bad, their unity has been broken, and the caliph only lives in Friday sermons. In various places they are controlled by foreign nations. In Ankara, the caliph has been sacked and there is no new caliph in Istanbul. Then Agus Salim emphasized that the Al-Islam Congress needs to seek unity, so it is an obligation to find a solution to the problem of the caliphate. For Agus Salim the existence of an independent Muslim government is an important matter (Bruinessen, 1995: 127). This incident was increasingly responded to by Muslims and scholars where on 4-5 October 1924 the leaders of the Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, and Al-Irsyad held a meeting at Madrasah Tarbiatoel Aitam Genteng Surabaya which was also attended by leaders at the local level from the three the organization. This meeting was also attended by many great scholars, both Arabs and Javanese. During this meeting there was a long discussion about the caliphate and sending delegates to the congress in Cairo. Tjokroaminoto in his speech conveyed the need for Muslims to have a caliph and the need for an active role for Muslims in Indonesia for the sake of the caliphate. Important outcomes of this meeting were the agreement that the existence of a caliphate was mandatory, the willingness to attend the Khilafah Congress in Cairo, and the formation of the Chilafat Committee (Khilafah Committee) (Bruinessen, 1995).

As well as positioning themselves against the idea of communism, the ulama positioned themselves as initiators and facilitators. This is because the Pan-Islamic idea, has been considered an idea that is in accordance with the Islamic concept of society, where the interpretation of the idea was born in the land of Islam. The Hajis, as the

facilitators of this movement, also played an important role in maintaining the dynamics of the response of the Muslims of the Dutch East Indies at that time. This can be seen from the dominant role of the figures who mainly joined the Sarekat Islam. The role of Sarekat Islam, especially Agus Salim as an inspiration, in this struggle seemed to be the most dominant compared to other groups. The organization that became the inspiration for the implementation of the AI-Islam congress, which discussed a lot about Pan-Islamism. This kind of response is in line with the strengthening of Sarekat Islam's attention to Pan-Islamism which they claim to be the fighters for this understanding in Indonesia. The existence of the AI-Islam congress has also become a forum for facilitation in order to bring together a middle way between modernist and traditionalist Islamic groups (Mukayat, 1985: 39).

In subsequent developments the issue of the caliphate was abandoned by Muslims in Indonesia. The reason is because the traditional groups belonging to NU, as well as Muhammadiyah and AI-Irsyad focus their struggles on social and educational fields. Meanwhile, the Sarekat Islam was no longer charismatic in front of them after the Sarekat Islam had actually become entangled in the internal feuds of Muslims. Since then, the Sarekat Islam struggle no longer represents the political aspirations of Muslims in Indonesia. They also could no longer claim to be the pioneers of the national movement after the PNI took their place. In addition, the support of the Islamic world for the issue of the disappearing caliphate resulted in the Sarekat Islam abandoning the struggle for Pan-Islamic ideas and shifting it to the Islamic struggle in the context of nationality.

### **Response and Role of Ulama to the Idea of Nationalism**

The nationalism of the Indonesian people in the struggle to escape from the influence of the power of the Dutch Kingdom which is the soul point that unites ethnic groups with different cultures. Indeed, in its historical aspect, Nationalism was born as a tool towards the goal of an independent Indonesia due to criticism of the government system that gave birth to educated groups in the social structure of the Dutch East Indies society. However, with the creation of a new aristocracy, there appears to be a loss of identity as a colonized nation due to a new social status. They lost co-optation with the Dutch even though they had enjoyed a Western education into the bureaucratic system of the Dutch East Indies government. So the Intellectuals realized that they were a colonized nation with the inclusion of the ideology of nationalism in them to foster a sense of unity and nationality among the citizens of the Dutch East Indies. Budi Utomo started the idea of Nationalism against colonial rule even though it was still within the scope of nationalism based on Javanese culture (Abdullah, 2001: 24-34). Thus, the spirit of nationalism that sparked the birth of the national movement was the contribution of the intellectual class and the indigenous priyayi who every time they were transferred to other areas in the Dutch East Indies opened the ideology of Nationalism that was strongly internalized as the soul of the struggle. Besides that, it opens insight into the actual situation in the colony in other areas that have never seen it before, resulting in an inner bond with other regions, of course also creating a feeling of shared destiny and sharing as a colonized nation. In the 20th century, Indonesia, including the Asian and African nations, has become one of the ways in which humanity is managed on the basis of a sense of unity and the seeds of nationalism that have been planted from itself.

The idea of nationalism (secular) in the Dutch East Indies, then began to strengthen after the idea of communism was banned and Pan-Islam (began) abandoned. The idea of nationalism as at the beginning, at this time has been fostered from the birth of a



national-local scale organization, namely Budi Utomo and then culminated with the establishment of the Indonesian National Party. The emergence of the PNI marked the formation of another intellectual political tradition in Indonesia, namely the secular "Nationalist" tradition (Latif, 2012: 312) (Ricklefs, 2008: 393). Nationalism in Indonesia (Dutch East Indies), as in other Southeast Asian countries, has a historical basis during the colonial period, so anti-colonialism is the main part. Therefore, there is an interdependence between nationalism and colonialism as well as a mutual influence, especially between growing nationalism and colonial politics and its colonial ideology. In this case, nationalism can be categorized into two, namely western nationalism, namely nationalism in an advanced society, as an effort to overcome an unfavorable situation, and eastern nationalism as an effort to overcome backwardness by imitating the west, but hostile to the west (Karim, 1996: 97).

This idea is in contact with Muslims in various forms of dynamics. The earliest response to this idea was to try to be accommodative, considering that Pan-Islamic ideas and the charm of the Sarekat Islam had faded. This response is shown by normatively supporting each other's various activities. This response also means the emergence of ambiguity, where on the one hand, Muslim leaders must cooperate (alliance) and form bonds of political solidarity with secular nationalists in the face of the Dutch colonial government. On the other hand, there are quite sharp differences in the basic ideology of the struggle, which often creates internal conflicts among the nationalist groups. This ambiguity finally reached its peak when the trial against Sukarno in August revealed a letter from Tjipto Mangunkusumo dated March 1928. In his letter, Tjipto reminded Sukarno of the dangers of Pan-Islamism and the possible attempts of Tjokroaminoto and Salim to control the PPPKI. According to Tjipto, if they succeeded, it would result in the destruction of the nationalist movement led by Soekarno and his friends. He warned Sukarno of the 'treasonous act' committed by Tjokroaminoto with PSII. Unmitigated, Tjipto accused Salim and Tjokroaminoto of being traitors. Tjipto's letter to Soekarno proves that he expresses his personal hatred which he absolutely cannot accept if the leadership of the national movement is in the hands of people with an Islamic ideology (Ingelson, 1983). In subsequent developments, scholars such as Ahmad Hassan and Mohammad Natsir (Islamic Union) also responded to Soekarno and his colleagues' political ideas of nationalism. The two latter figures were also involved in various debates and polemics with the PNI circles above. These polemics further emphasized the response of the ulama who wanted to separate themselves from this idea. In this case, the ulama initially acted as supporters of the idea, but later developed their role as a catalyst/purifier of Islamic ideas after experiencing polemics vis a vis with the idea of nationalism. As a result, in the context of the twentieth century, the true characteristic of nationalism is that the nation-state is considered a political unit that is indispensable and appropriate for modern times. Furthermore, that a communal sense of ethnic and national identity helps ensure the stability of the existing nation-state when it is formed and becomes the main criterion in deciding whether claims for an autonomous state should be recognized by the international community. In the end, this idea continues to grow today and influences further perceptions among Muslims as an appropriate idea - if not considered the only one - in building a unitary identity. The impact clearly places the ulama in the position of being the legalization stamp of the truth they want to build, and denying the existence of further polemics against other ideas.

## **CONCLUSION**

From this article, several things can be concluded. the first, namely, the ulama as informal leaders in society had a very important role among the pre-independence

Muslims of Indonesia. These roles were manifested by their independent position against colonial government power. Although, it still generates discourse, the independent and consistent attitude in the pre-independence period was a tangible form of proving his position as a role model to be followed. Second, in general, the role of the ulama will also be reflected in their various attitudes and responses to a condition/ event that affects the needs of people's lives. In the pre-independence period, in the mid-1920s to be precise, the ulama played different roles and had different responses in responding to ideas for independence and the identity of the people. The roles and responses shown in the end also contributed to the stratification and classification of ulama in various terminology. Even so, this is important, so that Muslims can clearly identify the emergence of a difference. Third, the ideological decade (1920-1930) was a period in which Indonesian Muslims experienced the dynamics of life that were no less complex than the dynamics of life today. various ideas come and go and influence the mindset and attitudes of the people and their scholars, including in responding to the ideas of Communism, Pan-Islamism, and Nationalism.

In this case, it can be concluded that Muslims and ulama are fragmented in various responses and the roles shown in their various attitudes. When responding to the inclusion of these ideas in Islamic societies and organizations, the responses that emerged also showed the pros and cons of this idea, as well as the role of the ulama in it. This shows the dynamics of Muslims as well as the dynamic role of ulama, as well as the spirit of the times that supports competition and differences in offering something in this country. In the end, history has shown us that there was a difference in the past that can be addressed wisely, including addressing the ideas that are currently developing without any unfounded concerns.

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