

Perceptions and Reactions of Ahmadiyya to Fatwa Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI): An Anthropological Linguistics Approach

Fariz Alnizar, Amir Ma'ruf, Fadlil Munawwar Manshur

Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama Indonesia (UNUSIA), Jakarta, Indonesia

Email: Fariz@unusia.ac.id

Departement of Humanities, Faculty of Cultural Sciences Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia

amir_maruf@ugm.ac.id

Departement of Humanities, Faculty of Cultural Sciences Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia

fadlil@ugm.ac.id

Abstract

Over the past two decades, the trend of fatwa requests has increased. Fatwas issued by certain individuals or organizations are used as references in daily life. Likewise in Indonesia through the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) where the desire for asking fatwas is almost the same as the desire for implementing the fatwa itself. Including fatwas related to religious sects such as Ahmadiyya which are often become victims of discrimination and assault. Studies of this research focuses on texts fatwa issued by MUI on Ahmadiyya sect in 1980 and 2005. This study departs from the claims of some researchers who think that the fatwa had a strong correlation with actions and violent behavior that befell the Ahmadiyya Community. Use an anthropological linguistic approach, this study show Jemaah Ahmadiyya considers that fatwas are opinion. As usual opinion, he must be respected. Disagreement with an opinion is common. Because opinions are not binding. Such a pedestal of thinking simultaneously raises attitudes and responses that tend to appear to 'accept what we are'. However, if examined more closely, there are a number of efforts which although they are 'sporadic' and are not interpreted as a specific strategy to counter the actual heretical labelling efforts carried out by the Jemaah Ahmadiyya.

Keywords: Fatwa, Ahmadiyya, Anthropological Linguistic, Indonesian Ulama Council

Abstrak

Selama dua dekede belakangan, tren permintaan fatwa semakin

meningkat. Fatwa-fatwa yang dikeluarkan oleh individu atau organisasi tertentu dijadikan rujukan dan referensi dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Demikian pula yang terjadi di Indonesia melalui Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI). Di Indonesia gairah untuk meminta fatwa hampir sama dengan gairah untuk mengamalkan fatwa itu sendiri. Termasuk fatwa-fatwa yang terkait dengan aliran dan paham keagamaan seperti Ahmadiyah yang kerap menjadi korban diskriminasi dan penyerangan. Kajian pada penelitian ini berfokus pada teks-teks fatwa yang dikeluarkan oleh MUI tentang aliran Ahmadiyah tahun 1980 dan 2005. Penelitian ini berangkat dari klaim sebagian peneliti yang menganggap bahwa fatwa memiliki korelasi yang kuat dengan tindakan dan perilaku kekerasan yang menimpa Jemaah Ahmadiyah. Dengan pendekatan linguistik antropologis, penelitian menunjukkan Jemaah Ahmadiyah menganggap bahwa fatwa adalah pendapat dan opini. Sebagaimana lazimnya pendapat, maka ia harus dihargai. Ketidaksetujuan terhadap sebuah pendapat lazim terjadi. Dasar berpikir semacam itu melahirkan sikap dan respons yang cenderung tampak 'menerima apa adanya'. Namun, jika ditelisik lebih dalam, ada semacam usaha-usaha yang meskipun bersifat 'sporadis' dan tidak diartikan sebagai strategi khusus untuk menghambat upaya pelabelan sesat nyata terus dilakukan oleh Jemaah Ahmadiyah.

Kata kunci : *Fatwa, Ahmadiyah, Linguistik Antropologis, Majelis Ulama Indonesia*

Introduction: After Fallen, Hit by Community Organization

On Friday, July 8, 2005, several people suddenly came to the Mubarak Campus, the Ahmadiyya Congregation Headquarters, located in Kelurahan Pondok Udik, Kemang, Bogor. At the headquarters, for three days July 8-10, 2005, the Ahmadiyya Community held an annual event titled *Jalsa Salana* which involved participants from various parts of Indonesia. There were around 1500 participants consisting of Jemaah Ahmadiyya, domestic and foreign invited guests, government officials, and Muslim scholars. Some unknown people who came were seen as

'taking laps', looking at the conditions and putting up banners that read "Ahmadiyya Not Islam, the Prophet Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, and the Holy Book Tadzkirah". They paced around and fro in the area in front of the main gate of the Campus. Not so long, they returned home, somewhere. While the security committee remains relaxed. There is no worry, let alone fear. "Everything will be fine," said one of the security committee members, Murtiyono.

In the daytime, after completing Friday prayers, dozens of people led by M. Amin Djamaluddin from the Islamic Studies and Research Institute (LPPI) came to the Mubarak Campus. They said they were eager to meet with representatives of the Ahmadiyya Congregation. Amin said that he had sent a letter to the head of the West Java regional police and the head of the Bogor area police on July 5, 2005. The contents of his letter said he requested to revoke the permit for the Ahmadiyya congregation's activities on the Mubarak Campus. The letter number 50 / VII / LPPI / 05 also contains a number of statements stating that it had held meetings with various government parties such as the Attorney General's Office, TNI Headquarters, National Police, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, and Central MUI. In the letter, it was stated that the results of the meeting with various parties decided that immediate dissolution of Ahmadiyya in all regions of Indonesia. (Burhani, 2016: 155; Hamdi, 2007: 224-225; Alnizar, 2019: 419; Aji, 2012: 140)

Meeting agreed. M. Amin Dajamaluddin that afternoon met with representatives of the Ahmadiyya at the Office of the Village Head of Pondok Udik, Kemang, Bogor. Ahmadiyya was represented by Ahmad Sumarto, Ruhdiyyat Ayyubi, Qomaruddin and also one of MTA (Muslim Television Ahmadiyya). While Amin Djamaluddin came with Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf. The Kemang Military District

Commander, Kemang sector police chief, Kemang sub-district head was present on behalf of the government. During the meeting Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf stated that the Ahmadiyya was heretical.

“Listen today, I speak. The aspirations of the Islamic community of Parung and all Muslims demand that you disband. If within 7x24 hours there is no official statement you dissolve, then you have declared war with Indonesian Muslims.” (Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf, 9 July 2005 on Video Documentation of The Mubarak Kampus)

Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf gave an ultimatum to the Ahmadiyya Community to leave the Mubarak Campus. The building must be emptied. If not, the masses will take over and force their way. They were given 7x24 hours to go.

Unexpectedly, on Saturday, July 9, 2005, more people arrived. Some who arrived at the Mubarak Campus first put up banners that read "Post Dissolution of Ahmadiyya". Occasionally they take pictures while throwing agitative sentences. "Let's take pictures in front of the sign before we destroy them," said one person. The crowd who came tried to push and asked to enter the main gate. They push each other. Many officials, but their existence did not help much. In fact, in an amateur videotape, it was clear that a number of police officers from the civil service enthusiastically joined in demolishing the signposts bearing the identity of the Jemaah Ahmadiyya Mubarak Campus. The action of pushing each other ignited emotions and not long afterwards the action of throwing each other into a single sight on the Mubarak Campus. Bottle fragments hurt Jemaah Ahmadiyya, mostly women and children, which at that time was being held *Jalsah Salanah*. Throw after throw came over. Some can be avoided, but not a few hurt the limbs, even the head of the congregation. While the conditions in the area of the

Mubarak Campus complex were chaotic, the mass outside the gate which also scattered along the highway that connects Parung-Bogor was increasingly violent and raging. Some of them shouted. Squealing. Shouting *takbir*. Shouts of "infidels", "apostates", and "heretics", sounded very loud. The masses that partially used the attributes that read the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) knocked down the ornate gates made by Jemaah Ahmadiyya in order to celebrate the *Jalsah Salanah* activities. After rummaging through the main gate and bombarding the rocks to the congregation. (Rogers, 2014: 71; Hasyim, 2019: 1; Mariani, 2013: 16-17; Burhani, 2016: 140)

Thousands of Ahmadiyya congregations who are still on the campus of Mubarak were frightened. Small children, women carry anxiety. While some men try to calm down. Some of the others did seem to get emotional, but some congregations cautioned that all actions taken must be with the approval of Amir (the leader of the Ahmadiyya Community).

"If the amir says fight, we are fighting. But amir did not order us to fight. We only defend ourselves with tools as we have."(Murtiyono Yusuf Ismail, 28 July 2018)

Rage struck the minds of the Ahmadiyya Congregation. They felt that the Mubarak Campus was their home. Their organizational status is also legal. In fact, since 1953. Throughout the 2000s, even before the reforms none of the anarchist events were addressed to them. if even deemed deviant Ahmadiyya should not be allowed to stand by the Government. But in reality the government officially gave permission for the establishment of the Ahmadiyya Congregation through the Decree of the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Indonesia No. JA 5/23/13 Date 13-3-1953. (Zulkarnain, 2005: 4; Sevea, 2009: 134-148; Burhani, 2020: 207-211)

The peak of the riots occurred on July 15, 2005. There were several versions of the people involved in the attack. First, some sources say a total of 10,000 people. The two said that there were not even ten thousand, only around 3000 people. Regarding the number of attackers, until now there is no valid information that can be accounted for. The crowd arrived at around 2:00 p.m. They carried various weapons: wood, clubs, and sharp bamboo. The crowd urged that the Ahmadiyya congregation still inside the Mubarak Campus immediately exit and vacate the place. They threatened if until 4:00 p.m. they were still on campus, the masses would burn the place. The Ahmadiyya Representative, Ahmad Supardi was summoned by the Head of Kemang Sub-District who was at the gate of the Mubarak Campus — where the masses were concentrating — voicing aspirations and agitation. Head of Kemang sub-district wanted to negotiate with representatives of the Ahmadiyya congregation. At the gate of the Mubarak Campus, there was also the Bogor Regent, the head of the state prosecutor's office, the regional police chief, and the Bogor resort police chief. The government officials and officials claim to offer choices which in this context are more coercive. They offered that the Ahmadiyya congregation want to leave the Mubarak Campus with guaranteed security from the authorities. This is an agreement between the government and the leader of Massa who took action, namely Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf. Ahmad Supardi insisted on his stand. They did not want to leave the Mubarak Campus which they had established and built on their own land. The lobby lasted for a long time until Amir Jemaah Ahmadiyya H. Abdul Basit spoke via cellphone connection with the police chief and decided to evacuate the Ahmadiyya congregation.

While the evacuation scenario was agreed upon, at the same time in the Lajnah Imailah (LI) building complex located on the back of the Mubarak Campus the mob had been destroyed and burned. The crowd continued to move towards the main complex of the Mubarak Campus through the back door. The mob burned books, burned a motorcycle, and also looted Jemaah's house. The evacuation process is also classified as not smooth. Because from amateur video footage the visible attack of the congregation that was transported by bus was pelted by the masses. *“After arriving at the police station, we were taken down. at night we were told to go home. No transportation and no question whatsoever.”* (Murtiyono Yusuf Ismail, 28, July 2018).

There are three levels of discrimination that afflict Ahmadiis. First *state level*. Second, *semi state level*. And last *non state level*.

“In general, JAI Suffers from discrimination and violence at the state level, semi state level and non-state level. First, in the state level, the government throught the minister of religion, attorney general and minister of interior, declarated the join circular in 2008 which gave warning to JAI to not proselytize.....second, at the semi-state level, MUI (the Indonesian council of ulama) pronounced a fatwa on the heresy of qadiyan Ahmadiyya in 1980. Third, at the non-state level Islamic group opposed to Ahmadiyya in various regions have attacked the JAI.” (Fadhillah, 2017: 35-52)

All three indeed befall the Ahmadiyya Community. In the Tempo report, it was stated that since the 1990s the Ahmadiyya Community of Indonesia had always lived under pressure and also threats. These pressures — with variations in variations made by Fadhillah (2017) — occur in all variants, both state levels through state policies, semi-state levels through semi-governmental fatwa and opinion products, and also non-state levels carried out by parties outside the government. The latter is carried out by a group of intolerant organizations (Tempo, Juni, 2018: 20).

In the past eight years, at least nationally, the issue of attacks, destruction and sealing of buildings belonging to Jemaah Ahmadiyya members occurred eight times. In 2011 three times, namely January 28 in the form of a threat from the FPI against the Ahmadiyya Community, February 6, three Ahmadiyya congregations in Cikeusik, Pandeglang, Banten were attacked and killed by a group of people, April-May Bogor government sealed a mosque belonging to the Ahmadiyya Community in Sindang Village Goods, Bogor for reasons urged by the society. In 2012, precisely on 17 February, the Nurhidayah Mosque belonging to the Ahmadiyya Community in Cianjur, West Java was damaged by residents. While in 2016 there were three events, namely on February 5, the expulsion of the Ahmadiyya congregation in Sri Kelurahan Waiting for Bangka Belitung, May 22 The Alkausar Mosque belonging to the Ahmadiyya Congregation in Kendal was damaged, and on June 14 eight Ahmadiyya congregations in Lombok were forced to sign a repentance statement local village head. The most recent incident that befell Jemaah Ahmadiyya was the destruction and expulsion of the Ahmadiyya congregation in Dusun Grepek, Gereneng, East Sakra, East Lombok, NTB which occurred on May 20, 2018. to service the needs of the state administration, and so forth.

This shows that a series of treatments in the form of violence and discrimination continue to occur to this day. The issue of Ahmadiyya is increasingly becoming a main issue when talking about minorities, especially in the Indonesian context.

Fatwa and *Liyan* Stereotype

The phenomenon of the MUI fatwas which have lately become a trending topic and the lips of the people is actually not a new phenomenon. He has actually happened since decades ago. The escalation of conversation and debate increased after the new order. This condition is of course due to the increasingly patterned color of thought in the MUI, but at the same time there is a wave of purification of thought due to battles and struggles and debates within the MUI. The voice of the ulama whose style of thinking is more right, in fact is louder. The color of the fatwa becomes so rigid and tends to be 'hard' (Hosen, 2004: 147; Suaedy, 2018: 290; Fuller, 2011: 11).

The fatwa on Ahmadiyya itself by the MUI was issued twice as well as two explanations on fatwas or recommendations. This means that the MUI issued four documents (fatwas and also their explanations) regarding Ahmadiyya. The first fatwa was issued in 1980. The fatwa of the MUI dated June 1, 1980 was signed by the General Chair of the MUI Buya Hamka and Secretary H. Kafrawi. This fatwa was released by MUI on the initiative of the MUI II National Consultative Forum June 26, 1980 in Jakarta. In the fatwa body itself, it was explained that the Fatwa referred to the results of the MUI National Working Conference held on March 4-7, 1984. (Saat, 2018: 153-158; Platzdasch, 2013: 221)

Darmadi said that the fatwa of the MUI on the Ahmadiyya in 1980 was derivative from a fatwa issued by Rabitah Alam al-Islami or *The Word Muslim League* (OKI) in 1974. This organization held a conference in which one of its decisions issued a fatwa concerning the heresy of the Ahmadiyya. Four years after that, in 1978 *Muslim Scholar organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC)*, whose character is a series of well-known names in the Islamic world from Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, and also Indonesia also 'confirms' similar fatwas. Interestingly, the signing of the fatwa included Abdullah bin

Abdul Aziz bin Baz (Wahabi mufti), Shaleh Ibn Uthaimin, Abdul Quddus Nafvi, and H.M Rasjidi from Indonesia. Rasjidi's presence was interesting to discuss further on different occasions, especially regarding his role in fostering the spirit of 'prosecuting' Ahmadiyya (Darmadi, 2013: 29)

If examined more deeply, this is of course very interesting. First, there is inconsistency. In the upstream or explicit edicts of the fatwa, the MUI gave the title of his fatwa with "Ahmadiyya Qadiyan." That is, the group targeted by the MUI fatwa was the Ahmadiyya group of Qadiyan, not Lahore. However, in other sentences in the body of the fatwa the MUI sometimes uses Ahmadiyya Qadiyan, sometimes also using Ahmadiyya. On the dictum of the contents of the fatwa, the MUI always uses the word Ahmadiyya. However, when he moved on to the appeal dictum (still in the body of the fatwa), MUI switched to using the Ahmadiyya Qadiyan phrase.

Second, there is a breakdown of logic in the fatwa. A copy of the fatwa circulating and recorded by MUI and published in collaboration with the publisher Erlangga, contains the fatwa signed on June 1, 1980 or 17 Rajab 1400 H in the dictum of consideration which was used as a decision reference, one of which was the results of the MUI national work meeting held on 4- March 7, 1984 or 1-4 Jumadil Akhir 1404 H. That is, how could letters and fatwas be made with reference to recommendations and decisions that were only four years later? Of course in this context this fatwa is worth questioning.

Uniquely, in Suaedy's note that the fatwa of the MUI on Ahmadiyya issued in 1980 was in no way followed by a variety of acts of violence and also attacks. This means that in the 1980s or when the MUI fatwa on Ahmadiyya was first issued an escalation of conflict and

attacks have not been found, or even nonexistent (Suaedy & Maarif, 2006: 263).

Meanwhile, in the MUI fatwa issued in 2005, the upstream fatwa used was the "Flow of Ahmadiyya". MUI seems to respond to the condition of the community on the ground which in fact does not really understand - or perhaps does not want to know - what is the difference between Ahmadiyya Qadiyan and Lahore. In practice the community did not really understand the difference between the Ahmadiyya Community of Qadiyan and Lahore. So, in the dictum of the fatwa issued on July 28, 2005, the MUI mentions globally "Ahmadiyya Flow." Even if it refers to the 1980 fatwa, the only one that is prohibited and deviated is the Qadiyan Ahmadiyya. Even so, in this context, as stated by Basuki (one of the members of the Ahmadiyya Central Committee) that MUI until now has never provided a thorough explanation of the Nine Ahmadiyya books that were used as a reference to decide that the sect is heretical and misleading (Basuki, 28 July 2018).

In the meantime, if we explore deeper than the fatwas issued by the MUI regarding the field of *aqidah*, there are 14 fatwas. The fourteen fatwas concerning schools which are considered deviant and misguided (also misleading). However, what is very interesting to note is that fatwas about deviant flows are generally issued only once. Fatwas challenged by the Flow of Salamullah, Islamic Jemaah, Darul Arqam, Lia Eden, Al-Qiyadah Islamiyah, and also Gafatar for example, all were issued once. Unlike the Ahmadiyya which was officially issued twice with two explanations as well. This 'special' condition is worth making us wonder, why did that happen? What's wrong with Ahmadiyya?

Is it so dangerous for the movement so that the MUI, even later the state intervened to 'discipline' it?

In this context it seems interesting to point out how Bung Karno still held an objective view of the Ahmadiyya. In 1936, during his exile in Ende, Bung Karno was accused and suspected of establishing an Ahmadiyya branch in Sulawesi. A daily reporter from *Pemandangan* reported that Bung Karno had secretly established an Ahmadiyya branch in Sulawesi, even though Bung Karno's position was being exiled in Ende (Mohamad, 2010: 176)

What is the reaction of Bung Karno? He firmly said that he was not an Ahmadiyya. However, as Bung Karno wrote, *“although some of the articles in them have a vision, I reject with certainty, yet in general they have features that I agree with: they have rationalism, they have broadmindedness, they have modernism, they have caution against hadiths, they have striven Al-Quran only, they have systematische aannemelijk making van den Islam”* (Soekarno, 2017: 63).

In addition to fatwas about religious schools or thoughts that often lead to controversy, debates also often approach the MUI fatwas for the field of muamalah or social relations. Fatwa number 56 of 2016 concerning the use of Christmas attributes, for example, is the *ian tasalsul* '(repeatedly endless) event that is the umpteenth time. Even on the same topic, about Christmas, the MUI also issued a fatwa regarding the prohibition of saying merry Christmas. Gus Dur wrote an essay entitled “Fatwa Natal: Ujung dan Pangkal”. Gus Dur very sarcastically said that the MUI was an institution that was made only to be a liaison between the government and the followers of Islam, and that the link was often troubling rather than reassuring.

Furthermore, Abdurrahman questioned the fact that the MUI fatwa was in fact never found its end and base. This means that the upstream and downstream problems have never been resolved. Because it is

endless, the problem will not be resolved and tends to cause new problems. In the language of science, things like this will be called a cycle (repetition).

“If there is no desire to set the end of the problem, perhaps we may not allow Christians to take a taxi in their glass with Arabic calligraphy Bismillahirrahmanirrahim. How airy is the air of our lives, if that happen!”(Wahid, 2007: 27)

in addition to failing to determine the tip and base of the question, MUI basically has a problem with the pattern of preaching communication. The pattern of preaching communication applied by the MUI has tended to be more repressive than compromise. The pattern of repressive propaganda communication like this one day will result in a lay understanding that religion, especially Islam, has a very rigid and creepy character. Such lay understanding is of course not without reason, considering that disappointment that comes from a lack of tolerance and poor communication of preaching will gradually lead the lay to reduce their belief in Islam. In fact, Islam in the dictum of its preaching is more self-proclaimed as a religion that gives grace to the exclamation of all nature (*rahmatan lil ‘ālamīn*).

Islamic dictum *rahmatan lil ‘ālamīn* if translated in the language of preaching is Islam that is tolerant and promotes persuasive-accommodative efforts, not repressive. At this stage, it is important to point out that MUI in its missionary activities, in every pulse of its struggle and breath of fatwa, should prioritize persuasive functions over repressive functions. Why? Because even though Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, if we map out the many Muslim communities in Indonesia we will know that the characteristics of how to embrace Islam in Indonesia are very unique and distinctive. Not to mention that if faced with the phenomenon of urban sociology in Indonesia which tends to be cosmopolitan.

The MUI's persuasive function in preaching we suppose as Walisongo's preaching in the days of Islamizing the island of Java. The cultural approach that is embracing provides education and understanding to the community without patronizing it so that Islam reaps very high sympathy. The pattern of Walisongo's preaching communication is of course based on an understanding of the "fields" of preaching concerning the socio-demographic of the community. Of course we cannot conclusively conclude that the MUI did not understand the "fields" of its preaching. But as an effort to improve it is better if the MUI also begins to more deeply study and reformulate the pattern of communication of preaching. This is based on the increasing number of rejections both attitudes and verbal.

The fact that the language of the MUI propaganda communication often takes a one-sided judgment can be found, for example, related to the fatwa deviating from Ahmadiyya number: 05 / Kep / Munas II / MUI / 1980. In the decree, it was written "In accordance with the data and fatwa found in 9 books on Ahmadiyya, the Indonesian Ulama Council states that Ahmadiyya is a congregation outside of Islam, misguided and misleading." The sentence is written in language with a true diction provocative namely "misguided and misleading".

In fact, there are two typologies of preaching movements. The first is compromise preaching and the second is non-compromise preaching. Compromising preaching is preaching that puts forward the values of dialogue and is accommodative by using a persuasive communication approach. This kind of Preaching is suitable for use in a pluralistic sociological environment as Indonesia. While on the other hand, non-compromise preaching is preaching which tends to be repressive by using power tools as a symbol of legitimacy. Usually it is implemented

through regional regulations, regulations and even laws as in Saudi Arabia.

Thus, in this context it is good that the MUI begins to reorganize the pattern of preaching and its "fatwa language". If this is not the case, finding the reality of the people who tend to be "farther away from religious values" today, is inevitability they will gradually see Islam not as it was assigned to the Prophet Muhammad, namely as *basyīran wa nazīran*. Islam has the task of making happy creatures happy, and then showing the limits of happiness that is not excessive.

Political Commodities, Not Ideology

Every time a case of an attack occurs, every time a shocking political issue is followed. The spokesperson for the Ahmadiyya Yendra Budiana, argued that the Ahmadiyya case was made, not as just a theological issue and belief, but instead had transformed into a political commodity. Assault cases as happened in Parung, Bogor, in Cianjur, in Cikeusik, Manislor, and also East Lombok often - if not always said - were used as fuel to ignite the dispute about political contestation, both locally and nationally.

This also happens in various locations of conflict with a scale of issues which is of course different. Particularly related to the attack on the Mubarak Campus, in the record of Hamdi there are at least three significance which of course is greater than the cases that befell the Ahmadiyya Community in other places that have occurred before. First, the Mubarak Campus in Kemang is the Central Office of the Ahmadiyya Community. He is a symbol. So if the center is attacked and succeeds in being crippled, destroyed, and conquered, then the Ahmadiyya symbolically has been successfully suppressed and destroyed. Secondly,

the attack carried out on 8.9, and 15 July 2005 had a period that was so close to the moment of the MUI VII National Musyawarah held on 26-29 July 2005 that one of the decisions was the issuance of a fatwa on the Ahmadiyya sect. Third, state officials contribute and legitimize the prohibition of Ahmadiyya. In the context of the attack on Kemang, the officers who were registered took part and took part in giving legitimacy between the other: the Bupati as executive representation, the Chairperson of the DPRD as a legislative representative, and of course the Chairperson of the Judiciary (Hamdi, 2007: 215-216; Ropi, 2010: 291)

Specifically for number two, which is about the timing of the attack adjacent to the MUI Fatwa decision on the Ahmadiyya sect, in this context it is interesting to explore and question more deeply: first, whether the MUI VII general assembly held on July 26-29 is really based early? If it is true that the schedule of the MUI VII national consultation will be carried out on that date from the beginning, then is it true that in this activity one of the material is a discussion about the Ahmadiyya sect. Why? This second question becomes very important to be examined more deeply. Because as is usually a big event, the material that will be discussed in a big event is certainly well prepared. Moreover, there will be a lot of material that must be discussed. Meanwhile, we know that the distance between the incidents of the Mubarak Campus attack and the MUI VII national meeting was no more than fourteen days or less than two weeks. If calculated from the outbreak of large-scale riots, namely July 15, 2008, only 13 days later, MUI issued a fatwa on the Flow of Ahmadiyya. There is something strange there. If the material about Ahmadiyya was initially not included in the agenda of the discussion of the Fatwa Commission in the MUI VII

national meeting, then of course the assumption was that there were demands and pressure from various parties to the MUI to issue the fatwa. In this context, once again, thick nuances are not purely ideological, but the issue has shifted into a political commodity.

In comparison, in the context of the scale and scope of the event, we can refer to the Nahdlatul Ulama. For forums that have the same scale, namely the National Conference and a large Conference involving participants from regional management representatives, the material must be reviewed and discussed at least six months before the event takes place. Moreover, we are related to fatwa material (in NU it is called the decision of *Bathsul Masā'il*), the process of discussing *as'ilah* or the matter takes a short time. Assessed, discussed, debated, until then considered feasible to be made a national decision.

Regarding the MUI National Conference event, Sholeh said that the national deliberation forum was a joint forum aimed at responding to various issues of actual publicity and corruption. Besides of course this forum is intended to conduct performance evaluations, formulate work plans, and establish work program lines for the next period. As the highest forum, the level of actuality, scope of issues, and the personnel involved are strictly selected. Because this will affect the products of the National Conference which if related to the law are called fatwas.

“Fatwas decided at the MUI National Conference forum were carried out through a long process and in-depth study. Even before that, the Central MUI Fatwa Commission Team had prepared a draft of the issues that would be addressed in the MUI National Conference and socialized the Inter-Regional Coordination Meeting” (Sholeh, 2016: 98)

With such conditions, it becomes legitimate for us to be careful, even through regional coordination meetings? In fact, once again, the time between the outbreak of riots on the Mubarak Campus and the MUI VII National Conference was only thirteen days.

In the view of Yendra Budiana, the issue of Ahmadiyya is also often used as fuel to attack political opponents. In the event leading up to the local election, for example, as happened in Depok, West Java, each party made the issue of Ahmadiyya as ammunition. If one party is attacked by the issue of the still developing Ahmadiyya in the region, then the other party does not remain silent, he returns to attack with promises if he will terminate Ahmadiyya activities in Depok. In this context, according to Yendra, the battle of issues in the elite is not at all accompanied by real conflicts in the community. Ahmadis in Depok socialize with non-Ahmadis without any problems. However, ironically, the Ahmadiyya Mosque was suddenly sealed by local elites. In Tirta's records there are at least 7 sealing times (from 2011-2017) to mosques belonging to the Ahmadiyya Congregation in Depok.¹

The sealing was carried out by Depok City Government itself. In his explanation, the Mayor of Depok said that the sealing was in accordance with procedures and rules. Because Jemaah Ahmadiyya who carried out activities at the mosque in the Sawangan area violated the rules. The referral referred to was the 2005 MUI fatwa, the Joint Decree of the Three Ministers (SKB 3 Minister) in 2008 as well as Governor Regulation 12/2011 concerning the prohibition of the activities of the Ahmadiyya Congregation in West Java, as well as the prohibition of Ahmadiyya No. 9/2011 concerning the prohibition of Ahmadiyya activities in Depok City.

In this context, it is important to refer to the MUI Fatwa regarding Ahmadiyya. In the dictum of the MUI Fatwa on the Ahmadiyya Qadiyan in 1980, three reasons were raised. First, it arouses

¹ Tirta.id/kasus-kasus-intoleransi-yang-menimpa-ahmadiyya-cp4V accessed July 18th 2018.

anxiety because the content of its teachings is contrary to the teachings of Islam. Secondly, it caused fall, especially in terms of ubudiyah such as Prayer and Munakahat. Third, it is dangerous for order and state security.

While in the fatwa of the MUI on the Ahmadiyya sect issued in 2005, there were four considerations that were used as reasons. First, that the Ahmadiyya sect continues to strive to develop its understanding in Indonesia. Secondly, the development of the teachings caused unrest in the community. Third, the community reiterates the fatwa concerning the prohibition of Ahmadiyya. Fourth, to fulfill these demands, the MUI finally issued a fatwa banning the Ahmadiyya.

Broadly speaking, the reasons for consideration by the MUI could be categorized into two major groups. First, the reasons are theological. Second, the reasons are sociological. On the theological grounds the MUI stated that the Ahmadiyya was in trouble because it deviated from the teachings of Islam (the majority). Secondly, the sociological reasons that were captured in the scheme were “unsettling” and “disrupting state order and security.”

The various reasons above, if associated with the case of sealing the mosque, of course have a problem. Mainly related to charges of sociology, that is unsettling and disturbing the peace and security of the country. This accusation must, of course, be empirically proven, whether the existence of Ahmadiyya is disturbing for the surrounding community or perhaps only a mere claim. Because for the case of sealing the Mosque in Depok, as said by Yendra, it was not preceded by conflict or riots. Jemaah Ahmadiyya has a good and harmonious relationship with the occupation of non-Ahmadis. Hospitality is maintained. But why is the government so active 'alienating' Jemaah Ahmadiyya.

On the contrary, in the case of riots in Cianjur, what really happened was a clash between members of the Ahmadiyya Community and non-Ahmadis. Some houses burned down. The building is badly damaged. However, it is interesting that the government is silent, tends to be passive, and does not interfere. Even though such conditions (seeing the background of conflict and riots) it is very possible for a regional leader to issue a regional regulation to address the incident.

“The presence of the government, in the context of addressing the Ahmadiyya Congregation, will increasingly make things worse, if whose concerned (government) does not put himself in a fair and right position” (Yendra Budiana, 28 July 2018)

In this context, Bourdieu’s contribution of thought is very important and has very high relevance to guess and read how the process of shifting conflicts that plagued the Ahmadiyya Community from ideological to political commodities. Rey in *Bourdieu on Religion: Imposing Faith and Legitimacy*, represent how 'the workings of religion' which in certain conditions can be used as an asset to embrace and reach 'victory' in a battle arena. Both the battles are in the social, economic and political spheres. In very simple language, Bourdieu's concept - as discussed by Rey - can be explained by looking at the phenomenon of the proliferation of religious leaders at present. This fact — in Rey's language — is very scary. In certain contexts, we cannot generalize that the proliferation of religious leaders is same with negativity, but the presence of incompetent religious leaders is a very sad phenomenon. The presence of them - incompetent religious leaders - is often used by those who only aim to use the religious space to be used as capital and capital to fight in the spaces of socio-political arena (Rey, 2014).

This phenomenon, for example, can be witnessed through the increasing number of religious leaders who position themselves as a pressure group by taking the path of influencing the thinking of many people based on the identity of a particular religion. By using symbols and verse quotes from the scriptures, they 'work' and carry out operations that are as if they are fighting for their religious interests. Even though the truth is not so. Most of these, borrowing from Bourdieu's analysis as stated by Rey, are merely hiding in the bush of identity which is nothing but the purpose of getting a mere stage. This condition is increasingly worse when the production of religious teachers and religious leaders is influenced by a new variable: industry. Industrialistic character increasingly excludes capability, wisdom, religious insight and competence.

The industrial character is indeed terrible. Everything that enters the industrial vortex forces anyone to submit to the law and language they have. The Ustadz (who has been industrialized), of course not all, suddenly descended from the sky. They are adored, hailed, followed by their lifestyles, allegiance to be fashion references and culinary styles. In the end Ustadz-ustaz, who may have genuine intentions, was actually forced to become a celebrity because of his career demands. Too much praise, too high respect, and always asked for a fatwa to be a solution to life's problem, on the contrary it became a boomerang that lulled them. This makes some of them often offside talking about things that are beyond their competence (Alniezar, 2018).

Spreading Love for Heaters

The fatwa of the MUI on Ahmadiyya in 2005 was admittedly explicitly triggered various acts of assault, violence, as well as various kinds of discrimination against the Jemaah Ahmadiyya in the following years. Yendra Budiana said that he felt the impact of the fatwa deeply in the years after the fatwa was issued.

“I think the MUI's fatwa was influential and triggered an attack in 2006 and above, as happened in Cianjur, Lombok, Cikeusik and Dopok. As for the case of the attack that took place at the Mubarak Campus, the fatwa of the MUI which became the foundation might be issued in 1980” (Yendra Budiana, 28 July 2018)

The facts presented by Yendra Budiana seem to confirm what Assyaukani found that there is a connection which is difficult to refute between the fatwa and a series of violence that befell the Ahmadiyya Community. Although, in this context, Assyaukani was not very successful in empirically proving how fatwas worked as lubricants or fuelled a series of attacks carried out on the Ahmadiyya Community (Assyaukanie, 2009: 11)

How does the Jemaah Ahmadiyya's attitude towards a series of discriminatory treatments often take the form of direct violence? in this context it seems that what is often ignored by a number of studies is the response of the Ahmadiyya Community to the events that befell them. Yendra Budiana acknowledged that his group did not have specific tips, strategies, and methods to respond to a series of actions that were inflicted on them. The administrators and preachers of the Ahmadiyya only provided the congregation with the doctrine of spreading love and affection, even for haters. This is in line with the motto of the Ahmadiyya Congregation which was echoed by Mirza Nashir Ahmad *“Love for All, Hatred for none”*. This doctrine was triggered in order to respond to threats and also the actions of orthodox clerics who tried to stop the steps and preaching of Ahmadiyya in Pakistan in mid-1974 (Lavan, 1974: 235; Lavan, 1976: 57)

In the context of Indonesia, the Ahmadiyya Community in addition to holding the doctrine above, its movement also relies on what

they claim to be the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad reads “*ḥubbul Waṭan Minal Īmān*” which means love for the homeland is part of faith.

In one official presentation, the Ahmadiyya Congregation said:

“The love of the homeland is an inseparable encouragement of the life of an Ahmadi. A selfless love. Love of the homeland is part of faith. It is a sacred obligation to maintain the independence and honor of the Indonesian people in accordance with the word of Rasulullah SAW ḥubbul waṭan minal īmān” (Yendra Budiana, 28 July 2018)

It is important to say in this stage that what is believed to be the credo of the love of the land is summarized in the dictum “*ḥubbul watan minal īmān*” which is claimed to be the word or hadith of the Prophet is not appropriate. The dictum, namely sentence *ḥubbul watan minal īmān* said by KH. Abdul Wahab Chasbullah, especially when it stirred up the spirit of love for the country when it formed the Nahdlatul Wathan group, at the time of the 1945 Jihad resolution in Surabaya and also as stated in mars *Subbānul Waṭan* belongs to Nahdlatul Ulama. Many people actually think that the dictum of the Hadith, or sayings of the Prophet, but the fact that Prophet Muhammad never said as above. In the current context, the Arabs also adopted the concept of nationalism or the love of the homeland which means the sentence *ḥubbul waṭan minal imān* as *al wathan fi qulūbinā*.

In addition, in this context it is relevant to borrow the analysis of Said Aqil Siroj (Zaini, 2018) which in many forums repeatedly says that the translation *ḥubbul waṭan minal īmān* which has been circulating, namely the love of the homeland, part of the faith is a translation that is less accurate. What is accurate is part of faith nationalism. A sense of nationalism — borrowing Said Aqil — does not just love the homeland, but more than that loving all elements that are more complex and complicated than mere homeland concepts. The credo and teachings

about loving the homeland seems to have been implemented by Ahmadiyya as an ideological basis for responding to all treatments that tend to be discriminatory. In a deeper and tactical context, Yendra Budiana said that the Ahmadiyya Community always tried to open itself to dialogue with anyone. Even the leadership of Jemaah Ahmadiyya had visited and was well received by FPI Chairman Habib Rizieq Shihab at the FPI headquarters in Petamburan, Jakarta. Gathering and dialogue are recognized as one of the strategies which, although sporadic and tactical are not systematic, are effective in at least reducing the tension of conflict and the threat of violence.

Fadhillah (2017) notes that in facing a series of discriminatory treatments, the Ahmadiyya congregation is not silent. They try to survive and also accept these allegations while remaining active in conveying their teachings with cultural approaches. Ahmadis use a cultural approach to spread their teachings so that in this context, the Jemaah Ahmadiyya can be said to be a new social movement that emphasizes the use of cultural attributes in the implementation of its movements. In turn, the cultural approaches carried out by Jemaah Ahmadiyya are used to build a collective identity which will eventually be very useful for conveying Ahmadiyya teachings.

Cultural approaches carried out by Jemaah Ahmadiyya are not only useful to fortify their identities (rejecting identities) from parties outside of them, on the contrary more than that these efforts will be said to be useful for forming - borrowing the language of Castells– a *project identity* (Castells, 2010: 8).

“JAI’s Cultural Approaches also reflect the rise of collective identity. JAI’s actions don’t only strive for survival and acceptance suggest that this group is not just a resistance

identity, furthermore JAI's actions can be seen as effort to form a project identity” (Fadhillah, 2017: 50).

The cultural approach is carried out through a series of humanitarian programs. One of them is for example through an eye donor program (cornea) and also a blood donor. The Ahmadiyya congregation is actively registered in campaigning — directly or indirectly — the two humanitarian programs. For example, the most phenomenal is the blood donation movement through the Give Blood application, which was launched on May 26, 2018. Namely, the online blood donation system application is similar to online motorcycle taxi applications. A humanitarian innovation that is quite brilliant.

In the meantime, another humanitarian approach carried out in the context of 'campaigning for' love for those who have been 'hated' has been done through the Humanity First program which is active in the field of humanity. In 2018 for example, as released by the twitter account @humanityfirst_ID, a series of social service activities such as eye, dental, and general medical treatment services continued. This proves that there is a strategy, although the Ahmadiyya leadership of Indonesia refuses to call it a sporadic, strategy that is carried out in order to 'respond' to heretical stamps and get out of Islam that is attached to the Ahmadiyya Community.

Conclusion

Jemaah Ahmadiyya considers that fatwas are opinion. As is usual opinion, he must be respected. Disagreement with an opinion is common. Because opinions are not binding. As opinion, people may believe in opinions, may also not believe it. This kind of awareness is trying to be instilled and also practiced by the Ahmadiyya Community in various levels. By placing the fatwa as an opinion, Jemaah Ahmadiyya feels that it is not bound by a heretical fatwa and is out of Islam.

Such a pedestal of thinking simultaneously raises attitudes and responses that tend to appear to 'accept what we are'. However, if examined more closely, there are a number of efforts which although they are 'sporadic' and are not interpreted as a specific strategy to counter the actual heretical labelling efforts carried out by the Jemaah Ahmadiyya. In this context the most prominent is in the field of humanity. This shows that Jemaah Ahmadiyya is also engaged in its own way in responding to the fatwa issued by the MUI. They, Jemaah Ahmadiyya, may always and always try to sow love, even to haters.

In the context of religion, every religious communities should have expressed their religious characters and practices in gentle way. since, each religious communities have same responsibilities to lend their hands for the others and to express their religion beliefs gently and full of responsibility. moreover, in the context of maintaining diversity of Indonesia, practicing their religious beliefs in gentle way is a must.

Religious authority has a big responsibility to protect religious diversity in indonesia. MUI as one of religious authority should have seen wisely the difference of theology between ahmadiyah and mainstream islamist group. the approach of issuing a fatwa it,s not simply from theology approach, with astray labelling heretic as deviant. however, sociological and anthropological approaches must be considered in relation to the survival and harmony of the nation and state

On the other hand, the government has a great responsibility to guarantee independence in practicing the belief of each of its citizens. All forms of violations, including violence against beliefs deemed different must be dealt firmly. This is important because in the context of freedom of practicing the belief that minority groups such as Ahmadiyah that experience three levels of discrimination as well as state

level discrimination, semi-state level discrimination originating from religious authorities such as MUI and no-state level discrimination originating from intolerant groups

References

- Aji, A. M. (2012). Taubatu Jamaati Ahmadiyyah ba'da Ishdari Qarari Rais Dairah Jawa Al-Gharbiyyah. *Ahkam*, XII(1), 139–146.
- Alniezar, F. (2018). Pedomam Memilih Ustadz Pada Bulan Ramadan.
- Alnizar, F. (2019). Pretext for Religious Violence in Indonesia: An Anthropolinguistic Analysis of Fatwas on Ahmadiyya Abstract: *Studia Islamika*, 26(3).
- Assyaukanie, L. (2009). Fatwa and Violence in Indonesia. *Journal of Religion and Society*, 11, 1–21.
- Burhani, A. N. (2016). Fundamentalism and Religious Dissent: the LPPI's Mission to Eradicate the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. *Indonesia and Malay World*, 44(129), 145–164. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13639811.2015.1135610>
- Burhani, A. N. (2020). Ahmadiyah and Islamic Revivalism in Twentieth-Century Java, Indonesia: A Neglected Contribution. In *Alternative Voices in Muslim Southeast Asia: Discourse and Struggles* (pp. 199–220). Singapore: ISEAS.
- Castells, M. (2010). *The Power of Identity*. Singapore: Wiley-Blackwell. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444318234>
- Darmadi, D. (2013). The Meccan Fatwas and The Globalized Discourse of Exclusion: The Case of Anti-Ahmadiyah Movements in Indonesia. *Heritage of Nusantara*, 2(1), 22–50.
- Fajari Fadhillah, N. (2017). Towards Peaceful Islam: Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) as A New Social Movement. *Masyarakat*, 22(1), 35–52.
- Fuller, A. (2011). Religious Freedom in Indonesia: Curious Cases of Dialogues, Fatwas and Laws. *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 05(01), 1–16.
- Hamdi, M. (2007). Sang Liyan dan Kekerasan: Kasus Penyerangan kampus Mubarak Jemaah Ahmadiyah Kemang, Parung, Bogor. In A. Suaedy (Ed.), *Politikasi Agama dan Konflik Komunal: Beberapa Isu Penting di Indonesia*. Jakarta: The Wahid Institute.
- Hasyim, S. (2019). Fatwas and Democracy: Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Ulema Council) and Rising Conservatism in Indonesian Islam. *TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies*

- of Southeast Asia, (2019), 1–15.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2019.13>
- Hosen, N. (2004). Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (1975-1998). *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 2(15), 147–179.
- Lavan, S. (1974). *The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective*. Delhi: Manohar Book Service.
- Lavan, S. (1976). *The Ahmadiyah Movement: Past and Present*. Guru Nanak Dev University.
- Mariani, N. (2013). Ahmadiyah, Conflicts, and Violence in Contemporary Indonesia. *Indonesia Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, 3(June 2013), 1–30.
- Mohamad, G. (2010). *Catatan Pinggir 9*. Jakarta: TEMPO.
- Platzdasch, B. (2013). Religious Freedom in Contemporary Indonesia: The Case of Ahmadiyah. In H. Yei-Fong (Ed.), *Encountering Islam: The Politics of Religious Identities in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS).
- Rey, T. (2014). *Bourdieu on Religion Imposing Faith and Legitimacy*. New York: Routledge.
- Rogers, B. (2014). *Indonesia: Pluralism in Peril The Rise of Religious Intolerance across the Archipelago*. United Kingdom.
- Ropi, I. (2010). Islamism, Government Regulation, and the Ahmadiyah Controversies in Indonesia. *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, 48(2), 281–320.
<https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2010.482.281-320>
- Saat, N. (2018). *The State, Ulama and Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia*. Amsterdam University Press.
- Sevea, I. S. (2009). The Ahmadiyya print Jihad in South and Southeast Asia. In *Islamic Connections: Muslim Societies in South and Southeast Asia*. <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789812309242-010>
- Sholeh, A. N. (2016). *Metodologi Penetapan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Penggunaan Prinsip Pencegahan dalam Fatwa*. Jakarta : Emir.
- Soekarno. (2017). *Islam Sontoloyo: Pikiran-pikiran Progresif Pemikiran Islam*. Jogjakarta: Jogjakarta : Basabasi.
- Suaedy, A. (2018). *Islam, Minorities, and Identity in South Asia*. Depok: Inklusif & ISAI.
- Suaedy, A., & Maarif, A. S. (2006). *Kala Fatwa Jadi Penjara*. Jakarta: The Wahid Institute.
- Tempo. (2018). Teror Terhadap Ahmadiyah. *Majalah Tempo*, 2.

Perceptions and Reactions of Ahmadiyya....

Wahid, A. (2007). *Melawan Melalui Lelucon*. Jakarta: TEMPO.

Zaini, A. H. F. (2018). *Nasionalisme Kaum Sarungan*. Penerbit Buku Kompas.

Zulkarnain, I. (2005). *Gerakan Ahmadiyya di Indonesia*. Yogyakarta: LKiS.

Interview with Basuki, 28 July, 2018.

Interview with Budiana, 28 July, 2018.

Interview with Murtiyono Yusuf Ismail 28 July, 2018.

Tirto.id/kasus-kasus-intoleransi-yang-menimpa-ahmadiyya-cp4V accessed July 18th 2018.

Attachment:

I. Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia on Ahmadiyah 1980

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Majelis Ulama Indonesia dalam Musyawarah Nasional II tanggal 11-17 Rajab 1400 H/ 26 Mei – 1 Juni 1980 M di Jakarta memfatwakan tentang jama'ah Ahmadiyah sebagai berikut :

1. Sesuai dengan data dan fakta yang diketemukan dalam 9 (sembilan) buah buku tentang Ahmadiyah, Majelis Ulama Indonesia memfatwakan bahwa Ahmadiyah adalah jama'ah di luar Islam, sesat dan menyesatkan.
2. Dalam menghadapi persoalan Ahmadiyah hendaknya Majelis Ulama Indonesia selalu berhubungan dengan Pemerintah.

Kemudian Rapat Kerja Nasional bulan 1- 4 Jumadil Akhir 1404 H/4 – 7 Maret 1984 M, merekomendasikan tentang jama'ah Ahmadiyah tersebut sebagai berikut :

1. Bahwa Jemaat Ahmadiyah di wilayah Negara Republik Indonesia berstatus sebagai badan hukum berdasarkan Surat Keputusan Menteri Kehakiman RI No. JA/23/13 tanggal 13-3-1953 (Tambahan Berita Negara: tanggal 13-3-1953 No. 26), bagi umat Islam menimbulkan :
 - a. keresahan karena isi ajarannya bertentangan dengan ajaran agama Islam
 - b. perpecahan, khususnya dalam hal ubudiyah (shalat), bidang munakahat dan lain-lain.
 - c. bahaya bagi ketertiban dan keamanan negara.

Maka dengan alasan-alasan tersebut dimohon kepada pihak yang berwenang untuk meninjau kembali Surat Keputusan Menteri Kehakiman RI JA/22/ 13, tanggal 31-3-1953 (Tambahan Berita

Negara No. 26, tanggal 31-3- 1953).

2. Menyerukan :

- a. Agar Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Majelis Ulama Daerah Tingkat I, Daerah Tingkat II, para ulama, dan da'i di seluruh Indonesia, menjelaskan kepada masyarakat tentang sesatnya Jema'at Ahmadiyah Qadiyah yang berada di luar Islam.
- b. Bagi mereka yang telah terlanjur mengikuti Jema'at Ahmadiyah Qadiyah supaya segera kembali kepada ajaran Islam yang benar.
- c. Kepala seluruh umat Islam supaya memperinggi kewaspadaannya, sehingga tidak akan terpengaruh dengan faham yang sesat itu.

Jakarta, 17 Rajab 1400 H
1 Juni 1980 M

**DEWAN PIMPINAN
MAJELIS ULAMA INDONESIA**

Ketua Umum

Sekretaris

ttd

ttd

Prof. Dr. HAMKA

Drs. H. Kafrawi



ALIRAN AHMADIYAH

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

FATWA MAJELIS ULAMA INDONESIA
Nomor: 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005
Tentang
ALIRAN AHMADIYAH

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), dalam Musyawarah Nasional MUI VII, pada 19-22 Jumadil Akhir 1426 H / 26-29 Juli 2005 M, setelah :

Menimbang :

1. bahwa sampaisaat ini aliran Ahmadiyah terus berupaya untuk mengembangkan pahamnya di Indonesia, walaupun sudah ada fatwa MUI dan telah dilarang keberadaannya;
2. bahwa upaya pengembangan faham Ahmadiyah tersebut telah menimbulkan keresahan masyarakat;
3. bahwa sebagian masyarakat meminta penegasan kembali fatwa MUI tentang faham Ahmadiyah sehubungan dengan timbulnya berbagai pendapat dan berbagai reaksi di kalangan masyarakat;
4. bahwa untuk memenuhi tuntutan masyarakat dan menjaga kemurnian aqidah Islam, Majelis Ulama Indonesia memandang perlu menegaskan kembali fatwa tentang Aliran Ahmadiyah.

Mengingat :

1. Firman Allah SWT., :

مَا كَانَ مُحَمَّدٌ أَبَا أَحَدٍ مِنْ رِجَالِكُمْ وَلَكِنْ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ وَخَاتَمَ النَّبِيِّينَ، وَكَانَ اللَّهُ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمًا
(الأحزاب: 40)

"Muhammad itu sekali-kali bukanlah bapak dari seorang laki-laki di antara kamu, tetapi dia adalah Rasulullah dan penutup nabi-nabi; dan adalah Allah Maha mengetahui segala sesuatu" (QS. al-Ahzab [33]: 40).

وَأَنْ هَذَا صِرَاطِي مُسْتَقِيمًا فَاتَّبِعُوهُ وَلَا تَتَّبِعُوا السُّبُلَ فَتَفَرَّقَ بِكُمْ عَنْ سَبِيلِهِ، ذَلِكُمْ وَصَاكُم بِهِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَتَّقُونَ
(الأعام: 153)

"Dan bahwa (yang Kami perintahkan) ini adalah jalan-Ku yang lurus, maka ikutilah dia; dan janganlah kamu mengikuti jalan-jalan (yang lain), karena jalan-jalan itu menceraiberaikan kamu dari jalan-Nya. Yang demikian itu diperintahkan Allah kepadamu agar kamu bertakwa" (QS. al-An'am [6]: 153).

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا عَلَيْكُمْ أَنْفُسَكُمْ لَا تَضُرُّكُمْ مَنْ ضَلَّ إِذَا اهْتَدَيْتُمْ ... (المائدة : 105)

"Hai orang-orang yang beriman! Jagalah dirimu. tiadalah orang yang sesat itu akan memberi mudarat kepadamu apabila kamu telah mendapat petunjuk..." (QS. al-Ma'idah [5]: 105).

2. Hadis Nabi SAW antara lain:

قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ وَسَلَّمَ: لَا نَبِيَّ بَعْدِي
(رواه البخاري)

"Rasulullah bersabda: Tidak ada nabi sesudahku" (HR. al-Bukhari).

قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ وَسَلَّمَ: إِنَّ الرِّسَالَةَ
وَالنَّبِيَّةَ قَدْ انْقَطَعَتْ، فَلَا رَسُولَ بَعْدِي وَلَا نَبِيٍّ (رواه

الترمذي)

"Rasulullah bersabda: "Kerasulan dan kenabian telah teputus; karena itu, tidak ada rasul maupun nabi sesudahku" (HR. Tirmizi).

- Memperhatikan :** 1. Keputusan Majma' al-Fiqh al-Islami Organisasi Konferensi Islam (OKI) Nomor 4 (4/2) dalam Mukhtamar II di Jeddah, Arab Saudi, pada tanggal 10-16 Rabi' al-Tsani 1406 H./22-28 Desember 1985 M tentang Aliran Qodiyaniyah, yang antara lain menyatakan bahwa aliran Ahmadiyah yang mempercayai Mirza Ghulam Ahmad sebagai nabi sesudah Nabi Muhammad dan menerima wahyu adalah murtad dan keluar dari Islam karena mengingkari ajaran Islam yang qath'i dan disepakati oleh seluruh ulama Islam bahwa Muhammad SAW sebagai nabi dan rasul terakhir.

Teks Keputusan tersebut adalah sebagai berikut:

إِنَّ مَا ادَّعَاهُ مِيرْزَا غُلَامُ أَحْمَدُ مِنَ النَّبِيَّةِ وَالرِّسَالَةِ وَتُرُوسِ الْوَحْيِ
عَلَيْهِ الْكَارُ صَرِيحٌ لِمَا نَبَتْ مِنَ الدِّينِ بِالضَّرُورَةِ لِيُونَا قَطْعِيًّا
بَعِيثًا مِنْ حَقِّمِ الرِّسَالَةِ وَالنَّبِيَّةِ بِسَيِّئَاتِ مُحْسِنٍ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ
وَسَلَّمَ وَأَنَّهُ لَا يَبْرُلُ وَحْيٌ عَنِّي أَحَدٌ بَعْدَهُ. وَهَدْيِ الدُّعْوَى مِنْ
مِيرْزَا غُلَامِ أَحْمَدَ تُحْفَلُهُ وَسَائِرُ مَنْ يُؤَاقِفُونَهُ عَلَيْهَا مُرْتَدِّينَ
خَارِجِينَ عَنِ الْإِسْلَامِ. وَأَمَّا الْأَعْمُورِيَّةُ فَبَالِحُ كَالْقَادِيَانِيَّةِ فِي
الْحُكْمِ عَلَيْهِمْ بِالرَّفْقِ، بِالرَّغْمِ مِنْ وَصْفِهِمْ مِيرْزَا غُلَامَ أَحْمَدَ بِأَنَّ
هُنَّ وَتُرُوسَ لِنَبِيَّتَا مُحْسِنٍ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَآلِهِ وَسَلَّمَ.

BIDANG AQIDAH DAN ALIRAN KEAGAMAAN

"Sesungguhnya apa yang diklaim Mirza Ghulam Ahmad tentang kenabian dirinya, tentang risalah yang diembannya dan tentang turunnya wahyu kepada dirinya adalah sebuah pengingkaran yang tegas terhadap ajaran agama yang sudah diketahui kebenarannya secara qathī (pasti) dan meyakinkan dalam ajaran Islam, yaitu bahwa Muhammad Rasulullah adalah Nabi dan Rasul terakhir dan tidak akan ada lagi wahyu yang akan diturunkan kepada seorang pun setelah itu. Keyakinan seperti yang diajarkan Mirza Ghulam Ahmad tersebut membuat dia sendiri dan pengikutnya menjadi murtad, keluar dari agama Islam. Aliran Qadyaniyah dan Aliran Lahoriyah adalah sama, meskipun aliran yang disebut terakhir (Lahoriyah) meyakini bahwa Mirza Ghulam Ahmad hanyalah sebagai bayang-bayang dan perpanjangan dari Nabi Muhammad SAW."

2. Fatwa MUNAS II MUI pada tahun 1980 tentang Ahmadiyah Qodiyaniyah.
3. Pendapat Sidang Komisi C Bidang Fatwa pada Munas VII MUI 2005.

Dengan bertawakkal kepada Allah SWT,

MEMUTUSKAN

Menetapkan : FATWA TENTANG ALIRAN AHMADIYAH

1. Menegaskan kembali fatwa MUI dalam Munas II Tahun 1980 yang menetapkan bahwa Aliran Ahmadiyah berada di luar Islam, sesat dan menyesatkan, serta orang Islam yang mengikutinya adalah murtad (keluar dari Islam).
2. Bagi mereka yang terlanjur mengikuti Aliran Ahmadiyah supaya segera kembali kepada ajaran Islam yang haq (*al-ruju' ila al-haqq*), yang sejalan dengan al-Qur'an dan al-Hadis.
3. Pemerintah **berkewajiban** untuk **melarang** penyebaran faham Ahmadiyah di seluruh Indonesia dan membekukan organisasi serta

HIMPUNAN FATWA MAJELIS ULAMA INDONESIA

menutup semua tempat kegiatannya.

Ditetapkan: Jakarta, 21 Jumadil Akhir 1426 H
28 Juli 2005 M

**MUSYAWARAH NASIONAL VII
MAJELIS ULAMA INDONESIA**

Pimpinan Sidang Komisi C Bidang Fatwa

Ketua

Sekretaris

ttd

ttd

K.H. Ma'ruf Amin

Drs. Hasanuddin, M.Ag