

## SOCIAL MOVEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ISLAMIC SHARIA (KPSI) IN STRENGTHENING ISLAMIC VALUES IN WEST SUMATERA

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### Abstract

This study describes the social movement of the West Sumatra Islamic Shari'a Enforcement Committee (KPSI) in the strengthening of Islamic values in West Sumatra for the 2014-2019. This period follow after the activities carried out by the West Sumatra KPSI after the rejection of the Lippo Superblock construction in 2013. This uses qualitative research with descriptive analysis with interview and documentation data collection methods. This research uses Islamic social movement theory and arrived at some important findings from this research. First, the mobilization of KPSI in strengthening Islamic values is not based on feelings of disappointment or dissatisfaction but as a form of concern towards the decadence of society. Second, political opportunities led KPSI West Sumatra to conduct da'wah (Islamic propogation). Third, the framing in which KPSI West Sumatra engaged in discourse became the target of mobilization in social movements based on the Qur'an and Sunnah. Fourth, the West Sumatran KPSI alliance or network has many alliances or networks to strengthen its movement.

**Keywords** :Islamic Social Movement; KPSI West Sumatra; Islamic Sharia

### Abstrak

*Penelitian ini mendeskripsikan gerakan sosial Komite Penegakan Syari'at Islam (KPSI) Sumbar dalam penguatan nilai-nilai Islam di Sumbar Tahun 2014-2019. Periode ini mengikuti kegiatan yang dilakukan oleh KPSI Sumbar pasca penolakan pembangunan Superblok Lippo pada tahun 2013. Penelitian ini menggunakan penelitian kualitatif dengan analisis deskriptif dengan metode pengumpulan data wawancara dan dokumentasi. Penelitian ini menggunakan teori gerakan sosial Islam dan sampai pada beberapa temuan penting dari penelitian ini. Pertama, mobilisasi KPSI dalam penguatan nilai-nilai Islam tidak didasarkan pada perasaan kecewa atau tidak puas tetapi sebagai bentuk kepedulian terhadap dekadensi masyarakat. Kedua, peluang politik mengantarkan KPSI Sumbar melakukan dakwah. Ketiga, framing di mana KPSI Sumbar berwacana menjadi sasaran mobilisasi dalam gerakan-gerakan sosial yang berbasis Al-Qur'an dan As-Sunnah. Keempat, aliansi atau jaringan KPSI Sumbar memiliki banyak aliansi atau jaringan untuk memperkuat gerakannya.*

**Kata Kunci** : Gerakan Sosial Islam; KPSI Sumatera Barat; Syariat Islam

### Background

The term Islamic movement has recently become a negative and has been is oriented

towards radical<sup>1</sup> political movements that justify their cause by any means including the

<sup>1</sup> Muhamad Hizbullah, 'Dakwah Harakah, Radikalisme, dan Tantangannya di Indonesia', *Misykat*

*Al-Anwar Jurnal Kajian Islam dan Masyarakat*, 1.2 (2018), 13.

use of violence<sup>2</sup> for their political interests. In fact, Islamic movements should not be like that. Islamic movement normatively refers to the renewal movement that initiates a better, peaceful and civilized situation. However, the method used to achieve this goal is sometimes contrary to what it should be, so many people call it radicalism<sup>3</sup>.

The Islamic movement is the activity to respond<sup>4</sup> to the growing imperialism<sup>5</sup> of Western culture<sup>6</sup> which is supported by the political, economic, and military situation.<sup>7</sup> Islamic activists often show their dislike of the culture that is contrary to their beliefs so that they continue to carry out movements to purify Islamic teachings and restore the glory of Islam which has sunk low since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>8</sup>

Islamic social movement as a response to the economic and political conditions faced by Muslims which aims to improve the quality of Muslim lives to become more civilized and to embody more Islamic values. Islamic social movements<sup>9</sup> usually emerge due to unstable

political situation in a country rebellion and terrorist movements. They attempt to take advantage of political opportunities to restore the political, cultural, economic system and reshape the identity of Muslims<sup>10</sup>. Islamic social movements are categorized as movements of marginalized community groups. They, organize themselves to declare their existence and seek identity and recognition through their actions.

This research is a literature review to be used as a reference for later research. We have research conducted by Zainal entitled "Islamic Movement in West Sumatra Post-New Order". This study examines how the Islamist movement in West Sumatra after the New Order<sup>11</sup> led to radicalism against mass organizations<sup>12</sup> in West Sumatra with the main organizations being Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and the Committee for the Enforcement of Islamic Law (KPSI). These organizations motivated by nineteenth century clerical movements. This research is qualitative with a case study

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<sup>2</sup> Anzar Abdullah, 'Gerakan Radikalisme dalam Islam: Perspektif Historis', *Addin*, 10.1 (2016), 5.

<sup>3</sup> Mohammad Syifa A Widigdo, 'Gerakan Islam Indonesia: Mengurai Belenggu, Membangun Peradaban', *Journal of Islamic World and Politics*, 2.2 (2018), 388.

<sup>4</sup> Ismatillah A Nu'ad, 'Gerakan Islam Konteks Lokal Dan Global; Respon Pemikiran Sosial Politik dan Ekonomi Aktivistis Gerakan Islam di Indonesia', *El-Hikam*, 9.1 (2016), 58.

<sup>5</sup> Sun c Ummah, 'Akar Radikalisme Islam di Indonesia', *Humanika, Kajian Ilmiah Mata Kuliah Umum*, 12.1 (2012), 116.

<sup>6</sup> Ahmad Izudin, 'Gerakan Sosial dan Nalar Islam Progresif: Mencari Titik Temu Kerangka Metateori', *Jurnal Pemberdayaan Masyarakat: Media Pemikiran Dan Dakwah Pembangunan*, 1.2 (2017), 282.

<sup>7</sup> Sokhi Huda, 'Struktur Pemikiran dan Gerakan Islam Kontemporer', *Al-Tabrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam*, 18.1 (2018), 156.

<sup>8</sup> Quintan Wictorowics, *Gerakan Sosial Islam: Teori, Pendekatan dan Studi Kasus* (Yogyakarta: Gading, 2018) p. 45-46

<sup>9</sup> Tatu Afifah, Fuqoha Fuqoha, and Sukendar Sukendar, 'Implikasi Ideologi Pancasila Pada Gerakan Sosial Islam dalam Prinsip Demokrasi Konstitusional', *Ajudikasi: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum*, 4.2 SE-Articles (2021), 183 <<https://doi.org/10.30656/ajudikasi.v4i2.3003>>.

<sup>10</sup> Aam Amirudin, 'Transformasi Identitas Aktivistis Gerakan Islam', *Linimasa: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi*, 2.1 (2019), 9.

<sup>11</sup> Moh Dliya'ul Chaq, 'Pemikiran Hukum Gerakan Islam Radikal Studi Atas Pemikiran Hukum dan Potensi Konflik Sosial Keagamaan Majelis Mujâhidin Indonesia (MMI) dan Jamâ'ah Anshârut Tauhid (JAT)', *Tafâqqub: Jurnal Penelitian Dan Kajian Keislaman*, 1.1 (2013), 16.

<sup>12</sup> Bambang Karsono, 'Gerakan Islam Radikal di Sulawesi Selatan: Pola Rekrutmen Dan Pola Gerakan Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI) dan Laskar Jundullah', *Jurnal Keamanan Nasional*, 4.2 (2018), 232.

research design. The conclusion that can be drawn from this work is that radical<sup>13</sup> elements are increasingly free to establish organizations after the New Order. This heyday of Islamic movements occurred during the Padri movement which inspired HTI, Salafi, FPI, and KPSI in West Sumatra.

Furthermore, we have research conducted by Rudi Hartono entitled "Committee for the Enforcement of Islamic Law (KPSI) West Sumatra (2006-2009)". This study explains the establishment of many post-New Order organizations throughout Indonesia, especially in West Sumatra, the establishment of the West Sumatran KPSI to realize the vision of "Enforcing Islamic Law as a source of complete life in the Minang Land of West Sumatra". This research uses literature research. It concludes that with the existence of KPSI activities that want to purify the understanding and practice of Muslims from 2006-2009, many KPSI activities have been carried out to realize this vision and coordinate with other mass organizations. They also follow up what they considered un-Islamic or deviating from Islamic law at that time, such as holding anti-Ahmadiyah demonstrations and the disbandment of the West Sumatra Center for Inter-Community Studies (Pusaka).

### **The Shariatization in Minangkabau**

West Sumatra Province, is one of the provinces with a majority Muslim population and is also famous for the term<sup>14</sup> "*Adat Basandi*

*Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah*" which is a characteristic of the Minangkabau community in carrying out Islamic teachings and Minangkabau customs. It means that the basic source of Minangkabau law is Islamic law, where Islamic law is sourced from the Qur'an and Sunnah which are the guidelines for the life of Muslims and also the Minangkabau community. The influence of customs and religion in West Sumatra has resulted in various policies from the West Sumatra government that are inspired by Islamic law<sup>15</sup>.

In 2018, the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) released an index of democracy for all provinces in Indonesia. The result is that West Sumatra Province has the lowest rank of all provinces in Indonesia, which has 67.06 points, even lower than 2017 which was 69.50. This number measures the freedom of civil rights, political rights and democratic institutions.<sup>16</sup> From the civil liberties variable, there are threats from several community groups against other communities related to their religious teachings. Many community groups or mass organizations are involved, one of which is the West Sumatra Islamic Shari'a Enforcement Committee (KPSI).

KPSI West Sumatra is an organization formed in 2006 on the basis of upholding Islamic law based on the Qur'an and Sunnah in West Sumatra. It attempts to strengthen Islamic values in West Sumatra by carrying out acts of violence<sup>17</sup> against places that are hotbeds of

<sup>13</sup> Fuqoha Fuqoha, Ahmad Sururi, and Hasuri Hasuri, 'Gerakan Sosial Islam Diantara Gagasan Demokrasi Konstitusional dan Ancaman Radikalisme di Indonesia', *Jurnal Mabkamah: Kajian Ilmu Hukum Dan Hukum Islam*, 3.1 (2018), 111-40.

<sup>14</sup> Wira Hospita, Aidinil Zetra, and Afrizal Afrizal, 'Framing Gerakan Forum Masyarakat Minangkabau dan Advokasi Kebijakan Investasi di Kota Padang: Kasus PT. LIPPO TBK', *Kelola: Jurnal Sosial Politik*, 1.1 (2018), 61.

<sup>15</sup> Wasisto Raharjo Jati, 'Permasalahan Implementasi Perda Syariah dalam Otonomi Daerah', *Al-Manahij: Jurnal Kajian Hukum Islam*, 7.2 (2013), 312.

<sup>16</sup> Indonesian Democracy Index, "Indeks Demokrasi Indonesia (IDI) Sumatera Barat 2018", p. 1

<sup>17</sup> Zainal Zainal, 'Gerakan Islamis Di Sumatera Barat Pasca Orde Baru', *Miqot: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman*, 38.2 (2014), 455.

immorality. KPSI West Sumatra is also a movement that idolizes the Padri movement<sup>18</sup>. This is motivated by the concerns that the people of West Sumatra who are increasingly distant from the Shari'ah.

Therefore, as an institution that enforces Islamic Shari'a in West Sumatra, KPSI tries to actively participate in strengthening Islamic values in accordance with the Qur'an and Sunnah. However, the problem is that the movement has not received much response<sup>19</sup> from the people of West Sumatra because the West Sumatran KPSI only emphasizes big issues such as the construction of the Siloam Hospital. Because of this, the movement does not get a good response by the community. The researcher assumes that the West Sumatran KPSI has not been well received by the people of West Sumatra even though this organization has done many things in strengthening Islamic values<sup>20</sup>, such as the rejecting the Lippo Superblock<sup>21</sup> in 2013 which was also supported by the Minangkabau Community Forum (FMM), the Indonesian Ulema Council. (MUI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)<sup>22</sup>, Paga Nagari, and other organizations.

The factors behind the West Sumatran KPSI movement have not been clearly seen by the people of West Sumatra, namely first, the

movement carried out by the West Sumatran KPSI is a movement that is not based on dissatisfaction with the government, but is a movement that is purely motivated by upholding Islamic law. Second, the West Sumatra KPSI took advantage of political opportunities by preaching, such as preaching in mosques, bringing in reputable scholars, and other activities. Third, the West Sumatra KPSI publish their ideas through media, such as print media and social media.<sup>23</sup> And fourth, West Sumatra KPSI has many alliances in carrying out Islamic law movements.

In addition, because this research is quite broad in scope, since it deals with the beginning of the organizations until now, the researcher will limit research to those published from 2014 to 2019. The following is the research question: How is the Social Movement of the Committee for the Enforcement of Islamic Law (KPSI) carry out their goal of strengthening Islamic values in West Sumatra for the 2014 – 2019 period? To answer this question, we use the theory of Islamic social movements and qualitative methods with descriptive analysis.<sup>24</sup>

### **Islamic Social Movement Theory**

Quintan Wictorowicz and Noorhaidi Hasan<sup>25</sup> has argued that views political Islam in the contemporary<sup>26</sup> world tends to be trapped

<sup>18</sup> Welhendri Azwar, 'Paham Keagamaan dan Aktivitas Sosial Kaum Tarekat: Resistensi Kearifan Lokal Terhadap Paham Radikal di Sumatera Barat', *Gerakan Sosial*, 2016, 1265.

<sup>19</sup> Dalmeri. 'Prospek Demokrasi: Dilema Antara Penerapan Syariat Islam dan Penegakan Hak Asasi Manusia di Indonesia.', *SALAM: Jurnal Studi Masyarakat Islam*, 15.2 (2012) 230.

<sup>20</sup> Hayatun Na'imah and Bahjatul Mardhiah, 'Perda Berbasis Syari'ah dan Hubungan Negara-Agama dalam Perspektif Pancasila', *Mazhab Jurnal Pemikiran Hukum Islam*, 15.2 (2016), 154.

<sup>21</sup> Zulfadli Zulfadli and Beni Kharis Arrasuli, 'Kuasai Ormas di Ranah Minang: Penolakan Ormas

Keagamaan Terhadap Pembangunan Rumah Sakit Siloam di Kota Padang', *Sosial Budaya*, 14.1 (2017), 40.

<sup>22</sup> Rendy Adiwilaga, 'Gerakan Islam Politik dan Proyek Historis Penegakan Islamisme di Indonesia', *JWP (Jurnal Wacana Politik)*, 2.1 (2017), 5.

<sup>23</sup> Firmanda Taufiq and Lalu Wahyu Putra Utama, 'Media Sosial Dan Gerakan Sosio-Politik Umat Islam di Indonesia', *Fikrah*, 6.2 (2018), 396.

<sup>24</sup> Sugiyono, *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif* (Bandung: Alfabeta, 2016) p. 132

<sup>25</sup> Noorhaidi Hasan, *Islam Politik di Dunia Kontemporer* (Yogyakarta: SUKA-Press, 2012) p. 53

<sup>26</sup> Muhammad Rusydi, 'Transformasi Pemikiran dan Gerakan Islam Indonesia Kontemporer',

around ideological issues so that economic-political, social problems and activities in these phenomena are often ignored. Political Islam tend to exploit disappointment to motivate mobilization.<sup>27</sup>

#### *Resource Mobilization*

In this element there is a sense of disappointment due to the process of marginalization and modernization that is felt by many people. Here, there is the need for sources and structures of mobilization in formal and informal organizations to actualize these disappointments into a massive and organized movement.

#### *Political Opportunity*

This element strengthens the first element where massive and violent movements carried out by groups in the name of religion do not just express feelings of irrational disappointment. On the contrary, these activities are rational actions that consider opportunities and obstacles that are structural in nature and are read as problems of access.

#### *Framing*

Framing is a process by which a social movement creates and surrounds a discourse that can resonate among those who are the target of mobilization. At the heart of the process is the interpretation of certain complaints and the generations of hope for success. These framings are similar to linguistic codes in that they provide a grammar that marks and syntactically connects patterns or events in the world. It can be defined as the art of communicating messages to persuade the masses and gain support and participation.

#### *Network or Alliance*

Islamic social movements are also determined by the existence of a recruitment network. The recruitment network plays a fundamental role in the inclusion process of individuals, because mobilization never starts from an empty space with isolated individuals. This recruitment network is an important connecting tool for understanding the process of how people engage in collective action.

#### **West Sumatra KPSI Social Movement 2014 – 2019**

The movements carried out by several Islamic organizations including KPSI are inspired, driven by Islamic values that have developed since the last century and which have played a major role in reforming the spirit of Muslims. This is achieved by the growing relationship of Islamic movements with social and political life. Peaceful demonstrations, banners, and marches are very common in modern activism, although the organization and tactics applied are based on the local context.

In Islamic social movements, issues related to political Islam are important because they convey important discourses promoted by West Sumatran KPSI members, such as the application of Islamic law, revitalization of the caliphate system and jihad. *Khilafah* and *Sharia*<sup>28</sup> the ideals of those who that to return to the glory days of Islam. The development of political Islam is always associated with political, economic, social and cultural crises in a given region. When the regime in power is

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TAJDID: Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin, 16.1 (2017), 37 <<https://doi.org/10.30631/tjd.v16i1.50>>.

<sup>27</sup> Abdul Jamil, 'Islam dan Kebangsaan: Teori dan Praktik Gerakan Sosial Islam di Indonesia (Studi

Atas Front Umat Islam Kota Bandung)', *Harmoni*, 12.1 (2013), 132.

<sup>28</sup> Fatimah Halim, 'Obsesi Penerapan Syari'at Islam di Wilayah Lokal', *Al Daulah: Jurnal Hukum Pidana dan Ketatanegaraan*, 4.2 (2015), 357.

experiencing fragility, this becomes a momentum to carry out its actions as a mediating group in society.

KPSI West Sumatra is driven by members who have recently become more religious. They realize that social, cultural, economic and political problems are getting worse which makes them motivated to strengthen Islamic values and to spread the verses of the Qur'an in order to strengthen Islamic brotherhood.

#### *Resource Mobilization*

The resource mobilization carried out by Islamic group takes several forms. It can be seen in various incidents such as voicing anti-immorality messages, strengthening Islamic values and sometimes protesting the government, such as in the Solo area, where groups mobilized thugs and youth groups under the pretext of enforcing the Islamic law<sup>29</sup>. KPSI West Sumatra also engage in resource mobilization, such as: (1) The movement to close night entertainment venues such as teeboxes. This movement was mobilized by KPSI, Padang City FPI, 212 Alumni, Laskar Mujahidin and others in 2018 since the Provincial Government policy of Satpol PP Damkar to conduct raids on community "illnesses". (2) The movement to report Al Chaidar to the West Sumatra Regional Police (Polda) related to the mention of 3,000 people who were caught by terrorists in West Sumatra. This movement was attended

by the West Sumatran KPSI, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI)<sup>30</sup>, the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), the West Sumatran Islamic Boarding School (Ponpes), the Minangkabau Customary Density High Council (MTKAAM), and the 2018 Islamic Student Front (FMI).<sup>31</sup> (3) The movement demanding the President Joko Widodo to resign as President of the Republic of Indonesia given his perceived failure in office. This movement was followed by FMM, KPSI, Paga Nagari, West Sumatra Mujahidin Council, West Sumatra FPI, and the Anti-Foreign Debt Community Coalition in 2018.<sup>32</sup>

Resource mobilization<sup>33</sup> is inseparable from the costs incurred for each action or movement. KPSI West Sumatra carried out its activities from funds from the congregation and members of the West Sumatra KPSI. This was done when carrying out da'wah activities in mosques. The costs of carrying tasks by KPSI members while carrying out the action is borne by the members themselves.

"In carrying out the KPSI movement, there will costs. The source of KPSI funds comes from the Jama'ah and KPSI members and sympathizers who act in the name of da'wah and do good deeds. If there is an event such as a natural disaster, KPSI also mobilizes donations on behalf of the congregation and this is not done by force. This was done on behalf of Da'wah and KPSI's duty was to invite the community to follow Islamic

<sup>29</sup>Muzayyin Ahyar, 'Membaca Gerakan Islam Radikal dan Deradikalisasi Gerakan Islam', *Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan*, 23.1 (2015), 10.

<sup>30</sup>rendy Adiwilaga, 'Afiliasi Gerakan Islam Politik di Indonesia Pasca Reformasi', *Jisipol Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik*, 3.2 (2019), 6

<sup>31</sup>Harian Haluan, *11 Ormas di Sumbar Laporkan Pengamat Terorisme Al Chaidar ke Polda*, 18 Agustus 2018, <[https://www.harianhaluan.com/news/detail/70993/11-ormas-di-sumbar-laporkan-pengamat-](https://www.harianhaluan.com/news/detail/70993/11-ormas-di-sumbar-laporkan-pengamat-terorisme-al-chaidar-ke-polda)

[terorisme-al-chaidar-ke-polda](https://www.harianhaluan.com/news/detail/70993/11-ormas-di-sumbar-laporkan-pengamat-terorisme-al-chaidar-ke-polda)> {diakses 23 Agustus 2019}

<sup>32</sup>Gelora.co, *Perwakilan Gabungan Ormas Islam Sumbar Menuntut Jokowi Mundur*, 9 September 2018 <<https://www.gelora.co/2018/09/perwakilan-gabungan-ormas-islam-sumbar.html>> {diakses 23 Agustus 2019}

<sup>33</sup> Oman Sukmana, 'Konvergensi Antara Resource Mobilizationtheory dan Identityoriented Theorydalam Studi Gerakan Sosial Baru', *Jurnal Sosiologi Reflektif*, 8.1 (2013), 41.

law (*amar maruf nahi munkar*), but whether the community accepts it or rejects it is up to the community itself."<sup>34</sup>

The West Sumatran KPSI movement in 2014 - 2019 had a relatively unique resource mobilization. As a movement formed by rationally formed individuals, West Sumatra's KPSI did not admit to showing dissatisfaction with the governing regime. The movement carried out by KPSI West Sumatra originated from the concerns of its members that immorality is increasingly rampant in West Sumatra. They advocated for strengthening Islamic values that is in accordance with the Qur'an and Sunnah. Since the government does not act in accordance to religious law, only they can enforce and fight for Islamic law.

"Actually, KPSI West Sumatra did not depart from dissatisfaction. Allah SWT has ordered us that the rules in this life should be based on Islamic Shari'a. So if the government that governs their country does not follow that (Islamic Shari'a) of course they will be responsible for what they do. We carry out what Allah SWT commands. Therefore, dissatisfaction does not exist because it is not our business, fighting within the government system is acceptable."<sup>35</sup>

The Islamic Sharia movement carried out by KPSI West Sumatra is believed by members of KPSI West Sumatra to be the right movement to solve the problems of Muslims. This is because KPSI West Sumatra sees that many problems that arise from the community are problems that cannot be resolved quickly. KPSI West Sumatra is not involved in making local regulations (*Perda*) because there is no authority for the West Sumatran KPSI in

formulating the local regulation. Rather, they themselves as overseeing the execution of local regulation and taking action against immoral places such as night entertainment, closing such businesses and making sure the government closes these places.

The resource mobilization movements carried out by the West Sumatran KPSI have the aim of strengthening Islamic values, but they are not the same as the movement carried out by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) which has a clear vision and mission to enforce Islamic law. However, while West Sumatra KPSI has a clear vision and mission in strengthening Islamic values, it is not purely engaged in upholding Islamic law and has political elements. There are KPSI members who are running for legislative offices. The mobilization carried out by KPSI has had a political element in the last five years.

From the statement above, a former member of the KPSI responded to the West Sumatran KPSI movement, saying that mobilization of resources carried out by the organization was not motivated by dissatisfaction. For the past five years and there has been no result for the community and this has raised suspicions against the movement.

"If you look at the movement, you will definitely see what effect it mobilized itself. But so far it doesn't exist (showing dissatisfaction), maybe they just show dissatisfaction, but when they meet the authorities they seem lost and run away, what they have demanded to this day is only a few things here and there"<sup>36</sup>

The movement carried out by KPSI West Sumatra is only a 'follow-up' movement to

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<sup>34</sup> Amir Aulia, (Chairman of KPSI Padang City) Interview {Wednesday, 15 January 2020}

<sup>35</sup> Irfianda Abidin, (Chairman of KPSI West Sumatra) Interview {Thursday, 26 December 2019}

<sup>36</sup> Sri Setiawati (Lecturer of Anthropology FISIP Unand) Interview {Wednesday, 4 March 2020}

other movements or actions that have been carried out in several regions such as DKI Jakarta with the 212 action. The KPSI would then hold the same action in West Sumatra which will have an effect of promoting a member legislative assembly.

#### *Political Opportunity*

Tarrow describes this political opportunity as when a social movement experiences an increase when faced with open political influence after obtaining mobilizing resources. The actors of the Islamic movement would join in a collective action and form a network between Islamic groups to voice their goals. If we look at the West Sumatra KPSI there are several political opportunities carried out, including: (1) Fundraising movement for riots in Wamena and natural disasters in West Sumatra with KPSI and Minangkabau Muslim Care in 2019. (2) The “safari da’wah” movement and Tabligh Akbar in every city in West Sumatra, which together popular preachers such as Ustadz Rahmat Baequni, Ustadzah Irene Handoko, KH. Tengku Zulkarnain, Gus Nur, Ustadz Abdul Somad (in 2017) and others. (3) The movement to oversee the 2019 simultaneous general elections with Islamic organizations such as KPSI and Alumni 212 in 2018.

Looking at the West Sumatran KPSI movements in terms of political opportunities, there are many problems that Muslims often face, such as Islamophobia which is often used by groups outside Islam to pit Muslims against each other. However, not all of the problems faced by the West Sumatra KPSI have been responded KPSI West Sumatra realizes that if everyone responds it will take time to solve it,

there are still many problems that are most important to be resolved.

“There are many problems experienced by Muslims such as Islamophobia which is used to pit Muslims against each other and several other issues that we do not address because they will waste time. So in the last five years KPSI's issues were not affected by that. Under these conditions, KPSI took advantage of this opportunity by preaching, because da'wah such as “prohibiting the immoral” (nahi munkar) is considered a to be very important, given QS. Ali Imran verse 104”<sup>37</sup>

This is often done by KPSI West Sumatra in responding to the problems faced by Muslims by conducting da'wah safaris in many mosques, carrying out peaceful humanitarian actions, raising funds for natural disaster areas and eradicating immoral places in several cities in West Sumatra. In taking advantage of political opportunities, there are obstacles faced by KPSI West Sumatra, such as the Indonesian education system which is considered to be liberal that it makes it difficult for the sharia to be accepted.

“In the obstacles during the West Sumatran KPSI movement, namely the Indonesian education system which is so chaotic and supports liberalism that it is difficult for people to accept the da'wah carried out by KPSI and only a few people accept these da'wah”<sup>38</sup>

In addition, the law in Indonesia is not clear and does not strictly follow the Dutch colonial laws which are still used today. This is what KPSI West Sumatra is concerned about because of the impact it has on the people who apply the law and who would compare it with the Shari'a. As a result negative perception of

<sup>37</sup> Irfianda Abidin, (Chairman of KPSI West Sumatra) Interview {Thursday, 26 December 2019}

<sup>38</sup> Ibnu Aqil D. Ghani, (West Sumatra KPSI Shura Council) Interview {Friday, 24 January 2020}



Islam will appear. Media coverage is also an obstacle for KPSI West Sumatra where the media reports a lot of things that are considered untrue in the field. They corner Islam and blame for things that are untrue.

“There are so many obstacles for KPSI in implementing Islamic law. Indonesia still uses laws of the colonial era. This has an effect on society such as business where non-Muslims or infidels also adhere to the laws of their religion. For instance the law on drinking alcohol. Islam forbids the drinking, but for other religions it is permissible. KPSI has also had dialogues or discussions with non-Muslim/infidel entrepreneurs KPSI does not prohibit non-Muslim/infidel entrepreneurs from selling liquor, but can these entrepreneurs sell these drinks only to fellow non-Muslims and can also engage in prostitution and gambling as long as it does not involve Muslims in it.”<sup>39</sup>

Related to this statement, it is a weakness for Islamic organizations to carry out the strategy. This is because the strategy carried out by KPSI is not good and unclear. This can be seen in the emotional movements of its members, which ends up distracting them from strengthening Islamic values. As shown by the emotional approach of Irfianda Abidin, who is the main figure in the KPSI movement, the KPSI movement ends up having no clear direction and purpose.

“The weakness of Islamic organizations like this is that their strategy for the movement is not good, so it is more emotional and intuitive for the movers. The figure, Irfianda Abidin, is not aware of other things. The key is only the leader, Irfianda Abidin. This is why the program

translates into jargons; these is what are used for movement.”<sup>40</sup>

From the political opportunities in the West Sumatran KPSI movement in the last five years, there are not more political influences since the 2019 election. The purpose of forming the activities carried out by KPSI has now a double meaning in addition to their goal of strengthening Islamic values as well as taking advantage of these opportunities to seek support for their candidacy in the 2019 election.

### *Framing*

Framing carried out by Islamic groups goes a step further in the framing process. They realize that the West is making efforts to weaken Muslims from several fields such as economics, military, and politics through international institutions, media and projects to infiltrate values. There are foreign values that have seeped into the life of Islamic society. Framing what KPSI West Sumatra does, depends on the conditions that arise in the community. They first framed what were the issues that developed in the community and then they socialize what they discussed. Framing carried out by KPSI West Sumatra include: (1) KPSI protest movement with GNPf MUI in 2017<sup>41</sup> regarding the rejection of Siloam Group and Karaoke Inul Vizta. (2) The movement to prohibit the use of the second floor hall of the Nurul Iman Mosque as a 'baralek' place. The movement was initiated by the West Sumatra KPSI, the Minangkabau Community Forum (FMM), and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) Padang

<sup>39</sup> Amir Aulia, (Chairman of KPSI Padang City) Interview {Wednesday, 15 January 2020}

<sup>40</sup> Sri Setiawati (Lecturer of Anthropology FISIP Unand) Interview {Wednesday, 4 March 2020}

<sup>41</sup> Covesia News, *GNPF MUI Gelar Unjuk Rasa di Padang* 10 April, 5 April 2017, <<https://www.covesia.com/news/baca/35440/gnpf-mui-gelar-unjuk-rasa-di-padang-10-april>> {diakses 23 Agustus 2019}

in 2018. (3) The movement to reject the crematorium in Pondok Pondok, Padang City. The movement was carried out on behalf of the people of West Sumatra, including the KPSI West Sumatra in 2017. (4) The movement demanding that IAIN Bukittinggi lift the ban on the veil for lecturers and students in 2018. Furthermore.

"In framing the ideas that will be carried out by the KPSI, we had deliberations as in the Wamena case. The KPSI would conduct deliberations with members about the problems and consider facts on the ground. We discuss how to cooperate with other Islamic organizations to raise funds such as Minangkabau Muslim Care and there are several members went to Wamena to see firsthand the conditions there and noted that the victims in the Wamena conflict were non-Papuan citizens and were even Muslims. Therefore, Islamic mass organizations, including KPSI, spread the facts of what happened according to the version of KPSI and other mass organizations based on field observation and filed a protest against the government."<sup>42</sup>

The framing carried out by KPSI West Sumatra is almost the same as the movements carried out by other Islamic mass organizations. They bring an issue that is hotly discussed by the national mass media then they respond with knowledge and convey what they feel is not right according the community based on the Qur'an and Sunnah. Framing is a

scheme given in language and cognitive form to understand activities and events.<sup>43</sup>

To attract public sympathy, KPSI West Sumatra conveyed their ideas through media such as newspapers, television radio and social media. However, KPSI is not aggressively spreading this idea because there will be misunderstandings between KPSI's ideas and the public, because KPSI is aware that the media is currently hostile to Islam and would violate Islamic organizations<sup>44</sup> as if they are radical organizations<sup>45</sup>. Seeing the prudence of the West Sumatran KPSI in conveying their ideas, few sympathize with the West Sumatran KPSI.

"Through media such as newspapers, radio and television and social media. However, KPSI does not intensively convey to the media because KPSI knows how the media formulates its news to show as if KPSI is blaming the government. Therefore, KPSI is careful in dealing with these media and with anyone who covers KPSI activities and spreads them in their social media"<sup>46</sup>

The religious issues brought by KPSI West Sumatra have no effect on the public. This was seen by several KPSI members who came forward as legislative candidates who took advantage religious issues and acted on behalf of KPSI and voiced their jargons in order to attract public sympathy to support and vote for them during the 2019 election. Their efforts did not affect the community because people only see the track record, not the issues they bring, let alone money politics.

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<sup>42</sup> Amir Aulia, (Chairman of KPSI Padang City) Interview {Wednesday, 15 January 2020}

<sup>43</sup> Arie Setyaningrum Pamungkas and Gita Octaviani, 'Aksi Bela Islam Dan Ruang Publik Muslim: Dari Representasi Daring Ke Komunitas Luring', *Jurnal Pemikiran Sosiologi*, 4.2 (2017), 80.

<sup>44</sup> Azyumardi Azra, 'Revisitasi Islam Politik dan Islam Kultural di Indonesia', *Indo-Islamika*, 1.2 (2012), 236 <<https://doi.org/10.1548/idi.v1i2.1176>>.

<sup>45</sup> Eka Hendry Ar, 'Pola Gerakan Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia', *Jurnal Khatulistiwa LP2M LAIN Pontianak*, 3.2 (2013), 166.

<sup>46</sup> Irfianda Abidin, (Chairman of KPSI West Sumatra) Interview {Thursday, 26 December 2019}

“Religious issues that are wrapped and packaged have no effect because people only see the track record, not see the issues brought up and they also have no effect on money politics”<sup>47</sup>

The framing carried out by KPSI was vague and did not have a clear purpose as to where the movement was going, thereby raising suspicions of the movement led by Irfianda Abidin and several other members.

#### *Alliance or Network*

Social movements carried out by Islamic organizations utilize personal networks related to politics, economy and culture. It is difficult to identify how the networks are formed by movement actors to strengthen their network. Often it is a tactic to evade the public and is difficult to analyze further. Several social movement actors take advantage of networks and alliances through scholarly assemblies and Tablighi congregations to spread the message of their movement. This activity is not just to recruit members, but also includes activities to influence the congregation. There are activities carried out by KPSI West Sumatra in a network or alliance, including: (1) Tauhid Touring Movement where all Islamic organizations including KPSI are involved as well as youth organizations, students, and others in 2018. (2) West Sumatra Tauhid Parade Movement involving all West Sumatra Islamic Organizations including KPSI, Ta'lim Council, Islamic Boarding Schools, Islamic Schools and Pro-Islamic communities throughout West Sumatra in 2018.

In this network, KPSI West Sumatra and other Islamic organizations interact with each

other, influence each other during deliberation before carrying out their activities and provide motivation to mass organizations that will carry out the movement. The alliance carried out by the West Sumatran KPSI with other mass organizations acted not only on behalf of the mass organizations they brought, but on behalf of the West Sumatran Muslims. KPSI is more likely to carry out da'wah by bringing popular clerics to West Sumatra to conduct da'wah safaris in each city.

There are many alliances or networks owned by the West Sumatran KPSI, but the mass organizations that work together with the West Sumatran KPSI are actually under the same leadership as MTKAAM, FMM and KPSI which are the same mass organizations under the leadership of Irfianda Abidin. Thus, it is not clear if there is a movement involved, behalf of which mass organization he acted<sup>48</sup>. In the end it was not clear what the movement was and the form of the effort that was initiated by Irfianda Abidin.

“The efforts made are actually personnel efforts from Irfianda Abidin, he has 'many clothes'. When there is a question, it must be asked whether it is on behalf of FMM, MTKAAM or KPSI. That's why he made the wings of the organization, whether these are wings or not, what is clear is that the issue has starting to get blurry or unclear”<sup>49</sup>

The number of mass organizations under the auspices of several KPSI members such as Irfianda Abidin (KPSI, FMM and MTKAAM), Jel Fathullah (KPSI and GNP West Sumatra) and Ibnu Aqil D.Ghani (KPSI and Paga Nagari) created conflicts of interest with many

<sup>47</sup> Sri Setiawati (Lecturer of Anthropology FISIP Unand) Interview {Wednesday, 4 March 2020}

<sup>48</sup> Kunawi Basyir, 'Ideologi Gerakan Politik Islam di Indonesia', *Al-Tabrir: Jurnal Pemikiran Islam*, 16.2 (2016), 339–62.

<sup>49</sup> Sri Setiawati (Lecturer of Anthropology FISIP Unand) Interview {Wednesday, 4 March 2020}

mass organizations. They do this so they can manipulate the position they have. This is the weakness of Islamic organizations in West Sumatra. It is increasingly unclear what the objectives of the movement are.

### Conclusion

This study finds that the West Sumatran KPSI social movement in their efforts of strengthening Islamic values can be seen from the following perspectives. First, the movement carried out by KPSI West Sumatra is a movement that is not based on dissatisfaction with the government, but is a movement that is purely motivated by strengthening Islamic values. Second, West Sumatra KPSI took advantage of political opportunities by preaching, such as preaching in mosques, bringing in popular scholars, and others activities. Third, West Sumatra KPSI framed their ideas through media such as print media and social media. And fourth, KPSI West Sumatra has many alliances in carrying out Islamic law movements.

Of all the indicators of Islamic social movement theory shows that the West Sumatra KPSI is less active in initiating social movements on a regular basis. It is only a supporting organization or event organizer, utilizing the movements carried out to improve their voices at the time of the general election. However, the issues they brought were stale, and their activities did not purely<sup>50</sup> reinforce Islamic values, but had certain interests in them that conflicts with their mission. For instance, they rejected the establishment of organizations that are very active in carrying out Islamic activities such as the rejection of Siloam in 2013. The KPSI West Sumatra is currently considered an organization that has

not succeeded in embracing the public in their efforts to strengthen Islamic values in West Sumatra.

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