

## **Madhhab Negotiation, Education Transformation and Conflict Resolution in Conveying the Sermon of Tablighi Jamaat in Southeast Asia**

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**Abstract:** The article aims to understand the phenomena of practicing madhhab in the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) community in Southeast Asia, particularly in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The article also investigates the madhhab negotiation between TJ members and local people where the dawah occurs in a specific context. The article also looks at changes in religious educational program developed by TJ members that tend to be informal religious education. The majority of informal religious education surrounding TJ communities is tahfiz school (memorizing the Quran). TJ members are more interested in sending their children to tahfiz school than informal school and later become Islamic priests (kyai). They are not interested to semade their children take the university level. Besides, the article also concerns exploring another role of TJ in a socio-political context where they become facilitators to overcome the Pattani Muslim conflict with the Thai government. This research was conducted for a year in 2017-2018 (March 2017-April 2018) in three countries using ethnography approach during the process of collecting data by directly involved in Tablighi Jamaat activities. The method of collecting data used in this research was qualitative with observative participative technique, deep interview, and documentation. The result of the research shows that Jamaah Tabligh was successful negotiating the madhhab they believe to Muslim community with different Islamic point of view. Moreover, the shifting of education orientation was emerging in TJ community, the focus was on religious exegesis without paying attention on another aspect of education for their children. Parents of TJ have pride to be called a father of a hafiz than a doctor. Another finding was Jamaah Tabligh have prominent role as a reconciliatory in Pattani, South Thailand that they earned trust from Thailand Government. Amid the deadlock of reconciliation of local Muslim who want to separate from the state of Thailand with regression that created violence, bombing and arresting the activist, Jamaah tabligh was there as their guarantor.

**Keywords:** Madhhab; Social Conflict; Tablighi Jamaat; Tahfiz.

**Abstrak:** Artikel ini bertujuan untuk memahami fenomena pengamalan mazhab dalam komunitas Jamaah Tabligh di Asia Tenggara, khususnya di Thailand, Malaysia, dan Indonesia. Artikel ini juga mengupas tentang negosiasi mazhab antara anggota Jamaah Tabligh dengan masyarakat lokal di mana dakwah terjadi dalam konteks tertentu. Artikel ini juga melihat perubahan program pendidikan agama yang dikembangkan oleh anggota Jamaah Tabligh yang cenderung menjadi pendidikan agama informal. Mayoritas pendidikan agama informal di sekitar komunitas Jamaah Tabligh adalah sekolah tahfiz (menghafal Al-Qur'an). Anggota Jamaah Tabligh lebih tertarik menyekolahkan anaknya ke sekolah tahfiz daripada sekolah informal dan kemudian menjadi kyai. Mereka tidak tertarik untuk membuat anak-anaknya mengambil jenjang perguruan tinggi. Selain itu, artikel ini juga membahas tentang peran lain Jamaah Tabligh dalam konteks sosial politik dimana mereka menjadi fasilitator untuk mengatasi konflik Muslim Pattani dengan pemerintah Thailand. Penelitian ini dilakukan selama satu tahun pada tahun 2017-2018 (Maret 2017-April 2018) di tiga negara dengan menggunakan pendekatan etnografi dalam proses pengumpulan datanya dengan terlibat langsung dalam kegiatan Jamaah Tabligh. Metode pengumpulan data yang

digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah kualitatif dengan teknik observasional partisipatif, wawancara mendalam, dan dokumentasi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Jamaah Tabligh berhasil menegosiasikan mazhab yang mereka anut kepada umat Islam dengan pandangan Islam yang berbeda. Terlebih lagi, pergeseran orientasi pendidikan yang muncul di komunitas Jamaah Tabligh, fokusnya adalah pada eksegesis agama tanpa memperhatikan aspek lain dari pendidikan untuk anak-anak mereka. Orang tua Jamaah Tabligh lebih bangga disebut bapak hafiz daripada dokter. Temuan lainnya adalah Jamaah Tabligh memiliki peran penting sebagai rekonsiliasi di Pattani, Thailand Selatan sehingga mereka mendapatkan kepercayaan dari Pemerintah Thailand. Di tengah kebuntuan rekonsiliasi umat Islam lokal yang ingin memisahkan diri dari negara Thailand dengan regresi yang menimbulkan kekerasan, pengeboman dan penangkapan aktivis, Jamaah tabligh hadir sebagai penjamin mereka.

**Kata Kunci:** Madzhab; Konflik sosial; Jamaah Tabligh; Tahfiz

## 1. Introduction

Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) is a consistent transnational missionary movement presenting their religious activities in many regions and countries. TJ is Muslim communities who are welcomed widely in the world including non-Muslim community as well as secular countries in which Muslims are minority (Chakrabarti, 2010; Rana, 2009; Siddiqi, 2012; Y. S. Sikand, 1998). Tablighi Jamaat movement is exceptionally organized, disciplined, and in order by using discussion to get decision despite of having a clear structural organization such as non-government organization or political party (Y. S. Sikand, 1998, p. 172). The diaspora of Tablighi in the world is continually showing a rapid development. As for today, TJ has headquarters in 180 countries spreading in every continent with approximately more than 80 million members (Horstmann, 2007, p. 108). Tablighi uses mosques as their center of religious movement known as "*Markas*" in Indonesia. In the mosques they do their daily activities such as cooking, laundry, sleeping, sermon, *bayan*, discussion and organizing members to do the outside sermon (*dakwah*). The mosque is not merely used as a worship place but also as the center of *dakwah* and other activities. Therefore, the mosque has prominent role in religious practice and ritual of the Tablighi, without the mosque the Tablighi unable to run their missionary activities (Hamdi, 2015; Noor, 2012; Siddiqi, 2012).

Tablighi is rapidly developing in America, Latin America, Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In Southeast Asia including Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Philippine, and Malaysia, the Tablighi is developing incessantly and becoming part of Islamic entity in Southeast Asia (Burki, 2013; Metcalf, 2002; Noor, 2012; Siddiqi, 2018; Wong & Levitt, 2014). The presence of Tablighi in Southeast Asia has given new colors for the shape of religiosity of local people in Asia. This article focuses on the movement of Tablighi in Southeast Asia namely Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia related to the fluidity of streams (*madhhab*) that is thriving within the Tablighi community environment. Fluidity is the melting of nuance or the ease stream, in this context Islamic streams (*madhhab*). The fluidity pattern of *madhhab* brings a query on how Tablighi easily fuses the practice and different *madhhab* tradition and how the Tablighi negotiates and accommodates the different *madhhab* within and out them. The issue of *madhhab* has been a crucial issue in the Muslim community because it's placed as doctrine or ideology that must be obeyed and should not be mixed with the other.

Moreover, the other purpose of this article is to understand the pattern and religious education's construction that is thriving within the Tablighi community. There is a huge change of education among the Tablighi community in which the informal religious education is more put forward than the formal one. The informal education department is perceived as a more effective way in teaching Islamic knowledge by designing their own curriculum without following the government. In addition to that, some Tablighi members do not send their children to formal school, the informal education such as *pesantren tahfiz* (Quranic boarding school) is enough for them. *Sekolah Tahfiz Alquran* is

flourishing in the Tablighi education environment that is integrated with the headquarters. Almost in every headquarters there is *sekolah tahfiz* within.

The life of the Tablighi among society becomes a personal challenge for each member when they need to encounter certain political conditions. The case of Pattani shows the extraordinary role of the Tablighi as the facilitator of conflict resolution between Muslim Pattani and Thai government. In fact, the Tablighi is one of many who is trusted as the assurance if there is Muslim Pattani arrested for suicide bomb attack. This article profoundly explores the Tablighi's role for their community and their country.

## 2. Method

This research uses a combination approach of phenomenology and ethnography, besides exploring the experiences of the Tablighi, the influence of social setting and culture on their point of view and behavior is explored as well. The researcher stays with the Tablighi doing *khuruj*, actively seeing and experiencing their ritual and religious activities for three years. I conducted a deep interview and formal discussion with some members of Tablighi about their teaching at the time and of course about the research's focus I conducted. The spiritual experiences during *khuruj* reflect the description of a phenomenon that happens among the Tablighi members which generally is similar with the Tablighi in other places. This research was conducted from 2017-2018 (March 2017- April 2018) in Pattani, Southern Thailand, Pataling Jaya Malaysia, and in some of Tablighi boarding schools in Temboro East Java, Samarinda, Balikpapan and Lombok of West Nusa Tenggara.

## 3. Spreading Pattern and Tablighi Diaspora in Southeast Asia

The history of Tablighi Jamaat establishment strongly relates to the local political dynamic and religiosity in the era of colonialism towards India under the British Empire (Bukhari et al., 2019; Chakrabarti, 2010). India, back at the colonial era was struggling to be free from British colonialism, they experienced internal conflict among their figures, there was a difference in approach and method on embodying their vision and mission of independence. Some did choose physical war and some preferred diplomatic ways, peace. Mahatma Gandhi for instance, used a popular non-violence approach and embrace community outside Hindu including Muslim as majority community after Hindu. The step taken by Mahatma Gandhi was challenged by the radical Hindu who refused to admit the existence of a non-Hindu community. The political conflict and interest involving religious elements pushed Muslim figures to strengthen their community to find solutions not merely for political issues but also religion (Barbara Daly Metcalf, 2002, p. 9).

Syaikh Maulan Ilyas was one of the charismatic Muslim figures who understood the social-political condition that happened and the impact towards the development of religion of local Muslim community in India. There were two movements faced by Muslim back then, one was colonial political movement with mission to spread Christianity, and the Hindu extremism movement with mission to spread Hinduism and brought back Hindu who converted other belief especially Islam (Gent, 2018; Lone, 2018; Mamun, 2019; Barbara Daly Metcalf, 2002; Noor, 2012; Pieri, 2019). After gaining inspiration or inspiration from Mecca when doing the pilgrimage/*hajj*, Syaikh Ilyas then built the movement that was recently known as Tablighi *wat Dakwah*. His target was the internal Muslim community by strengthening their faith and worship.

The Tablighi is part of a reformist *sufism's* project from *Madrasah Darul Ulum Deobandi* stream (Ali & Amin, 2020; Hamdi, 2022; Rauf et al., 2018). *Yayasan Darul Ulum Deobandi* is an institution that is active in religious education and missionary endeavours that was built in 1867 in Saharanpur, India. Deobandi was successful in creating great ulama or priests dispersed all over the world. Tablighi is a part of their third pilot project namely tauhid, sunnah (following Hanfi Madhab) and jihad (J. Ali, 2003, p. 174). Not all alumni and Deobandi's figures have a similar approach on spreading *dakwah*. Tablighi is the one that is different from others due to its focus on spreading the tauhid and sunnah element using a door-to-door approach with the purpose to gain maximum results.

Syaikh Ilyas criticizes the less maximum pattern used by *tarekat* these days due to their focus only on fixing themselves. The pattern of *tarekat* that only stays in the cave, living hermit life in ritual rooms, mosques, temples and other holy places is useless because it has no benefit for society. To be useful, these *tarekat* teachings should be preached to other people for them to get spiritual awakening (Y. Sikand, 2006, p. 178). The intention to change society only through pesantren or madrasah is impossible because of the limitation of space and time. The only way to embody the mission is by visiting houses and inviting them sincerely to study religion and the pure path of Islam. This is the reformist value shown by the Tablighi in their Islamic movement.

Different from other Islamic groups, the Tablighi refuses to involve politic in their dakwah, on the other hand, the Tablighi is a pure religious movement with '*silaturrahmi*' friendship (visiting each other) as their struggle to spread religion with different targets (Ali & Amin, 2020; Ali & Minxing, 2021; Hamdi, 2022; Metcalf, 1996). If other groups are targeting community out of Islam as their missionary's object, the Tablighi is targeting the internal community of Islam or the Muslim itself. The popular motto among the Tablighi is the quotes stated by Syaikh Ilyas "Oh Muslim! Be Muslim" (Prakash, 2020, p. 134). The Tablighi wants to Islamize the Muslim, meaning by this, strengthening the Islamic value internally. For the Tablighi, reinforcing Islamic value on Muslim community is more valuable and pivotal than administer non-Muslim community. If the faith on Islam strong, then there will be no concerned on the disturbance of other community out of Islam.

After flourishing in India and other countries in Southern Asia, Tablighi has spread its *dakwah* wings to foreign countries since 1946. The first sending mission was to foreign country namely to Hijaz and England in 1946. After reaching England, the United States of America accepted the Tablighi, in the 1960s the Tablighi was introduced in France and experienced rapid growth in 1970. During the 1970-1980 the Tablighi had spreaded in Europe continent (Ali & Minxing, 2021; King, 1997; Kroessin, 2008; Noor, 2012; Prakash, 2020). The rapid transmission in Europe is the starting point of the Tablighi movement as the movement of global piety, moreover, after the Tablighi built the biggest mosque as their headquarter in Dewsbury called Dewsbury Headquarters. The Dewsbury headquarter is also well known as *Darul Ulum* (the house of knowledge) built in 1978 located in Sevil city, Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, England. The mosque accommodates 4000 people along with a boarding school for students of Quran memorization (King, 1997; Metcalf, 1996; Noor, 2012).

On Faris Noor's note (2012, pp. 34-35) since 1950 the Tablighi has begun sending their preacher from India to Burma, British Malay and Indonesia. The Tablighi sent their first delegation in 1952 to Indonesia under a leader or *amir* named Maulan Haji Miaji Isa. This first group was stranded in the ports of Penang, Singapore, and Medan. In Singapore and Malaysia this group was supported by Indian Muslim community who was under the authority of England. Whereas in Medan, they conveyed their sermon in Masjid Al Hidayah at Gajah Street. This group used the sea as their former did. As cited by Noor, history experts such as Levi, Sastri and Coedes found the expansion of Indians who expanded Hindu and Buddha teaching since the 7th century through sea. They departed to Sumatra and Java as merchants, preachers and scholars. This period was well known as "Indianization" when scholars from India dominated the religious culture and politics in Nusantara by establishing Hindu and Buddhist empires.

The second delegation was eight people sent by plane to Jakarta in 1955. They could not speak bahasa and only a few spoke English. They were puzzled looking for connection in Jakarta but then they decided to ask to meet Indian Muslim figure to ease their communication and get helped to find place to do the preach. They were brought by the taxi driver to the house of Haji Zarista Khan, an Indian who had become an Indonesian citizen and belonged to freedom fighters in Indonesia (Noor, 2012). Zaristan gathered the Indian community to meet the Tablighi group in his house at Industri street. The Tablighi group was placed in Bandengan Mosque, Kampung Pandan north Jakarta. From here the Tablighi then flourished to all parts of Indonesia.

#### 4. *Madhhab* Isolation as Tablighi's *Dakwah* Strategy in SouthEast Asia

*Madhhab* comes from Arabic language "*zahaba*" means through or passing a pathway, something that has become someone's destination abstractly or obviously. *Madhhab* is a method formed through point of view and research on some texts or religion-social cases which then used by the followers as guidance with clear limitations and built on Islamic principles and law (Harahap, 2019, p. 3).

*Madhhab* is also defined as a group or school of thought that discusses social issues and constructs Islamic law modified on fiqh, ushul fiqh, and theology. In the development of *Madhhab*, it is identical the stream of ideology and political Islam. *Madhhab* appears after the demise of prophet Muhammad exactly 150 years after the thriving of Islam. During this era the disciples of Muhammad created Islamic knowledge by interpreting the texts from the Quran and Hadits and transferring various knowledge such as philosophy and science on the dialogue with religious knowledge (Phillips, 2000, p. 60).

The next centuries the *madhhab* developed and spread rapidly, diversely, and experienced atomistic reaching 130 *madhhab*. Traditionally there are 8 official *madhhab* recognized by Muslim communities in the world; five *madhhab* from the Sunni consist of Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hambali and Zahiri, and three *madhhab* from Syiah consist of Ja'fari, Zaidi and Ibadi. In addition to that, there are three *madhhab* categorized as theology or knowledge of kalam derivative of Sunni and Shia. These three *madhhab* from Sunni consist of Mu'tazilah, Ash'ariyah, and Maturidiyah. Whereas from Shia consists of Imamiyyah, Ismailiyah dan Zaidiyah. And recently one *madhhab* emerged from Sunni named Jariri (Phillips, 2000, pp. 64–65). The dynasties of Islam who are incompatible with the Jariri *madhhab* executed them from Islamic discourses.

The same faith experienced by Zahiri *madhhab*, they were vanished by the Ottoman empire of Turkey who decided to assign four great *madhhab* namely Hanafi, Maliki, Syafi'i and Hambali as the state *madhhab*. Although having dark history due to its connection with the interest of authority, yet the development of *madhhab* in modern era keep thriving and has become part of Islamic identity. The Hanafi *madhhab* grows in Southern Asia such as India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Irak, Libanon, Suriah, Tunisia, Turki and Balkan. While Hambali *madhhab* has big followers in Africa (Egypt, Tunis, Al Jazair and Morocco). And Syafii *madhhab* thrives in Southeast Asia namely Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei.

*Madhhab* in the beginning was a set of thought and exegesis of Muslim leaders who worked to unfold the mystery and symbolic meaning of the holy text that contains sharia law, morality, sexuality, Islamic economy, pattern, and social interaction's guide; started experiencing consolidation in 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> century as dogmatic theology by each imam. Even in it' development *madhhab* experiences politization and power intervention by certain groups through positioning it as state *madhhab* with purpose to fortify political interest and authority (Abdo, 2017, pp. 3–4). In the other side, the followers of the *madhhab* are racing to gain recognition and legitimation from the empire and tries to place their representative in the parliament as *mufti* or *godi*. Related to this context, the *madhhab* is not purely used to ease the process of learning Islamic law, but also to withstand the seeds of rebellion towards authority from grassroot or political opponent. *Madhhab* eventually has significant role in Islamic country, it is the determinant of state religiosity and stability. Difference of *madhhab* in one nation can cause isolation, marginalization, discrimination and even a long conflict.

Therefore, *madhhab* is functioned as religious dogma believed generationally within oral or written tradition, *madhhab* has pivotal role as one of religious identity that is implemented by community, group, and individual daily. *Madhhab* is thriving and spreading all over the regions and countries as one of discourses and teaching in Islam. *Madhhab* is the third law source in Islam after the Quran and Hadith. In daily life reality, *madhhab* is considered more important than Quran and Hadith, even perceived as holy and the truth is forbidden to be criticized and challenged.

Each *Madhhab* group criticizes and demeans each other, however, defend their imam as if their teaching is the most authentic one and they are more intelligent than the imam from other *madhhab*. The subjectivity of each supporter in in *madhhab* is seen when the *mahzab* followers accentuate their imam's features based on their subjective evaluation on the quality of knowledge and social piety of

the imam. Imam Hanafi is described as a very honorable figure and had prominent position by the government. He was known as a skillful, creative, informative, religious and detail person. Whereas Maliki is pictured as a mundane, shallow, and strict figure who restrict himself as if they are the most obedient towards the prophet. Shafi'i is well known as a clever, patient, and cunning person, whilst Zahiri is known as arrogance, temperamental but good at his job. Hambali is depicted as an individual who loves to preach, give charity, and enjoy wealth and fam.

The conflict between *madhhab* is worsen when political element involves due to the greed to gain power over certain groups. *Madhhab* is often used for political interest and misused power to sacrifice other *madhhab* who refuse to support their interest. The symbol of *madhhab* was merely used to legitimize and protect their power from other groups. Submission, loyalty, and the piety of the *madhhab* followers who are anti critic and compliance are the condition created by authority to strengthen their order (Saifullah, Aksa, & Alfikri, 2020). The biggest conflict in history is the conflict between Sunni and Syi'ah that happened in some countries such as Irak, Iran, Yaman, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Syria. These conflicts killed many from both groups and experienced transformation into a long, laten conflict. It is guaranteed that wherever they are met the conflict will appear from both strongholds.

*Madhhab* as one of conflict and violence sources in Islam has pushed the pioneer of Tablighi to take a safe step to avoid conflict and war. Tablighi does not reach *madhhab* territory especially those with *furuiyah* character, talk, and discuss about it in their *dakwah*. The Tablighi leader understands that reaching the *furuiyah* territory in *madhhab* means facing other groups that is risky for conflict and social conflict between Muslim (Janson, 2014). The innovation built by the Tablighi is giving leeway for its followers to practice whichever *madhhab* they please personally with condition not to preach them. This is what the writer calls "The fluidity of madhhab, " which melts the process of *madhhab* praxis for all Tablighi members without any pressure.

With the concept of fluidity of *madhhab* namely melting and integrating the existing *madhhab* within one big energy focused on faith and deed. *Madhhab* fluidity is implicated to the release of Islam from the rigid, confining *madhhab* culture, even often cut good relation between Muslim community. *Madhhab* fluidity is important to do to minimalized conflict and tensions that appear because of the difference practice of *madhhab* culture that is potential to divide Muslim. The pattern of fluidity gives new colours that can work as mediator for the miscommunication and misperception between Islamic organization in local, regional, national, and international.

The fluidity of *madhhab* movement frees Muslim from the prison and the conflict of *madhhab* because it is prioritizing the freedom of choosing any *madhhab* that is suitable for their member (Hamdi, 2022). The Tablighi members are not required to follow certain *madhhab*, they are given freedom to practice each *madhhab* with the condition that it's forbidden for them to provoke or show their *madhhab* in front of other followers. Even each member should be able to adapt and follow and be united with local *madhhab* followed by Muslim community in which they convey their sermon.

The fluidity of *madhhab* practiced by Tablighi is not different from one place with the others. In Indonesia, from many mosques and community that we observed shows that the *madhhab* has never been serious issue for the Tablighi. In Pondok Pesantren Temboro, the biggest boarding school of the Tablighi with 15,000 students from all over the world, they live in peace and united. Besides students, the other Tablighi members also live in Temboro village with other missionaries. These followers intentionally move to Temboro to gain religious awakening and conducive environment to do their missionaries mission "*dakwah*". Some of them are leaving their job to devote their life for *dakwah*. They gather in the mosques without any contestation about *madhhab*. The talk is only about faith to God, the good deeds and *dakwah* practice. The same perspective also can be found in Masjid Jami, Kebon Jeruk, Jakarta, Masjid Raya Mataram and other Tablighi headquarters. The debate over *madhhab* almost never happened within those community. H. Ridwan, Tablighi member from East Lombok explains that the *madhhab* is not important to be contesting because it will cause conflict and disunity.

In Masjid Pujut, Pattani and Masjid Annur, Jala South Thailand where Muslims from other places visit every day show the harmony condition and peace in doing worship. The followers merely

come to do prayer, listening to preach and go out for *dakwah* at the same time strengthening Muslim friendship. Their talk is more about faith and sharing *dakwah* experiences. There is no discussion about *madhhab* discourse in their preach, moreover about the difference perspective of the Imam.

There is a finding different fact in Masjid Manabi'ul Ulum Penanti Malaysia, this is the first headquarter of the Tablighi who has experience of conflict due to the intersection with the local Islam there. Women who are active in the mosque are contested; it becomes serious problem because in Tablighi tradition women have their own worship place that should be separated from men. They are not able to visit the mosque anytime because the masjid is made as headquarters by the Tablighi, the live in the mosque. Women who come to the mosque for praying can no longer free when the Tablighi are complained of their presence. The headquarter then moved to other place because of the debate. This conflict portraits that there is an odd way of managing the difference of *madhhab* and the thriving local tradition of Islam. Some of the Tablighi members are not able to accommodate the difference developing religious traditions, even problematize the religious culture there.

## 5. Reconstruction of the Tablighi Jamaat's Religious Education in Southeast Asia

The Tablighi movement is a transnational religious movement which focus is not only in *dakwah* but also education (Barbara Daly Metcalf, 2002, p. 11). The number of members who join the *dakwah* mission of the Tablighi push the Tablighi activists to build special education institution for the young generation of the Tablighi. Before, the focus mission of the Tablighi is only on doing *dakwah*. It is *dakwah* over everything, meanwhile education for children is the private responsibility of the parents. But as the members of the Tablighi is growing wide and rapid, the committee of the Tablighi eventually decide to build an informal education institution. In every headquarters of the Tablighi there is informal school/madrasah as a learning place for the members (Nisa, 2014, p. 472). The data in the field shows the difference design of education institutions developed by the Tablighi and other religious institution, the Tablighi is more focus on memorizing the Quran or *tahfiz Al Quran* especially the Tablighi members in Southeast Asia. We argue that the education pattern constructed by the Tablighi only focuses on after-life. Which means the Tablighi don't look for profit on their education like other institutions, it is seen from the free *sekolah tahfiz* for their members. *Pondok Tahfiz* or memorizing Quran school is a new identity of Tablighi education using boarding school format that is usually located in their *dakwah* headquarters. *Sekolah Tahfiz* is implementing an overly simple curriculum. *Pondok Tahfiz* focuses on the program of memorizing the whole verses of the Quran from early age until teenager. They are not burdened with other subjects, only focus on memorizing the Quran. Every day they must memorize the Quran and recite them to their supervisors who come to their school. Each classis is supervised by an *ustad* who memorizes the whole Quran. They are paid humbly and asked to be sincere in teaching.

The trend that is developing this last decade is that the Tablighi family don't send their children to formal schools because the orientation of formal schools is only for earthly purpose, ignoring the hereafter. Formal schools for some Tablighi are only focus on secular orientation, and it is seen as inappropriate for children's education because it hinders the salvation for the next life. The common subjects are meaningless for the Tablighi because they will not save them from the hereafter, even can make their children go astray. For some Tablighi members only religious education can save human to the immortal bliss. Rudi for instance, he decides to quit his job in bank and move to live in Temboro with his family. He leaves his good, stable job with good salary to fulfill the Tablighi *dakwah* mission and live a simple life. His main reason to live in Temboro is for the sake of the good education for his children, there they can learn how to have good behavior, morality, and religion. Moreover, the religious and education environment of religious people in Temboro is his other significant reason. He is worried that if his children go to public school their association will be ruined and uncontrolled.

Ramli works in a private oil factory in Balikpapan also decides to build house in Temboro. He is active working in the oil factory in Balikpapan and buy a house in Tablighi environment in Temboro for his children and wife comfort. Hakim is a senior doctor, after joins the Tablighi he closes his

workplace because he no longer finds peace while doing his job as a physician. He has no interest on high salary, on the other hand he wants to live a simple life and his children are sent to boarding school in Temboro to memorize the Quran. H. Bukran is a member of Tablighi from West Nusa Tenggara, moves his children to the Tablighi Tahfiz school in Jakarta, He is surrender to Allah for the faith of his children including their future and their job.

Mostly, the Tablighi members are proud to be called "Abu Huffaz" or the father of Quran memorizer than as a father of a doctor. They believe that by memorizing the Quran will bring salvation for themselves, their children and their family in the afterlife as promised by God. They believe that the Quran can help them through the blessing "*syafaat*" of the prophet Muhammad. Most of them have no dream of having children working in important sectors such as bureaucrat, businessmen, doctor, etc. For them, having children as preacher in the path of God is enough. The students we interviewed in Ponpes Al-Fatah Temboro schools explained that after they finish their study, they will become a hafiz and build school and spread the *dakwah*. They have no worry for financial condition because they believe that God guarantees that for them. When asked about their life partner, they would hope that their spouse will be the alumni of the pondok for the same religious stream they have and the understanding of the prominent of *dakwah* mission so their family life would be easy. The pattern of Tablighi education system that is strict is inseparable with the exegesis of the rigid Tablighi teaching.

Shaikh Ilyas in the other hand never restricted children's education or differentiated between public education and religious education. We figure out that the mistakes of Tablighi interpretation is on the education. The worst of them is the interpretation that say Tablighi is only for *dakwah*, other than that is not necessary. For those who believe in this interpretation, they see that education is not an obligation and public schools are the product of the *kafir*. Hamdan is a member of Tablighi from Samarinda, he does not acknowledge important of knowledge other than *dakwah*. If the *dakwah* is practiced, then the other obligations for Muslims are abort. To be a preacher doesn't require a lot of knowledge because *dakwah* for the Tablighi is conveying religious message, not rhetoric or selling knowledge (Pieri, 2019). Kyai Lufi, the leader of Tablighi headquarter in Banjarmasin on his preach in Masjid Agung, Al-Mujahidin, Selong East Lombok states that waiting for more knowledge is not significant for Islamic *dakwah*, knowledge will come later.

Ponpes Al Fatah Temboro as one of the biggest Tablighi schools in Southeast Asia shows different pattern. The Tablighi here integrates with school system used by NU and implementing the same religious rituals, this is distinguished Tablighi school in Temboro with other Tablighi schools. From the interview and observation conducted in field it is seen that The Ponpes Al-Fatah manages to establish huge Tablighi school because they made it to unite and combine their things such as academic, *tarekah* and *dakwah*. Academic in this context means a formal religious education that is developed by Ponpes Al-Fatah including the study of *kitab kuning*. The members of Tablighi also learn *tarekah* developed by the founding father of the schools before the Tablighi came. Al-Fatah separates men and women students including the teachers. Women are obligated to use hijab and black face veil as daily clothe in the school and public. Whilst man students wear white *gamis* and white *kopiah* every day as school uniform (Nisa, 2014, p. 475).

The institution of education in Ponpes Al-Fatah Temboro has some education levels from kindergarten to high school. The *pondok tahfiz* is established special for Quran memorizer or *tahfiz* consists of children from age 5-16. They must memorize the Quran within 1-6 years. Besides that, the level of Daurah 1-2 is studying *hadis*, and *takhasus* is a continue program for learning *kitab kuning* such as *fiqh* and *tajwid*. Male students sleep in the mosque and their room only used for their clothes. Those who are not discipline and disobey the rules such as sleep late over 10 pm, they will get punishment namely standing under the sun at noon time. At the time of taking data, we found four children who were punished to stand under the sun from 09.00-12.00 because they slept late.

For them who are in formal school of Tsanawiyah and Aliyah the curriculum is modified. The insignificant subjects are removed and change with the subject of religion. The learning schedule is starting from 07.00, class break (taking nap) is on 10.00-12.00 until the time of afternoon prayer



"*zuhur*". They perform prayer together, while waiting for the imam to lead the prayer they recite the Quran and perform zikr. The interesting phenomenon is that four years ago the Ponpes Al-Fatah had prison for student '*santri*'. Students who broke the rules such as smoking cigarette and possessing a phone would get prison punishment. They were forced to live in the isolated room and their foot were chained just like criminals. They were arrested for a month and not allowed to go anywhere. But due to the protest over this rules, Kyai Ubaidillah, the leader of the *Ponpes* eventually ended the rule because it was considered inhuman. The prison of *santri* then officially closed and the punishment was changed in to act of service such as cleaning school toilet, moping the floor, etc.

Besides academic teaching, Ponpes Al-Fatah also teaches the *tarekah* of Naqsabandiyah Kholidiyah. This *tarekah* is open for public, whoever wants to clean themselves and learn tasawuf knowledge profoundly. Most of the Tablighi jamaah who are suggested to join the *tarekah* are taught by the Mursyid, Kyai Ubaidillah. For the daily prayer, Kyai Mahmud, the first founder of Ponpes created *hizib* well known *Hirzi*. After evening prayer "magrib" the *Hirzi* is read together with a loud voice. Together with the academic activities and *tarekah*, Ponpes Al-Fatah also practices *dakwah* as part of Tablighi. The *Dakwah* is important to strengthen the network of *pesantren* to all Indonesia and foreign countries. Ponpes Al Fatah send the students for *dakwah* as daily routine to other village known as "*khuruuj*" to convey the sermon at least a day or 24 hours. Al-Fatah also actively accepts the *muballigh* from other regions and countries to do *khuruuj* in the *ponpes* environment. The coming of the guests from other regions or countries not only beneficial for the mission of the *Ponpes* but also increase the income of local people.

We observed that with this integration Ponpes Al-Fatah is continually developed. Other Tablighi schools that do not embrace three aspects as well as Ponpes Al-Fatah in Temboro are not established well. Moreover, the support and acceptance from local people involved by the *pesantren* in establishment, internal and external activities are the key factor of the success of Ponpes Al Fatah. The *pesantren* don does not dominate the guests from outside, they are given freedom to stay in the *pesantren* environment by renting rooms from local people to help their economy increases. In addition to that the presence of the guests can be seen directly by the locals so the relation of both becomes mutual and beneficial. Most of local people we interviewed support the activities of *pesantren* Al-Fatah with the *dakwah* of Tablighi.

The religious education pattern in Thailand dan Malaysia is also the same with religious education pattern of Tablighi *Jamaah* in Indonesia. Based on the data in the field, started from Pattani to Kuala Lumpur, the headquarters of Tablighi are dominated by school of *tahfiz*. Even though there are some who combine academic with *tahfiz* but the numbers are not significant. In the region of Pujut, Pattani, Thailand there is an advance *tahfiz* school with number of students approximately 500 people. Before the number of *tahfiz* school increases in other parts, the *tahfiz* school in Pujut headquarter is the biggest with students from many countries. All students live in a boarding school in the mosque area and the learning hall is one with the mosque. On the right part of the mosque there is learning room facilitated with portable tables. They sit on the floor on the mat while reading the Quran. They come from many villages around Pattani and come to only concentrate to memorize the Quran. They don't study another knowledge but focus on memorizing the Quran.

Evenly they come to the *tahfiz* school "madrasah" because of their parents. Ahmad is one of the students who told us that he was pushed by his parents to go to *tahfiz* school in hope that he would be the Quran memorizer and teacher of Quran in the school his father established for him. When asked about his plan in the future, he answered that he wanted to be a preacher and built Islamic school when he graduated from his *tahfiz* school.

In the biggest headquarter of the Tablighi in Annur Yala, thousands of students learn in *tahfiz* school. They come from many regions, even from other countries like Malaysian and Indonesia. They only focus on the field of *tahfiz* without learning other subjects as apply in formal religious school. The education curriculum used is *tahfiz* curriculum, that is designed to accelerate the memorization of 30 juzz of the Quran. Whilst for other religious knowledges, the *dakwah* is considered enough to fulfill those. They listen to the preach from priests who sent to do *dakwah* there. The tradition of storytelling

is significant to color the Tablighi education system, listening carefully to the messages convey by the Kyai about the prophet and the disciples. Generally, they don't have reading *kitab kuning* tradition intellectually, on the other hand only focus on the *tahfiz*.

The finding in Malaysia shows that the education focus on *tahfiz* Quran as well. The Ponpes Manabi'ul Ulum Pinanti is the first Tablighi headquarter and the first *tahfiz* school. This school collaborates *tahfiz* and formal school. The same thing is seen in the biggest headquarter of Tablighi in Masjid Jamek Bandar Baru Seri Petaling Jaya, Kuala Lumpur. This mosque is completed with Thafizul Quran as well with a guest's room for *khuruj jamaah*. The atmosphere in this masjid is fresh and peaceful, the guests are not allowed to capture the mosque's area, in or out. This headquarter is crowded and all the guests who come to Malaysia usually spend the night first then sent to all part of the nation to do *dakwah*.

In Malaysia there are some Tablighi's headquarters equipped with school of Tahfiz Al Quran namely Masjid Jamek Bandar Baru Seri Petaling, Kuala Lumpur, Madrasah Miftahul Hidayah, Beseri, Perlis, Madrasah Hafiz Bukit Choras, Kota Sarang Semut, Alor Setar, Kedah, Madrasah Tahfiz Al-Quran, Sg. Petani, Kedah, Madrasah Tahfiz Al-Quran, Bukit Pinang, Jitra, Kedah, Madrasah Manabi'ul- Ulum, Penanti, Pulau Pinang, Masjid Benggali, Penang – Hari Khamis, Masjid Hanafi, Taiping, Perak, Masjid Abdul Karim, Selama, Perak, Madrasah Taman Pinji Perdana, Ipoh, Perak, Masjid Jamek Rahang, Seremban, Negeri Sembilan, Madrasah Al-Hidayah, Tenggera, Melaka, Madrasah Tahfiz Al-Quran, Batu Pahat, Johor, Madrasah Tahfiz Al-Quran, Sinaran Baru, Kempas, Johor, Masjid Ahmad Shah, Jerantut, Pahang, Masjid Mat Kilau, Jalan Gambang, Kuantan, Pahang, Madrasah Al-Quran, Kubang Bujuk, Kuala Terengganu, Terengganu, Masjid Pakistan, Besut, Terengganu, Madrasah Dusun Raja, Kota Bharu, Kelantan, Surau Darul Muttaqin, Kampung Semerah Padi Semariang, Petra Jaya, Sarawak, Masjid Daerah, Bintulu, Sarawak, Masjid An-Na'im, Lutong, Miri, Sarawak, Masjid Al-Qadim, Sibu, Sarawak, Masjid Besar, Limbang, Sarawak, Surau Perumahan Perbadanan Labuan, Bukit Kuda, Labuan, Masjid Hj. Akbar Khan, Kg. Bingkol, Beaufort, Sabah, Masjid Pekan Menggatal, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Madrasah Kg. Tanjung Batu Darat, Tawau, Sabah, dan Masjid Muroqabah, Kg. BDC, Sandakan, Sabah.

## 6. Peace Jihad and Conflict Resolution Facilitator

The Tablighi has significant role of Islamization in South Thailand especially in three parts namely Naratthiwat, Pattani dan Yala. The proselytization even reaches Bangkok, the capital city of Thailand in which the majority are Buddhists. The Tablighi has headquarter in Bangkok, it is in Masjid Aslam, Bangkok used as the center of *dakwah*. While in South Thailand, the Tablighi build huge headquarter around Masjid Annur Yala together with the *tahfiz* school that able to capacitate thousands of people. Other than Masjid Annur, Masjid Pujud is also a headquarter of the Tablighi in Pattani region. This mosque is famous because of its *tahfiz* school in which the students are from many countries. Islam in South Thailand cannot be separated from the History of Melayu Islam of Pattani that was colonialized by Siam, Thailand in 18<sup>th</sup> century. As for today, the Muslim empire of Melayu Pattani is powered by Thailand and has become part of the country so the existence of it is faded by the pressure and the eradication of kingdom by Thailand government (Horstmann, 2007, p. 120). The number of Muslim in Thailand are approximately 7 million people or 10% from the total people of Thailand. Most of them live in Southern Thailand namely Yala, Naratthiwat and Pattani with total number 80 %. Islam that is developing there are various, however the majority are Sunni Muslim (*Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah*). The affirmation and transmission of Islam done by proselytization and school lead by a 'Babo', initial for religious figure in South Thailand. Babo usually has *pesantren* and responsible as preacher like Kyai in Java or Tuan Guru in Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara Indonesia.

Most of the Babo get their education in Mecca particularly in Madrasah as-Saulatiyah established by the ulama from India. This madrasah is the only school of *Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah* in Mecca in which its existence is being watch by the government of Saudi Arabia who follow the *madhhab* of *sunni-wahabi*. After finishing their study in Mecca, commonly they build madrasah and boarding

school in South Thailand. Some Madrasah is integrated with formal schools, and some are pure Islamic boarding schools. Through this madrasah/ schools the spread of Islam is started, and all the alumni build new madrasah/schools in South Thailand. The presence of the Tablighi since 1980s has given new colors to strengthen Islam position in Thailand because of the sustainable *dakwah*. Although the focus is in the internal of Muslim, the Tablighi *dakwah* in fact give big influences on the spread of Islam outside the Muslim community such as the majority people of Buddhist in Thailand. Many Buddhists who are interested to Islam then eventually convert including some of the bikhu after listening to the Tablighi *dakwah*. From the data gained when conducting interview with Muslim, the Bikhu who is converted to Islam has gained the *hidayah* after experiencing inability to sleep at night after listening to the *dakwah* of the Tablighi's imam. God has given him *hidayah* and led him to do *syahadah* in the headquarter.

The thriving of Tablighi is massive in South Thailand and has become the pioneer of Islamic spread since 1980s (Braam, 2006; Horstmann, 2007). They keep fighting for *dakwah* to all part of Thailand involving preachers from many countries. The interesting phenomenon on the field that the Tablighi is more accepted by Thai government after the rebellion of Muslim independency in Pattani, Thailand, they demanded to separation from and freedom from Thailand. The conflict in Patani has appeared since 1948 but getting stronger and explode to war in 2001 followed by violence action such as killing and bombing. Since the rebellion and Muslim separatist movement in 2001, there are around 3000 victims of civilian and hundreds of militaries including the Buddhist. The Muslim targeted not only the armies, the also targeting the Buddhist civilians who are considered being influenced by government policy.

The critical question is why do the Tablighi is more accepted by Thailand government compared to other Muslim community? Tablighi is a pure transnational Islam movement untouched by politic, they even forbid their members to involve in any political agenda because it can destroy their faith and cause conflict. Amid the complicated political situation between Pattani rebellion who pro for the independency and the government preserving Pattani as part of Thailand Kingdom, Tablighi comes as a neutral part between groups in conflict which are Muslim and government. The presence of the third part as mediator in the process of reconciliation according to Bloomfield and friends (2006) is prominent and will ease the communication between two parties who are in conflict. Reconciliation in practice emphasizes on the peaceful life and cooperation between two groups who are in conflict. Thailand's government itself has established military camp in the villages and monitored every movement of people and schools '*madrasah*' suspected as militia basis. The government also tries to transmigrate Buddhist to the center area of Muslim in Pattani so that the blending and integration of culture happen. Yet the government allows the *dakwah* movement of the Tablighi because of their inaction towards politic.

If the Tablighi *jamaah* is asked whether they support the independence of people of Patani or not, most of them are silenced and state that they only follow what the best for people. They agree for independence and dependence, the most important thing is the *dakwah* must go on whatever the political conditions and the thriving issues in the regions. That is the main mission and voice of the Tablighi, *dakwah* is more important than political independence issued by Pattani Muslim. What've done by the Tablighi in Pattani is repeating the history that happened in India when the figures of Tablighi refused to involve in independence political movement violently to fight the British colonial. Back then, the Tablighi was attacked by other Muslim militant and claimed them as colonial's minions. The dynamic in Thailand a little bit different because not all Muslim Pattani willing freedom.

Based on some of our interview results with people of Pattani, it is found that most of them want to be independent from Thailand especially those who live in village area. They keep fighting for their right and trying to bring back their history as an independent Muslim empire. They feel that they are not part of Thailand because their position is still under colonialism since King of Siam took over. Meanwhile urban people become more open with the option of unity with Thailand because they enjoy the facilities provides by the government including for scholarships for students. One

Muslim student stated that she refused to see Pattani separated from Thailand rather hoping united with the government. The same perspective from Buddhist who want Thailand and Pattani united, for them both can teach each other culture, Islamic culture, and Bahasa Melayu for example.

Another interesting data is that the Tablighi positioned themselves as facilitator when the political violence appeared due to the conflict. Muslims who were arrested by government because of violence cases and separatist saved by the Tablighi with assurance that there will be no more violence. Only the Tablighi can assure these Muslims prisoner to be freed from the prison because they are trusted by the government, then they are cleaned and taught as Tablighi *jamaah*. When they become Tablighi *jamaah*, there is only small possibility that they will back doing violence and involve to politic because the Tablighi do not allow such things on its teaching. The critical question is will there be any possibility that the Tablighi and Thailand government work together to stop separatist movement? Detached from those possibilities, the Tablighi is in neutral position and decrease the endless conflict between civilian and the government.

The Tablighi struggle is not merely in political era, but also in religion and spiritual which focus is on Muslim community. The principle of apolitical has been part of religious culture of the Tablighi that can be violated. We never stated that all Tablighi *jamaah* in South Thailand do not act for Pattani independence because from some of the interview with the family of the Tablighi we found that there are some Tablighi *Jamaah* join the militant to fight government for independency. He said that his father is Tablighi member, and he was active on *dakwah* yet now not anymore.

The misunderstanding about the Tablighi movement existence has created negative image in society. Most of the Tablighi is equated with the Wahabi even seen as part of global terrorist networking. Contrarily with the real prominent principle of the Tablighi not to discuss and touch anything related to politic both within and outside the nation. Here is the power of the Tablighi, refusing to involve in politics and power make them accepted everywhere by society and government. Even in Israel with majority are affiliated to Jew give positive respond to the presence of the Tablighi and let them thrive in Muslim community there. Based on one of our informants, when they enter Israel there was no hard process, they just needed to explain six of their characteristics to be recognized as the Tablighi group by Israeli military. Therefore, they are permitted to enter Israel even though generally it is hard to enter the strict security policy of Israel.

The increase of radicalism and terrorism movement in Indonesia since the case of Bali Bomb 1 and 2 and some bombing cases in Jakarta effecting the identity of the Tablighi that is claimed as part of terrorist group. The Tablighi is suspected everywhere as a group that involves with terrorism because they do *dakwah* wearing the same dress as the terrorists who wear *gamis* and beard. Is it true that the Tablighi involves with the terrorist's networking in the level of local Indonesia, Southeast Asia and global? This suspicion appears not only in Indonesia but also the world.

From some research conducted previously about the Tablighi in America and Europe show that the Tablighi *dakwah* movement is believed to be involved in some terrorism act. Contrary with the prejudice and suspicious given to the Tablighi related to their involvement on terrorism in the eyes of the world, we don't see any implication of the Tablighi *jamaah* in Indonesia involve with radicalism and global terrorism. In the filed whether it is in Lombok or Jakarta, I have never heard the Tablighi talk about politics, even more terrorism and radicalism. The members I that I interview don't understand and care about the political movement of the radical and terrorist internationally. They only talk about faith and benefaction following the character of Muhammad and his comrades.

The ulama reciprocally convey the "*bayan*" without mention any political issues and power. They talk more about the faith of Muslim who is getting weak in practicing the shariah. There are no discourses of hate towards other groups, anti-western, anti-secularism, anti-Jews, anti-Christian, and anti-freedom in which all this time campaigned by radical groups. Utad Lutfi from Banjarmasin for instance, when he preached in East Lombok, he didn't mention anything about political issue, insult other religion or spread hate. He focused on the practice of *dakwah* that must be done by Muslim no matter what. Ustad Lutfi mentioned that *dakwah* doesn't require people to search for knowledge to

start practice it, even with little knowledge if it can be implemented. So, there is no political discourses at all including global politic such as terrorism and radicalism.

In the other headquarters that we observed including in Kebun Jeruk and Temboro, we don't find any preach about radicalism and terror. Masjid Kebun Jeruk Jakarta and Ponpes Temboro are the epicentrum of Tablighi headquarters in Indonesia. Masjid Jamik Kebun Jeruk is a transit place for the Tablighi *jamaah* from many countries, they are given chances to share their knowledge and deed in *bayan* and *taklim*. From the sermon of the ustad and syaikh from other countries I have never heard any message about politics, including political Islam and the establishment of Khilafah Islamiyah nation.

It is seen that the *jamaah* is consistent enough with the teaching of the Tablighi that forbids any discussion about politics and gossiping other people. Is asked their point of view about violence and conflict in Islamic countries such as Palestine, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, most of them answer that what happen there is their fault as Muslim due to the weakness of their faith. According to the Tablighi *jamaah*, there will be no strong nation if the faith and deed of Muslims are weak, they don't practice prayer daily and care about Islamic *dakwah*. For them it is important to fix the faith, particularly the faith of Islam, this is the key to be a winner. The Tablighi principle is not to blame other people or another group for what happened to us. Sharing personal problem including financial conditions to other people is forbidden, moreover asking them to help.

Tablighi refuses to use violence in struggling, vice versa taking peaceful path. Jihad khuruj fi sabilillah is not a war but striving to go out on the path of God to spread *dakwah* about religion. According to the Tablighi, the *dakwah* gives rewards as big as doing jihad physically. The Tablighi *dakwah* brings high affection mission and kinship for Muslim family. Accordingly, from the data above, it is concluded that there is no indication of the involvement of the Tablighi in Indonesia with terrorism networking in local and national area. The Tablighi *jamaah* in Lombok, Samarinda and Jakarta are the victim of prejudice because of the image given to them by the media lead people to judge them so. The case of Bali Bombing 1 and 2 and some suicide bomb attacks in Jakarta and West java give big impact towards the safety and existence of the Tablighi members. The image of terrorist with beard and *jubah* that is similar with the Tablighi creates opinion that the Tablighi is part of terrorism.

This generalization appears in society due to the trauma and afraid of other suicide bomb attack will happen again. Based on the experiences of some Tablighi members, they are not allowed to go abroad in the time of *khuruj dakwah*. Their passports are detained by the immigration office and not allowed to continue their flight from Malaysia. Some youth in some places in East Java attack them while yelled them as terrorist when they do their *dakwah* in the mosque there. The Tablighi who avoid conflict decide to retreat from the masjid. Some of the Tablighi was arrested in Bali when they do their *dakwah*, Theye were taken to the police office in one region in Bali, because there was no proof of their involvement in terrorism acts eventually, they were released.

## 7. Conclusion

The Tablighi apply the fluidity of *madhhab* pattern in their religious practice in which all members are given freedom to practice their own *madhhab* without influencing other members. The Tablighi even emphasize that the local *madhhab* must be followed during *dakwah*. There is no provision for members to follow certain *madhhab* in Tablighi, all *madhhab* are accommodated as long as the members are believer. The fluidity of *madhhab* is Tablighi's way to accommodate the Tablighi members who come from diverse background. This pattern is beneficial for the Tablighi in one hand, yet weakness in another. The fluidity of *madhhab* prevents the Tablighi from the latent inter-*madhhab* conflict of Muslim. Almost all Islamic Organization bound in conflict with other *madhhab* including the war of Sunni and Shiah.

The fluidity of *madhhab* also brings positive aura for the Tablighi religious culture. The hatred and enmity caused by *madhhab* differences do not appear on their members, with such acceptance of diversity, the Tablighi members are respecting, loving, and completing each other. The Tablighi play

the role as an umbrella for Islamic organizations and neutralize the conflict that all this time haunted Muslim. However, the problem face by the Tablighi with this pattern is that their less understanding about the discourse of *madhhab*. The spirit of Islam feels fade away because one of the knowledge sources of Islam is through *madhhab*. Understanding *madhhab* is the same as understanding the syariah of Islam because the interpretations of the texts are elaborated in the perspective of the imams which are modified in *madhhab*. So, not developing the discourse of *madhhab* makes the Tablighi has no power on the discourse on Islamic knowledge.

The religious education pattern of the Tablighi is more oriented to the hereafter than the earthly matter. Even though each school *pesantren* or Tablighi education institution have different curriculum, however generally religious education in the Tablighi environment focus on the informal education of *tahfiz* Al Quran. The thriving trend within the Tablighi community is that they are no longer send their children to public formal schools, the informal *tahfiz* school is enough. The members are proud to be called the father of a hafiz than called as a father of a doctor or engineer. The Tablighi schools we visited in southeast Asia including Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are mostly developing *tahfiz* schools. Most of the students in the *pesantren* want to be hafiz, preacher and *pesantren* establisher in their own house. They have no interest in other professions.

The Tablighi *dakwah* movement is far from radicalism, especially the Tablighi groups in Southeast Asia including Indonesia. The Tablighi *jamaah* accentuate peaceful path in their *dakwah* and resistance towards any attacks from other groups. There is no record of the complicity of Tablighi *jamaah* with terrorism and radicalism case in Indonesia. As well as in Malaysia and Thailand, especially in Thailand they have positive role as moderate groups to be facilitators of conflict mediation between Muslim Pattani and Thailand government. The Tablighi *jamaah* are given trust by the government to disenchant the separatist Muslim of Pattani and guarantee their freedom from government detention due to their attack on the military. They are suggested to join the Tablighi, their faith is strengthened for them to practice *dakwah* rather than involve in political agenda. The Tablighi is in the neutral position related to the struggle of separatist Pattani Muslim, they refuse to support them directly but also do not stop them to do the jihad.

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