

## Contained-Opposition, Opposition Movements in Indonesia: A Case Study of ICMI

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### Introduction

Many inquiries have been made about the existence of *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI* – phonetically: *Each Me* – Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), notably after Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie resigned from the presidency, and 'Gus Dur' (a nickname of Abdurrahman Wahid) was elected as the new president of Indonesia (the fourth president) for the period 1999-2004. In the Soeharto era, under the so-called *Orde Baru (Orba, New Order)* regime, B.J. Habibie (at the time Minister of Research and Technology, and later the third president after Soeharto) was appointed first head of ICMI. The leading opposition figure to ICMI at the time was Gus Dur. So what has ICMI done to Gus Dur and likewise, what has Gus Dur done to it now that he is the president? What changes have taken place?

This inquiry is one of many which have been presented. ICMI has drawn the attention of various people, intellectuals and lay-people, from the period of its appearance to the present time. From 1 December 1990 until April 1991 no less than 234 news-articles were presented in 27 newspapers and magazines. This does not represent the entire news industry in Indonesia, but at least embraces the major ones such as *Jawa Post, Surabaya Post, Surya, Suara Indonesia* (East Java), *Suara Merdeka* (Middle Java), *Kedaulatan Rakyat, Berita Nasional* (Yogyakarta), *Fajar* (Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi), *Bali Post* (Bali), *Pikiran Rakyat* (Bandung, West Java), *Pelita, Kompas, Suara*

*Pembaharuan, Neraca, Media Indonesia, Berita Buana, Jayakarta Pos, Indonesia Times, Indonesia Observer, Suara Karya, Pos Kota, Jayakarta, Bisnis Indonesia, Jakarta Post (Jakarta)*, weekly magazines in Jakarta (*Panji Masyarakat, Tempo, Prospek, Editor*), and one newsagent *Antara*. Therefore, one cannot refute that out of many subjects presented by the mass-media, ICMI has attracted the Indonesian people's attention.<sup>1</sup>

It goes without saying that ICMI has been a phenomenon of *Indonesian Islam* (or *Islam in Indonesia*) not only in terms of religious movements, but also social movements. It comprises both: social in terms of Muslim intellectuals (individuals or groups), and religious in terms of ideology (Islam). Nevertheless, there might be difficulties in interpreting social or religious movements from the western conceptual foci. Unlike its neighbors, i.e. western countries, Indonesia has grown up with its own characteristics and dialectics. Western theories in respect to social movements (SMs) in this context are convinced that SMOs (social movement organizations) are a mass society approach, which emerged *vis a vis* authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. Grievances and deprivation are the key words regarding SMOs emergence. Western scholars and theorists will discern SMOs as being totally separate and different from the government.<sup>2</sup> This picture will be entirely contradicted when we examine ICMI and its activities. Indeed, currently we have found a new theory of social movements, particularly an article written by Katzenstein<sup>3</sup> demonstrating that current issues in SMO theory have expanded. Through her surveys we encounter some SMOs within definite institutions. However, her evidence still does not delineate state or government originated SMOs, which were habitual in Soeharto's *Orba* (New Order).<sup>4</sup>

In addition, ICMI cannot be claimed as exclusively a SMO since it considers another aspect, i.e. Islam, to be a foundation of its ideology, activities and movements. It also cannot be seen as a completely religious movement for it has arisen in terms of the nation as a whole, i.e. Indonesia, where many ethnic groups and religious people live. For that reason ICMI has to be witnessed as a socio-religious movement, and we shall elucidate more below.

ICMI was seen as an organization to be used by the government to establish Soeharto's regime. Simultaneously there were individuals who used this opportunity as a political-vehicle. However, there were also people who saw ICMI to be an excellent solution for Indonesian Muslims to bridge the gap between the Muslim populace and the *umara'* (rulers), because the New Order was recognized as being oppressive towards the Islamic community. In the New-Order, which was repressive and powerful, a phenomenon like ICMI

was the only opposition which could be created, in spite of not being a true opposition group, which was forbidden in Soeharto's era.

ICMI accommodates diverse Islamic schools, such as traditionalist, modernist, neo-modernist and others. It also incorporates different disciplines like technology and the social sciences. As such, ICMI has presented itself as a place for every Muslim. However, in practice, ICMI seemed to be dominated by Habibie's link to individuals who are occupied in technology, which is the field in which Habibie was educated. Hence, there are tensions among its members.

In the light of this narrative, first this paper will examine ICMI as an organization in favor of the regime, which, on the other hand was hoped would be an opposition or pressure group. Facing this problem it develops a concept of *loyal-opposition*, working as it does in a contained space. Second, I will look at its ideology and political orientation and its role in relation to these. Third, ICMI's position as an organization or network of various interest groups will be discussed.

### Establishing ICMI

The idea to establish ICMI was initiated by several undergraduate students at the Technology Department of Universitas Brawijaya, Malang, Jawa Timur (East Java). Five of them were Erik Salman, Muhammad Iqbal, Ali Mudzakir, Mohammad Zaenuri and Awang Surya, who made efforts to actualize the plan until it becoming reality. They were activists at the *Unit Aktivitas Kerohanian Islam Mesjid Raden Fatah* (Islamic Spiritual Activity Unit of the Mosque Raden Fatah) of the University.<sup>5</sup> However, their original intention was first to create a national symposium that could bring together Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. This symposium was intended as *silaturahmi cendekiawan*.<sup>6</sup> Previously, the symposium would be conducted on 29 September–1 October 1990, with the theme "*Sumbangsih Cendekiawan Muslim Menuju Era Tinggal Landas*" (Muslim Intellectuals' Contributions Heading for the "Taking-Off" Era). According to Erik Salman, at the beginning of November 1989 several young students were concerned that numerous Muslim leaders and scholars did not have convenient space to communicate with each other in order to create worthy and positive contributions to build the *Indonesian nation* and the nation-state. In his view, Muslim intellectuals were individual fighters, struggling and fighting without coordination. Later on, to realize their agenda they went to meet some intellectuals in several cities such as Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Malang, Surabaya, Bogor and Bandung. In Jakarta they met some leading

Muslim figures: Imaduddin Abdulrachim, M. Dawam Rahardjo and Syafii Anwar, who suggested the students ascertain Habibie's willingness to be a head. Only through a memo from ex-Minister of Religious Affairs, H. Alamsjah Ratuperwiranegara, could the students meet with Habibie. However, Habibie could not grant such a request until he asked for Soeharto's acquiescence, since he at the time was a minister who was an assistant to the president. On 27 September 1990 Habibie stated that Soeharto would allow him to be the chief, and he proposed that the symposium should be directed on 6-8 December 1990, when Soeharto would open and the vice president, Sudharmono, close. The theme of the symposium was altered becoming "*Simposium Nasional Cendekiawan Muslim: Membangun Masyarakat Abad XXI*" (National Symposium of Muslim Intellectuals: To Build Civil Society of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century).<sup>7</sup>

One should note here, Habibie asked the students to get support from Muslim intellectuals in the form of their signatures. After proceeding to several cities they collected 49 Muslim intellectuals' signatures<sup>8</sup> endorsing Habibie as the head. This was followed by meetings at Habibie's office and *operation room* at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, attended by several prominent figures. The meetings resulted in some decisions connecting appointing the organizing committee, preparing drafts and concepts of articles of association, master budget and financial estimation.<sup>9</sup> And when the 'Day' came, 6<sup>th</sup> December 1990, about 500 people<sup>10</sup> from diverse factions and levels (intellectuals, businessmen, military, bureaucrats, and middle-class individuals) attended the meeting, and about 115 indigenous and foreign journalists covered the conference. Soeharto struck a *bedug* (a large mosque drum) to call the opening ceremony of the first meeting of ICMI.<sup>11</sup> On 7<sup>th</sup> December 1990 (Friday, 20 Jumad al-Awwal 1411 H.), at 8: 15pm (20:15), ICMI was justified. The situation was described as moving, enchanting and gripping. With the continuous *bedug's* voice and the thunder of *takbîr* (an act of reciting and chanting religious verses repeatedly in praising God), much of the audience wept.<sup>12</sup> And Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie was elected in only three minutes through acclamation. At his first speech, after being chosen the chief, Habibie stated,

Saya ini bukan kiyai, bukan pula manusia ahli agama. Pertama, saya hanya manusia biasa yang beragama Islam dan melaksanakan ajaran Islam secara sungguh-sungguh, tidak berbeda dengan yang lain. Kedua, saya hanya seorang insinyur yang bisa membuat kapal terbang dan memimpin pembangunan dengan memanfaatkan ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi, malah kalau perlu mendobrak sesuatu. Tetapi saya sadari bahwa di belakang ilmu pengetahuan, manusia harus mempunyai iman. Dalam hal ini saya berusaha akan menjadi manusia demikian itu. Jadi konsekuensinya, kalau saudara-saudara para cendekiawan mengharapkan

bahwa yang memimpin ICMI itu mempunyai tugas pemimpin bangsa atau umatnya, (atau) supaya Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) dan pesantren-pesantren semua menjadi juara nasional atau internasional dalam Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur'an (MTQ), saya bukanlah orangnya. Silakan memilih yang lain, saya tidak mau dan tidak sanggup. Tetapi bukan berarti saya tidak akan membantu. Saya akan membantu, tetapi kekuatan saya tidak di bidang itu. Sebaliknya, kalau saya diminta untuk membina, memimpin cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia untuk membina umat menjadi lebih pintar dan mandiri menguasai Iptek, sehingga bisa menentukan nasibnya dan masa depannya sendiri, menguasai ilmu pengetahuan dalam arti yang luas untuk pembangunan, maka insya Allah, dengan doa restu para kiyai dan para santri, seluruh cendekiawan Indonesia saya pimpin secara sistematis bergerak memerangi kebodohan dan kemiskinan".<sup>13</sup>

*(I am neither an Islamic scholar nor an expert in religious studies. First, I am just a layman who is Muslim and practices earnestly the Islamic teachings, no different from any other. Second, I am only an engineer who is able to create aircraft and directs national development through utilizing science and technology, even when necessary, to batter down the scientific tradition. However, I am fully aware that behind the knowledge, human beings should have a belief, a faith. In this respect I will work hard to be such a man. Consequently, supposing you, dear intellectuals, expect that who directs this ICMI is also having task to lead the nation and their ummah (Islamic people), or who makes IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies) and Islamic boarding schools to be a champion nationally or internationally in MTQ (competition of Qur'anic reciting), I am not the right person. I do not want to and cannot do that. Please choose another one. But this does not mean that I will not assist you. I will. Unfortunately my strength is not in such fields. Conversely, supposing I am asked to improve, direct Muslim intellectuals all over Indonesia towards reforming ummah to be smarter and more independent in mastering science and technology, so they can decide their own fates and future; to master science and technology for wide purposes i.e. for national development, thence insha'a Allah (God willing) and with Islamic Scholars' and students' prayers, I shall systematically direct all Indonesia Muslim intellectuals in the purposes of battling against illiteracy and poverty.*

His opinion about IAIN and pesantren, which are understood as institutions dealing with MTQ rather than Islamic thought and the intellectual community, became a great deal for his future leadership of ICMI. In this respect, Habibie never appreciated that pesantren and IAIN could confer another color and paradigm of Islam within ICMI, therefore he dealt more with the "unexpected" Islamic perspective and opponents, as will be discussed later.

With the opportunity, when he was interviewed, Habibie continued his ideas,

*ICMI bisa jadi katalis, atau magnet yang mengarahkan aliran untuk sedapat mungkin, seefisien dan seirama mungkin membantu tercapainya cita-cita bangsa ini dalam waktu sesingkat-singkatnya. Tentunya hal itu harus dilakukan dengan tidak ada henti.... Karena itu saya katakan ini suatu long march. Tidak untuk suatu peperangan militer, tapi fighting against poverty dan kebodohan, untuk seluruh bangsa tak ada kecuali, dengan umat Islam di garis depan....<sup>14</sup>*

(ICMI can be a catalyst, or magnet which directs as well, efficiently, harmoniously as possible, an energy which helps the nation to achieve its goals as fast as possible. This, of course, should be done without ending...As such I said this is a long march; not for a battle in terms of the military, but fighting against poverty and ignorance, for all the Indonesian populace without exception, with Muslim people in the front-line....).

He was right when alluding ICMI to be fruitful for the Indonesian nation, and Muslims, as a majority in the country, have to be a pioneer in the national building. However, his limited comprehension towards Islamic thought dialectics inside the country finally put him in a crucial position, as seen from the survival of ICMI today, in which ICMI has difficulties in front of the new government i.e. Gus Dur's era.

### Muslim Intellectual Organizations before ICMI and Indonesian Islamic History

As told before, ICMI is not the first project for Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. A project to invent an organization of Muslim intellectuals was long awaited. It commenced in the first half of the 1960s, in 1964, by HMI alumni,<sup>15</sup> who created *Persami* (*Persatuan Sarjana Muslim Indonesia*, Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars).<sup>16</sup> About 100 Muslim scholars established *Persami* headed by Soebchan Z.E., affiliated to the *NU* (*Nahdlatul Ulama*, Revival of Islamic scholars), a religious organization headed by Gus Dur from 1984-2000. The organization was formalized at Soebchan's villa, in Megamendung, Bogor. It was declared as "*anak semua partai*" (child of all Islamic political-parties), rather than an *underbow* of a specific party. Unfortunately, after three years it collapsed. In 1967, it divided into two factions because of competition between HMI and *PMII* (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*, Association of Indonesian Islamic students) which is *underbow* of *NU*. This happened because Soebchan was not considered appropriate anymore to be the leader. After that *PMII* established another organization called *ISII* (*Ikatan Sarjana Islam Indonesia*, Association of Indonesian Islamic Scholars) still with Soebchan as the head. Alas, in 1970 Soebchan died on his journey to Makkah, to do pilgrimage (*hajj*). *ISII* was buried with the late Soebchan. In 1974, when the government divided political-parties into three groups (PPP, Golkar, PDI), *Persami* was paralyzed and its members (about 400 people) disappointed. And finally it was also buried when the government Orba regulated through the President's Regulation No. 8/1985 that every organization should reregister its name with the government.<sup>17</sup>

In the early '80s there emerged numerous proposals to build such an association, but senior Muslim figures such as Mohammad Natsir,

Anwar Harjono and their affiliated colleagues did not see a strong probability of success, or the opportunity to assemble at that time. Instead, they suggested building organization locally. So *Cendekiawan Muslim Al-Falah* appeared in East Java; *Yayasan Shalahuddin* in Yogyakarta, *Forum Silaturrahmi Ulama dan Cendekiawan Muslim Jawa Barat* in West Java; *Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah* in Jakarta. In 1984, the first symposium of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals was governed in Jakarta by some institutions such as LSAF, UIA, UIIK and LP3ES,<sup>18</sup> and unfortunately the results and proceedings were only reported to MUI businesses. In 1987 the second symposium was directed, but thence just resulted in the *Forum Komunikasi Pembangunan Indonesia (FKPI, Communication Forum for Indonesian Development)*. The obstacles to such efforts was caused by the *Orba* rulers, who were suspicious of every single Muslims' endeavor to have activities dealing with an *Islamic* perspective.<sup>19</sup>

It is also important to highlight direct lines between these groups and ICMI. It was Imaduddin Abdurachim (whose nickname is *Bang Imad*) who had an influential role in establishing ICMI. As asserted by Bang Imad himself, after finishing his Ph.D. in the United States in September 1986, he found that Indonesian Ph.D. scholars still did not communicate each other even though there were many of them. As a result, the Indonesian situation at the time remained the same as if there were no Ph.D. scholars, for they often misunderstood and were cruel to each other. For that reason Bang Imad wanted to continue the concept initiated by the Persami and invited around 50 people to meet in Kota Gede, Yogyakarta, and build an ICMI as an organization. Among the invitees were Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur, a guest lecturer and professor at IIS/Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University in 1991-92), Gus Dur (now president of Indonesia 1999-2004), Amien Rais (now head of Consultative Assembly), Syafii Maarif (another guest professor at IIS in 1993) and others coming from various regions of Indonesia. However, only 39 people could attend the meeting; Gus Dur could not attend because he was sick and apologized to Bang Imad, but he supported and agreed with the proposal to found ICMI. The meeting started on Saturday evening, and everybody was determined to accept the proposal. Unfortunately, on Sunday morning, after having breakfast, four policemen came and asked them to refrain from meeting which, the police claimed, did not have a permit.<sup>20</sup>

With a hard feeling, Bang Imad and his junior acquaintances dispersed, but were still determined to continue such a project in the future. Following this, Bang Imad motionlessly kept in his mind the project, while analyzing the ever changing situations. He was an

initiator and supporter of every effort to build an organization of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, until finally he met the five graduate students of Brawijaya University, who succeeded in bringing Habibie to be head of ICMI. *Bagaikan bunga dengan tangkainya* (an Indonesian figurative expression that means "like a flower and its stalk"), the *rendezvous* between Bang Imad and the students resulted in the dream becoming reality. This became *gayung bersambut* (the wish is granted) for Bang Imad. However, he disguised himself and backed the students work because he realized that he was *persona non-grata* in front of the ruler's eyes.<sup>21</sup> And because of ICMI later Bang Imad was accepted by the rulers.

Based on historical writings one admits that tensions between state and Islam were heated since the colonial era, and the appearance of ICMI was recognized as an end of such tensions. To review briefly the heated strain between Islam and state, below is a condensed summary quoted in order to perceive Indonesian nuances at a glance.

During the colonialist era, the Dutch government restricted Muslims' activities even in going for h}ajj. VOC (*Verenigene Oostindische Compagnie*, Dutch East Indie Company), a trading company that held a monopoly in Indonesia (called *Hindia Belanda*, East Indie) 1607-1799, supported the government's decision by propagating and aiding Christianization.<sup>22</sup> This was aimed to limit Muslim movements in every matter. Correspondingly, the governor of *Hindia Belanda* at that time, Idenburg, stated,

*As a Christian nation the Netherlands have a duty to improve the condition of the native Christians in the archipelago, to give Christian missionary activity more aid, and to inform the entire administration that the Netherlands have moral obligations to fulfill as regards the population of those regions.*<sup>23</sup>

At the time Snouck Hurgronje became an advisor to the governor and headed an institution called *Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche zaken* (Office for Indigineous People's Affairs). Muslim's activities were allowed for ritual-ceremonial manners such as going to the mosques, doing prayers. They could not establish organizations or parties. Every expression connected to Political-Islamic<sup>24</sup> would be banned and the activists were jailed without justice.<sup>25</sup>

In the Japanese occupation 1942-1945, Indonesian Muslims achieved considerable benefits from political activities. The Japanese government supported the establishment of Masyumi (*Majlis A'la Syura Muslimin Indonesia*, High Council of Indonesian Muslims' Consultative) which gathered all components of Muslims' power inside one organization. They also received a military training at the hands of the Japanese army. However, this Japanese kindness was caused by several conditions: 1) it could not utilize skilled indi-

viduals who were trained by the Dutch when they did not see any prospects from the new rulers i.e. Japanese. In other words, the Dutch-trained Indonesians still did not get assurance from Japanese activity and training. 2) a different religious inclination between the Dutch-trained (Christian) and the Japanese (Shintoist) suggested the former to be higher than the later. 3) The trained and skilled individuals were limited in numbers, while the Japanese government needed many people, and only Muslims could be used to fulfill its requirements. 4) The Japanese realized that the most important element in Indonesia was Muslims.<sup>26</sup> Although this is the first time Indonesian Islam was seen as a promising factor, it was still targeted for colonialism. So that Indonesian Islam again could not expect many things from such a situation.

The dispute over the state ideology was the biggest problem in the era of Soekarno (the first president of Indonesia), the so-called *Orde Lama* (*Orla*, Old Order), and was prolonged in the *Orba* of Soeharto (the second president). The dispute centered on whether the state ideology should be Islam or Pancasila?<sup>27</sup> On 7<sup>th</sup> December 1944 the *Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (Committee for Preparing the Task of Indonesian Liberation) was founded, and it succeeded in formulating the political document *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter), which later on became the *Pembukaan Undang-Undang Dasar 45* (Preamble of the Constitution 45). The Jakarta Charter included four paragraphs containing the words "with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law", which became famous as *tujuh kata* (the seven words). These seven words, in time, triggered considerable disputes since many Muslims believed that these seven words gave them the legitimacy to establish an Islamic state based on Islamic law. Thus, they were surprised and angered when the seven words did not appear on the final draft of the Preamble of the Constitution.<sup>28</sup>

To clarify the issues concerning the state ideology, *Majelis Konstituante* (Constituent Assembly) was established. Its task was to write and ratify the final Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Nonetheless, the debates raged on and the Assembly reached a deadlock. When the votes were cast and counted, neither the Islamic nor the Pancasila blocks emerged as a winner, due to the fact that the former did not attain majority votes, whereas the latter could not achieve the two-thirds majority necessary for the making of the Constitution. Furthermore, president Soekarno, who had been previously recognized as a non-partisan head of the state, came to be seen as spokesman of the Pancasila block and became increasingly involved in the Assembly's affairs.<sup>29</sup> At that point, the deadlock could have

been solved, had Soekarno and the military not interfered with the Assembly, and had the Assembly, which had accomplished 90 % of its job, been given more time to finish its task.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, the failure of the Assembly was not caused by the deadlock, but by Soekarno's involvement, particularly by his ambition to implement the *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy).

It was on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1959 that Soekarno issued the *Dekret Presiden* (Presidential Decree) proclaiming that 1) the Constituent Assembly is to be dissolved, and 2) that a return to the Constitution 45 is to take place. Accordingly, the debates around the Jakarta Charter and its seven words were unwarranted and should be eliminated. And the next step was that Soekarno practiced the so-called Guided Democracy which banned democracy altogether.<sup>31</sup>

The dream of building an Islamic state was undisputed and the Masyumi, which was established as a political party on the 7<sup>th</sup> November 1945, was the most persevering and courageous organization in pursuing that dream. The reason being that Masyumi was the only modern Muslim political party to support the creation of an Islamic state, and to actively promote it after the colonial epoch. To a greater degree, its vision and objective as the party were to persuade the state and the people to practice Islamic teachings and law. Briefly speaking, Masyumi was perceived by many as a political institution which could implement the expectations and political aspirations of Muslims.<sup>32</sup> Unfortunately, on 17<sup>th</sup> August 1960 the Masyumi party was dissolved by Soekarno, for it publicly opposed his policies, which tended to protect the Communist party, PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, Indonesian Communist Party), through the concept of NASAKOM.<sup>33</sup> Further, Masyumi believed that the concept of Guided Democracy is nothing but tyranny and dictatorship in disguise.<sup>34</sup>

The cases of NII (*Negara Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic State), DI (*Darul Islam*, House of Islam), and its soldiers, named TII (*Tentara Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic soldiers), created turbulence and more heated tension between the state and Islam. In this context, the rulers claimed that NII, DI/TII were founded by Muslim radicalist, who did not want to accept Pancasila. As a matter of fact it was not based on ideology but dissatisfaction within the army.<sup>35</sup>

The interregnum between the Orla and Orba occurred on 12<sup>th</sup> March 1967, when Soekarno resigned from the presidency and selected Soeharto as the *penjabat presiden* (acting president) without holding a national election. Later, on 27<sup>th</sup> March 1968, Soeharto officially became the president of Indonesia for a five-year term, also without a national election. The fall of Orla and the rise of Orba raised the hopes of many Indonesian Muslims, especially those who

had hoped that Islam would be a major player on the political stage. This optimism was crushed when the Orba displayed no ideological orientation, and did not want to raise the issue of religion, thus ignoring the many ideological questions which were still unanswered. As such, many Muslims requested the rehabilitation of the Masyumi party. Unfortunately this request was refused for fear that the Masyumi might insist on the creation of an Islamic state, an act which would create fierce ideological debates and would ultimately lead to strife and revolt. Not surprisingly, the Orba made an effort to eliminate the ideological debate and to concentrate on the economic development of the republic. It attempted to do so by the concept of *de-ideologisasi* (de-ideologization), and by insisting on the adoption of Pancasila as the sole ideology (*asas tunggal*) of every single party and organization. These included such concepts as pragmatism, *de-parpolisasi* (depoliticization, to divide political-parties into a small number, three parties only), program-oriented (orientation to programs which can lead to national development), and *pembangunan-oriented* (developmental orientation). These concepts not only focused on the economic development, but served to counter the ideas disseminated by the Orba, and to justify the existence of the Orba.<sup>36</sup>

Hence, due to the fear of sectarian strife, the Orba postponed national elections, which were supposed to be held on the 10<sup>th</sup> of January 1968 until, at least, before the 5<sup>th</sup> of July 1971. Such a delay was meant to guarantee the full implementation of the state ideology, Pancasila, and to safeguard it from change.<sup>37</sup> The Islamic parties wanted the elections to be conducted in 1968, for such a date would have given them a better chance at realizing their dream of an Islamic state, whereas the military favoured a lengthy period of time before the elections. The army wanted to stage the elections carefully and to set up a harmonious atmosphere that would ensure the effective running of the elections and the army's continued dominance of the status quo. Therefore the military openly declared that they would not tolerate any future revolts and insisted that *stabilitas politik* (political stability) was everything.<sup>38</sup>

It was based on such a conception, political stability, and two other points—thence called *trilogi pembangunan*, three main points of development—i.e. *pembangunan ekonomi* (economic development) and *pemerataan* (distribution of prosperity), moreover the Orba mainly stressed the first and second points, and neglected the third one,<sup>39</sup> therefore the Orba never tolerated any movement which did not favor the state. And through such policy, the state became more powerful than civil society. People's participation in the country or

development was directly controlled by the rulers. Since the majority of Indonesian populace is Muslim, then every single policy will, in the first place, face and affect Muslims. This means, when Indonesian nation is smashed, the most shattered element is Muslim. Vice versa, when Indonesian Muslims are ravished then the Indonesian nation will vanish. This is the reason that Indonesia and Muslims are one.

As such, whenever the rulers oppressed Indonesian people, it was primarily Muslims who were affected. Many Muslim militants were discriminated against, their motions were limited, and they were jailed or sent to the prisons without justice or reasonable cause for a long time. Muslim preachers (*da'i, khatib*) could not proselytize unless with the police's permits. Their speech was censored. They were spied on. The condition was frightening. The relationship between the state and Islam was fully suspicious. They suspected each other.<sup>40</sup> Surprisingly, some military people having a high rank now even admit that the marginalization of the Islamic community existed and happened as a state policy.<sup>41</sup>

Only in the 1980s was the government considered *tame*, friendly, intimate towards Islam. The relation between the two is called *bulan madu* (lit. 'honey moon', harmonious). This can be proved from several sources as follows. First, *Undang-Undang Keormasan* (Regulations for Mass-Organizations) No. 8/1985 stating that every organization should receive Pancasila as organizational principal (rather than Islam) was accepted by Indonesian Islamic organizations. Second, the government legitimized *UU PN (Undang-Undang Pendidikan Nasional, Regulation of National Education)* in 1988 that every school (state and private) should give Islamic religious lessons to the students who are Muslims. Third, *UUPA (Undang-Undang Peradilan Agama, Regulation of Islamic Court)* and the compilation of Islamic law in 1999. Fourth, Soeharto went on pilgrimage for *hajj* to Makkah in 1990. Fifth, the rulers allowed Muslim women to wear *jilbab* (veil, Islamic dress) in every junior and senior high school. Sixth, the regulation of building *BAZIS (Bazis Badan Amil Zakat, infaq dan Shadaqah, Institution of Islamic Tax)* in every province through Government departments. Sixth, the establishment of *BMI (Bank Muamalat Indonesia, Islamic Bank)*. And finally, establishment of *ICMI* in 1990.<sup>42</sup>

### ***Keislaman, Keindonesiaan, Kecendekiawanan* (Islamization, Indonesianization, Intellectualization)**

The three terms *keislaman* (Islamization), *keindonesiaan* (Indonesianization), and *kecendekiawanan* (Intellectualization) are the guidelines of ICMI's paradigm,<sup>43</sup> which is called *khittah*.<sup>44</sup> A basic aspect

of Islamization in this dimension and in the context of ICMI is that Islam becomes a belief or an ideological system bestowing a universal worldview. Therefore the cores of Islamic teachings such as al-Qur'an, The Prophet's (Muhammad Rasul Allah) traditions and *ijtihad* (endeavor based on religious precepts) of classical 'ulama' (scholars) are sources for the way Muslims live. This indicates that Muslims should follow whatever the Qur'an teaches. The Qur'an is God's word Muslims understand from the Prophet's traditions implemented in his time. *Ijtihad* is to assist Muslims in comprehending various implementations made through interpreting the Qur'an and the Prophet's tradition. The essence of Islamic teachings in this context is to build a good relationship between the human being and his/her environment through doing justice, and acting honestly and modestly. Muslims should be moderate individuals.<sup>45</sup>

Those sources (al-Qur'an, the Prophet's tradition, and *ijtihad*) are called Classical Islam. However, Muslims should take their messages in accordance with Islamic contemporaries rather than to apply them as they are.<sup>46</sup> This is discussed because it relates to the second concept, Indonesianization.

In the light of Indonesianization, the *khittah* argues that a kind of Islam which suits the Indonesian context should be established—Indonesian Islam. It can be argued that Muslims all over the world have different challenges and have grown up facing their own traditions, norms and values. Therefore, Islam in Indonesia is also a kind of opinion which has to be appropriate to the Indonesian Muslim era (modern and contemporary life). In other words, to be interpreted in a specific sphere and time.<sup>47</sup>

Last, Intellectualization dimension refers to a belief in God's orientation; that every human deed is only for achieving God's will (*li mardatillah*), and sensitivity towards universal phenomena, open-mindedness, egalitarianism, science-technology, scientific ethos is key in this.<sup>48</sup> Again, this connects to Islamic teachings and endeavors to build the Indonesian nation (a consequence of Indonesianization).

Through the *khittah* (Islamization, Indonesianization and Intellectualization), ICMI designs 5K (5Q) programs: 1) *Kualitas iman dan taqwa* (quality of faith and piety), 2) *Kualitas berpikir* (quality of thinking), 3) *Kualitas hidup* (quality of life), 4) *Kualitas Bekerja* (quality of working), 5) *Kualitas berkarya* (quality of inventing).<sup>49</sup>

By such *khittah* and programs, ICMI has pursued many activities over 5 years, such as influencing the Government's policy to raise the national budget for human resources development about 620 %;<sup>50</sup> created a process of reconciliation between the Government and dissidents the so-called *Kelompok Petisi 50*;<sup>51</sup> conducted training

and education for groups with a weak economy or business people with small capital and low income; for teachers at senior high schools in math, biology, physics; facilitated meetings for Muslim groups; operated cooperative work with some *pesantrens* (Islamic boarding school) in providing Islamic books and improving learning/teaching skills; established Islamic banks;<sup>52</sup> governed intensive Islamic programs at hotels for high-class individuals;<sup>53</sup> contributed scholarships for Indonesian students studying abroad and domestically;<sup>54</sup> founded a daily newspaper, *Republika*; sought donations for people called *dompot dhu'afa'* (lit. purse for weak people); founded *Orbit* (a program for orphans by providing them parents);<sup>55</sup> formed a discussion group for young intellectuals *Masika* (*Majlis Sinergi Kalam*), and CIDES (Center for Information and Development Studies) which is intended as a think-tank of ICMI;<sup>56</sup> and built ICMI-Net (Information Center of Motivating Innovation Network) proposed for business data, information on science-technology, and national and international industry.<sup>57</sup> And the last important thing was national seminar on human rights conducted by CIDES on December 1992. CIDES's journal, *Afkar*, even published in February 1993 some articles presented in the gathering.

It is not surprising that ICMI could do so many activities which could not be done by other organizations, for it was directed by bureaucrats who are in the majority. Almost every Muslim minister got involved in high positions and as members of ICMI. Accordingly, in terms of resources mobilization (finance, buildings, infra and supra structures), ICMI did not face difficulties. ICMI was considered "a miracle baby" who grew up in the very short time. Its branches spread out all over the world, nationally and internationally, supported by embassy bureaucrats.<sup>58</sup> Such conditions raised questions about whether ICMI gained financial support legally or illegally. And debates concerning such issue were heated. Pros and cons polluted Indonesian weather at the time. For people in favor of ICMI, legal or illegal is not a concern because that is a habitual manner of the Orba rulers: the consequence of being close to power is to gain advantages in the light of government facilitation. The case of ICMI is not the first precedent. Before, when another religious group (Christians) was too close to government power, they also did the same thing. The most important variable in this case is not the group itself, but the behavior of the government.<sup>59</sup> It was not coincidental that ICMI was established in 1990, while the national election would be conducted in 1992. And the ruler gave many concessions to Islam in order to gain Muslims' votes, for there were elite conflicts between the military, especially the army, and Soeharto.<sup>60</sup> So in spite

of Soeharto's sympathetic manner towards Islam, ICMI was considered a vehicle for his succession.

However, we could argue here that the intellectuals who entered and accepted ICMI really understood Soeharto's play through ICMI, for them ICMI was the best solution to solve the problem between state and Islam. As such, they intentionally maintained ICMI with a view to order; they do not adopt the mentality of "*di luar pagar*" (lit. out of fence). It was natural that Indonesian Muslims had difficulties getting close to the government, and this mentality existed since the colonial era. They were always in opposition, so another group would fill such a gap.<sup>61</sup> In fact, wherever the country is, the majority will be represented fully, but this did not happen in Indonesia. ICMI then was seen to alter the habits that not conducive to cooperation. Another reason is that the Indonesian Muslim has enjoyed appropriate education. They were competitive, which was needed as a channel to actualize their skills and capabilities in all aspects of Indonesian matters including politics. The boom of *santri* (practicing Muslim students, opposite of *abangan*) scholars was another rational for the ICMI phenomenon.<sup>62</sup> And it is not surprising for intellectuals to have an organization, since this already happened a long time ago.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, in Indonesia intellectuals have a good reputation as an agent of transformation. As such, the class of intellectuals has a heroic spirit for their nation and people.<sup>64</sup>

In addition, the only person who rejected ICMI was Gus Dur. In this respect, Gus Dur claims that ICMI is sectarian, primordial, and exclusive, for it merely embraces one religious group. This does not fit in Indonesia, where many ethnic-groups and religious people live. For Gus Dur, pluralism is more suitable.<sup>65</sup> However, we can doubt his opinion, and several arguments can be offered to counter his idea regarding ICMI. First, ICMI is actually like the NU which Gus Dur heads i.e. a group of Islamic people. So it is inconsistent to accuse ICMI of being sectarian while arguing that NU is not. Second, ICMI was accepted by various Muslim factions including NU people. And Gus Dur himself does not forbid members of NU from joining ICMI, albeit that he does not suggest it either. And there were NU people who became members of ICMI.

The most reasonable of Gus Dur's refusals towards ICMI is that he was never invited to get involved. It is really clear if we look at his statement in a famous weekly magazine *Tempo* where he said, "*Saya tak pernah dihubungi, dikonsultasi, ya...tempat saya bukan di situ*" [I am never contacted or consulted, yeah...my place is not there].<sup>66</sup> In addition, Gus Dur was not invited because the persons who selected the people were activists of PII, an organization built in the

'40s which has different in the mainstream from Gus Dur.<sup>67</sup> And according to Bang Imad, at the time Gus Dur actually agreed with establishing ICMI as seen from his support when he was invited to come to Yogyakarta, although he could not come because of sickness. As Bang Imad said,

*"Sesudah saya menghubungi ikhwan seiman ini secara pribadi, maka mereka saya undang berkumpul di Yogya dengan menyewa sebuah penginapan termurah yang terletak di pinggir jalan Kota Gede. Setiap hadirin saya minta sedapat mungkin untuk membayar penginapan mereka masing-masing....Gus Dur yang sudah berjanji akan datang tiba-tiba sakit sehingga menyatakan mohon maaf, tapi menyetujui gagasan saya akan mendirikan Ikatan Cendekiawan Islam se-Indonesia".<sup>68</sup>*

*(After I contacted personally these my brethren in faith, later I invited them to come altogether to Yogya by renting the cheapest inn located in the side of street Kota Gede. I asked every participant to pay his rent as possible...Gus Dur, who already promised to show up suddenly got ill and sent an apology, but he agreed with my idea that I will establish an Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals).*

It is obvious that Gus Dur rejected ICMI because of psychological effects rather than an ideological base, i.e. he was offended when he was not invited. However, his feeling of being offended was legitimate. NU is the biggest Islamic organization with considerable membership, even Muhammadiyah (headed by Amien Rais before directing the party PAN) is lesser in terms of number of members. One will feel odd and uncomfortable whenever there is a movement connected to Indonesian Islam without considering NU, which has the most considerable grass-roots support. In this respect, Gus Dur was right to be be offended and was justified to ignore ICMI as a powerful organization. He was even legitimate to oppose ICMI, because in this context ICMI performed an opposition towards NU, and never appreciated and even neglected NU as having merits in building the Indonesian nation.

Apart from not appreciating the NU, ICMI also never appreciated different ideas concerning Islamic understanding from various people. It is true that ICMI contains many factions and groups of people, however, it is run with one-single-minded perspective. Before describing this issue, it is noteworthy to allude to Adam Schwarz's idea dividing groups within ICMI into three typologies. First, bureaucrat-technocrats, who work under Habibie's influence, some of them are technologist at Habibie's office, lecturers, Golkar leaders, ministers of Soeharto's cabinet. The orientation of these people is pragmatic, to support the government. Second, neo-modernists who emphasize essences of Islamic teachings rather than symbols. This group is concerned with ethics, values and work. The figures in this group were Habibie himself, Nurcholish Madjid, Emil

Salim and Soetjipto Wirosardjono. In this context, Schwarz categorizes Habibie as having two types—the first and second group. Third, modernists who had a modern urban-based education. Figures in this group were Bang Imad, M. Amien Rais, Adi Sasono, Dawam Rahardjo, Sri Bintang, Lukman Harun, Nasir Tamara, M. Amin Aziz. The third group was also considered by Schwarz as having the desire to build an Islamic state, and it is this group which can be characterized as “totally original ICMI”.<sup>69</sup> Here Schwarz is inclined to Gus Dur’s analysis, particularly in understanding the third group, which is convinced that Islamization at government and bureaucratic levels should be carried out, and the government should be Islamic.

Even though Schwarz’s argument gives insights in analyzing ICMI, his categories are totally misleading. He still uses an old methodology, i.e. utilizing Geertz’s approach (such as trilogy *santri-abangan-priyayi*), which is out of date.<sup>70</sup> Understanding groups inside ICMI is made simple, by looking their education and discipline. *First*, people or intellectuals graduated from the faculty of hard-sciences (exact disciplines), at Habibie’s *alma mater*. Technology is the base for these graduates. Because their basic knowledge is technology, their mode of thought or mind-set is linear. The variables in hard-sciences are few (compared to social sciences which connect to human-beings), therefore most technology-graduates approach social-problems as though solving technological crises. In the hard-sciences, as in technology they only face inanimate objects. *Second*, individuals graduated from Islamic studies. They learnt Islam not only for belief or faith, but also as an intellectual exercise. And *last*, scholars graduated from the social-sciences (sociology, anthropology, politics, history etc.). The third group is the weakest influence for they are not occupied neither in Islam nor technology. So they only supported one of the former groups.

In the first group we find a link to ITB (*Institut Teknologi Bandung*, Technology Institute of Bandung), and the second is IAIN (*Institut Agama Islam Negeri*, State Institute of Islamic Studies). Both of them are institutes, i.e. an educational institution which specializes in one discipline [ITB = technology, IAIN = Islamic studies], unlike the university which embraces many subjects. Figures in the ITB link are Habibie, Bang Imad, Ginanjar Kartasasmita, Wardiman Djojonegoro, Haryanto Dhanutirto, Muslim Nasution, Adi Sasono, Fadel Muhammad, Aburizal Bakrie, Marwah Daud, Haidar Bagir. While in the IAIN link there are Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur), A. Zacky Siradj, Fachry Ali, Komaruddin Hidayat, Dien Syamsuddin, Bahtiar Effendy.<sup>71</sup> All these mentioned names are staff and organiz-

ers of ICMI, but the ITB link was more dominant.

The strain inside ICMI was between the first and second groups dealing with interpreting which Islamic paradigm and methodology to execute. The style of the ITB link is pragmatic and there is a dislike for abstractive or philosophical thought, that is why a writer of ICMI khittah is Nurcholish Madjid. Further, in terms of implementing Islam, they are rigid, strict, inflexible. Bang Imad is typical of this; he can recite the Qur'an and always quotes Arabic phrases from Qur'anic verses and Prophet's tradition, but cannot read Islamic books written in Arabic letters, so he learns Islam from other languages (Indonesian and English). And he does not know classical Islamic history.

Unlike the ITB link, the IAIN link understands Islam from various schools and colors, as a result they have different horizons even radical ones. This a matter which cannot be admitted by the ITB link, so it is not a secret that Adi Sasono rejects Madjid's opinion in dealing with Islamic application in the field.<sup>72</sup> The style of the IAIN link is not to achieve political position or power, but intellectual community. This is the reason the IAIN link do not keep in touch with ICMI, and keep a distance. None of the names mentioned above, as organizers from the IAIN link, stay with ICMI any longer. They are now inactive, although they do not exit ICMI.

### Conclusion

ICMI was the best solution for Indonesian Muslims to dissolve the heated relationship between Islam and the state. As such, Muslims all over Indonesia supported the establishment of ICMI, and only Gus Dur rejected it. However, such rejection was not ideologically-based but psychologically. The appearance of ICMI was also an indication that Indonesian Muslims are aware of the need to do a lot for their nation and people, since they perceived that Muslims are a majority in the country, and the Indonesian nation is Muslim.

Besides, ICMI was also *loyal-opposition* (opposition in favor of the rulers, and not in support of toppling the government), because the state at the time was very powerful and tyrannical. As such they avoided confrontation or frontal attack against the state. Unfortunately, after Gus Dur was elected as the fourth president of Indonesia, ICMI lost its momentum. Gus Dur is considered more democratic, tolerant, and able to bring the Indonesian country forward as a democratic nation.

In terms of social movements, ICMI was not entirely established by social power, but was combined with the government's support. A concept of "bottom-up" could not be applied totally in the case of

Indonesia, especially in the *Orba*, therefore this affects the kind of movements organized by Indonesian people. From this history, one can see that political tension between Islam and the state was the cause of social movements, or socio-religious movements in the country.

For some scholars,<sup>73</sup> ICMI would not be seen a product of democracy or democratization, let alone civil society, for civil society contains elements such as independence, pluralism, tolerance, individualism. In terms of independence and individualism, ICMI is questionable. However we could argue, civil society is not a *taken-for-granted* thing, we should fight to gain it. This means that we need process and time to achieve civil society. Moreover, there will be no civil society in the authoritarian regime like in such Soeharto's era. As such, we can merely see that ICMI can be an instrument to establish civil society in the future. In addition, phenomenon of ICMI may give a concept of civil society under the oppressive rulers; a concept which is different from we always imagine and expect.

### Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> For information dealing with mass-media related articles, see A. Makmur Makka (ed.), *ICMI: Dalam Sorotan Pers Desember 1990–April 1991* [ICMI: On the Press Spot December 1990–April 1991], (Jakarta: Sekretariat Pusat ICMI, 1991), i-ii.
- <sup>2</sup> For more discourse regarding social movements see *inter alia* Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Paul Lichterman, *The Search for Political Community: American Activists Reinventing Commitment*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Aldon Morris and Carol M. Mueller (eds.), *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. (Yale: Yale University Press, 1992). Apart from these books, several articles strengthen the views: Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Social Movements", in N.J. Smelser (ed.), *Handbook of Sociology*. (Newbury Park: Sage, 1988), 695-730; Ralph H. Turner, "Collective Behavior and Resource Mobilization as Approaches to Social Movements: Issued and Continuities", in L. Kriesberg (ed.), *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change*. (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Inc., 1981), 1-20; N.A. Pichardo, "New Social Movements: A Critical Review", *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 23, 1997, 411-30; A. Melucci, "The Process of Collective Identity", in H. Johnston & B. Klandermans, *Social Movements and Culture*. (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 41-63; C. Tilly, "Social Movements and National Politics", in C. Bright and S. Harding (eds.), *Statemaking and Social Movements*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 297-317; D.S. Meyer & Suzanne Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements and the Structure of Political Opportunity", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 101, No. 6, 1996, 1628-60.

- <sup>3</sup> Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, "Stepsisters: Feminist Movement Activism in Different Institutional Spaces", in D.S. Meger & S. Tarrow (eds.), *The Social Movement Society*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 195-216.
- <sup>4</sup> Also noteworthy is writing by Meyer and Staggenborg, who depict counter-movements against some SMOs, although, like Katzenstein, they do not depict government's counter-movements. See D.S. Meyer & Suzanne Staggenborg, "Movements, Countermovements and the Structure of Political Opportunity", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 101, No. 6, 1996, 1628-60.
- <sup>5</sup> Short data relating this story can be seen in Hasan Bisri and Lukman Hakim (eds.), *Jejak dan Langkah: Dokumen Lima Tahun Perjalanan ICMI* [Trace and Step: A Document of ICMI's Five Years Journey]. (Jakarta: Panitia Pelaksana Mukhtar II dan Simposium Nasional, 1995), 9. For deeper information and the continued long paragraph as well are altogether united within footnote 7 below, and we do not specify them one by one.
- <sup>6</sup> The term *silaturrahmi* is an Arabic word containing *silah* (connection, link, tie, kinship, relationship, reunion of lovers) and *rahim, rahm* (mercy, compassion), see Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*. Ed. J. Milton Cowan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961), 832 and 1073. In this context, *silaturrahmi* is typical Indonesian parlance meaning to build fraternity and friendship, and to bestow mercy between individuals (Muslims). Whilst *cendekiawan* means intellectuals or scholars.
- <sup>7</sup> Several articles, books, magazines, and newspapers discuss the plan to establish ICMI: *Pelita*, "Gelisah Melihat Cendekiawan Muslim" [Being Anxious to See Muslim Intellectuals], 4 December 1990; *Berita Buana*, "Dari Cita-Cita Mahasiswa Menjadi Perhelatan Akbar" [From Students' Ideals to the Greatest Party]; *Berita Buana*, "ICMI Hendaknya Berisi Semua Unsur Intelektual" [ICMI Should Contain All Intellectuals from All Factions], 29 November 1990; *Pelita*, "Potensi Cendekiawan Muslim Perlu Dihimpun" [Muslim Intellectuals' Potencies Have to be Gathered], 3 Desember 1990; *Angkatan Bersenjata*, "Simposium Nasional Cendekiawan Muslim di Malang" [National Symposium of Muslim Intellectuals in Malang City], 1 December 1990; *Tempo*, "Ide setelah Membaca Kiblat" [Idea after Reading Kiblat Magazine], 9 Desember 1990; A. Makmur Makka, B.J. Habibie: *Kisah Hidup & Kariernya*. (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1995), 133-4, this book is already translated into English, see idem, B.J.H. (Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie): *His Life and Career*. (Jakarta: Pustaka Cidesindo, 1996), 180. An article was also written in English to elucidate briefly as regards to ICMI's establishment: Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class", *Indonesia*, No. 56, Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1993, 16-22. Collected articles about ICMI from various mass-media are already published in several books: Abrar Muhammad (ed.), *ICMI dan Harapan Umat* [ICMI and Ummah's Expectation]. (Jakarta: YPI Ruhama, 1991); Bambang Djono Sedjati and I. Made Leo Wiratma (eds.), *Dokumentasi: Kliping tentang ICMI* [Documentation: Clippings about ICMI]. (Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993); A. Makmur Makka (ed.), *ICMI: Dalam Sorotan Pers Desember 1990-April* [ICMI: On the Spot Press]. (Jakarta: Sekretariat Pusat ICMI, 1991). The newest article and book and more comprehensive, M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Visi dan Misi Kehadiran ICMI: Sebuah Pengantar" [Vision and Mission of ICMI: An Introduction], in Nasrullah Ali-Fauzi (ed.), *ICMI: Antara Status Quo dan Demokrasi* [ICMI: Between Status Quo and Democracy].

- (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), 25-43; A. Makmur Makka, *ICMI: Dinamika Politik Islam di Indonesia* [ICMI: A Dynamic of Islamic Politic in Indonesia]. (Jakarta: Cidesindo, 1997).
- <sup>8</sup> The 49 intellectuals are listed in Hasan Bisri, and Lukman Hakim (eds.), *Jejak dan Langkah: Dokumen Lima Tahun Perjalanan ICMI* [Trace and Step: A Document of ICMI's Five Years Journey]. (Jakarta: Panitia Pelaksana Muktamar II dan Simposium Nasional, 1995), 11-2.
- <sup>9</sup> *Pelita*, "Gelisah Melihat Cendekiawan Muslim" [Being Anxious to See Muslim Intellectuals], 4 December 1990; *Berita Buana*, "Gagasan ICMI Berkembang Terus" [Idea of Building ICMI is Continuously Developing], 4 December 1990.
- <sup>10</sup> There is no exact number reporting the attendees, according to *Kompas* there were 512 participants, but *Suara Karya* recorded 470 people. See *Kompas*, "Tepat Waktu, Prakarsa Cendekiawan Muslim Bahas Pembangunan Abad XXI" (Now is the Right Time for Muslim Intellectuals to Discuss Development in 21<sup>st</sup> Century), 7 December 1990; *Suara Karya*, "Menteri Habibie Terpilih sebagai Ketua Umum ICMI" (The Minister Habibie was Elected the Chief of ICMI), 8 December 1990.
- <sup>11</sup> *Merdeka*, "Cendekiawan Muslim Bangkit" [Muslim Intellectuals Revive], 5 December 1990; *Tempo*, "Perjanjian di Malang" [Testament in Malang], 8 December 1990; *Pelita*, "Yang Benar-Benar Ilmuwan akan Kembali ke Agama" (The Original Intellectual Will Return Back to the Religion), 10 December 1990.
- <sup>12</sup> *Editor*, "Terpilihnya Orang Dekat Pak Harto" (An Election of Mr. Soeharto's Closed Person), 15 December 1990.
- <sup>13</sup> A. Makmur Makka, B.J. Habibie: *Kisah Hidup*, 139-40; Idem, B.J.H.: *His Life*, 187-88; *Kompas*, "Lebih Jauh dengan Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie" [Further with B.J. Habibie], 16 December 1990.
- <sup>14</sup> *Kompas*, "Lebih Jauh dengan Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie" [Further with B.J. Habibie], 16 December 1990.
- <sup>15</sup> HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, Organization of Muslim Students) was established on 5<sup>th</sup> February 1947. It is now the biggest organization of university students in Indonesia, even in southeast Asian countries. Since it is not an *underbouw* (organization controlled by an outside force or influence) of some institutions, its independence is strong and its members could enter various mass institutions and state departments. Unlike other Indonesian Islamic Reformist movements, HMI is free from failure in terms of socio-politics and religious concerns. Whilst many organizations based on a religious perspective did not succeed *vis a vis* the government, HMI has enjoyed victorious continuity. Further description is divulged by Victor Tanja, *HMI, Islamic Student' Association: Its History and Its Place among Muslim Reformist Movements in Indonesia*. Unpublished dissertation submitted to Hartford Seminary Foundation. Hartford. Connecticut, United States, 1979. This dissertation is translated into Bahasa Indonesia, *HMI: Sejarah dan Kedudukannya di tengah Gerakan-Gerakan Pembaharu di Indonesia*. (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1991). See also critiques toward Tanja's work in Agussalim Sitompul, *HMI dalam Pandangan Seorang Pendeta: Antara Impian dan Kenyataan* [HMI in front of a Priest's Eyes: Between Dream and Reality]. (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1984); Idem, *Pemikiran HMI dan Relevansinya dengan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa Indonesia* [HMI's Thoughts and Its Relevance with History of Indonesians' Struggle]. (Jakarta: Integritas Dinamika Press, 1986); Idem, *Histografi HMI 1947-1993* [Historiography of HMI 1947-1993]. (Jakarta: Intermedia, 1995).

- <sup>16</sup> The term *sarjana* here should be specifically defined as people graduated from universities.
- <sup>17</sup> *Tempo*, "Sepuluh Tahun Berarti, lalu Mati" [Ten Years was meaningful, and then died], 8 December 1999.
- <sup>18</sup> We intentionally abbreviate the Institutions in accordance to their respective names; *LSAF* (*Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat*, Institution of Religious and Philosophical Studies) is an Islamic NGO which succeeded in publishing an Islamic journal entitled *Ulumul Qur'an (UQ)*; *UIA* (*Universitas Islam Asyasyafi'iyah*) is a private university located in East Jakarta and affiliated to the classical Islamic school of fiqh sunni al-Shaff'i *UIIK* (*Universitas Islam Ibnu Khaldun*) is another private university located in Bogor; *LP3ES* (*Lembaga Penelitian Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Ekonomi dan Sosial*, Institution to Research, Analyze and Develop Economy and Society) is a wellknown NGO funded by Germany foundations, and its publication, *Prisma*, is written in Indonesian as well as English; *MUI* (*Majlis Ulama Indonesia*, Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars) is an institution which solely contains Muslim scholars who are expert in Islamic *shari'ah* (Islamic law derived from Qur'anic teachings and the Prophet's traditions).
- <sup>19</sup> Resources referring to the enactment of Muslim associations are summarized from *Berita Buana*, "Wadah ICMI sudah Didamba" [Association such as ICMI has been Strongly Desirous for Long Time], 4 December 1990; Lukman Hakiem, Tamsil Linrung, Mahmud F. Rakasima (eds.), "Wawancara dengan Anwar Harjono: ICMI Bukan Hasil Rekayasa Pemerintah" [Interview with Anwar Hajono: ICMI is not the Government's Engineering], *Mereka Bicara tentang ICMI: Sorotan 5 Tahun Perjalanan ICMI* [They Talk about ICMI: To Observe ICMI after 5 Years]. (Jakarta: Amanah Putra Nusantara, 1995), 81; *Tempo*, "Cendekiawan Muslim: Melangkah dari Malang" [Muslim intellectuals: Walking from Malang], 8 December 1990.
- <sup>20</sup> Muhammad Imaduddin Abdulrachim, "Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie yang Saya Kenal" [B.J.H. whom I Know], in Mahmud F. Rakasima and Tamsil Linrung (eds.), *Wawancara Habibie* [Habibie's Interviews]. (Jakarta: Amanah Putra Nusantara, 1995), 151-55.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 155-60.
- <sup>22</sup> A.W. Pratiknya (ed.), *Percakapan antar Generasi: Pesan Perjuangan Seorang Bapak* [Dialogue between Generations: A Father's Advice about Struggle]. (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1978), 50-87.
- <sup>23</sup> Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 165; Idem, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942*. (Indonesian version). (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 200.
- <sup>24</sup> There are two terms that should be defined clearly. First, Islamic-political (*politik-Islam*) is a concept of politics in accordance to Islamic teachings. Second, political-Islamic (*Islam-politik*) is Islamic movements which express in a political manner rather than cultural, economic and so on.
- <sup>25</sup> Aqib Soeminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda 1800-1942* [Dutch's Islamic-political in Indonesia 1800-1942]. (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1984).
- <sup>26</sup> Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: The Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-45*. (The Haque and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1958).
- <sup>27</sup> *Pancasila* is the five principles of the foundation of an independent nation state, and is intended as a compromise between the Islamic faction and the

- other. It contains 1) believe in One God, 2) humanity, 3) Indonesian unity, 4) representation and democracy in common deliberation, 5) social justice. For the debate about Pancasila since the beginning of post-colonialism see M. Jamin, *Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945* [Drafts of Constituion 1945], (Jakarta: Sekretariat Negara, 1959); S. Bahar, and A.B. Kusuma, and N. Hudawati, *Risalah \Sidang Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 dan Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, 28 Mei – 22 Agustus 1945* [Articles of Council Pleno in Preparing the \National Constitution 1945, 28 May–August 1945], (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1995).
- <sup>28</sup> B.J. Boland, *The struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*. (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 1982), 15-39; Saifuddin Anshari, "Islam atau Pancasila sebagai dasar Negara?" [Islam or Pancasila as the State Ideology?], in Ahmad Ibrahim et al., *Islam di Asia Tenggara* [Islam in South-east Asia]. (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990), 201; Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan: studi tentang Percaturan dalam Konstituante* [translated from his Ph.D. thesis at Chicago University, *Islam as the Basis of State: A Study of the Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates in Indonesia*]. (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 101-10.
- <sup>29</sup> B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, 90-9; Saifuddin Anshari, "Islam atau Pancasila", 201; Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in Ruth T. McVey (ed.), *Inndonesia*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 317.
- <sup>30</sup> Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 1945-65* [Islamic Parties on the National Stage 1945-65]. (Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1987), 268; Idem, *Islam, Pancasila and Asas Tunggal* [Islam, Pancasila and One Fundament]. (Jakarta: yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1983), 8-10.
- <sup>31</sup> Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), 594-5; B.J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, 102.
- <sup>32</sup> Masyumi, *Pedoman Perjuangan Masyumi* [The Orientation of the Masyumi's Struggle]. (Jakarta: Pimpinan Partai Masyumi Bagian Keuangan, 1955), 6; Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, *Merambah Jalan Baru Islam: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Indonesia di Masa Orde Baru* [Tracing the New Islamic Path: A reconstruction of Indonesian Islamic Thought in the New Order]. (Bandung: Mizan, 1986), 85-88.
- <sup>33</sup> NASAKOM stands for NAsional, Agama, KOMunis (Nationalist, Religion, Communist), and was created by Soekarno and intended to be a fusion of ten political parties representing three social strata i.e. the Nationalist, Religious and Communist political groups. Through the presidential decree no. 7 of 1959, no. 128 of 1960, and no. 440 of 1961 NASAKOM was legalized as a political party in Indonesia. Staf Umum Angkatan Darat I, *Nasakom: Djilid I, II, III* [Nasakom: Vol. I, II, III]. (Jakarta: Angkatan Darat, 1962).
- <sup>34</sup> Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam*, 50-1; Ahmad Syafii Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan*, 187; Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, *Merambah*, 89.
- <sup>35</sup> Barbara Sillars Harvey, *Permesta: A Half Rebellion*. Monograph Series No. 57. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1977); Idem, *Pemberontakan Kahar Muzakkar: Dari Tradisi ke DI/TII* [Kahar Muzakkar's Rebellion: From Tradition to DI/TII]. (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1989).
- <sup>36</sup> Harold Crouch, "The Trend to Authoritarianism: The Post-1945 Period", in Harry Aveling (ed.), *The Development of Indonesian Society: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1980), 166-204;

- Abdul Munir Mulkhan, *Runtuhnya Mitos Politik Santri* [The Collapse of the Myth of Santri Politics, 1992], 33-4; Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, *Merambah*, 93-5.
- <sup>37</sup> Munir Mulkhan, *Perubahan Perilaku Politik dan Polarisasi Umat Islam 1965-87 dalam Perspektif Sosio-logis* [The Sociological Perspective on the Change of Political Behavior and Muslims' Polarization between 1965-78]. (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1989), 51; B.J. Boland, 154;
- <sup>38</sup> Daniel Dhakidae, "Pemilihan Umum di Indonesia: Saksi Pasang Naik dan Surut Partai Politik" [The National Elections in Indonesia as a Witness to the Rise and Fall of the Political Parties], *Prisma*, September 1981; Parakitri Tahi Simbolon, "Di Balik Mitos Angkatan 66" [Behind the Myth of the '66 Young Generation], *Prisma*, December 1977.
- <sup>39</sup> In practice, the *trilogi pembangunan* was mainly focused on the first item, and the item of distribution of prosperity never worked. The 'Master' of Indonesian economics and the most influential critic, Soemitro Djojohadikusumo, stressed perpetually this view, see his article, "Peranan Cendekiawan Indonesia pada Umumnya dan Cendekiawan Muslim pada Khususnya dalam Pembangunan" [Role of Indonesian Intellectuals in general, and Muslim Intellectuals in Particular within the Development], in *Silaterrahmi Kerja Nasional I ICMI* [National Works I of ICMI]. (Jakarta: ICMI, 1992), 14, 19-20; *Merdeka*, "Reformasi Kesejahteraan Harus Diutamakan" [Reformation of People's Welfare Should be Given Priority], 5 December 1991.
- <sup>40</sup> Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia*. Thesis Ph.D. submitted to Ohio State University, 1994; Mahmud F. Rakasima et.al (eds.), "Wawancara dengan Abujamin Roham: Jangan Bawa ICMI sendirian" [Interview with Abujamin Roham: Don't Bring ICMI Alone], *ICMI di Mata Pemuda, Mahasiswa, Da'i dan Kaum Dhu'afa* [ICMI in front of Their Eyes: Young People, Students, Islamic Preachers, and Poor People]. (Jakarta: Amanah Putra Nusantara, 1995), 19-21; Idem, "Wawancara dengan Nabhan Husein: ICMI sekedar Mengubah Cuaca, Bukan Musim" [[Interview with Nabhan Husein: ICMI just Changes Weather, not Season], 134; Idem, "Wawancara dengan Rhoma Irama: Untuk Apa Mencurigai Habibie dan ICMI?" [Interview with Rhoma Irama: What's the Point to Suspect Habibie and ICMI?], 166; Idem, "Wawancara dengan Syukron Makmun: Saya tak Pernah Diajak ICMI" [[Interview with Syukron Makmun: I am never Invited by ICMI], 170-1.
- <sup>41</sup> As witnessed by Roekmini K. Soedjono (Brigadier General in the Police Department) and Rudini (general in the army). Lukman Hakiem, Tamsil Linrung, Mahmud F. Rakasima (eds.), *Mereka Bicara tentang ICMI: Sorotan 5 Tahun Perjalanan ICMI* [They Talk about ICMI: To Observe ICMI after 5 Years]. (Jakarta: Amanah Putra Nusantara, 1995), 214, 219, 221, 228.
- <sup>42</sup> A new dissertation was written in respect to harmonious relationship between state and Indonesian Muslim by Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State: The Transformation of Islamic Political Ideas and Practices in Indonesia*. Thesis Ph.D. submitted to Ohio State University, 1994; Idem, "ICMI dan Artikulasi Politik Islam yang Melebar" [ICMI and a Wide Articulation of Islamic-Politic], in Zuli Qodir and Lalu M. Iqbal Songell (eds.), *ICMI, Negara dan Demokrasi: Catatan Kritis Kaum Muda* [ICMI, State and Democracy: Critical Opinions of Young Generations]. (Yogyakarta: Kelompok Studi Lingkaran, 1995), ix-xvi; *Editor*, "Terpilihnya", 15 December 1990.

- <sup>43</sup> *Buku Saku Anggota ICMI 1995-2000* [Pocket Book for ICMI Members 1995-2000]. (Jakarta: Sekretariat ICMI, 1996), 45-100.
- <sup>44</sup> *Khitjah* is derived from Arabic and literally means line. In this context it means lines of paradigm or basic agendum, see *Buku Saku*, 45.
- <sup>45</sup> *Buku Saku*, "Khitjah ICMI", 57-65.
- <sup>46</sup> The best methodology of interpreting the Qur'an for modern or contemporary life is Fazlur Rahman's book *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
- <sup>47</sup> *Buku Saku*, "Khitjah ICMI", 65-70.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 71-4.
- <sup>49</sup> Hasan Bisri (eds.), *Jejak Langkah*, 15-6.
- <sup>50</sup> Lukman Hakim (eds.), *Mereka Bicara*, 26.
- <sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 27. *Kelompok Petisi 50* is a group of people (50 individuals at various levels) who are really critical towards Government's (the Orba) policies. Some of them were jailed without trial or receiving justice.
- <sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 174. Apart from Islamic banks called BMI (*Bank Muamalat Islam*), ICMI also created credit banks for poor people in accordance with the Islamic law, *BPR-Syariah* (*Bank Perkreditan Rakyat*), and a bank for loan-deposit called BMT (*Baitul Mal wa Tamwil*).
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 177.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 178.
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 190.
- <sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 202.
- <sup>57</sup> *Pelita*, "ICMI-Net Gratis untuk para Santri" [ICMI-Net is Free of Charge for Santri], 23 May 1992; *Warta Ekonomi*, "ICMI Jual Data Bisnis" [ICMI Sales Business Data], No. 6, Year IV, July 1992
- <sup>58</sup> United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Japan are some foreign branches. In Canada, the branch is in Montreal and headed by one of students at Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. It was built in 1992.
- <sup>59</sup> "Wawancara dengan Eros Djarot: Kalau untuk Ukhuwwah Islamiyah, Semua Pihak harus Dukung ICMI" [Interview with Eros Djarot: If It Is for Muslim Brotherhood, All Parties Should Support ICMI]. *Mereka Bicara*, 131 & 134.
- <sup>60</sup> Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*. (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994); R. William Liddle, "Religion as a Political Resource in an Authoritarian Regime: ICMI and the Future of Islamic Politics in Indonesia". Paper presented in International Conference *Religion and Society in the Modern World: Islam and Society in Southeast Asia*, conducted by LIPI (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*, Institution of Science and Knowledge in Indonesia), in Jakarta 29-31 May 1995.
- <sup>61</sup> Nurcholish Madjid, "Suatu Saat ICMI akan Diterima Semua Pihak" [Once ICMI will be Accepted by All Parties], in Nasrullah Ali-Fauzi (ed.), *ICMI: antara Status Quo dan Demokrasi* [ICMI: Between Status Quo and Democracy]. (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), 298.
- <sup>62</sup> *Tempo*, "Setelah Boom Sarjana Islam" [After Booming of Muslim Scholars], 8 December 1990.
- <sup>63</sup> Taufik Abdullah points out that intellectual organization even started in the contemporary of Soekarno and Hatta (the vice president of Soekarno) by establishing *Jong Islamitend Bond* (JIB). And were also there the same such as

Jong Sumateranen Bond, Jong Ambonese Bond, Jong Javanese Bond. These groups were initially purposed for trivial needs such as to have mutual help in financial problems because their postal money-order from their village came late, they were out of money, or in order that woman-students from Sumatra and out of Java were not bothered by Javanese students. But later those organizations were pioneers of Indonesian independence and were heroic, "Wawancara dengan Taufik Abdullah: ICMI Belum Menjadi Organisasi yang Serakah" [Yet, ICMI Has Not Become a Greedy Organization], *Mereka Bicara*, 262.

- <sup>64</sup> It is a provable fact that the most influential classes in Indonesia are three, 1) state/government/ruler with their military as a machine of transformation, 2) students, 3) intellectuals/'ulama'. In terms of intellectuals, much evidence proves that rebellions and wars were headed by intellectuals or educated individuals rather than lay-people. Even though the rebellion was conducted by peasants, the leader was a *kiyai* (religious intellectual who was not considered an uneducated person). See, Sartono Kartodirdjo, *The Peasant's Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel (A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia)*. (The Hague, 1966); Idem, *Protest Movements in Rural Java* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978).
- <sup>65</sup> Abdurrahman Wahid, "Intelektual di tengah Eksklusivisme" [Intellectualism in the mid of exclusivism], in Ali-Fauzi, *ICMI: Antara Status Quo, 70-75; "Interview dengan Abdurrahman Wahid: ICMI memang Sektarian, kok" [Interview with Gus Dur: It Is that ICMI Is Sektarian]*, *Mereka Bicara*, 15-23.
- <sup>66</sup> *Tempo*, "Momentum ICMI, dan Munculnya Habibie" [Momentum of ICMI, and Habibie's Appearance], 9 December 1990.
- <sup>67</sup> I have to thank God for the moment I obtained this information. It was in 1996 when I visited Muhammad Iqbal's (one of the students from Brawijaya University who had made an effort to found ICMI) parents, Gomsony Yasin and his wife, Titi Yasin. They told me that they were individuals who selected people and made lists of intellectuals when ICMI was first formed, and they excluded Gus Dur because they saw that Gus Dur's deeds could not be understood and never benefited the Islamic community. Gomsony and his wife were activists of PII (*Pelajar Islam Indonesia*, Pupils of Indonesian Islam) which was recognized as a hard-liner organization.
- <sup>68</sup> Muhammad Imaduddin Abdulrachim, "Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie yang Saya Kenal", in Mahmud F. Rakasima et.al. (eds.), *Wawancara Habibie*, 154.
- <sup>69</sup> Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s*. (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994).
- <sup>70</sup> *Santri* and *abangan* are anthropological perspectives, while ICMI is political case in the Orba regim.
- <sup>71</sup> ICMI, *Buku Saku*, 119-43).
- <sup>72</sup> Many people told me that Adi Sasono sharply fight against Madjid
- <sup>73</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994); Idem, *Nationss and Nationalism* (Ithaca Cornell University Press, 1983); Idem, *Muslim Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); John A. Hall, *Civil Society* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1996).

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