

## RETHINKING THE CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE OF *JIHĀD*

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**Abstract:** This article purposes to evaluate the phenomenon of domination of combative jihadism and factors that have conditioned the domination. It also evaluates whether the dominant concept of *jihād* can be paralleled to the Western concept of “just war”. It can be argued that normatively Islam recognises two forms of *jihād* namely the greater *jihād* (self-purification and improvement) and the lesser *jihād* (combative war). Historically, the contemporary discourse of *jihād* has been dominated by its combative meaning, however. This domination has been conditioned by several factors, such as the growth of the ideology of radical Islamism, the Western hegemonic behaviour, globalisation and the absence of alternative narratives. This article finds that, furthermore, the dominant concept of *jihād*, in a legalistic view, is relatively similar to the Western concept of *just war*, although, in reality, it tends to be illegal or “breaking the law”. It discusses the normative and historical meanings of *jihād*, the factors that have been conditioning the domination of combative jihadism, and *jihād* and *just war*.

**Keywords:** *Jihād*; jihadism; combative jihadism; Jama’ah Islamiyah; Laskar Jihad; terrorism.

### Introduction

Shortly after the moment of 11 September 2001, a well-known leader of *Jamaah Islamiyyah*, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, had been giving a preaching on Sunday morning. It was in the midst of more than

thousands of Muhammadiyah's followers<sup>1</sup> in Masjid Ahmad Dahlan, Banyuwangi, East Java, Indonesia. I and my parents were a part of them who had listened to his speech. Until now, I still remember that it was a very strong message of Islam(ism) that had been campaigned by a charismatic and pious personage. *Jihād*, for him, was the best way not only to defeat enemies of Islam but also the most important obligation that should be done by every single Muslim. During his speech, he had consistently cited both the most authoritative sources of Islam (al-Qur'ān and ḥadīth) and certain selected figures' opinions such as Osama bin Laden, Sayyid Quṭb, Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb, and Ibn Taymīyah. Although as a high school student I only knew little things about them, obviously that the most important message that Ba'asyir delivered was the ultimate noble achievement of every good Muslim is die in a war as a *mujāhid* (pl. *mujāhidūn*).

Several weeks after, in a small mosque (*Masjid al-Taḥwā*) in the district of Rogojampi, Banyuwangi Region, we met a commander-in-chief of *Laskar Jihad*, Ja'far Umar Thalib and his some high-ranking commanders. Since 1999 they had involved in *jihād* against Christians in Poso, Central Sulawesi and Ambon, Moluccas. He tried to convince Muslims in the region that due to a *fatwā* that came from a Salafist *Shaykh* in Saudi Arabia, he claimed that he had an authority to lead a *jihād* in Indonesia. In his speech, he had often referred to Salafists such as Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī, 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Baz, 'Abd Allah Yūsuf Azzam, and Osama bin Laden. *Jihād* in Thalib's understanding was the holy war against infidels (*kaḥfīrūn*).

On 12 October 2002, Bali bombings occurred. It was the event that Indonesia had become the most priority concern of international communities of counter-terrorism.<sup>2</sup> In this case, the dead victims were 88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, 26 British, 7 Americans, 6 Germans and others.<sup>3</sup> Some Islamists such as Imam Samudera, Ali Imron, Mukhlas and Amrozi, those who were responsible for this incident

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<sup>1</sup> Muhammadiyah is the largest modernist Muslim organisation in Indonesia. See Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Muhammadiyah," in *Oxford Islamic Studies Online*. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t343/e0296> (accessed December 09, 2018).

<sup>2</sup> Ross Tapsell, *By-Lines, Balibo, Bali Bombings: Australian Journalists in Indonesia* (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2014).

<sup>3</sup> Tim Dokumentasi Bom Bali, *Buku Putih Bom Bali: Peristiwa dan Pengungkapan* (Jakarta: PTIK Press, 2004).

claimed that it was a kind of *jihād* actions intended to kill *kāfirūn*.<sup>4</sup> Interestingly, all of them had an educational and ideological background of Muhammadiyah, although at the same time, they were directly in connection with Ba'asyir.<sup>5</sup>

Both moments of 9/11 and Bali bombings have led to a massive growth of the discourse of *jihād* as waging war against enemies of Islam, not only in the Middle East but also in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the image of Islam has been coloured strongly by arguments and practices of violence, extremism, radicalism and terrorism.<sup>6</sup> In this situation, the alternative discourse of *jihād* has been forgotten and has remained in absent from the global discourse contestation. The prophetic idea of the greater *jihād* (*jihād al-akbar*) that emphasises the essentials of spiritualising self-purification and improvement, for instance, has been underestimated and potentially has become an unthinkable discourse.

This article aims to critically evaluate the phenomenon of the domination of combative jihadism and factors that have conditioned this domination, and also rethink whether this dominant concept of *jihād* can or cannot be equated with the Western concept of “just war”. It arguably states that normatively Islam recognises two forms of *jihād* namely the greater *jihād* (self-purification and improvement) and the lesser *jihād* (combative war). Based on history, however, the contemporary discourse of *jihād* has been dominated by its combative meaning. This domination has been conditioned by several factors, such as the growth of the ideology of radical Islamism, the Western hegemonic behaviour, globalisation and the absence of alternative narratives. The dominant concept of *jihād*, in a legalistic view, is relatively similar to the Western concept of *just war*, in spite of the fact that it tends to be brutalised and “breaking the law”. In order to explain the arguments systematically, this article discusses the normative and historical meanings of *jihād*, the factors that have been

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<sup>4</sup> Abdul Aziz [Imam Samudera], *Aku Melawan Teroris!* (Solo: Jazeera, 2004); Greg Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle, Jamaah Islamiyah, and the Soul of Islam* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004); Nasir Abas, *Melawan Pemikiran Aksi Bom Imam Samudra dan Noordin M. Top* (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2007).

<sup>5</sup> ES Soepriyadi, *Ngruki dan Jaringan Terorisme: Melacak Jejak Abu Bakar Ba'asyir dan Jaringan nya dari Ngruki sampai Bom Bali* (Jakarta: Al-Mawardi Prima, 2003).

<sup>6</sup> Evelyn Alsultany, *Arabs and Muslims in the Media, Race and Representation after 9/11* (New York; London: New York University Press, 2012).

conditioning the domination of combative jihadism, and *jihād* and *just war*.

### **Normative and Historical Meanings of *Jihād***

The concept of *jihād* can be understood in both its normative and historical meanings. Normatively, the word of *jihād* has its etymological root in the Arabic language which means “exertion” or “effort” or “striving”.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, Muslim scholars excavated its functional derivations within the Qur’ān. They found that there are 80 various basic meanings of *jihād* and “war” is only one of them.<sup>8</sup> Through these various meanings, Islamic tradition maintained a general classification that there are two forms of *jihād*, namely the greater *jihād* (*jihād al-akbar*) and the lesser *jihād* (*jihād al-asghar*). While the former means “the effort of inward purification and of a human being’s spiritualisation before his Creator,” the latter means “the holy war”.<sup>9</sup> However, although there are two primary meanings of *jihād*, nowadays, *jihād* which means war has dominated the global public sphere. Its popular meaning tends to be radicalised due to many factors that will be explained in the next chapter.

The lesser *jihād* has been becoming more popular since the moment of 9/11 in the United States (US).<sup>10</sup> Immediately after this moment, the Western world has been blaming “Islam”, “Muslim” and the radical doctrine of holy war for the phenomenon of terrorism that has happened.<sup>11</sup> However, what they have missed is Islam(s), Muslim(s) and the concept(s) of *jihād* are not monolithic.<sup>12</sup> The

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<sup>7</sup> Riaz Hassan, “Conceptions of Jihad and Conflict Resolution in Muslim Societies”, in Shahram Akbarzadeh and Fethi Mansouri (eds.), *Islam and Political Violence: Muslim Diaspora and Radicalism in the West* (London; New York: IB Tauris, 2010), 125-150; David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (California: The University of California Press, 2015); Tariq Ramadan, *Jihad, Violence, War, and Peace in Islam*, trans. by Myriam François (Swansea, UK: Awakening Publications, 2017).

<sup>8</sup> See Ramadan, *Jihad*.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid; Tariq Ramadan, *Islam, the West, and the Challenges of Modernity* (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 2001), 61.

<sup>10</sup> KA Powell, “Framing Islam: An Analysis of US Media Coverage of Terrorism since 9/11”, *Communication Studies*, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2011), 90-112.

<sup>11</sup> John L. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>12</sup> Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds.), *Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

blaming and misunderstanding have happened in a way of over-generalisations which cannot be able to distinguish between peaceful Islam and radical Islam, ordinary Muslims and extremist-jihadist Muslims, and *jibād* for spiritual development and *jibād* for waging war. Even in an interview with CNN, Donald Trump expressed cynically that “I think Islam hates us”.<sup>13</sup> In line with this situation, some Muslims themselves claimed that *jibād* which means war is the most important action that Muslims should do.<sup>14</sup> Prominent Muslim activists such as Sayyid Quṭb, Muḥammad al-Farrāj, Osama b. Laden<sup>15</sup> and even Imam Samudera<sup>16</sup> confidently defended their arguments of the importance of combative jihadism.

However, according to the views of masters of Qur’anic exegesis (sing. *mufasssir*, pl. *mufasssirūn*) and experts of Islamic jurisprudence (sing. *faqih*, pl. *fuqahā’*) in the classical era of Islam, there is no one that mentions that the lesser *jibād* is more important than the greater *jibād*. A set of ensembles of evidence for this part can be found through *al-Maktabah al-Shāmilah*, a software that provides almost all of the hundreds of works of both classical *mufasssirūn* and *fuqahā’* (Comprehensive Library Foundation 2005). Many works, in general, referred to the verses of al-Qur’ān that put *jibād* as the obligation of every Muslim that emphasises the sincere devotion to God. One of the verses, for example, mentions, “But as for those who strive hard (*jibād*) in Our cause—We shall most certainly guide them onto paths that lead unto Us: for, behold, God is true with the doers of good”.<sup>17</sup> These works, moreover, referred also to the prophetic tradition (*ḥadīth*) that highlights the importance of *jibād* as a way of struggle for the self-detainment from lustful minds and acts. For example, the Prophet Muhammad said that “We returned from

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<sup>13</sup> Khaled Beydoun, “In Trump’s America, ‘acting Muslim’ is more dangerous than ever”, in *The Washington Post*. Accessed 17 May 2018.

<sup>14</sup> Noorhaidi Hasan, “Between Transnational Interest and Domestic Politics: Understanding Middle Eastern *Fatwās* on Jihad in the Moluccas”, *Islamic Law and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), 73-92; Rola El-Husseini, “Jihad, and Martyrdom in Contemporary Lebanese Shi’a Discourse”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (2008), 399-414; Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters Islam and the Globalization of Jihad”, *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2010), 53-94; Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, “Remediating Jihad for Western News Audiences”, *Journalism*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2011), 199-216.

<sup>15</sup> Euben and Zaman (eds.), *Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought*.

<sup>16</sup> Abdul Aziz [Imam Samudera], *Aku Melawan Teroris!*.

<sup>17</sup> Q.S. al-‘Ankabūt [29]: 60.

the lesser *jihād* to the greater one,”<sup>18</sup> and “The best *jihād* is a man who is striving for purifying himself and his desire”.<sup>19</sup> The Prophet delivered this message shortly at the moment before Muslims must face a month of Ramadhan when each of them had the most challenging duty of fasting in order to purify his or her spiritual dimensions.<sup>20</sup>

Other normative views come from contemporary *mufasssirūn* and *fuqahā’*. Many of them have emphasised that the greater *jihād* is more essential than the lesser one. Their opinions are similar to their predecessors’ views, though they contextualise this concept in order to ensure its relevance in modern life. For instance, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, apart from his extreme views on certain specific cases, generally, agrees that the best interpretation of *jihād* is the explanations that are stated by the Prophet.<sup>21</sup> It means *jihād* for self-spiritualisation and development is more important than waging war. Parallel with his thought, modern *mufasssirūn* such as Hamka and Quraish Shihab stand for the opinion that mentions Islam is a religion of peace.<sup>22</sup> As a consequence, *jihād* should be expressed via its peaceful faces. It also means that *jihād* provides the teachings of both individual and societal developments of the quality of life.

These normative views on *jihād*, however, have been highly unlikely in line with the current historical realities. Or at least, it has depicted a discontinuity of the history of Islam. Both classical and contemporary *mufasssirūn*’s and *fuqahā’*’s views have not been necessarily implemented by other Muslims. Indeed, in this context, the social, political and cultural complexities of historical realities have become dynamic spaces of the implementations of the Islamic teachings.

The deeper explanation of this discontinuity that covers fragmentations of meanings and expressions of Islam in general and

<sup>18</sup> Abū ‘Abd Allah Mah}mūd Muh}ammad al-H{addād, *Takbrīj Ab}ādīth Ib}ya’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn li al-‘Irāqī wa Ibn al-Subkī wa al-Zubaydī* (Riyad: Dār al-‘Ās}imah li al-Nashr, 1987).

<sup>19</sup> Muh}ammad b. Ismāīl al-Amīr al-S{an‘ānī, *al-Tamwīr: Sharb} al-Jāmi‘ al-Saghir* (Riyad: Maktabah Dār al-Salam, 2014).

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, *Fiqh al-Jihād: Dirāsah Muqāranah li Ab}kāmil wa Falsafatib fi D{an’ al-Qur’an wa al-Sunnah* (Kairo: Maktabah Wahbah, 2009).

<sup>22</sup> Hamka, *Tafsīr al-Azhar*, Vol. 5 (Jakarta: Panjimas, 1982), 217; M. Quraish Shihab, *Tafsīr al-Misbah*, Vol. 9 (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2002), 134-135.

of *jihād*, in particular, has been offered by a prominent Muslim scholar, Abdullah Saeed. He argues that Islam consists of at least three dimensions namely core values, interpretations and manifestations.<sup>23</sup> In the dimension of values, there is no divergence either between Sunnī and Shī'ah, their schools of theology and schools of jurisprudence and others. Every believer would agree that Islam has universal values that are immutable<sup>24</sup> such as rightness, justice, equality, humanity and also monotheism (*tawhīd*). In the dimension of interpretations, Islam is totally fragmented. It depends on what the schools of thought that Muslims believe in. Accordingly, it depicts also complex realities of ways of thinking and methodology in understanding scripture and prophetic tradition. In the dimension of manifestations, Islam has existed both in its socio-political-cultural and material forms which are totally heterogeneous. This can be considered as the reason why in the case of competing for the concept of *jihād*, Muslims have various meanings and expressions of it.

According to this theoretical understanding, it can be understood that normative meanings of *jihād* are different from its historical expressions. Although classical and contemporary *mufassir* and *fuqaha'* emphasise essentials of the greater *jihād* rather than the lesser *jihād*, some Islamists have their own ways both in understanding and expressing *jihād*. Thus, the modern phenomenon of the domination of the discourse of combative jihadism is the historical fact that cannot be denied.

### **Factors of Conditioning the Domination of Combative Jihadism**

It cannot be doubted that the discourse of combative jihadism in the public sphere has been dominated by Islamist-jihadists. This paper argues that there are four central factors that have contributed to this domination. Those are the growth of the ideology of radical Islamism, the Western hegemonic behaviour, globalisation and the absence of alternative narratives.

The first factor that should be primarily examined is ideology. The ideology of jihadism becomes significantly dominant since the

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<sup>23</sup> Abdullah Saeed, *Islam in Australia* (New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 2003), 65; Abdullah Saeed, *Interpreting the Qur'an: Towards a Contemporary Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 116-125.

<sup>24</sup> Adonis, *al-Thābit wa al-Mutah}ammil*, Vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Sāqī, 1994), 258-314.

concept of the combative *jihād* has been viewed as a tenet of Islam by conservative Muslims, particularly in the circle of Wahhabism.<sup>25</sup> How do they deal with this view? They have believed that their interpretation of Islam is the most credible than others. According to them, the most important teaching of Islam is *tawhīd* or faith in the unicity of God which covers all of the aspects of human life. That is why they called themselves as *muwahhidūn* or the defenders of *tawhīd*.<sup>26</sup> In defending this doctrine of *tawhīd*, they have undertaken actions not only in the fields of rituals but also the social and political aspects of life.<sup>27</sup> It means that they do not separate religious and mundane matters. As a consequence, in terms of actions in considering practices of politics, sometimes they have to fight against a regime of domestic politics and in many cases, they have condemned political penetrations of external powers due to they think that both the regime and the external powers violate *tawhīd*.<sup>28</sup> In the midst of strong pressures from both power directions, they believe that *jihād* which means a combative war against the enemies of Islam should be conducted. Thus, they instrumentalise a certain doctrine of Islam (*tawhīd*) which results that the combative jihadism is superior and more important than *jihād* which means a strong effort of the self-spiritualisation and improvement.

In the situation of long-lasting pressures, it has led to the endless struggle for defending *tawhīd* through the combative jihadism. In order to strengthen their power and to gain supports, some conservative clerics have helped to produce fatwas that legitimate the

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<sup>25</sup> Stephen Schwartz, *The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror* (New York: Doubleday, 2002); Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton: Marcus Wiener Publisher, 2005), 154; Amin Saikal, "Westphalian and Islamic Concepts of Sovereignty in the Middle East", in Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford, and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia?* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), 73-82.

<sup>26</sup> Hamid Algar, *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay* (New York: Islamic Publications International, 2002), 1.

<sup>27</sup> James Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 101-116; Saikal, "Westphalian and Islamic Concepts", 77.

<sup>28</sup> Christina Hellmich, "Creating the Ideology of Al Qaeda: From Hypocrites to Salafi-Jihadists", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2008), 111-124; Randall G. Rogan, "Jihad Against Infidels and Democracy: A Frame Analysis of Jihadist Ideology and Jurisprudence for Martyrdom and Violent Jihad", *Communication Monographs*, Vol. 77, No. 3 (2010), 393-413.



implementations of the lesser *jihād*.<sup>29</sup> The persistence campaigns of *jihād* against Muslims' enemies have been strongly disseminated by jihadist groups such as Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), *Jamaah Islāmīyah* and *Laskar Jihad* can be an evidence of the importance of ideology in shaping the domination of the discourse of combative jihadism.<sup>30</sup>

The second factor, the Western hegemonic behaviour is also important to contribute to the domination of the discourse of combative jihadism. This factor has closely connected to the factor of ideology. It can be understood that the resistance to Western behaviour in Muslim countries has strengthened the radicalisation of the ideology of jihadism.<sup>31</sup> It has resulted in strong sentiments of anti-Western, particularly of anti-America, which have been expressed through various actions of combative jihadism. This case has not happened without the influences of the political dynamics within certain Muslim countries. Strong regimes' characters of authoritarianism, dictatorship and despotism which pragmatically have become alliances of America, have urged to the rise of hate, vengeance and "tendency of *jihād*" amongst radical Islamists. In dealing with this, Fawaz A. Gerges conceptualises phenomenologically two central concepts of the enemy in the jihadists' point of view: the near enemy and the far enemy.<sup>32</sup> While the former demonstrates the combative *jihād* against the local government,<sup>33</sup> the latter is directed to fight against the West or America.<sup>34</sup> No matter the

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<sup>29</sup> Noorhaidi Hasan, "Between Transnational Interest and Domestic Politics: Understanding Middle Eastern *Fatwās* on Jihad in the Moluccas", *Islamic Law and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), 73-92;

<sup>30</sup> Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle*; Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia* (New South Wales: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005), 48; Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publication, Cornell University, 2006).

<sup>31</sup> Sabri Ciftci and Güneş Murat Tezcür, "Soft Power, Religion, and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2016), 374-394; Sabri Ciftci, Becky J. O'Donnell, and Allison Tanner, "Who Favors al-Qaeda? Anti-Americanism, Religious Outlooks, and Favorable Attitudes Toward Terrorist Organizations", *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 70, No. 3 (2017), 480-494.

<sup>32</sup> Fawaz A Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 43-79.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 119-150.

American reasons in the region, whether they come for oil,<sup>35</sup> defeating the Soviet domination,<sup>36</sup> security issues of nuclear proliferation,<sup>37</sup> protecting the state of Israel,<sup>38</sup> exporting democracy,<sup>39</sup> or “war on terrorism”,<sup>40</sup> all of them have escalated the domination of the combative jihadism. The popular cases of the declaration of *jihād* that were published by Osama b. Laden *vis-a-vis* the regime of Saudi Arabia and America,<sup>41</sup> Muḥammad al-Farrāj *vis-a-vis* the Egyptian regime and the West,<sup>42</sup> and Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī *vis-à-vis* the Iraqi and Syrian regimes and America<sup>43</sup> can support this argument.

The third factor is globalisation. Globalisation determines the accessibility of two primary things: human migration and borderless sharing information. Due to the development of technology—thanks to the Western modernisation of the 21<sup>st</sup> century—the Muslim world has encountered the new mode of transportation and new media. Because the former has provided modern vehicles such as planes and ships, problems of reaching distances have been relatively being solved. In the context of Muslims’ migration, specifically in the case

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<sup>35</sup> Joseph McMillan, “US Interest and Objectives”, in Richard D. Sokolsky (ed.), *The United States and the Persian Gulf: Reshaping Security Strategy for the Post-Containment Era* (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2003), 9-36; Abdulhay Yahya Zalloum, *Oil Crusades: America through Arab Eyes* (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

<sup>36</sup> Michael C. Hudson, “The United States in the Middle East”, in Louis Fawcett (ed.), *International Relations of the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 356-379.

<sup>37</sup> Judith S. Yaphe, “Gulf Security Perceptions and Strategies”, in Richard D Sokolsky (ed.), *The United States and the Persian Gulf: Reshaping Security Strategy for the Post-Containment Era* (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 2003), 37-60.

<sup>38</sup> Grant F. Smith, *Big Israel: How Israel’s Lobby Moves America* (Washington, DC: Middle Eastern Policy, Inc., 2016), 259-284; Hudson, “The United States in the Middle East”, 356-379.

<sup>39</sup> Shahram Akbarzadeh and Benjamin MacQueen, “Democracy Promotion: An Unfortunate Legacy”, in Shahram Akbarzadeh, Benjamin MacQueen, James Piscatori, and Amin Saikal (eds.), *American Democracy Promotion in the Changing Middle East: From Bush to Obama* (London; New York: Routledge, 2013), 1-8.

<sup>40</sup> Charles Webel and Mark Tomass (eds.), *Assessing the War on Terror: Western and Middle Eastern Perspectives* (London; New York: Routledge, 2017).

<sup>41</sup> Usama Bin Laden, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holly Places”, in Roxanne L Euben, Muhammad Qasim Zaman (eds.), *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), 436-459.

<sup>42</sup> Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?*, 15-20.

<sup>43</sup> Fawaz A. Gerges, *ISIS: A History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).

of the massive diaspora of Islamist agencies throughout the world, it has notified the emergence of Islamist transnationalism.<sup>44</sup> Accordingly, Islamists have campaigned their ideologies of jihadism and established branches of Islamist movements. As Fealy and Bubalo have emphasised, in terms of disseminating Islamist ideologies, it has facilitated one way of ideologization from the Middle East to others—particularly in Southeast Asia.<sup>45</sup> It has been argued, additionally, mostly Muslim jihadists in the region have had an ideology of jihadism that tends to be coloured by the Arab-Islam nuances instead of their cultural indigenous comprehension. Important jihadist figures in Indonesia such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Ja'far Umar Thalib, they become leaders of Islamist organisations such as Jamaah Islamiyah and Laskar Jihad respectively.

In addition, Muslims now, not only can use newspaper, fax, radio and television, but also the internet, smartphone and social media. Through these new media, they can find, take, give and share any information they need, anytime and from anywhere. As the nature of the new media, according to anthropologists, Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson, it arises the new publics as a new space for new people with new thinking.<sup>46</sup> The new media provide highly sophisticated technologies that facilitate Muslims as social agents to communicate with each other transnationally, without any disruption from any dominant political power. In short, from these new media, they gain their freedom: either the freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of religion and belief, or freedom of expression. It means globalisation via its new media has provided wider access for jihadists to develop their ideology of the combative jihadism. Indeed, roles of media have significantly contributed to disseminate and foster the expansion of this ideology.<sup>47</sup> Through this way, they also have

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<sup>44</sup> Azyumardi Azra, "Islam in Southeast Asia: Tolerance and Radicalism", *CSCI Islamic Issues Briefing Paper Series*, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia (2005), 1-3.

<sup>45</sup> Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?*

<sup>46</sup> Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson, "Redefining Muslim publics", in Dale F. Eickelman and John W. Anderson (eds.), *New Media in the Muslim World: The Merging Public Sphere* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 1-18.

<sup>47</sup> Merlyna Lim, "Islamic Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of the Internet", *Policy Studies*, No. 18 (2005), 34-36; Hoskins and O'Loughlin, "Remediating Jihad", 199-216.

chances to develop their networks globally.<sup>48</sup> Important evidence for this argument is the event of 9/11. It demonstrates the roles of globalisation in encouraging the emergence of globalised jihadism. Another evidence is the growth of the project of the “electronic jihad” (or the online *jihād*) which gains advantages from the global access of social media.<sup>49</sup> Thus, globalisation which gives a significant contribution to the popularity of jihadism definitely is a highly likely very important factor.

The last factor is the lack of alternative narratives in the discourse contestation. It does not mean that there is no such kind of counter-narratives against the combative jihadism. The echo of alternative ideas is difficult to be heard by the public. Although there are some moderate (and progressive) Muslim intellectuals that have promoted the essentials of the greater *jihād* rather than the lesser *jihād*, such as Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, Tariq Ramadan, Amin Saikal, Jasser Audah, Abdullah Saeed, Hashim Kamali, Hamka, M. Quraish Shihab and others, their voices are not as loud as jihadists’ voices. It happens, because they unlikely have any intention to attack or disturb the security matters of the West. Accordingly, the Western media seems not quite interested to highlight their roles, thoughts and alternative narratives. Another reason is their level of intensity in using media and new media, is not as massive as the project of online jihadism that spends 24 hours every day. Thus, in this context, although they have better ideas of *jihād*, these ideas seem to be defeated by the discourse of combative jihadism.

Political manoeuvres of the US in the Muslim world have stimulated not only positive responses but also resistance, mainly from the circles of jihadists. This resistance has hardened the conservative ideology of Islamism which encourages the massive growth of the ideology of the combative jihadism. In the context of this growth, globalisation has given wider access to ensure the process of nurturing and sophisticating the ideology of jihadism. In this situation, indeed, the emergence of alternative narratives in the discourse constellation has been absent or at least its roles should be questioned. Therefore, all of these factors have conditioned each

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<sup>48</sup> Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters Islam and the Globalization of Jihad”, *International Security*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2010), 53-94.

<sup>49</sup> Martin Rudner, “Electronic Jihad: The Internet as al-Qaeda’s Catalyst for Global Terror”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2017), 10-23.

other in complex multiple interplays which in turn contributed to the domination of the discourse of combative jihadism.

### ***Jihād* and Just War**

In a normative and legalistic view, the lesser *jihād* is relatively similar to the Western concept of *just war*. Both *jihād* and *just war* are similar because their ultimate objectives have a similar direction and their specific rules of the declaration of war and conducting the war, are also alike. However, implementations of *jihād* throughout the modern history of Islam, mainly in the post 9/11 era, tend to be brutalised and “breaking the law”.

The first argument that emphasises a similarity between *jihād* and *just war* is, their ultimate objectives have an analogous direction. Although their main references are different, the universal values that they have struggled for are relatively similar. While *jihād* was born from the religious tradition with its theological justifications (the Qur’ān and ḥadīth), *just war* was reformulated from the secular tradition without any theological reference.<sup>50</sup> While *jihād* has its precedence in the prophetic traditions and the practices of the Prophet Muhammad’s companions (*al-Rāshidūn*), *just war* has its roots in the circle of Christian intellectuals such as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas, though it was viewed as the secular and mundane thing. However, both war in the Islamic law and in the Western concept should be intended to serve the values of rightness, humanity and justice.<sup>51</sup>

The second argument lays on the primary rules of *jihād* and *just war* namely the declaration of war and the rule of during the war. These rules of both concepts are relatively similar. First, in context of the declaration of war or *jus ad bellum* (justice to war), both *jihād* and *just war* agree that (1) “war must be declared by a legitimate authority,” (2) “war must be in self-defence,” (3) “must be chosen only as a last resort.”<sup>52</sup> Second, in the context of conducting war or *jus in bello* (justice in war), (1) “war must be fought with proportionate means,”

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<sup>50</sup> Charles W. Amjad-Ali, “Jihad and Just War Theory: Dissonance and Truth”, *Dialog*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2009), 239-247.

<sup>51</sup> Ramadan, *Jihad*, 139.

<sup>52</sup> Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), 169-170; Amjad-Ali, “Jihad and Just War Theory”, 243; Jamila Hussain, *Islam, Its Law, and Society* (Sydney: Federation Press, 2011), 58-60.

(2) “war must be fought out of love for humanity,” (3) “non-combatants may not be attacked.”<sup>53</sup>

However, the similarity of both concepts should not necessarily be understood that they do not have conceptual problems. In the concept of International Relations in Islam, the world is divided into at least three parts: the territory of the Islamic state (*dār al-Islām*), the enemy territory or the territory of war (*dār al-ḥarb*) and the territory in a treaty relation with Islam (*dār al-‘ahd*). While there is external aggression (from *dār al-ḥarb*) that enters *dār al-Islām*, waging *jihād* is a collective obligatory. It should be done under the order of the Muslim ruler. In this case, James Turner Johnson critically argues that while the existence of the “Islamic state” should be questioned, it has impacted on the validity of the order of *jihād* and the authority of the Muslim ruler.<sup>55</sup> The next criticism comes from Majid Khaduri who re-examines both the definition and criteria of the “Islamic state”, mainly whether it should be governed by a Muslim ruler, should implement the Islamic law, and also whether the composition of the people in the territory should be Muslims, the people of the book (Jews and Christians), non-Muslims under protection of Muslim (*dhimmis*) and so on.<sup>56</sup> In addition, Alia Brahimi also questions whether *jihād* can be declared by non-state actors, conducted beyond the Muslims territory and even franchised globally throughout countries in the world.<sup>57</sup>

All of the criticisms cover the major issues of the Islamic International Relations (*siyar*), the law of war and peace in Islam, the concept of nation-states and Muslim countries, and globalisation. Johnson, Khaduri and Brahimi are right when they mention that there is no the Islamic state anymore today, the composition of the citizens of Muslim countries is highly pluralistic and multicultural, and *jihād* becomes an object of political instrumentalisations by many groups the globalisation era. What they need to consider is principally the concept of Islamic law (especially *jihād*) is not in its final form. It means, as a matter of interpretations and manifestations, it can be re-

<sup>53</sup> Khadduri, *War and Peace*, 172; Amjad-Ali, “Jihad and Just War Theory”, 243; Hussain, *Islam*, 60.

<sup>55</sup> James Turner Johnson, “Jihad and Just War”, *First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion & Public Life*, Issue 124 (2002), 12-14.

<sup>56</sup> Khadduri, *War and Peace*, 167-170.

<sup>57</sup> Alia Brahimi, *Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

evaluated, reinterpreted and redeveloped.<sup>58</sup> In another word, *jihād* as a concept is an object of *ijtihad*. Consequently, *jihād* should not necessarily be implemented to defend the Islamic state but the Muslims' rights and their human dignity in any country where they live. *Jihād* also should not be done due to any motivation of discriminations. For example, because other people are non-Muslims then they can be fought. Another important thing is *jihād* that has been franchised globally should not be directed to attack civilians or non-combatants. Indeed these formulations are difficult to be implemented.

In spite of the fact that there are conceptual problems within the concept of *jihād* itself, many actors have insisted that the applicability of *jihād* is still valid and even can be used in a sense of offensive war. For example, Osama bin Laden claimed to be responsible for the 9/11 attack that was happened in the US.<sup>59</sup> He also ordered many Muslims to wage *jihād* against American people no matter whether they are combatants or non-combatants.<sup>60</sup> Abu Bakar Baasyir directly instructed their executors of *jihād* such as Imam Samudera, Ali Imron, Mukhlas and Amrozi to blast bombs in Kuta, Bali, Indonesia.<sup>61</sup> Both cases and perhaps in many other cases were dedicated to the prices of Muslims' rights and dignity. They accused that the Western hegemonic behaviour destroyed and violated Muslims, their rights, the Muslim world and Islam. They condemned what the US and its allies did in Palestine, Iraq, and others. They also claimed that they have an authority to declare and conduct *jihād* against their enemies. In this way, *jihād* was the last resort that they could do. However, their concept and practice of *jihād* were also motivated by strong anti-Western sentiments, hate, vengeance and discrimination. Because most Americans were non-Muslims, they should be killed. In their operations, they also targeted (innocent) civilians. Thus, it can be understood that their implementations of *jihād* were highly illegal. Their implementation met neither the requirements of the Islamic concept of *jus ad bellum* nor *jus in bello*.

## Concluding Remarks

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<sup>58</sup> Ramadan, *Jihad*.

<sup>59</sup> Laden, "Declaration of War against the Americans".

<sup>60</sup> Johnson, "Jihad and Just War".

<sup>61</sup> Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle*.

Although normatively the concept of *jihād* emphasises self-spiritualisation, historically the domination of the discourse of combative *jihād* has become an obvious reality. The factors that have conditioned this reality are the ideology of conservative Islamism that has been hardened and strengthened by anti-Western or anti-American sentiments, due to their hegemonic behaviour in the Muslim world. Accordingly, there are condemnations of American political manoeuvres, massive campaigns of *jihād* as a holy war and also invitations to join in the agenda of *jihād* that have spread out not only throughout the Muslim countries but also others. Either these condemnations, campaigns or invitations have been done via media both in its old or new forms. It means that globalisation has helped to significantly disseminate the ideology of combative jihadism.

As a consequence, when there is a question of whether the concept of *jihād* is similar to the Western concept of *just war* or not, the historicity of the complex reality of the domination of combative jihadism will guide the answer. In a normative and legalistic view, furthermore, *jihād* means offensive war is relatively similar to the Western concept of *just war*, especially the concept of *jus ad bellum*. However, its implementations throughout the modern history of Islam, mainly in the post 9/11 era, have seemed to contradict the doctrine of Islamic *jus ad bellum* that emphasises the defensive purpose. Yet, how do Muslims deal with the implementations of the offensive combative *jihād* in the future, would be dependent on their theological interpretations and the external factors (social, economy and politics) conditioning.

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