

Lee Myung Bak's Decision on Sunshine Policy: South Korean National Interests or Personal Decision?

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Abstract

Sunshine Policy that had been implemented by South Korean Government on Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyeon's administration from 1998-2008. This policy started to do cooperative behavior for treating North Korea as a partner, not contrarily, yet the Sunshine Policy was considered as a failure by Lee Myung-Bak's administration, thereupon stopped offhandedly despite recent cultural and cooperative diplomacy that had been done by his successor President Moon Jae-In. Then Why the South Korean government at the time of President Lee Myung-Bak stopped the Sunshine Policy offhand? In the scheme of National Interest idea, North Korea still a predominant threat that very paramount for South Korean national interest, even an accommodative and cooperative policy like Sunshine Policy could not emphasize South Korean national interests. This paper also tries to analyze the issue with explaining foreign policy decision making factors, such as the domestic and external factor, decision environment, and psychology factor of President Lee Myung-Bak at that time.

Keywords: *Foreign Policy Decision Making, Korea, Lee Myung-Bak, National Interest, Sunshine Policy*

Introduction

After World War II, Korea was divided into two. It signed the emergence of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US as a result of their ideological spread. North Korea was developed by communist ideology of the Soviet Union then intended to spread its territory and ideology to South Korea. Based on history, it caused war and broke Korea up into two different countries until now.

South Korea in the era of President Kim Dae-Jung made a breakthrough in the policy to reunify two-divided Korea due to war. This breakthrough was called as Sunshine Policy. According to K.Y. Son (2006) *"The Sunshine Policy is the policy of South Korea towards North Korea during Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun presidency."* The formal name of the policy was the "Comprehensive Engagement Policy towards North Korea" and first announced by the 15th South Korean President, Kim Dae-jung, in 1998. The term "Sunshine Policy" was originated from one of Aesop's fables, "The North Wind and the Sun," as the policy aimed for loosening containment on North Korea, embracing North Korea, and eventually making the North Korean

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government to denuclearize by itself. This could mean that Sunshine Policy is formulated for North Korea in the hope that can soften and want to cooperate as a partner for the benefit of better Korea.

This policy has principles, which underlies their formulations, which are: (a) No armed provocation by the North will be tolerated. (b) The South will not attempt to absorb the North in any way. (c) The South actively seeks cooperation. Basic principles of Sunshine Policy were used as guidance in decision making related to North Korea. In these principles, especially in principle number three, clearly and explicitly state that South Korea will cooperatively active and accommodative make North Korea as a partner for cooperation. Therefore, like Fuqua (2011) said investment as development of Kaesong Industrial Area and uncountable efforts will always be done by South Korea if North Korea becomes good partner for cooperation so although principle number two states that South Korea does not want to take North Korea, but essentially, this policy was taken by South Korea in the era of President Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyeon for two Korea reunification by peaceful means, not by violence.

During the policy practice, there were many benefits that could be gained by two Korea, as stated by H. Paik (2002),

"Apparently, the Sunshine Policy elicited active economic and cultural interactions between the two and improved inter-Korean relations in multifaceted aspects. The objectives of the Sunshine Policy were more specific and substantial than any of the previous policies towards North Korea. Besides its direct influence on inter-Korean relations, the Sunshine Policy tremendously helped South Korean economy."

Even, President Kim Dae-Jung who initiates Sunshine Policy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. According to Nobel Organization (2000), a motivation of awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Kim Dae-Jung is *"for his work for democracy and human rights in South Korea and in East Asia in general, and for peace and reconciliation with North Korea in particular"*. Moreover, the Nobel Organization gave a nickname to President Kim Dae-Jung as "The Sunshine Politician".

However, Sunshine Policy was still discontinued by President Lee Myung-Bak and considered as a failure although this Sunshine Policy has been occurred since 1998-2008 even though it was full of humanism value and uphold

peace and also recently, similar steps like cultural and cooperative diplomacy, had been done by his successor President Moon Jae-in. Meanwhile, President Park Geun-Hye that came from the same party with President Lee Myung-Bak, came to power between President Lee Myung-Bak and President Moon Jae-In stand in the same position as President Lee Myung-Bak with strong views on North Korea. This could be seen from the party she came from and several policies toward the North. Therefore, this paper questions why the South Korean government in the era of President Lee-Myung Bak just stop the Sunshine Policy.

Therefore, in order to know why South Korean government in the era of President Lee Myung-Bak just stops the Sunshine Policy. This paper argues that Sunshine Policy cannot guarantee and give positive input for national importance so that the Sunshine Policy is reasonable to be discontinued even though it is full of factors that put forward cooperative and accommodative value.

Based on the literature review that I have done, mostly papers in this field argues policy issues do more prominent than others with theoretical framing such interdependence theory, classical realism and classical liberalism, and policy-institutionalization, without comprehensive explanation like deepening on idiosyncratic factor and a combination of domestic and external factors thoroughly. Such as Kim Inhan (2017) said, *“The false promise of engagement policy should not be surprising, as its underlying assumptions violate findings and wisdom accumulated from well-established theories of international relations on economic interdependence, engagement, and aid. Economic interdependence does not automatically and necessarily pacify the interacting partners.”*. Then, Ahn Mun-Suk (2006) said that *“South Korea came to have a more balanced security relationship with the U.S. by adopting liberal mechanisms in the post- Cold War era. Classical realism anticipates the small state’s influence in balances of power in international politics. Liberals observe that small states are also likely to rely not on the use of force as a technique of state-craft but on international legal norms due to their limited military capabilities.”*. Also, Bonhak Koo and Changhee Nam (2001) said that *“To build confidence, Pyongyang must be sincere in Inter-Korean Military Talks. Measure could include hot-line, institutionalization of military dialogues, personnel exchanges, North Korean compliance to the armistice agreement, peaceful utilization of the DMZ, and notification of military exercises and exchange of observers”*

Secondly, the beneficial output from partnerships and reciprocal relations between North and South Korea through Sunshine Policy with some critics through critic analysis and historical patterns model, Such as Scott Snyder (2009) said that *“South Korea’s capacity to effectively manage relations with regional powers, engage with North Korea, and meet its global commitments, based on a critical review of Lee Myung-Bak’s initial steps in relations with the United States, Japan, and China, and recent developments in inter-Korean relations.”*. Then, Valérie Gelézeau (2013) said *“The tangible and intangible areas of contact created by North-South engagement during the years of the Sunshine Policy. In three theme, 'Space', 'People', and 'Representations'.”*. Also, Hyun-Key Kim Hogarth (2012) said that, on the reciprocity of two Koreas that time and its critics, *“The North ‘jettisoned’ the principle of reciprocity, and the financial aid aimed to help the starving North Korean masses was used to develop weaponry including nuclear bombs and long-range missiles, the South Korean public began to question its validity.”*

Therefore, this paper trying to capture the Sunshine Policy issue under Lee Myung-Bak Presidency with mix between national interest concept by Hans J. Morgenthau Physical Security Identity (Territory and Sovereignty Integrity); Economic-Politic Identity (Economic-Politic Regime); Society Cultural Identity (Tradition and Culture); and foreign policymaking theory by Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr to search a whole answer from dimensions like Domestic Influence; International or external Factor; Decision Environment, and Psychology Factor.


National Interest and Foreign Policy Decision Making

Seeing change in President Lee Myung’s attitude in issuing policy for South Korea in facing North Korea, this paper uses Morgenthau’s national interest and Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr’s foreign policy decision-making that serves as analytical tool to see President Lee Myung’s background in issuing policy for South Korea in facing North Korea by discontinuing the Sunshine Policy. The usage of these theories facilitate in ability to analyze President Lee Myung’s attitude in issuing a policy for South Korea in facing North Korea substituting the Sunshine Policy.

National interest also is a tool to become the basis of national policies, especially foreign policy. National interest also can be used to explain and understand the behavior of a country, explain fundamental objectives, and determinant factors,

which become headspring of the policymakers in each country in generating their foreign policy. The national interest of a country particularly is elements forming the most vital needs of the country, such as defense, military security, and economic welfare.

Figure 1. Morgenthau's National Interest Scheme




Therefore, according to the view of Hans J. Morgenthau (1952) about national interest as he mentioned in his scientific journal, "Thus all nations do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations" It means that it is a country's goal in protecting physical security identity, economic-politic identity, and society cultural identities from other country's interference, to explain in more detail the meaning of these identities are: (a) The country should be able to defend its territorial integrity (physical security identity); (b) The country should be able to defend its economic-politic regime (economic-politic identity); (c) The country should be able to maintain the norm of ethnic, religion, linguistic and history (culture and tradition) of its people (society cultural identity).

Morgenthau (1952) also mentioned that "The necessary elements of the national interest have a tendency to swallow up the variable elements so that 'in the end all kinds of objectives, actual or potential, are justified in terms of national survival'" It means that usually national interest of each country is intended as a

country's attempt to defend its sovereignty within international system, either influencing other countries or maintain the country's condition. Therefore, Morgenthau considered national interest theory both as tool and goal of international politic action of a country. Hence, it could be explained by the Figure 1.


National interest used in analyzing research questions related to the change of a country's attitude in issuing and discontinuing policy. Based on Morgenthau's view, this paper analysis will be analyzed using identity instruments mentioned in operationalization scheme in the national interest domain. Hence, by the usage of this national interest theory, it can explain why Sunshine Policy is considered unable to give a guarantee on the national interest of South Korea so this policy is just stopped by President Lee Myung-Bak. Then, the analysis can be formed based on Figure 2.

Figure 2. Morgenthau's National Interest Scheme of South Korea



This paper support the Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr (2010) perspective about foreign policy decision factors include decision environment, psychological factor, international factor, and domestic influence. Each of these factors could lead to the leading actor behavior or decision process while the subject will or done foreign policy at times. Hence, the operationalization of this theory can be depicted by Figure 3.

Figure 3. Mint’s Lee Myung Bak’s Foreign Policy Decision Making Scheme



Decision environment means the environment when a decision was made, including the elite environment of the leading actor's government, such as ministries, party, and so on. The psychological factor is a factor that came from inside of the leading actor, such as mind, educational background, and so on. International factor means external factor when the foreign policy was implemented. Domestic influence means a domestic factor of the state when the leading actor implemented the foreign policy. Therefore, Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr considered foreign policy decision factors as an instrument to know what behind implemented foreign policy.

Lee Myung-Bak’s Choice Determinant Factors

a. South Korea’s Physical Security Identity (Territory and Sovereignty Integrity)

Physical security identity is an identity or tool covering security in the matter of basic security such as protecting country's territorial area, maintaining sovereignty, guarding against conflict and war, also securing country's security. It means that physical security is a basic thing that should be concerned with a policy related to a national interest of a country.

President Lee Myung-Bak judges sunshine Policy as unable to guarantee South Korea's physical security identity. Territorial and sovereignty integrity in the national interest of South Korea is regarded not well accommodated by the Sunshine Policy. This policy is seen as major failure in the insecurity of South Korea's national interest in the field of physical security including military security and defense, because when the Sunshine Policy was applied, exactly in 2006, after 8 years of North Korea's dismissal in conducting nuclear engineering trials, North Korea conducted nuclear trials for Rodong missile, Scud Missile, and including ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) Taepodong-2 rocket capable of traveling up to a height of 15.000 kilometers.

Then, Sam Kim (2017) said, in the same year, *“In October, North Korean National News Agency or KCNA officially announced their success in launch results and nuclear trials related to nuclear weapons.”* Next, in 2009, exactly a year after President Lee Myung-Bak became the President of South Korea after election conducted in 2009, North Korea via North Korean National News Agency or KCNA announced to do nuclear engineering trial test related to nuclear weapon for the second time through official press release of North Korean government that as well stated that they were no longer concerned in subject to ceasefire agreement that was agreed by North Korean Government and South Korean Government after the Korean War on 27th July 1953.

In addition, on 26th March 2010, a year when Sunshine Policy officially stopped effectively, North Korean Government launched an underwater torpedo that destroyed a South Korean navy military ship causing the death of 46 South Korean navy troops in the sea near the disputed boundaries between North and South Korea. Subsequently, Sunshine Policy still not changes North Korea's view in understanding and obeying not only relationship between Korea, but also its relationship with international world. Lies and threat done by North Korea is concrete evidence that North Korea does not want to change their attitude although Sunshine Policy is full of cooperative and accommodative value and meaning for North Korea. Thereupon, President Lee Myung-Bak himself with a various case related to defense and security of South Korea's territorial and sovereignty integrity, stated by Ronald Popeski (2010), *“There are no positive changes to North Korea's position*

that corresponds to the support and cooperation offered by us." Hereafter, in a white paper issued on 2010 by the South Korean Ministry of National Unification, Presiden Lee Myung-Bak said that, "We have always tolerated North Korea's brutality, time and again. I will continue to take stern measures to hold the North accountable. From now on, the Republic of Korea will not tolerate any provocative act by the North and will maintain the principle of proactive deterrence. If our territorial waters, airspace, or territory is violated, we will immediately exercise our right to self-defense."

It means that Sunshine Policy is considered as a fundamental mistake and failure in relating to North Korea. This also can be caused by the absence of good intention and reciprocal and positive feedback done by North Korea over South Korea, corresponding to mutual peace manifestation in Korea Peninsula which had not reached yet since mutually agreed ceasefire in 1953 when the Korean War ended. Therefore, President Lee Myung-Bak in 2010 stopped Sunshine Policy effectively. Therefore, some of the main impacts on South Korea were nuclear trials that very dangerous, not only for South Korea, but for regional, and international stability, and also casualties of their South Korean Navy personnel that died from the incident of Baengnyeong Island that I will explain further at later sections.

b. South Korea's Economic-Politic Identity (Economic-Politic Regime)

Economic-politic identity is an identity or tool covering welfare, prosperity, and condition presenting a well state life. A good economic-politic regime will invent good stability so the economy will grow positively. A healthy state's expenditure balance and qualified investment climate also help to create a well economic-politic regime in a country, as the economy and politics should normally go together to help and complement each other.

Morgenthau (1952) said in his scientific journal, "*The survival of a political unit, such as a nation, in its identity is the irreducible minimum, the necessary element of its interests vis-a-vis other units.*" It means that the sustainability of a country's politic entity is a crucial element for a country. Without stable government and condition, it is impossible for a country to be actively making an action in state and economic life. Therefore, a prime condition is needed in state life of a country.

Incidents threatening South Korea's physical security identity during the Sunshine Policy effectuation era are strongly influenced by the safety of South Korea's economic-politic identity, too. It is caused by the incidents threatening South Korea's physical security identity during Sunshine Policy era. The Guardian (2006) said *"North Korea said today it had performed its first-ever nuclear weapons test. The test was performed "with indigenous wisdom and technology 100%", the agency said, adding that no radiation leaked from the site."* Those experiments, such as nuclear trials for Rodong Missile, Scud Missile, and including ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) Taepodong-2 rocket conducted by North Korean government, which are as a threat for South Korea's economic-politic regime stability.

Table 1. Yearly Intra-Korean Trade Volume 1989-2010

Yearly Intra-Korean Trade Volume [unit: US\$ 1million]

Year	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Jan-June 2010
Inbound (Import)	19	12	10	16	17	17	22	18	19	9	12	15	17	22	28	35	44	57	79	93	99	553
Outbound (Export)	-	2	6	11	8	18	6	7	11	13	21	27	37	44	59	73	89	113	130	188	245	441
Total	19	14	16	27	25	35	28	30	32	22	33	42	51	66	77	114	133	170	209	287	344	994

Afterward, if it is seen from the side of the financial and economic condition of South Korea during the effectuation of Sunshine Policy from white paper version of South Korean Ministry of Unification (2010), explicitly elucidated that inter-Korean trade relationship during the effectuation of Sunshine Policy did not bring many benefits for South Korea. Moreover, since December 2008, South Korean Ministry of National Unification mentioned that, *"Monthly inter-Korean trade figures revealed that trade volumes had declined every month since 2008 when North Korea imposed*

restrictions on overland travel.", like shown by the table 1 based on The 2010 White Book of South Korean Ministry of National Unification.

It means that the Sunshine Policy does not give a stable economic regime for South Korea although at the beginning of this policy's effectuation intra-Korean trade had grown significantly. As illustrated by the graphic above, although intra-Korean trade volume shows positive things for several years, in 2008 it reached the trading peak, but since 2009, the intra-Korean trade started to show decreasing numbers, it can be associated with the emergence of review on Sunshine Policy which had been implemented for 10 years since 1998, before eventually was decided to be just stopped effectively by President Lee Myung-Bak in 2010. Since the economic gaps between two Koreas are widely unbalanced, then, why so-called the inter-trade between North Korea and South Korea very integral? This trade tried to established one Korea economy that the trades become a catalyst to reconciliation and unitizing Korean Peninsula economy into one, bridging their gapped economy toward integration as one Korea's economy in the future.

c. South Korea's Society Cultural Identity (Tradition and Culture)

Society cultural identity is an identity or tool covering public welfare condition of a country by concerning or guarantying sustainability of humanity, culture, and tradition entity well maintained. National interest should normally present a good guarantee to maintain culture and tradition entity of the people in a country. Society is the most basic thing of a policy generated by a state government. Hence, a country's national interest should normally give a feasible guarantee for its people humanity.

Society culture and tradition is a fundamental thing of a community. Culture is an attached thing and becomes an identity for the people of a country. Meanwhile, tradition is something that has been implemented since long ago and becomes part of the life of a group of people, usually from the same country, culture, time, or religion. Therefore, it can be concluded that national interest of a country cannot be separated from the people culture and tradition of a country in order to support its people humanity.

The people of a country are the first subject who will experience a positive or negative impact from a country's policy. Society cultural identity is strongly related to the tradition and culture of a social entity. A good policy is a policy that can protect and give good access to accommodate society interest about culture and tradition of the society. As reported by the VOA on November 2010 related to South Korea's society cultural identity in Sunshine Policy failure, "The ministry's report complains about the lack of progress on other critical issues, including reuniting separated families and the release or information about South Korean prisoners of war, as well as citizens abducted by the North's agents." The human of the separated families of two Koreas, why it is important? the people of two Koreas is the rigid manifesto of Korean culture legacy, since the two Koreas, slowly developed new pathways for their respective Korea, such as South Korea is more emphasizing on liberty, and North Korea is more emphasizing on socialism and dictatorship.

This means that Sunshine Policy cannot guarantee South Korea's society culture and tradition, in this case are unable to give access freely to separated family reunification in two Korea after Korean War and kidnapped South Korean people's condition also not transparent information about South Korean prisoners of war who are imprisoned by North Korean government. Later, in the white paper issued by South Korean Ministry of National Unification (2010) mentioned that, "*However, no progress was made because of divergent views of the two sides. The South urged fundamental solutions to humanitarian issues, including those of separated families, POWs, and abductees.*" It later becomes justification that Sunshine Policy still incapable to guarantee South Korea's national interest although it has been implemented for 10 years because it does not change North Korea's view and behavior related to humanity problem for Korean society cultural identity.

d. Lee Myung-Bak's Decision Environment

The Decision Environment means how President Lee Myung-Bak's inner circle of his government involved on giving pressure to him when terminated Sunshine Policy and changed it. This could be his ministries, his party, or even his advisors. These particular persons persuaded President Lee Myung-Bak's choice on

Sunshine Policy. His party, The Saenuri Party or also known as The Grand National Party or GNP or now known as Liberty Korea Party, The Britannica Encyclopedia (2018) classified it as a conservative political party in South Korea. It advocates fiscal responsibility, a market-based economy, and caution in dealing with North Korea. The 2007 presidential election was a commanding victory for GNP candidate and former Seoul mayor Lee Myung-Bak, who campaigned on a platform that promised economic growth and government reform.

As explained above, the Sunshine Policy does not give stable economic regime for South Korea although at the beginning of this policy's effectuation on intra-Korean trade had grown significantly. Then, the inter-Korean trade relationship during the effectuation of Sunshine Policy did not bring many benefits for South Korea. Therefore, with the clear alignment of his party that opposes President Kim Dae-Jung and President Roh Moo-Hyeon's Democratic Party and supported by the explanation above, it is blunt why President Lee Myung-Bak's decision environment demanded that Sunshine Policy should be terminated.

e. Lee Myung-Bak's Psychology Factor

Psychology factors mean factors that come from inside of the leading actor, such as mind, educational background, and so on. President Lee Myung-Bak is a businessman that became CEO of a company in South Korea. He also was a mayor for Seoul, South Korea. As his background as a businessman, usually, he will pursue benefit, efficiency, and effective of matters. Therefore, President Lee Myung-Bak would pursue a pragmatic policy that mixed with his party background that embodied conservatism. It is very possible and likely with the background like explained above. President Lee Myung-Bak would end the implementation of Sunshine Policy at that time. Aidan Foster-Carter (2008) also said that "*He (President Lee Myung-Bak) himself is not that interested in the North, he had planned to close the unification ministry, folding it into the foreign ministry*".

As I quoted from Chosun Ilbo newspaper (2007-12-20), "While chairman of Hyundai Engineering and Construction, I sometimes visited Pohang to attend some events at Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation. But I went back to Seoul as soon as I finished my business there. The town always reminds me of the extreme

poverty I experienced there." This adds to the proponent that President Lee is a pragmatic person with a sense of a hard working man and would be doing something to improve the country with practical way, not with theoretical way.

f. International Factor

The International Factors explain about the external factor of why foreign policy was made. Due to the interconnected world, the external factors could lead to how and why a foreign policy was implemented at the first time. Outside pressure and international political bargains have some integral parts with a foreign policy after all.

The 2008 Global Economy Crisis, US-S.Korea Alliance Partnership (including the visa waiver program and US-S.Korea FTA), and Trilateral cooperation between S.Korea-China-Japan is a focal point for the termination of Sunshine Policy. Moreover, Eunsook Yang (2008) said that President Lee Myung-Bak "focused on finalizing a basic framework for diplomacy with the four important powers (China-Japan-Russia-US) implicated to South Korea and laying down the groundwork to build mature foreign relations as a middle power and to reactivate the weak economy during the first year of his administration." Moreover, with the crisis that happened that time in 2008, his administration also stated that announced \$130bn financial rescue package to shore up the banking system and stabilize markets amiss a global financial crisis.

Furthermore, Chung-in Moon (2012) have said that "U.S. President George W. Bush's fault for disrupting those efforts before they (North Korea and South Korea) had a chance to build on political and economic systems that might lead to coexistence and eventually to peaceful unification." All of these external factors could add more pressure to President Lee Myung-Bak's choice to stop the Sunshine Policy.

g. South Korean Domestic Factor

Domestic factor means a factor that came from inside the country, and in this case is South Korea itself. The dynamics of domestic situation could add more pressure on why President Lee Myung-Bak decided to stop the implementation

of the Sunshine Policy. In March 2010, a South Korean warship was soaked in the Yellow Ocean off Baengnyeong Island, slaughtering 46 mariners, and a global group of examiners considered the North dependable. In late November North Korean ordnance units barraged Yeonpyeong Island, and a few regular folks and individuals from the military on the island kicked the bucket. Snyder and Byun (2002) said that *“There were more than 10 major armed provocations of North Korea including the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002, in which 1 South boat was sunk, 6 men were killed, and 19 were wounded.”*. Lee apologized for having neglected to counteract such an assault, and his defense minister resigned over the event.

In addition to that, like explained above, The Sunshine Policy is seen as major failure in the insecurity of South Korea’s national interest in the field of physical security including military security and defense, because when the Sunshine Policy was applied, exactly in 2006, after 8 years of North Korea’s dismissal in conducting nuclear engineering trials, North Korea conducted nuclear trials for Rodong missile, Scud Missile, and including ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missile) Taepodong-2 rocket capable of travelling up to a height of 15.000 kilometers.

This means, the President and his ministries felt huge domestic pressure, even caused the resignation of President Lee-Myung Bak’s Defense Ministry because of the warship event. Thus, President Lee-Myung Bak decided to terminate the implementation of Sunshine Policy.

Conclusion

National interest gradation of a country can be likened to from the point of just responding, expressing international norms, until state survival. Self-interest, which is a parameter of North Korea's national interest because it emphasizes itself ignoring other countries, actually cannot be faced to Sunshine Policy that is full of kindness, accommodative, and cooperative value. Indeed, national interest should protect physical security identity, economic-politic identity, and society cultural identity of a country. Hence, it is appropriate that President Lee Myung-Bak terminated Sunshine Police effectively in 2010 with some additional factors that gave pressure on foreign policy making to the president’s choice on sunshine policy.

The Sunshine Policy, after being analyzed using Morgenthau's national interest scheme and Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr's foreign policy decision making, cannot guarantee South Korea's national interest from the three sides of instruments mentioned in the theory, namely the physical security identity, the economic-politic regime identity, and society cultural identity with several factors that surrounds Lee Myung-Bak that time, like, the decision environment, psychological factor, international factor, and domestic influence, that add to the choice on the termination of Sunshine Policy. Events that represent North Korea's attitude and reaction during Sunshine Policy's implementation with domestic, external, and idiosyncratic factors that occurred at the time were concrete evidence that Sunshine Policy cannot guarantee and accommodate South Korea's national interests.

The decision of Lee Myung-Bak's could be analyzed that the significant factors of his decision were when he got values from the situation around and made him toward North Korea in particular, and North Korea actions and its implications that drove Lee Myung-Bak's decision toward North Korea. Furthermore, South Korea national interests aligned and adjusted when President Lee Myung-Bak took the office. Hence, President Lee Myung-Bak's personal decision was, first of all, strong views toward North Korea since the escalation of its nuclear trials and safety of Korean Peninsula and East Asia as a whole, strong and resilient economy toward 2008 Economic Crisis, and the separated families of two Koreas.

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